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The thesis critically re-examines classical historical conceptions of Central 
Europe. Its chief concern is to critique the discourses that, in the main, equated 
geographical imaginaries of Central Europe with a German dominated 
territorial entity in the crucial, formative 1880 - 1918 period. It is asked 
whether these could have played a vital role in the great powers’ endorsement 
of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The research hypothesis suggests that ‘conceptualisations of regional identity 
are exercises in geopolitics, which through the definitive discourse of Self and 
Other exercise influence over behaviour of political actors, thereby indirectly 
impacting upon international structure’. 
The research explores a broad range of Central European conceptions 
originating mainly in the former Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. 
Their respective influence on the discourse over Central Europe and their 
impact on how the notion itself was interpreted are analyzed partly through the 
use of contemporaneous and sometimes obscure secondary resources 
(newspaper and journal articles, printed volumes) that were written in a range 
of languages. A substantial body of archival evidence was also collected in 
various archives in the UK, USA, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The latter category of materials, some of which are little-known in the English-
speaking academic world, was used in an attempt to evaluate how concepts of 
Central Europe influenced the behaviour of political actors in the key countries 
for this research (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Britain and the USA). 
The author employed a constructivist viewpoint. The constructivist perception 
of actors as dynamic units, the identification of a system as a changing social 
concept, and the attention paid to the use of notions and their influence upon 
socially constructed international structures, presents a valuable platform for 
re-examination of classical geopolitical concepts. Constructivism has already 
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found its application in critical geopolitics. In terms of construction of non-
nation state identities, the recent works of Veit Bachmann and James Sidaway 
(2009), Mindaugas Jurkynas (2007) or Michelle Pace (2007) provide 
interesting examples and applications. 
It is concluded that conceptualising Central Europe did possess a definite 
geopolitical purpose, though this varied over time and concept to concept. In 
many cases this also informed the attitudes of policy-makers to a significant 
degree, mainly in constructing a negative definition of the Other. However, the 
final decision to dismember the Dual (Austro-Hungarian) Monarchy was based 
on more pragmatic military considerations and the perceived near-collapse of 
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The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to examine the notion of 
Central Europe; its formation, meaning and implications. The main emphasis is 
laid upon study of the formative period of the notion, 1880 – 1920, as it is 
perceived to have laid the groundwork for all subsequent discourses over the 
notion in the twentieth century and beyond. 
The opening chapter of the thesis begins quite deliberately with the renaissance 
of a re-emergent Central Europe from the stark context of East-West European 
bipolarity in the late 1980s. It emerged as a powerful vision of shared destiny in 
the Cold War borderlands; a metaphor subsuming the universal ideals of 
humanism, freedom and democracy. Through emphasis on a common culture 
and history, Central Europe captivated the imagination on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain and seemingly threw aside decades of ideological enmity. The rise of 
Central Europe apparently substantiated the proclaimed victory of the liberal 
democratic order and re-established the basis for a long lost European unity. 
Yet such an idyllic and optimistic picture vanishes rather abruptly when 
qualified by the contextual legacy of the Central Europe vision and the origins of 
the notion itself. Central Europe was not new – it was a notion deeply 
embedded in some of the most tragic vicissitudes of modern European history. 
So, the puzzle of Central Europe starts to take shape in the contrast of its 
brilliant contemporary record with its murky past. 
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1.1 Research context: The emerging puzzle 
“Central Europe is back” announced Timothy Garton Ash in 1986. (Ash 1986) 
On its own merits, it seemed a rather unimposing quotation but placed in the 
then contemporary context of strict geopolitical bi-polarity, it stood out rather 
starkly. For only two decades earlier Saul Cohen had posited that „Europe 
outside of Russia is divided into two parts: West and East. Central Europe is no 
more. It is a mere geographical expression that lacks geopolitical substance.” 
(Cohen 1964: 218) So what prompted Garton Ash to make such a bold claim? 
And what was its significance? 
 
1.1.1 Brewing trouble 
In the 1980s, Timothy Garton Ash was one of the foremost Western observers 
of the Eastern bloc societies. His research as well as contacts with the Eastern 
bloc dissidents led him to the conclusion that imminent changes were brewing 
under the thick cover of authoritarian regimes. He took a primary role in the 
debate printed on the pages of The New York Review of Books, which indicated 
that the abstract notion of ‘Central Europe’ was shaping among the dissidents 
as an antithesis of the existing ‘East European’ regimes. Central Europe was 
emerging as a synonym of humanistic values, liberalism and freedom – ‘Anti-
politics’ in the context of bureaucratic socialism, if you wish. 
Thus Ash joined the group of academics, who argued that the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc was not as sudden as other contemporary observers portrayed. In 
fact, it was long in the making. Valerie Bunce offered an elaborate explanation 
of the evolving social, political and economic environment within the Soviet 
bloc following the death of Joseph V. Stalin. (Bunce 1999: p. 38) Building on 
comparative analysis of institutional design and socio-political dynamics of 
post-Stalinist regimes, Bunce posited that their collapse in late 1980s was a 
combined function of their power projection mechanisms and expansion of 
opportunities for change during the 1980s. She demonstrated that in the de-
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Stalinization period, Communist regimes in Europe would opt for a social 
contract with their respective populations guaranteeing  
“A low-level equilibrium wherein weak dictatorships forced to buy 
public support (in part because of their fear of public unrest) ruled 
over a citizenry that could not change politics but that could, at the 
margins at least, dictate economic and social policy.” (Bunce 1999: 
p. 34)1 
In these systems, the political acquiescence of the population was being bought 
by relative price stability, minimalist work norms and a comprehensive social 
security safety net.  
However, the continuance of such an arrangement depended on the generation 
of economic surplus, which was becoming increasingly hard to sustain within 
the centrally planned economies in Europe. By the the 1980s, it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that pervasive economic inefficiency was gradually 
undermining the fragile social contract. Bunce noted that Communist regimes 
were faced with two options, both of them unpleasant (Bunce 1999: 37). The 
first option was to introduce substantial economic reforms, thereby risking 
public discontent over inevitable economic grievances (unemployment, 
inflation, increased work norms, etc.), uncapping intra-party factionalism and 
giving breathing space to those calling for political liberalisation. The second 
option was to put the reforms off and yet again appease the public with the 
extension of some sort of economic benefits; however, money to secure 
continuation of the illusion of prosperity had to be borrowed from abroad – 
usually, from the West. The middle way, which these regimes typically took, 
would only realise the shortfalls of both of them – a covert destabilization of the 
political system by partial reforms and of economic system by increased 
borrowing.  
                                                 
1
 The only case that did not fit this model was Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, but as we now know, 
Romania also proved an exception to the general pattern of peaceful transition towards democracy.  
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Gradually, the myth of the superiority of the socialist system was fading away 
with declining economic efficiency, to the point that it was obviously 
challenging regime legitimacy. The delegitimisation of regimes by the mid-
1980s was pervasive and attentive observers noted that the social contract 
negotiated in de-Stalinization period was not only outmoded but on the verge 
of collapse. (Hauslohner 1987)  
On the background of these changes, term ‘Central Europe’ was tiptoeing back 
into dictionaries of daily parlance on both sides of the strict East-West divide of 
Cold War Europe. 
 
1.1.2 Central Europe is back 
The phrase “Central Europe is back”, is thereby given a whole new dimension if 
placed within the context of changes long brewing under the cover of seemingly 
stable state-bureaucratic socialism. (Hodges 1981: 114, Blatt 1997: 81, 
Whitehead 2001: 357) The comeback of the “myth of Central Europe” (Trybuna 
Ludu 1986) signaled not only the coming earthquake in the political geography 
of Europe, but also the fact that conceptualisation of the approaching 
geopolitical future was well under way – and that at least some observers 
already had a relatively clear idea of what it would bring for the Iron Curtain 
borderlands.  
Those who sensed the imminent change started to hypothesize what might 
follow. Obviously, Timothy Garton Ash was not the first to invoke the notion of 
Central Europe in the late Cold War period. The discussion started with ‘The 
Tragedy of Central Europe’, the now famous essay of Milan Kundera, a Czech 
émigré novelist, published in the New York Review of Books in April 1984.  
His emotionally charged piece depicted “an uncertain zone of small nations 
between Russia and Germany” as a “kidnapped West” – a region, that lay 
“culturally in the West, politically in the East” (Kundera 1984: 35). In vivid 
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prose, Kundera presented the Western reader with a doomed picture of 
tragically fated, culturally Western nations that had suffocated under the heavy 
handed rule of an alien power, desperately seeking a political comeback within 
their native cultural orbit. He sought to depict an independent (and essentially 
Western) cultural and civilisational identity for these to counter the usual 
context for study of the region amid “footnotes of Sovietology”. (Ash 1986) And 
to a great degree, he succeeded. For understandably, Western audiences were 
only too willing to embrace the states emerging from Soviet domination. 
On the other side of the Cold War divide, Václav Havel, a Czech dissident 
playwright, started to embellish his political essays with references to Central 
Europe. Similarly to Kundera, he used “Central Europe” as a means of cultural 
approximation to the values of the West. Havel characterized it as a „spiritual, 
cultural and intellectual phenomenon… mysterious, a bit nostalgic, often tragic 
and even at times heroic." (Havel 1985) For Havel, Central Europe was a term 
tied to spiritual rather than physical territory. It did not have boundaries 
defined by features of physical geography, but rather by a claimed common 
cultural and artistic heritage. 
Gyorgy Konrád, a Hungarian novelist and sociologist, went even further and 
devised an ‘alternative history’ of Central Europe, which had “a thousand years 
ago… taken out a Western option” but was prevented from exercising it first by 
the Ottoman, then by the Austro-Hungarian and later by the Soviet empires 
(Konrád 1984b). Ignoring many obvious facts of history and geography, Konrád 
cast Central Europe as a discrete entity that had been prevented from fulfilling 
its predetermined fate as part of the West by the machinations and invasions of 
foreign empires. Now a historically repressed Central Europe was once again 
calling for help to be relocated in its historically correct geopolitical orbit. 
Many other prominent dissident writers were drawn into developing this tragic 
myth of a deprived Central Europe – a fascinating ahistorical narrative of 
mystical, heroic nations struggling to break the shackles of alien dictatorship 
and return into the extended embrace of their freedom and democracy loving 
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Western family. This depiction of the history of Central Europe, its 
characteristics and values, was more an expression of desire than fact, but it 
captivated the imagination of as many in the West as in the East. Central Europe 
was back. It was an intellectual project that those who wished the Iron Curtain 
to disappear subscribed to.2  
 
1.1.3 Did it work its magic? 
Yes, some authors would claim and in more than one way.  
The problems of countries emerging from Soviet domination were manifold and 
fundamental. The complexity of their envisaged transition was incomparable 
with previous transitions of authoritarian regimes from Latin America and 
Southern Europe, which provided the empirical basis for the theoretical tenets 
of the nascent sub-discipline of transitology. The only thing that was clear was 
the proclaimed direction of transition – towards the West, was in every sense 
meant to be taken figuratively. (Whitehead 2001: 366 – 367) 
The transition meant nothing less than the complete rejection and disowning of 
the very building blocs of society – its system of economic exchange, social 
hierarchies, political system, the security and economic cooperation structures 
and in some cases, the states themselves. With a threat of potential relapse back 
into the Russian sphere of influence, transitive countries raced to establish their 
Western credentials. The concept of Central Europe, as a kidnapped West 
‘returning to Europe’, presented an ideal means to vocalise their ambitions to 
be taken swiftly under the aegis of Western economic and security structures. 
The idealist character of dissident conceptions of Central Europe presented to 
the Western audiences towards the end of the Cold War greatly aided the use of 
                                                 
2
 Indeed, there also existed other ideas of what Central Europe meant – one of them was the Great 
Hungary vision of the Patriotic Popular Front presented in mid-1980s. (Scott 2006: p. 72) The 
discourse shaping the meaning of Central Europe was a complex mixture of streams and ideas 
competing with each other for attention of their target audiences and relevant international actors. For 
detailed discussion of these concepts, their proponents and relative strength within the discourse see 
literature review section 3.4.  
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this notion in the early 1990s. It conveyed the idea that the long suppressed 
true identity of these countries was finally being translated into their political 
institutions, society, foreign policy, etc. A recent work of Merje Kuus observes 
that the Central European narrative was “extraordinarily consistent” (Kuus 
2007b: 17) across the region and built on the repetition and reinforcement of 
themes of Western identity, a chronic existential threat and the resultant need 
for integration with the West.  
Taking on a shade of tautology, the notion of Central Europe became 
increasingly identified with the group of countries that was on a shortlist for EU 
and NATO accession, a vocabulary that promised the candidate countries a 
good chance for speedy admission. In itself, this fuelled the efforts of the 
transitive countries to be perceived as Central European to the degree that 
Timothy Garton Ash glossed: “Tell me your Central Europe, and I will tell you 
who you are.” (Garton Ash 1999: 384) Indeed, Central Europe became a self-
fulfilling prophecy and the countries typically associated with the notion would 
become full members of the EU and/or NATO within less then 15 years of the 
break-up of the Eastern Bloc. 
But Central Europe was not only a narrative of foreign policy. In fact, it was a 
genuine point of self-identification for many transitive countries and their 
respective populations. Transitions were neither easy nor painless, and the 
belief in their own Western credentials and promise of destiny helped to justify 
and bear the pain of often difficult adjustments in transitive countries. If the 
characteristics they wished to forget – authoritarianism, a centrally planned 
economy, foreign rule and occupation – were identified with the ‘East’, the 
institutions they strove to build – democracy, market economy, freedom, full 
sovereign independence – were identified with the ‘West’. And, of course, the 
“semantic division of labour” (Garton Ash 1986) between the negatively 
contextualised ‘Eastern Europe’ of old and the new positively associated 
‘Central Europe’ was visible in the works of dissident writers well before the 
transitions started. Central Europe was thus a ready made point of identity for 
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those who wanted to distance themselves from the negativity of the ‘East’ and 
approximate themselves to the ideals of the ‘West’. In sum, for many transitive 
countries and their populations, being Central Europe was the second best 
thing after being part of the ‘West’. It was a kind of “waiting room” for becoming 
the West. (Kuus 2007b: 16) 
Finally, many authors, statesmen and organizations once again began to 
characterise Germany and Austria as Central European countries, too. Many in 
Austria were looking for way to escape Austria’s peripheral status by casting it 
as a natural leader of the emerging region. The West German government 
employed the concept in a new phase of rapprochement with East Germany, 
conveying a common regional identity for the two German states.  
And this is where the story gets interesting… because the original version of the 
notion of Central Europe was actually the German expression das Mitteleuropa 
– and it was very far from being a universally acclaimed concept associated 
with freedom and democracy. Quite the contrary… 
 
1.1.4 Ein Rückblick auf Mitteleuropa3 
The notion of Mitteleuropa had first appeared loosely in German writings 
during the second half of the 19th century, however, its elaborated definitions 
only started to emerge in 1880s. (Evans 2006: 236) Yet, detailed study of these 
early conceptions unveils a high degree of disunity among authors as regards to 
the positioning, boundaries and characterisation of Central Europe.  
For example, the works of Hermann Wagner and Albrecht Penck, both of which 
were published in the mid-1880s, presented Central Europe in its narrowest 
spatial expression as extending from the North and Baltic Seas to the 
Carpathians and the Alps. A wider definition was offered by Berthold Voltz in 
1895. His Mitteleuropa comprised France, the Low Countries, Germany, and the 
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Upper Danubian Basin. Ernst Friedrich and E. E. Oehlmann alternatively 
described Central Europe as composed of Germany, Habsburg Monarchy, 
Switzerland, the Low Countries, Luxemburg and Lichtenstein. (Meyer 1946: 
180 – 183)  
Moreover, significant modifications in the conception of Central Europe were 
often evident in various works of a single author. Hermann Wagner changed his 
definition in 1900, even including Great Britain and Italy within his widened 
Central Europe. (Wagner 1900: 763) Similarly, while Friedrich Ratzel included 
France within Central Europe in 1898, his Deutschland: Einfuehrung in the 
Heimatkunde (1907) presented a Central Europe consisting of Germany, the 
Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, German-speaking Switzerland, the 
Low Countries and Denmark. (Ratzel 1907) 
However, what these concepts had increasingly in common was the belief in a 
leading role for the German nation in Europe and an underlying drive for 
conceptualisation of the area it should ‘naturally’ dominate. This effort found its 
expression in the seminal work of Joseph Partsch, a renowned German 
geographer. His Central Europe was published in London in 1903 as part of The 
Regions of the World Series edited by Sir Halford Mackinder and became one of 
the early classics of traditional geopolitics. He positioned Central Europe 
between the Alpine ridges and the northern seas, and described it as an area 
defined by a tri-layered belt of the Alps, lesser mountain chains; and northern 
lowlands, stretching from Dunkerque to Sandomirz. (Partsch 1903: 2 – 3) 
Partsch insisted, that in this area Germans did not only comprise 51 % of the 
total population, but were also the standard bearers of culture, knowledge and 
progress for other nations within the region. In order to “reach greatness” 
(Partsch 1903: 141) Central European nations had to unify on the common 
basis provided by German language and culture. Partsch reckoned that Central 
Europe „consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, belongs to the 
sphere of German civilisation“. (Partsch 1903: 142) Only unification under 
German leadership held the potential to safeguard it from Russian 
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expansionism and British hegemonic ambitions, thereby delivering the promise 
of peace and prosperity. (Partsch 1903: 159)  
Partsch’s work introduced some of the main themes that would be carried 
forward in subsequent conceptualisations of Central Europe in the German 
tradition – the uniqueness of the German nation and its culture; the need for 
unification of all areas inhabited by the German speaking population; the 
righteous historical mission to rise to greatness; ‘natural’ German domination 
of the said area. The notion of Mitteleuropa gradually became a synonym for the 
hegemonic pursuits taken to the extreme by Nazi Germany. It was far from 
being the notion associated with democracy and an overt western foreign 
policy orientation developed from 1980s onwards. Rather, it was an expression 
that became part and parcel of German attempts to dominate smaller nations 
inhabiting the same area.  
Yet perhaps the most perplexing piece of the whole puzzle was the conception 
of Central Europe emanating from the Paris Peace Conference, which directly 
contested Partch’s vision. Sir Halford Mackinder’s ‘Middle Tier’ (Mackinder 
1919) materialised in the form of the successor states to Austria-Hungary… 
Was this an inverted power notion of Central Europe displaying the preference 
of the world powers for dismemberment of the ailing Austro-Hungarian 
Empire? Was it the fear of a strong Central Europe under German domination 
(not to mention a potential alliance with Russia) that led, more than anything 
else, to creation of the successor states? Or was it really the result of another 
reactionary model of Central Europe – the one preferred by Thomas G. 
Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, advocating the right of self-
determination for small nations – that would storm the age old structures of 
Europe? After all, this synchronised fully with the Wilsonian idealism of the day. 
One way or the other, the Mitteleuropa concept created a strong adverse 
response among the non-German nations, focused attention upon the German 
ambitions for domination of the area and, in the end, probably contributed to 
there being little effective resistance to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
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This thesis therefore poses a question – how did this understanding of classical 
notions of Central Europe arise and what does it have in common with the 
version being promoted from the end of the 20th century? Perhaps nothing at 
all… So how does the same notion come to mean two fundamentally different 
things in a span of less than 100 years? How has the meaning of Central Europe 
been formulated? What were the main factors influencing this process in these 
two divergent periods? What happened with this notion in between? And above 
all – what were the implications of this changed meaning? 
 
1.1.5 Pivot of geopolitics? 
The problem of Central Europe is virtually inscribed into the ‘birth certificate’ 
of classical geopolitics in the shape of Sir Halford John Mackinder’s enigmatic 
treatises, The Geographical Pivot of History (1904) and Democratic Ideals and 
Reality (1919). Mackinder’s work combined the geostrategic thinking of 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan with applied geographic determinism, aiming to 
identify potential threats to the interests of the British Empire. The result was 
Mackinder’s controversial Heartland theory. 
Even though in 1904 Mackinder identified Russia (the Heartland) as the main 
threat to the interests of the British Empire (along the fringes of the World 
Island), his 1919 obsession was obviously with Germany (the ‘Strategic Annex 
of the Heartland’). Partsch’s depiction of Central Europe (edited by Mackiner 
some years earlier), the role of Germany within it and the vision of its future, 
presented a material basis for Mackinder’s insistence that Germany had great 
power ambitions and was actively seeking to undermine the position of the 
British Empire with German dominated regional integration. Reflecting 
experiences of the war, Mackinder’s (1919) nightmare scenario was an alliance 
between an expanded Germany and Russia. In an effort to prevent such an 
occurrence, Mackinder suggested the creation of a strip of small nation states 
separating Russia and Germany, whose independence would be safeguarded by 
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international guarantees and the region’s accessibility by navigable rivers. The 
Middle Tier, as he named it, was a direct challenge to the projected visions of a 
Central Europe under German control. The alarming potential of a Partsch-style 
Central Europe and the envisaged effort to counter it, thus lay at the heart of 
one of the earliest theories of classical geopolitics. 
Interestingly enough, the second constitutive part of classical geopolitics was 
the organic growth theory of Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel drew upon an earlier 
political geography of Carl Ritter infused with the evolutionary theory of Social 
Darwinism. (Jones, Jones and Woods 2004: 5) By projecting this peculiar 
viewpoint onto the political organization of human beings, Ratzel arrived at his 
conceptualisation of a state that corresponded to a living organism. (Ratzel 
1897: 1 – 2) He asserted that “the state of man is a form of distribution of life on 
the earth's surface... which carries all signs of moving bodies” or animated 
organisms.4 Ratzel’s emphasis on the territoriality of the state5 with analogies 
derived from the natural sciences6 led him to assert that as states got stronger 
and more populated they naturally needed additional living space – 
Lebensraum.7 Conversely, as they got weaker, they shrunk. The notion of 
Lebensraum provided the advocates of German expansionism with their 
conceptual cornerstone in the following decades, particularly the body of 
German geopolitical theorists headed by Karl Haushofer. Ratzel himself 
presented more than one conceptualisation of German-dominated Mitteleuropa 
(1898, 1907). He was one of the leaders of Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German 
League, succeeded by Partsch after his death in 1904) and a vigorous advocate 
of German expansion into Africa. (Buttmann 1977: 126)  
                                                 
4
 “… der Staat der Menschen [ist] eine From der Verbreitung des Lebens and der Erdoberfläche... 
der... trägt alle Merkmale eines beweglichen Körpers...” (Ratzel 1897: 3) 
5
 “Der Staat muss vom Boden leben” – the state has to live from the soil. (Ratzel 1897: 4) 
6
 “Es gibt Algen und Schwämme, die als organisierte Wesen ebenso hoch stehen wie der Staat der 
Menschen.” – there exist algae and sponges, which as organized existence stand as high as the state of 
the men. (Ratzel 1897: 9) 
7
 „Das Volk wächst, indem es seine Zahl vermehrt, das Land, indem es seinen Boden vergrössert, und 
da das wachsende Volk für seine Zunahme neuen Boden nötig hat, so wächst das Volk über das Land 
hin.” – the preople grows by increasing its numbers, the land grows by extending its terriotiry, and as 
the growing people  needs new territory for its surplus, it takes over the land. (Ratzel 1898: 115) 
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Thus obsession with Central Europe, Germany and its ambitions for the future, 
was a trait of both traditions - the geostrategy and the organic state theory. It 
also remained a central focus for several decades to come, at least until the Cold 
War shifted the main theatres for conflict to areas outside Europe. Debates over 
conceptualising Mitteleuropa would be a recurring feature of German 
geopolitics and their contestation a preoccupation of Anglo-Saxon political 
geographers. 
But what was the international stage on which Central Europe made its debut?  
 
1.1.6 The rise and fall of empires 
In the second half of the 19th century there would be a tectonic shift in 
European politics, setting the stage for the major earthquakes and landslides of 
the First World War. (see Appendix 31 and 32 for maps) 
With its creation of German Confederation, the 1815 Congress of Vienna had 
facilitated the gradual unification of the German states that would be fuelled by 
an awakened German nationalism. The experiences of the Napoleonic wars and 
a flourishing cultural romanticism aided the process of creating a German 
national consciousness. Prussia’s increasing military power and spectacular 
economic advancement throughout the 19th century fostered its dominant 
position within the German Confederation and the Zollverein (Customs Union) 
that had been formed in 1834. The intertwined effect of both processes paved 
the way for the gradual ousting of Austria and the political unification of the 
fragmented German states, finally sealed by their defeat of France in the war of 
1870-71. Under Otto von Bismarck’s era of Blut und Eisen8, the German Empire 
embarked upon an accelerated period of economic growth and military 
expansion, cementing its central standing in European power politics. 
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Conversely, the position of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was becoming ever 
more precarious. Following the revolts of 1848-49 and the establishment of a 
dualistic structure within the empire in 18679, tensions among the multitude of 
nationalities presided over by the monarchy were intensifying. Moreover, 
prolonged involvement in the Napoleonic wars, Austria’s ostracisation from 
Zollverein and an outdated social structure impeding the progress of 
industrialisation, all contributed to economic decline of the empire. By the turn 
of the century, Austria-Hungary was in the midst of internal turmoil and, 
effectively, just a junior power tied to the rising German Empire. Internal 
national tensions threatened to destabilize the empire and pointed towards 
violent implosion. The Vienna government was well aware of this danger and 
group of aides to the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand d’Este – the so called 
Belvedere Circle – was preparing internal reform of Austria-Hungary to guard 
against such a contingency. (Afflerbach and Stevenson 2007: p. 65) 
Meanwhile, the Russian Empire seemed unsettled, both internally and 
externally. Bogged down by an archaic social order and the reactionary 
tendencies of a paranoid autocratic regime eschewing any possibilities for 
liberalism, social or political change; Russia was struggling to catch up with 
economic advances elsewhere in Europe and faced looming threats of social 
discontent. The emancipation of serfs, the emergence of the proletariat and the 
strengthening ranks of intelligentsia all gave rise to increasing vociferousness 
of calls for political and social change. Revolutionary movements were on the 
rise throughout the second half of the 19th century and culminated in the 
Revolution of 1905, foreshadowing the tempestuous events that would follow a 
dozen years later. Russia’s erratic and restless behaviour had been underscored 
by its determined efforts to dominate the lands of the failing Ottoman Empire in 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and conflicts that resulted from such efforts 
                                                 
9
 Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 or ‘der Ausgleich’, was a formal act signed by Emperor 
Franz Joseph, which transformed unitary Habsburg Monarchy into dual structure, governed by two 
different parliaments (in Budapest and Vienna) and two different prime ministers. The country was 
only unified in the person of the monarch, the army and three ministries – finance, defense and 
foreign affairs.  
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in the 19th century10: the Russo-Turkish war of 1829, the Crimean War in 
1854-56 and another Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78. The European powers 
(especially Austria-Hungary and Britain) were uneasy about Russian ambitions, 
as demonstrated by their stances over both the Crimean War and the Congress 
of Berlin (1878). Even though the military decline of the Russian Empire was 
highlighted spectacularly by its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05 
(Page and Sonnenburg 2003: 513), a feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis an 
expansionary and internally unstable Russian Empire remained deep-seated 
among European powers, surviving into the second decade of the twentieth 
century.  
The ‘Eastern Question’ had preoccupied the minds of European statesmen from 
the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish war right up until the Paris Peace Conference. As 
far as it concerns our study area, it essentially revolved around the instability of 
Ottoman European possessions and regional destabilisation in the context of 
Ottoman decline. Balkan wars (1912 – 1913) served as a prelude of the 
European conflict to come and made great power leaders weary of small states 
rising in the place of failing empires. 
The Russian Empire was directly involved in several wars with the Ottomans 
gradually pushing the boundaries of its ailing adversary beyond Europe and 
attempting simultaneously to establish its own influence. Austria had originally 
joined forces with Russia, but became increasingly concerned over her 
advances within the Balkans and the Danube basin. (Kaplan 1995: 149) Other 
European powers were equally opposed to the growing prospect of an 
increased Russian presence in Europe at the expense of the Ottomans, as it 
threatened to upset the basis of the balance of power struck after the 
Napoleonic wars. The revision of the San Stefano Treaty at the 1878 Congress of 
Berlin became a test case for the European powers’ (and especially Britain’s) 
                                                 
10
 These wars were preceded by two major armed Russo-Turkish conflicts in the 18
th
 century: the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74, which marked the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
and established Russia as a Black Sea naval power; and a war of 1787-92, in which Austria joined 
Russia in its fight in return for sharing the gained territory, causing a major alarm among European 
powers. Both conflicts ended with a Russian victory. (Faure 2003: 153) 
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determination to limit encroaching Russian influence in South-eastern Europe. 
Even though the treaty catered for some Russian territorial gains, they were 
balanced by adjustments in the settlement that clearly favoured the Ottoman 
Empire, as well as provisions for the increased influence of Austria-Hungary in 
the Balkans.  
As tension was gradually building up among the Big Five in Europe, another 
imperial game was being played elsewhere… 
 
1.1.7 The Great Game 
In territorial terms at least, the British Empire experienced its heyday during 
the 19th century. Following the Napoleonic wars, Britain had emerged as a 
dominant world power. Though it would remain unchallenged on the high seas 
for decades to come, it was involved in a fierce strategic rivalry with the 
Russian Empire in Asia. Both empires were competing for the territories of the 
declining Ottoman, Persian and Chinese Empires in a feverish struggle that 
became known as The Great Game. The possibility of a real Russian challenge to 
British dominance of the Asian rimlands seemed imminent and the two powers 
seemed to be on a collision course by the mid-1880s, when skirmishes in the 
northern Afghan borderlands almost provoked a full-blown war (Olson and 
Shadle 1996: p. 478). However, the situation would now change with the 
addition of a third rival into this great power equation. 
Following the Congress of Berlin, Russia left the League of the Three Emperors, 
leaving Germany to grow ever closer to Austria-Hungary and, eventually, to the 
Ottoman Empire as well. German involvement in the construction of railways in 
Turkish territories caused considerable anxiety in both Russia and Britain, with 
the proposed Baghdad railway threatening to challenge both recently 
established Russian power interests in the area and British economic 
domination of colonial trade. A railway link to Baghdad would allow Germany 
to gain access to the considerable natural resources of the Ottoman Empire, 
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especially the emergent potential oil wealth of the Persian Gulf littoral. 
(Adelson 1995: 40) The prospect of increasing economic and political influence 
of Germany in Middle East was unwelcome for both London and St. Petersburg. 
However, Germany was on the rise and aiming to foster its position as not only 
as a European, but also global power, irreversibly upsetting the existing balance 
of power. 
 
1.1.8 The end of the Concert of Europe 
Great Game rivalry between Britain and Russia gradually ebbed off in the late 
19th century, as the situation in Europe grew increasingly threatening and 
complicated. The decline in the relative power of both the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires fuelled the volatility of south-eastern Europe, which was to 
become a major shatter belt of the early years of the 20th century. The 
protection of Russian power interests in the region (especially securing a 
shorter overland route to Mediterranean and access to the straits of Bosporus 
and Dardanelles) had been geared to gaining access to the Mediterranean at the 
expense of the Ottoman Empire. Britain was opposed to such possibility and 
thus supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as did Germany 
for its own reasons (especially access to Middle East). In the middle of Europe, 
Austria-Hungary was stretched by internal nationalist battles and was 
desperate to hold its empire together, dreading the potential domino effect of 
Ottoman failure. Whatever the interests of great powers might or might not 
have been, the common denominator in all calculations was the reality that at 
the turn of the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire was losing its grip on its 
long held European possessions (Duiker and Spielvogel 2008: 569) and that, 
consequently, the European Concert was nearing its end.  
The alliance building that would determine the fault-lines of future conflict had 
already started by the late 19th century. The Dual Alliance between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary (1879) was joined by Italy in 1882. Then France and 
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Russia formed their own alliance in the face of increasing German power in 
1892. Germany’s rise on the back of the declining Austro-Hungarian and 
Ottoman Empires, coupled with its significant naval build-up was certainly 
alarming the British Empire by the end of the century. So Britain would first 
approach the French Republic in 1904 (Entente Cordiale) and then invite the 
Russian Empire (1907) three years later into its Triple Entente.  
A complacent Concert of Europe had changed into a cacophony of insecure 
voices screeching about what the future of Europe would bring. Germany gave 
cause for concern to many by openly pursuing its Weltpolitik, which aimed for 
the acquisition of a naval capability that might challenge the supremacy of the 
British Empire, allowing the projection of greater influence over Austria-
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Growing German power, the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, tensions within Austria-Hungary and the expansionist 
tendencies of the Russian Empire provided the fault-lines of insecurity in the 
eyes of the British. The conceptions of Central Europe put forward by German 
and Austrian authors were strengthening alliance of these countries and, at 
least potentially, presented an even larger and stronger future enemy. Any 
materialisation of the possibilities for their alliance with Russia would have 
been a recipe for disaster from the British point of view.  
This was the discourse Mackinder somewhat belatedly bought into in 1919 as 
he depicted the area of the Middle Tier of countries as the crucial region, one 
which would ultimately determine, ‘who ruled the world’. The anxiety over the 
brewing instability in Europe found its focal point in Central Europe, a region 
that would become the geopolitical battlefield of the great powers for decades 
to come.  
 
1.2 Central Europe in contemporary research 
A significant volume of research on Central Europe has been published in 
recent years. Unfortunately, research into the formative years of this very 
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concept does not feature among its main topics very prominently. The history 
and formation of the notion as such has been somewhat marginalised. Allowing 
for the odd volume on gender issues (Lukic 2006), national identity (Judson 
2005) or social issues (Breuning 2005), the main themes dominating the bulk of 
research are post-Cold War transition and EU integration.  
Interestingly, the semantic division of labour referred to by Garton Ash (1986) 
also found its expression in contemporary writing, although in a less clear-cut 
fashion. While volumes on economic, political and social transition usually 
operate with the geographical orbit of what their authors define as East-Central 
Europe (Morlino 2009, Wolchik 2008, Orenstein 2008, etc.), conceptualisation 
of EU integration for the post-communist countries has shown a greater 
preference for the notion of Central Europe (Kirschbaum 2007, Kuus 2007b, 
Polacikova 2005). Interestingly, a comparison of more than 30 volumes on the 
politics of East-/Central Europe published since 2005 in the holdings of the 
British Library shows that it is almost exclusively authors originating in the 
new countries of the EU that gravitate towards the use of the term, Central 
Europe.  
Among these authors, a tendency to use the notion of East-Central Europe when 
considering issues of transition and Central Europe when conceptualising EU 
integration or regional cooperation is even more pronounced. Two volumes 
published in Poland in 2007 document this semantic dichotomy. For instance, 
Robert Alberski et al. edited a volume on the political systems of the post-
communist countries in Europe titled Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowej i 
Wschodniej (Political Systems of Central and Eastern Europe), while Jacek 
Wojnicki entitled his book on EU integration of Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland Slovakia and Slovenia -  ro   Europy Środkowej do  nii Europejskiej 
(The Route of Central Europe into European Union). This dichotomy can be 
viewed as an extension of the earlier tendency to associate the adjective 
„central“ with a positive context and the desired future (within the EU), and 
„eastern“ with previous negative experiences, in this case awkward questions 
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of transition. While authors writting under the banner of Central Europe 
usually limit their area of enquiry to new EU member countries11, volumes 
bearing East-Central Europe in titles tend to connote a wider geographical 
scope and include, for example, aspirant accession states such as Ukraine or 
Croatia. (Orenstein 2008) Thus the recent research tends to use the notion of 
Central Europe along the lines employed by Merje Kuus, who viewed it as a kind 
of a waiting room for those countries of the former Eastern Bloc that were on 
a sure path to becoming part of the West. (see section 1.1.3) Individual authors, 
of course, have their own personal preferences and some actually use both 
notions in the same volume, depending on the context. For example, Oskar 
Krejčí in his book entitled Geopolitics of the Central European Region operated 
within the confines of East-Central Europe when excluding Germany from the 
area of his considerations. (Krejčí 2005)  
The volume of academic writing on the political history of the area is more 
limited, usually taking the shape of an overview of the main events and issues 
occurring in the twentieth century. (Webb 2008) Writings on the geopolitical 
theorisation of Central Europe in the period preceding the First World War are 
even scarcer. Only one such volume published in the last 5 years can be found 
in the collections of the British Library – Andreas Peschel’s Friedrich Naumanns 
und Max Webers "Mitteleuropa" (‘Central Europe’ of Friedrich Naumann and 
Max Weber) published in 2005. This publication contemplated common and 
distinguishing features of both authors‘ conceptions, and discussed them in the 
context of more general trends in German thought during the First World War. 
The fact that even this volume was not in English (and there are no plans to 
translate it) underlines the scarcity of recent academic interest in the field.  
Inconsistency of writing on Central Europe as a geopolitical notion seems to be 
a persisting problem. It had been observed even at the height of its popularity – 
the 1940s. As Henry Meyer summarised at the end of the Second World War, 
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 New EU countries include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovenia from 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria from 2007.  
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a multitude of writing on German conceptions of Central Europe had appeared 
principally during the course of the conflict, though most were sketchy 
„autopsies of what has been written“ (Meyer 1946: 178). Since then, the volume 
of writing on such issues has been wearing ever thinner and they usually only 
feature in sections on the history of geopolitical thought within larger volumes 
(e.g. Dugin 2000, Krejci 2005) and solitary special issues of academic journals 
(e.g. European Journal of Social Theory 2008) The research presented in this 
thesis seeks to fill this gap in recent reseach by providing a comprehensive 
record of conceptualising of Central Europe in the critical formative period 
between 1880 and 1920. It tries to answer the fundamental questions 
surrounding the elusive notion of Central Europe: How did the notion come into 
being? How was it formulated and why? What were the implications for the 
international stucture and its actors? And, equally importantly – can we 
observe similar processes in considerations of its (very different) 
contemporary meaning? 
 
1.3 Research aim, hypothesis and original contribution 
The overall argument of this thesis is that conceptualisations of regional 
identity – in this case, Central Europe – are exercises in geopolitics, which 
through the definitive discourse of Self and Other exert influence upon the 
behaviour of political actors, thereby possibly impacting upon international 
structure. The research presented examines this hypothesis by analysis of 
concepts of Central Europe spanning a wide historical period (1840s – early 




1.3.1 Research aim 
As has just been suggested, the aim of the research is to investigate the 
formation of the notion and meaning of Central Europe in the period 1880 – 
1920 and its implications for changes in the structure of international relations.  
The author‘s enquiry stems from the previous masters degree research 
conducted on a similar topic.12 The previous research unveiled recurrent 
changes in the meaning of the notion of Central Europe throughout the 20th 
century, observing parallel changes in behaviour of some actors with regard to 
the notion and the area it described. These changes included the territorial 
extent as well as the very meaning of the notion, varying from concrete projects 
of regional federation to subtle abstract intellectual identity. The selected 
period has been identified (see section 2.3) as crucial for the very notion of 
Central Europe since it witnessed its emergence as an important concept in 
international relations discourse in general and geopolitics in particular.  
 
1.3.2 Origins of research hypothesis and its envisaged application 
Rather than following concrete objectives, the enquiry started with a set of 
‘puzzles’ and ‘hunches’ developed during the master level research, which are 
presented in detail in the first section of the methodology chapter. While being 
a fairly unorthodox approach, it is recommended to use in case of interpretative 
research considering textual material – a very fitting description of this 
research as well. (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006: xvi) On the basis of these 
puzzles and hunches, a working hypothesis of research is developed. 
The hypothesis of the research presented in the methodology (presented above 
and again in the section 2.1) is based upon projection of discourse analysis 
methods onto research of formulation and implication of constructed notions in 
international relations. It posits the potential correlation between the 
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 The thesis ‘Geopolitical Space of Central Europe and its Perspectives’ submitted in June 2006 at 
St. Antony’s College of the University of Oxford. 
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individual concepts of Central Europe, the constructed meaning of the notion 
and the behaviour of the relevant actors in international relations. In sum, it 
suggests that meaning of the notion of Central Europe is constructed through 
discourse. While various definitions put forward by individual authors are 
determined by their identities and interests, they gather strength by being 
consonant with identities and interests of relevant actors in the discourse. The 
constructed meaning is a result of this discourse, in return moulding the 
behaviour of relevant actors. Through actor behaviour, the constructed notion 
indirectly influences changes in international structure. 
 
For illustration of how the hypothesis might work in real context, let’s consider 
a simplified example of Central Europe as a federalist project creating a strong 
block of countries running north to south between Germany and Russia; and 
the Soviet behaviour in face of this possibility at the end of 1940s.  
The hypothesis presupposes that the contemporary meaning of the notion of 
Central Europe is a result of its surrounding discourse. The projects developed 
during the Second World War by émigré politicians in the United States and 
Great Britain gave the notion of Central Europe a new meaning – that of a 
strong federation of states able to resist outside pressures, especially any future 
potential German expansion. This was a marked departure from earlier pan-
Germanist connotations of the notion. 
Further, individual concepts follow certain objectives consonant with the 
identities and interests of their authors, a trait that is discernible to this date. 
For example, the interest of Czechoslovak authors (Hodža 1942, Beneš 1942, 
Feierabend 1942, etc.) was to safeguard the future independence of their 
country. Creation of a federative or confederative unit able to resist the German 
pressure seemed the best possible way to achieve this security. 
Then the hypothesis suggests that the discourse is shaped by individual 
concepts and their relative strength. As the inter-war period German authors 
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writing on Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) were abandoning this notion 
increasingly in favour of the term Reich, the new concepts mushrooming among 
the émigré groups in the USA and the Great Britain were ascribing Central 
Europe a new intrinsic quality – that of a federation of equal nations instead of 
an empire dominated by one of them. 
The relative strength of concepts is determined by the support they gather 
among relevant groups, which, in turn, may depend on their alignment with 
their identities and interests. As has been suggested, the projects of Central 
Europe were being developed by émigré politicians of occupied satellite states 
of the Reich, with the strong support of the British and the US governments. 
This support was determined by the fact that influential groups within both 
establishments believed that a strong political entity to the east of Germany 
would be able to prevent its future expansionist tendencies. Having sensed the 
support of Western Allies, theoretical plans were followed by practical 
preparations for federations, including treaties on future confederation (Poland 
with Czechoslovakia and Greece with Yugoslavia) and the foundation of 
working groups preparing plans for harmonisation of education, agricultural 
production, trade, etc.  
The hypothesis then suggests that the result of the discourse is the constructed 
identity or meaning of Central Europe – in our case as a federal unit consisting 
of countries between Germany and Russia, stretching at least from Poland 
down to Greece (with big question mark over Baltic states – Gross 1945).  
So far, the hypothesis and the story in our example focused on how the meaning 
of Central Europe developed and shifted. However, the final point of hypothesis 
posits that actor behaviour is shaped by the contemporary meaning of Central 
Europe, what has an indirect impact on international structures. As observed in 
the Chapter 6 (section 6.1.5), in the interwar period the notion of Central 
Europe was resented by academics and politicians of the successor states as it 
was associated with the threat of German domination. For that matter, the 
successor states were equally suspicious of any regional integration that would 
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challenge their national sovereignty until the Second World War, when Central 
Europe became associated with practical plans for a strong regional union able 
to ward off the threat of German expansionism (see sections 6.1.6 and 6.2.1). 
Yet, despite the concrete steps taken towards creating a regional federation 
were taken, the plan did not come to fruition owing to a fierce opposition of the 
Soviet Union. 
 
1.3.3 Research objectives 
Based on the foreshadowed application of the hypothesis, this research will 
involve in-depth analysis of concepts, the informative influences behind them 
and their envisaged objectives. In reviewing the formulation of concepts of 
Central Europe thus the research will attempt to identify the main influences 
moulding the authors’ identity, interests and views. Emphasis will be laid upon 
highlighting the envisaged identity of Central Europe in each significant concept 
and the model in which the author anticipated it would further the interests he 
or she advocated. Finally, the research will trace the influence these 
conceptions exercised and the support they have gathered among relevant 
actors in international relations and within the discourse over Central Europe. 
A distinctive and valuable feature of the research is its reliance upon original 
texts in German, Russian, Czech and other languages, to provide the best 
possible basis for the following analysis. As has been observed by Rankin and 
Schofield (2004) incorrect translation and misinterpretation of original sources 
is often carried forward by sources quoting translated materials, rather than 
the original sources themselves, contributing to further distortion of their 
understanding and interpretation. This research will therefore examine original 
sources allowing analysis free of the mediated interpretation of later 
translators and commentators. A similar effort will be followed in the conduct 
of archival research, where the author will aim at collecting original 
documentation relating to the potential influence of analysed concepts. 
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While the main focus of the research will be the earliest formative period of the 
notion (1880 – 1920), only discussion of core research findings in the light of 
processes of reformulation of the notion in following periods can provide for 
well rounded conclusions. The Chapter 6 provides an overview of the 
development of discourses over Central Europe since the end of the First World 
War, eliciting a basis for discussion of the findings of the core research. The 
chapter is expected to reveal a correlation between the evolving identities and 
interests of participants in the discourse and the resulting meaning of Central 
Europe as a notion. As authors entering the discourse follow the interests 
informed by their own identities, their contribution to the discourse moulds the 
resulting regional identity. The most obvious example might well be the 
marked shift in the constructed meaning of Central Europe caused by entry of 
dissident Eastern Bloc writers into the discourse. (see section 6.4.4) The 
research hypothesis suggests that the relative power of competing concepts is 
determined by the support they are able to harness among the relevant actors. 
Again, while federalist concepts of Central Europe failed to gather substantial 
support during the Cold War (see section 6.3.4), the abstract vision of Central 
Europe put forward by the end of the same period found a significant following 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain and gave the notion of Central Europe a whole 
new meaning. It is anticipated that the thesis will observe a correlation 
between the changing identities and interests of relevant actors, their relative 
power and the resulting character of the constructed regional identity. While 
the federalist concepts of Central Europe were being put forward by isolated 
émigré groups in 1970s, the abstract and culturally defined Central Europe was 
promoted by dissident leaders, who in the mid- to late-1980s commanded 
considerable attention among Western public. In turn, the newly constructed 
regional identity informs the attitudes and behaviour of actors, thus indirectly 
impacting on the international relations and system. The Central European 
narrative of the late 1980s was consciously used by many dissident writers to 
induce the sympathies of the Western public and further their cause in 
dismantling the regimes of the Eastern Bloc.  
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In short, the discussion of the core research findings with the data presented in 
Chapter 6 is expected to confirm that regional identities can and do evolve, 
depending on the changing identities and interests of relevant actors; and these 
changes induce modifications in the behaviour of relevant actors, shaping the 
changes in international relations and the system. 
 
1.3.4 Original contribution of the research 
The research presented here comprises a historical enquiry into geographic 
ideational constructs and their impact. The thesis thus operates disciplinarily    
within (and thereby connects central concerns in) critical geopolitics and 
historical geography. The original contribution of the work presented vests 
precisely with this interdisciplinary cross, as its conclusions challenge the 
perception that regional identities are constant, which underlines the modern 
geopolitical literature on Central Europe. Geopolitics too often focuses solely on 
contemporary concerns. Moreover, where historical variations of the notion are 
examined, past conceptualisations are interpreted through the lens of the 
present. 
Moreover, there is a marked dearth in the recent literature of sources that 
compare and analyze concepts of Central Europe. Therefore his thesis will 
patiently trace the origins of concepts in their native Anglo-Saxon, German and 
Central European contextual environments, thus offering a fuller picture of 
their intent and reasoning. Varied archival sources will subsequently be used to 
demonstrate the influence and effect of these theories. Such a deep and 
comprehensive analysis will hopefully lead to strong, clear conclusions.  
The novel and distinctive feature of this research is also its elected approach. 
There were numerous analyses of the concepts of Central Europe written in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, particularly in the United States. They 
predominantly dealt with German theories justifying territorial aggrandisement 
and generally employed a positivist view point and simple comparison of 
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individual concepts. They have been criticized as “bare autopsies“(Meyer 1946) 
of German theories rather than constituting legitimate research on its own 
terms. This research intends to overcome this autopsy approach and analyze 
the historical concepts of Central Europe within their real-life and time 
contexts.   
The research employs methods of discourse analysis. While common in other 
works of critical geopolitics, this approach is novel in examining geopolitical 
theories of Central Europe originating in period 1880 – 1920. The intention 
here is to deconstruct the notions used by individual authors to uncover the 
underlying intentions pursued in their conceptualisation of Central European 
space. Such analysis is vital for assessment of links of these concepts to 
behaviour of political actors and, potentially, changes in the international 
structure. 
This research also demonstrates how conventional wisdom on Central Europe 
is often derived from works of contemporary authors, who draw on secondary 
interpretations of original material, or read the original works superficially. In 
contrast, the equiry presented here, spans three centuries (1840s – early 
2000s) and returns to original sources to challenge the so often repeated 
misconceptions of Central Europe. 
The conclusions of the research imply that constructed notions and identities 
can have a significant impact on the international relations discourse and the 
conduct of foreign policy, through the changes in actor behaviour they induce. 
The substance and perceptions of constructed identities change according to 
the shifting tensions between the identities, interests and relative power of 
various actors. Consequently, ever shifting regional identities are at the same 
time an expression of the changing structure of international relations as well 
as provide an impulse for changes in the actors’ behaviour. Yet, they struggle to 
make an impact on international structure, due to its irreducible complexity. 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis will consist of the following chapters: 
1. Puzzle of Central Europe: An Introduction 
2. Approaching Central Europe: A Methodology 
3. German concepts, 1880 – 1920  
4. Austro-Hungarian concepts, 1880 - 1920 
5. Anglo-Saxon concepts, 1880 - 1920 
6. Variations in time and space 
7. Findings and Conclusions 
Bibliography will be presented in usual mode at the end of the thesis, followed 
by several appendices. These are used to illustrate and support the findings of 
the thesis, to provide higher degree of clarity for references (specifically in the 
case of archival materials quoted), as well as complement the text (generally 
maps referred to in the thesis). They include maps, charts, copies of historical 
maps, relevant treaties and other archival documents.  
 
This Introduction has provided the context for the research, outlining trends 
and themes in recent research into Central Europe. It also states research aims 
and objectives, and outlines a structure for the thesis. 
Chapter two, ‘Approaching Central Europe’, outlines methodological 
considerations, introducing the research hypothesis and unveiling its 
constructivist bent. It argues that constructivism offers a novel approach for 
analysis of conceptions of Central Europe and that it is likely to reveal sufficient 
patterns surrounding the notion of Central Europe to allow for the 
generalisation of the observed patterns. Even though constructivism is 
advocated as the most useful platform for study of the notion of Central Europe, 
the chapter also contemplates various other potential approaches to theorizing 
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Central Europe, such as the traditional and derivative idealist and realist 
approaches, functionalism, Marxist approaches, etc. The methodological 
reasoning is followed by a simplified application of constructivist thought 
developed to scrutinise Mackinder’s characterisation of a Middle Tier of Central 
European states. In regards to the applied methodology, the chapter discusses 
sampling, the types and location of data sources, data collection, methods of 
analysis and possible limitations in the adapted research design. 
The following three chapters will comprise the core components of the 
research. 
Conceptions of Central Europe originating in Germany during the period under 
review are numerous and are scrutinised in chapter three. The chapter 
documents the rise of the notion as a concept of regional identity with a specific 
aim for changing international structure shared by its many variations. They 
will be presented in chronological order, showing the line of development from 
vaguely defined initially westward-oriented concepts towards detailed plans 
for a customs and economic union stretching to the south-east of Germany. 
Increased analytical attention will be paid here to the ascribed role of the 
German nation in these concepts. Evidence from the political archive of the 
Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) and Bundesarchiv (German Federal 
Archive) in Berlin will be examined in an effort to identify the influences of such 
constructs. The chapter will debunk some of the myths of the origin of the 
notion tracing its coherent use to pan-German writers in late 19th century and 
early 20th century economists, who turned the notion into plan for customs 
union in continental Europe. It will be suggested that the First World War 
meaning of the notion of Mitteleuropa is largely a return to the pan-German 
ideas and reworking of the earlier notion of Deutschtum that flourished post 
German unification, which did not encompass all areas understood as a realm of 
the German nation – to say the least, it excluded Austria. 
Concepts originating in the area of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
examined in chapter four, can be subdivided into two streams – those in line 
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with German writing of the day and the reactionism this engendered. The clear 
dividing line drawn in this chapter advances the argument that definitions of 
central Europe work as definitions of the Self and the Other. The detailed 
examination of reaction of Viennese policy makers to the pan-German notion of 
Central Europe provides evidence to support the hypothesis that concept had 
both positive and negative influence in the policy circles. The chapter also 
details the historical episode, in which Central Europe came the closest to its 
realisation (the spring 1918 Spa Accords). In contrast, two main lines can be 
identified at the outset as far as reactionary concepts are concerned – the calls 
for reform of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, presented, inter alia13, by the 
Belvedere circle of Franz Ferdinand d’Este or Aurel Popovici; and the nation 
state building project, presented for example by Tomáš G. Masaryk. The pro-
German line is examined separately from the reactionary concepts and follows 
the same chronological order as the section of the previous chapter detailing 
German concepts. It is showcased how reactionary concepts were used as tools 
to influence policy makers in the allied countries (the effectiveness of these 
efforts is in turn examined in the chapter focusing on the Anglo-Saxon world).  
Chapter five focuses on the Anglo-Saxon world – Britain and the United States. 
While elaborate concepts of Central Europe are few and far between, both 
countries provide an ideal testing ground for examining the influence of the 
notion on policy makers in environments, where Central Europe was theorized 
as the Other. The chapter observes that in both environments, the pan-German 
interpretation of Central Europe was gradually adopted and leaders in both 
countries defined their policies in opposition to this supposed plan for German 
domination of Europe and beyond. Central Europe was often equalized to so 
called Berlin-Baghdad plan of German expansion and presented as a direct 
threat to British imperial interests as well as established global order. The 
highlight of the chapter is the examination of the effectiveness of efforts of T. G. 
Masaryk and other small nation leaders to galvanize support for 
                                                 
13
 among other things 
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dismemberment of Austria-Hungary by utilizing the perceived threat of Central 
Europe. However, the evidence collected eventually does not support the 
hypothesis that the great power endorsement of the break-up of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was motivated by the opposition to the concept of Central 
Europe. 
Chapter six, “Variations in time and space” provides evidence that processes 
identified in the core research period are not accidental and recur in 
subsequent historical periods. The chapter traces the development of Central 
European concepts in chronological order from 1920s onwards and, above all, 
aims to delineate discourse over the notion of Central Europe for periods 
associated with systemic change in international relations affecting the region. 
It follows the development of discourses over Central Europe for five distinctive 
periods, starting with the interwar years, though the Second World War, the 
Cold War, the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, to contemporary period. First and 
foremost, this chapter is intended to serve as a literary underpinning for the 
core research, providing the basis for discussion of research findings and 
identifying key material for the formulation of conclusions. Besides the critical 
discussion of concepts originated in the interwar period, during the Second 
World War and then within the post-Cold War period, the chapter also reflects 
on the lack of substantive development of the Central European notion during 
the Cold War period, suggesting that application of a constructivist 
methodology can account for this puzzling episode in the discourse of the 
notion. 
Research findings and conclusions attempt to generalise the research outcomes 
on a constructivist platform. The focal point of this effort will revolve around 
the identity of Central Europe – perceived, constructed, demonstrated or even 
just envisaged –, its purpose and effects. The findings are then contrasted to 
body of data derived from Chapter 6. There are strong suggestions that this 
comparison will unveil real links between the issues raised and dealt with in 
these two distinct periods and conclusions of the research may well have wider 
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implications than merely clarifying the origins, basis and implications of 
traditional geopolitical theorisation of Central Europe.  
Finally, the thesis is completed by the Bibliography and Appendix. Bibliography 
presents materials quoted in the thesis, separated primary and secondary 
sources. Appendix contains numerous maps, contemporary newspaper 
clippings and copies of key archival documents. The list of visited archives is 
also included, in order to provide the reader with an insight into breath and 






















Central Europe:  
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Chapter 2: Approaching Central Europe: A Methodology 
 
 
2.1 The puzzle of Central Europe 
Perhaps the most unique characteristic of the notion of Central Europe is its 
protean nature. Proteus was, of course, an enigmatic character in Greek 
mythology: a god, who could foretell the future and morph into whichever 
creature he chose. Homer wrote in his Odyssey that to obtain a truthful answer 
from this unusual oracle, his hero, Menelaus had to hold Proteus in a tight 
embrace as he shifted shapes. Central Europe seems to be an able shape-shifter 
itself, but how can we make it reveal its secrets? 
The introduction foreshadowed some of the apparent metamorphoses that 
Central Europe has been subject to. We saw how the territorial extent ascribed 
to Central Europe was first associated with German settlement while, during 
the First World War, it became a synonym for uniting the Austro-Hungarian and 
German empires. Then, during the Second World War, Central Europe was 
designated as a buffer strip of nations, running north-south between Germany 
and Russia. Later on, in the early 1980s, it became loosely associated with the 
European countries under Soviet domination. Its professed purpose differed 
from period to period – it has been a project of unification for the territories 
inhabited by ethnic Germans, a proposed union of two empires, a suggested 
buffer between Germany and Russia to safeguard world peace, a uniting 
regional identity helping post-Communist countries to part with their ‘Eastern’ 
past. It has been a pet notion of German nationalists, Nazi propagandists, 
dissidents in Eastern bloc countries, modern democrats, and advocates of 
European integration.  
The meaning of Central Europe has undergone a puzzling number and variety 
of metamorphoses within a relatively short period of a hundred years - in terms 
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of territory, intention, purpose and underlying philosophy. Often unpredictable 
protean shape-shifting seems to have been its most consistent characteristic. 
Invoked by a whole spectrum of ideological streams, its only firm connection 
seems to be with classical geopolitics and its realist variants in international 
relations. 
While this perplexing vicissitude in itself might sound a bit inconsequential in 
terms of international relations theory, the observed ramifications of these 
changes make it well worth researching. Divergent interpretations of Central 
Europe seem to have generated contrasting responses from the very same 
collective of international actors, contributing to a reshaping of their policies. 
While West German political elites had always been careful to avoid any 
references to Mitteleuropa for its negative association with the German 
expansionism of the early twentieth century; the same notion identified with 
the intellectual project of 1980s Eastern bloc dissent swiftly became a headline 
for their Ostpolitik. Thus defined, a revitalised Central Europe galvanized 
Western public support for the countries emerging from the Soviet sphere of 
influence; while yet another Central European metamorphosis would 
consequently become instrumental in supporting the integration of these 
countries into the European Union and NATO. The implications of both recent 
characterisations were in obvious contrast to the highly negative view 
harboured by the Western public and policy makers towards the Central 
Europe perceived as the union between Germany and Austria-Hungary in the 
First World War. 
One of the original features of this project is its examination of individual 
concepts of Central Europe in their varied historical contexts, rather than, as is 
more usual,  just latching onto one particular interpretation. The research seeks 
to explain how can one notion undergo so many erratic and multifold changes, 
galvanize such strong and divergent responses, and ultimately contribute so 
significantly to the shaping of critical international structures? The puzzle is 
impelling. Perhaps the processes identified by scholars as ‘definitive 
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discourse’14 can account for changes in the meaning of the notion of Central 
Europe and their implications. 
Dwora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea presented their concept of 
‘interpretive research’ as concerned with discourse analysis and text 
interpretation. (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006: xvi) They presented this as 
different from both qualitative and quantitative modes of the usual research 
taxonomy, and asserted that its distinguishing feature is the premise that “the 
meaning-making activity of human actors is central to understanding of causal 
relationships”. (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006: xii) This description is 
applicable to the proposed research project, which focuses on conceptions of 
Central Europe, the formative influences behind them, their role within the 
discourse and the practical implications that follow. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 
underlined that the very philosophical paradigm of interpretive research 
questions the application of traditional positivist research design, as it requires 
flexibility and adaptation to ensuing research findings. They suggested that for 
this reason, rather than setting objectives, 
“researchers in interpretive modes more commonly begin their 
work with what might be called informed ‘hunches’ or puzzles or 
a sense of tension between expectations and prior observations, 
grounded in the research literature and, not atypically, in some 
prior knowledge of the study setting. Understanding and 
concepts are allowed (indeed, expected) to emerge from the data 
as the research progresses.” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006: 
xvi) 
The puzzle of this research has already been presented at length. The first 
hunch with respect to its untangling was triggered by a number of discourse 
analysts contemplating the social construction of notions as linguistic 
propositions. Authors such as Edward Schiappa, Thomas S. Kuhn or Richard 
                                                 
14
 a discourse that defines meaning of a notion in process of social construction of reality (Schiappa 
2003: p. xi) 
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Rorty. Rorty put forward the assertion that people define notions on the basis 
of their needs and interests. (Rorty 1999: xxvi) The needs and interests are in 
turn said to be informed by any individual’s socially constructed identity. Here, 
we might remind ourselves of Timothy Garton Ash’s already-cited exclamation: 
“Tell me your Central Europe and I will tell you who you are.” (Garton Ash 
1999: 384) Yet the challenge for the research is not only to recognise that 
individuals formulate their own personal definitions, but, more importantly, to 
show how it is that these become recognized by other individuals and why 
certain of them seem to gain widespread acceptance. Especially illuminating in 
this regard is the work of Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star, who studied the 
institutional choice of definitions of relevant notions – such as the definition of 
HIV/AIDS provided by the World Health Organisation. They posited that wider 
groups of individuals forming institutions typically chose from the pool of 
potential definitions of a notion the one best suited for the shared institutional 
beliefs and interests; or, indeed, create their own. Some definitions, such as 
those for clinical diseases, become so strongly institutionalised that they count 
as the very meaning of the notion. (Bowker and Star 2000: 108) This does not 
mean that competing definitions for the same notion do not exist; it just means 
that they did not harness the necessary support among the various individuals, 
groups and institutions relevant for the given discourse. In fact, Bowker and 
Star assert that notions are in a continual process of reformulation and can 
undergo quite erratic changes in meaning over the course of time, particularly if 
the balance of power between various definitions keeps changing. Central 
Europe seems to provide a striking illustration of this tendency. However, the 
same authors also posited that given the nature of social interaction based on 
linguistic propositions, individuals are compelled to mould their behaviour to 
fit them, that is to conform (Bowker and Star 2000: 53). This conformity can be 
seen in many forms – even opposition to the idea expressed by the notion or a 
challenge to its definition. However, even these responses have to be 
formulated in reference to the institutionalised definition. For example, political 
leaders of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire opposed the 
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Central European vision of union between Germany and former imperial 
territories, when that notion was in vogue. Instead, they placed emphasis on 
their respective national sovereignties. However, when this meaning of the 
notion started to weaken in the late 1930s (see section 1.3), they advanced 
their own definition of Central Europe and shifted its very meaning. 
Contemplating notions as a philosophical category and observing the successive 
metamorphoses of Central Europe that have already been noted, this author has 
earlier suggested that all of them may have had something in common after all: 
they each constituted a distinctive, constructed version of regional identity, 
irrespective of whether the region was loosely formulated or identity variable. 
Attempts at definition of Central Europe typically spell out a set of unifying 
characteristics substantiating its separate identity from the surrounding world 
and ascribe it territory, purportedly demonstrating these characteristics. It 
seems that the characteristics of identity in successive Central European 
notions have taken precedence over its territorial shape and extent, which have 
only been defined by association. Look, for instance, at the clear tautological 
relationship during the 1990s between those Central European countries 
described as having made good progress towards joining Western economic 
and security structures and the tendency to therefore brand such countries as 
Central (rather than, for instance, Eastern) European (Kuus 2007, Dittmer 
2005) . Thus it seems that definitions of Central Europe attempt to construct 
certain regional identity, rather than define a region.  
Of course, any observed processes of notion formulation, regional identity 
construction and changes in meaning in the context of this research need to be 
conceptualised in terms of appropriate theory within the social sciences. 
Concepts capable of facilitating the projection of definitive discourse analysis 
into study of international relations needed to be identified. Indeed, the 
suitability of this approach for the study of international relations had to be 
tested and its analytical merits substantiated. This author believes that 
conceptualisation in this instance can be based upon a holistic modification of 
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Alexander Wendt’s actor-structure dynamics. My scrutiny of available theory 
and the reasoning behind selection of a Wendt-derived model are summarised 
in section 2.2 of this methodology. To foreshadow the conclusions of the 
discussion that follows in this chapter, it is suggested that constructivism will 
prove better able to account for various events in the history of international 
relations as well as to provide a more rigorous methodological framework for 
the projection of definitive discourse onto international relations.  
As a result of these considerations, a working hypothesis has been developed: 
Conceptualisations of regional identity are exercises in geopolitics, which 
through the definitive discourse of Self and Other exert influence upon the 
behaviour of political actors, thereby indirectly impacting upon 
international structure. 
The aim of the research is to conduct an in-depth investigation into this 
hypothesis and potentially formulate transferable generalised observations. As 
outlined in section 1.3, the core research focuses on the four decades period 
between 1880 and 1920. Findings of the core research will then be 
contextualised in the light of secondary research covered in Chapter 3, which 
traces development of the meaning of the notion of Central Europe from 1920s 
onwards. As has already been suggested, one of the original features of this 
research is its examination of various concepts of Central Europe without 
necessarily linking these to current geopolitical and regional concerns.  The 
multitude of permutations of Central Europe throughout the twentieth century 
and beyond offers ample cases, on which to test the findings of the core 
research, maximising potential of this research to produce well substantiated 
conclusions.  
There is probably no other notion that would offer the same number and 
divergence of variations in such as short period. Study of Central Europe 
provides a unique opportunity to analyse the process of formulation and 
implications of notions in international relations. Perhaps, just like 
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mythological Proteus, Central Europe can provide us with answers to our 
questions, if we hold it through all its metamorphoses. 
 
2.2 Approaching Central Europe 
This research contemplates conceptual spatializations of identity, their role in 
informing the construction of self/other binaries and the influence these ‘imagi-
nations’  can potentially exert upon behaviour of political actors(Atkinson 
2005: 68). This assertion would seemingly place the research within a group of 
critical rather than classical or neoclassical works in geopolitics. 
 
2.2.1 A constructivist approach in a critical geopolitics study 
Authors in neoclassical geopolitics, such as Geoffrey Sloan or Colin Gray, are 
commonly regarded to have built on the classical work of Halford Mackinder. In 
works of these authors, Mackinder’s take on world politics is considered to be a 
grand strategy at its best, while they recognize and address its limitations. 
(Venier 2010) However, in this research, classical geopolitics is an object, 
rather than framework of analysis presented. The research seeks to deconstruct 
the very first prominent discourse of classical geopolitics – the one of Central 
Europe – and highlight its implications. The works of Halford Mackinder, 
Friedrich Naumann or Friedrich Ratzel are to be subjected to a scrutiny rather 
than used as a methodological guidance. Paraphrasing Gerry Kearns, it could be 
said that rather than seeing spatialized identities as given, the research focuses 
on the processes of construction of these ‘given’ geographical imaginaries and 
their implications. 
The research employs a constructivist methodology, which is already well 
established in critical geopolitics, especially in the study of ‘geopolitical imagi-
nations’. The concerns of works in this field of critical geopolitics are the self-
images of states that define them “in relations to equivalence and antagonism to 
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other actors in world affairs” (Atkinson 2005: 68). The contributors to this 
debate include David Atkinson, David Newman, David Campbell and Matthew 
Sparke (Sparke 2003, Atkinson 2000, Newman 2000, Campbell 1992), and their 
works focus on questions of the construction of dominant interpretations of the 
notion of given nations, their underlying historical myths and 
institutionalisation through state bureaucracy. While the object of this research 
is a regional rather than national identity, works of Merje Kuus have already 
demonstrated value of the constructivist approach to interpreting this form of 
spatialized identity.  
Kuus presented several works considering identity formation in the states of 
‘Central Europe’ (Kuus 2007, Kuus 2007b, Kuus 2004, etc.) in which she 
scrutinized construction of shared regional identity of the post-Communist 
European states during the 1990s through the process of their othering from 
the former ‘Eastern’ context and approximation to their desired ‘Western’ orbit. 
She highlighted the processes of self-construction of identity as well as its 
reinforcing through perceptions of other actors. Kuus also suggested that 
regional identity of ‘Central Europe’ gradually developed from shared effort to 
reinforce cultural affinity with the West, as the means to further transitive 
countries’ security and economic interests. However, the logic of mutual 
construction of the Self and the Other dictated the identification of these states 
with their own deeds and led to the development of a tautological relationship 
between regional identity and its constructed characteristics.  
However, the recent history of the region is not the only subject of critical 
scrutiny from the constructivist viewpoint. A recent article by Richelle 
Bernazzoli (2010) tracks the US construction of self as the ascendant leader of 
the ‘free nations’ through the process of othering from the failing Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1918. The analysis of then contemporary newspaper 
articles follows the construction of the ‘autocratic’, ‘anomalous’ and ‘monstrous’ 
identity of the multiethnic empire in popular media and the portrayal of the 
USA as a champion of national sovereignty, the polar opposite of this faltering 
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Old World power. (Bernazzoli 2010: 656) Interestingly for this research, 
Bernazzolli observes the profound impact that the recognition of the potential 
slipping of former Austro-Hungarian territories under German influence had on 
the debate about the future of empire in 1918, even though it is not the primary 
focus of his article. (Bernazzolli 2010: 654 – 656) 
As suggested below, it is the aspiration of this research to enrich the 
constructivist debate of spatialized identities within the discourse of critical 
geopolitics by tracking potential effects of articulations of Central Europe in 
works of early classical geopolitics onto the changes of international structure 
following the First World War.  
 
2.2.2 Methodological clarifications 
Building on the above, it comes as a somewhat obvious statement that the 
research employs a constructivist viewpoint. The constructivist perception of 
actors as dynamic units, identification of systems as a changing social concept, 
and the attention paid to the use of notions and their influence upon socially 
constructed international structures, presents a valuable platform for re-
examination of classical geopolitical concepts. As already mentioned, 
constructivism has already found its application in critical geopolitics in the 
works of Merje Kuus, Richelle Bernazzoli, and also many others – in terms of 
construction of non-nation state identities. Here, the recent works of Bachmann 
and Sidaway (2009), Mindaugas Jurkynas (2007) or Michelle Pace (2007) 
provide interesting examples15.  
Ostensibly, constructivism offers the tools and a methodology for analysis of 
concepts, the context of their origin and their intended aims. It also provides 
models for idea transmission, identity construction and its influence on social 
                                                 
15
 Bachmann and Sidaway presented a critical enquiry into geopolitics of the European Union as a 
global power, Jurkynas examined shared identity of the Baltic states and Pace focused on the 
Mediterranean.  
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and international structures – all vital components of the projected research. 
Various actors can be examined as constructive parts of the system that are 
both accepting and creating systemic influences, thus potentially shaping 
international systems and relations. Most importantly, constructivism provides 
a viable basis for generalising of research results and for the possible 
formulation of these into transferable rules or models of behaviour for the 
actors involved. 
The decision was taken to follow in large part Alexander Wendt's methodology, 
though not all the constitutive parts of his theory can be employed. Given the 
fact that this research treats conceptions of Central Europe as attempts to 
create a new regional identity, Wendt’s focus on agents, identity, interests, 
environment and structure holds great promise for the projected research.  
Wendt’s model revolves around identity, shaped by notions of self and the 
environment (the other), which becomes the basis for formulation of interests. 
(Wendt 1987: 336 – 338) Notions of self and the environment both shape and 
are shaped by interaction, which is characterised by inter-subjectivity and the 
ascribing of meaning to agent behaviour and environmental change. This 
understanding of international relations will be engaged with through analyses 
of the domestic and international situation related to concepts of Central 
Europe. Emphasis will be laid upon the environment where examined concepts 
originated, gathered support or failed to do so. It will be used to explain why 
were certain conceptions of Central Europe formulated, to identify what 
interests they served, and to try and ascertain why they either managed or 
failed to be translated into reality in the practice of international relations.  
Certain other aspects of Wendt’s ideas will be applied in this research: his 
aforementioned explanation of agent-structure dynamics and collective identity 
formation theory (Wendt 1996). However, two of the main features of Wendt’s 
project seem much less likely to be useful for our purposes – his emphasis on 
the state-centric characteristics of the international structure and his reliance 
on analysis of international level agent-structure dynamics. Non-state actors, 
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such as émigré groups and exile politicians reportedly had a significant impact 
on the positions taken by allied governments through lobbying; therefore, both 
non-state actors and unit level processes need to be taken in regard. Therefore, 
this research prefers to adopt a holistic constructivist approach, employing 
Wendt’s agent-structure model on both the specific unit (state) and 
international level. This approach is unusual, but not unprecedented. The 
importance of identity as a determinant of state behaviour within international 
structure has been analysed by Kuus - interestingly for us, in direct relation to 
the notion of Central Europe. (Kuus 2007)  
There are three different ways in which a constructivist approach will be 
applied in this research.  
 Firstly, an analysis will be provided of the influence that the 
international and domestic environment exerted in shaping identity and 
recognition of environmental legacy in which specific conceptions 
originated. International and domestic structures, their norms and rules, 
significant events, significant theoretical influences, behaviour and the 
deeds of domestic and international actors will be analysed in this 
regard.  
 The second way is an application of constructivist theory on the studied 
concepts themselves. These will be examined for evidence of inter-
subjective interpretation of structure, agents’ behaviour and the 
intended impact that the concepts were meant to exert upon the existing 
international structure. Here, techniques of applied linguistics and 
discourse analysis will be utilized.  
 The third manner of application is the analysis of influences on the 
concepts of Central Europe, which will directly apply agent-structure 
model and draw conclusions on this basis. Perhaps, Gerard Toal’s re-
interpretations of works of Halford Mackinder (Toal 1992), Karl 
Wittfogel, Isaiah Bowman and Ives Lacoste (Toal 1994) could be 
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approximated to the method intended here. The findings of the research 
(Chapter 7) challenge some conventional wisdom on influence of 
theories of Central Europe, especially on policy making in German and 
Austro-Hungarian empires. 
 
2.2.3 Key notions defined 
Research operates more prominently with some notions than others; their use 
therefore needs to be both explained and justified.  
The most obvious notions under scrutiny here are Self and Other, as well as the 
derivate verb othering. Scholars in the stream of critical geopolitics often make 
extensive use of all three concepts (Kuus 2010, Toal and Agnew 1998, Dalby 
1998), which originated in post-positivist philosophy. As Kuus (2010: 689) 
observed, classical geopolitics frequently engages in reduction of geographical 
complexities into simplistic territorial demarcation of inside/outside, 
friend/enemy binaries. Perhaps the most famous of these simplifications is the 
conflict of the land and the sea in the defining work of traditional geopolitics 
(or, to be more precise, geostrategy), Halford Mackinder’s pivot theory (1904). 
Such opposites then become a basis for the analysis and formulation of 
recommendations.  
The fact that classical geopolitics engages in the formulation of such binaries 
makes the use of Self and Other important methodological tools for analysis of 
examined concepts. The concept of Self is defined as a sense of the author’s own 
defining features, the Other as their polar opposite. The concept of Self becomes 
a basis of referring to identity in this research: an individual’s sense of 
belonging to a nationally, regionally or otherwise determined group sharing the 
defining features of the Self. This research focuses on a particular regional 
identity – Central Europe, but in the analysis presented, it also operates within 
national identities (such as German, Czech etc.), where applicable. 
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Interests, then, are the desired goals determined on the basis of the given 
identity and perceived advantages the Self should achieve. Othering refers to 
gradual development of independent concept of Self and distancing from the 
group or territory that given actors previously considered themselves to be a 
part of.  
The research also widely operates with notions of author, political actor, 
behaviour and international structure. By author, all individuals engaged in 
conceptualisations of Central Europe with at least one attributable written 
work on the topic are meant. Political actor refers to elected officials or civil 
servants with decision making powers. Behaviour refers to both recorded 
perceptions as well as physical acts. International structure is defined narrowly 
and refers to the system of sovereign states and their territorial extent. 
Finally, the research is described as holistic on several occasions in this chapter. 
Such description essentially means that besides of unit level (state) influences – 
typical of Wendt’s analysis –, the research considers inputs and constraints of 
the international structure and its changes, as well as domestic sub-state events 
and actors. 
 
2.3 Research hypothesis and questions 
The research aims to re-examine some of the classical concepts of Central 
Europe from a critical perspective. The centrepiece of these considerations is 
the contention that the discourse itself surrounding geographical imaginaries of 
Central Europe as a German dominated territorial entity originating in the 1880 
– 1918 period could have played a vital role in great power endorsement of the 
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
 
 61 
2.3.1 Research hypothesis  
Let us again state the working hypothesis of the projected research: 
Conceptualisations of regional identity are exercises in geopolitics, which 
through the definitive discourse of Self and Other exert influence upon the 
behaviour of political actors, thereby indirectly impacting upon 
international structure. 
The first part of the hypothesis stems from the critical viewpoint of definitions 
of space, which unveils the nature of any such articulations as purposeful 
conceptualisations mirroring the authors’ geopolitical allegiances and 
convictions. Initial research into concepts of Central Europe suggested that 
rather than being impartial descriptions of physical space, definitions of Central 
Europe typically spell out a set of unifying characteristics. These are then used 
to substantiate its separate identity from the surrounding world and ascribe it 
territory purportedly demonstrating these characteristics. Thus derived 
concepts then take on a character of the construction of a notion of the Self 
(Naumann 1916) or the Other (Mackinder 1919) within a particular 
geopolitical scheme. Here the hypothesis employs a position developed by 
discourse analysts, a novel feature for examination of Central Europe, and 
treats conceptions of Central Europe as linguistic propositions informed by the 
authors’ socially constructed identities and resultant interests. (Rorty 1999: 
xxvi)  
The second part of the hypothesis also spells out the original contributions of 
the research, as it suggests that articulations of Central Europe have real impact 
on popular perceptions of regional identity and the conduct of political actors. It 
envisages the likely applicability of the process of definitive discourse 
developed within the framework of discourse analysis. (Bowker and Star 2000: 
108) Through the process of definitive discourse the dominant interpretation of 
a given notion is derived from the interplay of multiple definitions competing 
for the support of relevant actors within the discourse. In the process of 
definitive discourse, relevant actors develop or adopt definitions of a notion 
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consonant with their identities and interests and promote them in order to 
further these interests. Depending on the specifics of the discourse (in this case 
mutual construction of the Self and the Other in international relations), some 
definitions become so strongly institutionalised that they count as the very 
meaning of the notion. Should a dominant interpretation of a notion arise, the 
nature of social interaction based on linguistic proposition then necessitates the 
actors to mould their behaviour to conform to it. Yet, this conformity can 
demonstrate itself various forms, even an opposition to the dominant 
interpretation or a challenge to the idea it expresses. In the context of the 
research, the hypothesis suggests that through the process of a definitive 
discourse in regards to Central Europe was dominated by Pan-German authors 
and gave rise to its interpretation as a plan for a German-dominated territorial 
entity consisting of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Conformity with this 
dominant interpretation took a form of endorsement among Pan-German 
circles. In contrast, among the representatives of small nations of Austria-
Hungary it fuelled efforts for national emancipation. 
The single most important part of the hypothesis lies in suggesting that the 
dominant interpretation of regional identity can actually have a real impact on 
international structure. Contrary to the popular assertion that the great power 
endorsement of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire was based on the 
idealist principle of self-determination of nations (Bradshaw 2008: 32), this 
hypothesis contends that the US and the British position on the issue might 
have been more significantly informed by the unwelcome prospect of a 
substantial German dominated territorial entity in the form of Central Europe 
than a genuine desire of political leaders for self-determination of small nations 
in the area.   
Yet, the conclusions of the research highlight that Central Europe as an attempt 
at constructing regional identity struggled to make a real impact on the 
international structure. The final decision making in the US and Britain was 
informed more by emergent or perceived situations on the ground than 
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arguments for or against a German-led Central Europe. This supports the final 
conceptual claim of the thesis that ideational constructs have to be examined in 
their complex situational context and a cautious approach should generally be 
assumed when drawing links between concepts and practical politics.   
 
2.3.2 Research questions 
In order to test the hypothesis as presented, the research will focus on three 
main questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of definitions of Central Europe originating in the 
period 1880 – 1920? 
Under this question, the research will focus on what could be described as 
works in formal geopolitics. (Dalby and Toal 1998: 5) Besides establishing the 
necessary environmental context and the identity of the author in terms of his 
works and influence upon public opinion or political actors, the following sub-
questions will be the main point of the analysis in regards of each considered 
definition of Central Europe: 
1.1 What were the defining characteristics of the envisaged Central 
Europe? 
1.2 What were the geopolitical imaginaries implicit in the presented 
definition? 
1.3 What were the underlying philosophical and theoretical 
frameworks of the definition? 
1.4 What was the utility of Central Europe within the geopolitical 
scenario presented by the particular author? 
2. What were the main features and outcomes of the definitive discourse of 
Central Europe in period 1880 – 1920? 
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Moving more towards the realm of popular and practical geopolitics (Dalby and 
Toal 1998: 5), this question is tied to the second part of the hypothesis and can 
be further divided into following sub-questions: 
2.1 What concepts of Central Europe most significantly influenced its 
definitive discourse in period of 1880 – 1920? 
2.2 What was the mechanism by which individual concepts gained 
influence within the discourse? 
2.3 What was their contribution or challenge to the dominant 
interpretation of Central Europe? 
2.4 What changes in dominant interpretations of Central Europe can be 
observed as a result? 
3. What evidence exists that the dominant interpretation exerted influence upon 
the behaviour of relevant political actors in the period 1880 - 1920? 
Under this question, the archival evidence will be searched for evidence of 
influence of the dominant interpretation of Central Europe upon behaviour and 
actions of the relevant political actors – namely, the US, British, German and 
Austro-Hungarian governments and the political leaders of small nations of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The sub-questions here would focus mainly on the 
following areas: 
3.1 What evidence exists that a particular concept of Central Europe was 
adopted by any given political actor? 
3.2 What evidence exists that a particular concept of Central Europe was 
actively promoted by any given political actor? 
3.3 What evidence exists that dominant interpretation of Central Europe 
influenced an actor’s behaviour, actions or policies? 
4. What evidence exists in regard to the indirect influence of any dominant 
interpretation of the notion of Central Europe upon the international structure? 
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With these questions, the research will consider whether evidence exists that 
would support the claim that perceptions of Central Europe as a constructed 
regional identity exerted an impact upon decisions and actions taken by 
relevant political actors leading to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. 
 
2.4 Selection: What period? Which concepts? 
While the thesis explores variations of the notion of Central Europe across a 
significantly longer period of time, the core research focuses on the period of 
1880 – 1920 since the need for an in-depth enquiry of this key formative period 
has remained essentially unfilled, certainly in the English language.  
It does so for three main reasons. First of all, the period gave rise to the notion 
itself and witnessed the process of its original formulation. Second, previous 
research projects of the author have indicated that nascent notions of Central 
Europe held significant implications for the behaviour of several important 
actors in the international relations of the day16. Finally, the period offers ample 
(and generally as-yet unexplored) sources that make conduct of the research 
viable, especially the provision of archival materials for notionalising Central 
Europe – something that is not available for more recent periods. The temporal 
focus of the decision was thus information oriented and concentrated on the 
period that the author deemed to be paradigmatic.  
Even for this  40-year period, dealing with the sheer volume and variety in 
conceptions of Central Europe - more often than not emanating from German 
authors - has required extensive categorisation and a certain level of 
generalisation. It soon became obvious that only selected concepts could be 
analysed in a useful manner. Again, their selection is based upon the 
information-oriented method, as the author was searching for the period 
                                                 
16
 Previously, as a masters student at Oxford University, this researcher investigated notions of 
Central Europe since their emergence in the1880s in a more general sense. 
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formative for the notion of Central Europe. Similarly, the decision, as to which 
concepts to include in the research, was taken on the basis of their observed 
impact on the discourse in the phase of literature review and initial primary 
research. Only those concepts showing the greatest level of influence upon 
discourse will be examined in detail, with number of less influential ones 
referred in the text where appropriate.  
 
2.5 Sources: types and locations 
Given the historical character of the research, the project is necessarily based 
on upon analysis of secondary sources of data, which are essentially materials 
written or published by authors and group entities. (Clark ed. 1998: 8) This 
research will utilize various types of materials, such as: 
 Books (e.g. original concepts Ratzel 1898, Naumann 1916, Mackinder 
1904, assessments and analyses Werstadt 1920, Meyer 1946, Mattern 
1942, etc.) 
 Journals (New Europe, Journal of Central European Affairs, Central 
European Observer, etc.) 
 Media abstracts (mostly daily and weekly press, e.g. The Times, The New 
York Times, Neue Freie Presse), 
 Online materials (e.g. documents on the website of the Office of the 
Historian of the US Department of State, Google newspaper archive, 
electronic resources of the British Library, etc.), 
 Memos, minutes, internal reports (e.g. Foreign Office, the Inquiry, the 
Belvedere Circle, etc.), 
 Letters, diaries and other personal documents. (e.g. of Milan Hodža, 
Tomáš G. Masaryk, Halford Mackinder, etc.) 
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In general, the necessary data can be divided into four groups: concepts in the 
studies themselves; published sources; unpublished sources; and cartographic 
and other illustrative material.  
 
2.5.1 Concepts 
Anglo-Saxon concepts of Central Europe, originating in both Britain and the 
United States, have already been located in various collections of the British 
Library. Besides the works of British authors (e.g. Mackinder, Headley, Seton-
Watson), the British Library also holds original issues of volumes presenting 
the concepts put forward by the members of the Inquiry, such as Edward House 
and Charles Seymour (House and Seymour 1921 and 1926), and other 
American authors (e.g. Cram 1918).  
Significant research was necessary to collect and catalogue numerous theories 
of Central Europe originating from Germany in the period of 1880 – 1920. The 
data was collected primarily in the library of the Institut für Weltwirtschaft 
(Institute for the World Economy) at the University of Kiel, Germany, where a 
substantial collection of Central Europe concepts was concentrated during the 
1930s. 
Austrian Pan-German conceptions of Central Europe are also available in the 
Library of the Institute for the World Economy. Various nation-state 
conceptions originating from the former imperial Austria-Hungary were 
translated from national minority languages into English and are available in 
both the National Archives at Kew and the British Library at St. Pancras. Where 
applicable, original editions of Slovak or Czech writings available in the Štátn  




2.5.2 Documents in the public domain 
Published secondary sources (books, journals, reports, media abstracts and 
online sources) were used to examine the historical and theoretical background 
of the concepts discussed.  
Reconnaissance research soon established that the British Library would 
provide the most important English language sources for secondary research. 
The holdings of the British Library include relevant volumes and articles on 
wide ranging issues of history, economics, culture and society (in and prior to 
the period of the core research) for the countries of origin of all of the authors 
discussed, as well as writings on international relations, system and relevant 
events (prior and during the period). These works are predominantly written in 
(or translated to) English, however, volumes in German and languages of the 
former Austro-Hungarian Empire are also available here (Riesser 1914, Kálal 
1905, Nejedlý 1913, etc.). Also, the British Library Newspapers Colindale 
reading room holds various British, American, German, Austro-Hungarian and 
Russian (microfilm) newspapers contemporary to the period of research.  
Even though the holdings of the British Library are more than sufficient to 
provide information on the background of British and American originated 
concepts, for the study of others, visits to additional libraries were necessary to 
examine materials in their original languages. These included the Institute for 
the World Economy in Kiel, Germany; and National Scientific Library in 
Bratislava, Slovakia. Online newspaper archives, such as Austrian ANNO service 
of the Austrian National Library (http://anno.onb.ac.at), which holds scanned 
copies of Austrian newspapers dating back to the 18th century, were also used 
in the research.  
Few, if any, of these foreign language historical materials have been consulted 
in the English language literature on Central Europe. One of the unique features 
of this research is the return to original sources, so often referred to but rarely 
examined in their original version. Repeated misinterpretations of these 
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sources (e.g. Bruck 1849a, b, c; List 1844; etc.) have, indeed, been uncovered 
through the research and pointed out at appropriate places. 
 
2.5.3 Archival sources 
Another source of evidence for the influence and pervasiveness of the studied 
concepts upon the actors and structure of the international system are 
materials gathered in archival research. Published and unpublished sources, 
such as official correspondence, minutes and memos, personal log journals or 
documents of authors are used in analyzing concepts and their influence on 
foreign policy. 
The National Archives in Kew hold rich collections of materials related to 
foreign policy decision-making in the UK and comprise the most obvious source 
for assessing the possible influence, reach and pervasiveness of conceptions of 
Central Europe at various points in time. These include the records of the 
Foreign Office (e.g. FO 371: General Correspondence 1906 – 1966) and the War 
Cabinet and Cabinet Office (e.g. CAB 24 War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda). 
Collection and examination of sources held in Kew comprised a considerable 
share of all primary research work conducted as a part of this thesis. Especially 
the group FO 371 contains vastly under-researched breath and dept of material 
on policy-making in the British Empire, but also reports on events in other 
European countries and communication with foreign representatives. 
Moreover, at the time the research took place, holdings of FO 371 were not 
digitally catalogued. The research had to start with old-fashioned and 
painstaking leafing through paper catalogue cards and indexes to identify 
individual files to be examined. In total, thirteen subgroups of FO 371 files, 
three CAB 22 file groups, 73 digitalized documents from various groups and 
four volumes of the British Documents on Foreign Affairs provided the backbone 
of findings on British policy-making in regards of Central Europe in the core 
research period. 
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Yet, this work led to collection of key material for the research as well as better 
structuring of research of more geographically distant archives. Timeline of 
decisive events established in Kew allowed better temporal focus of research in 
US, German and Austrian archives, thus helping to cut down on research costs. 
Finally, besides the core research chapters, research conducted in the National 
Archives also provided rich material for Chapter 6, , which focuses on later 
periods of the twentieth century, following up on themes raised in the core 
research chapters (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.5).  
The National Archives of the United States contain ample document directories 
detailing Central European concerns during the First World War. They moved 
less than two decades ago from Washington DC to their current premises at 
College Park, Maryland (8601 Adelphi Rd, College Park, MD, United States). 
The holdings of Group 256: Records of the American Commission to Negotiate 
Peace, include the record of the Inquiry Commission (organized by and 
operating under the immediate supervision of President Woodrow Wilson), 
especially those files in the ‘Special Reports and Studies, compiled 1917 – 
1918’ series (ARC Identifier 635966 / MLR Number I9 4). These proved vital 
for analysis of the official US views of concepts of Central Europe, the 
reasoning behind the settlement that eventually transpired in the Central 
European area as well as the specific role played by representatives of the 
United States.  
Sources located in the archive of the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) 
and Bundesarchiv (Federal Archive) in Berlin were consulted to establish the 
level of influence of the examined concepts upon government policy both prior 
to and during the First World War. Prior to the actual visit to the archive, the 
British Library’s ‘Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign 
Ministry Archives 1867-1920’ was consulted for the purposes of preliminarily 
identifying likely materials of interest. The records of the Auswärtiges Amt have 
recently been re-catalogued, making use of its record much more user-friendly 
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than was the case previously.17 The initial research pinpointed the group of 
documents under shelf mark R 43/2254 Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein 
(Central European Economic Union) 1903 – 1918 in Auswärtiges Amt records as 
the likely starting point of any research. Ultimately, significant volumes of 
material were researched in both archives, as detailed in the appendix.  
The archival research of concepts and conceptions originating in the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire was inevitably geographically disbursed.  
The Austrian State Archive is a central archive, which contains materials of the 
former imperial offices, such as Federal Ministries and the supreme organs of 
state power. It also holds the records maintained by the former Habsburg 
monarchy (1526 - 1918). Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (The House, Court 
and State Archive) of the Habsburg Monarchy, which provides evidence of the 
activities of the highest court offices, the imperial cabinet, diplomatic and other 
official staff of the Danube Monarchy. The group of documents under shelf mark 
‘AT-OeStA/HHStA KA Vorträge’ (Cabinet Office Meetings’ minutes) for the years 
1880 – 1918 was the starting point of the research. Additional files were then 
identified based on dates and context of key cabinet decisions recorded in these 
minutes. These were located in the Staatsarchiv, as well as the Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsarchiv, another branch of the Austrian State Archive. Furthermore, 
the diaries and personal papers of key Central Europe enthusiasts, such as 
Joseph Maria Baernreither, were consulted for the added detail of the Austrian 
Central Europe movement that they provide.  
Some documents of interest in various collections of Národní Archiv České 
Republiky (The National Archive of Czech Republic) in Prague were located 
during an early reconnaissance trip in 2009, followed by another trip in the 
later phases of the research (January 2012). These included the private papers 
collections of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (Archiv Ak demie věd České republiky – 
Archive of the Czech Academy of Sciences – 1999 Inventory Registry no. 5019 – 




5022) and Milan Hodža (Archiv Národního muzea – National Museum Archive – 
1983 Inventory Registry no. 84), and collections of influential emigre 
organisations, such as České národní sdružení v Americe (Czech National 
Association in America, collection held at Vojenský historický archiv – Military 
Historical Archive, 1993 Inventory Registry no. 296) or České národní sdružení – 
Anglie (The Bohemian (Czech) National Alliance in Great Brittain - London 
Branch18, collection held at Military Historical Archive, 1992 Inventory Registry 
no. 272). Crucially for this research, documents of Československá národní rada 
v P říži (Czechoslovak National Council in Paris), which would have become the 
provisional government of a nascent Czechoslovakia in 1918, were located at 
the ‚Military Historical Archive 1992 Inventory Registry no. 410‘. These sources 
helped to document the full story (previously untold in English) of the efforts of 
those Czechs and Slovaks, as well as other nationalities of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire, that worked towards  dismemberment of the empire and 
the establishment of new nation states upon its former territorial extent.  
The Czech and Slovak collections will be complemented by data extracted from 
those documents from the UK and US archives that relate to the activities of 
national pressure groups from the former Austro-Hungary, since the essential 
issues here are obviously interrelated. 
A list of archives visited and materials researched is attached as Appendix 33. 
The depth of the archival research undertaken here is one of the distinctive 
features of this research and forms the backbone of its original contribution in 
terms of examination of complexity of formulations of regional identity. 
 
2.6 Data collection 
In terms of data collection, the main concern was one of practicality and cost – 
especially in the case of the US and German archives. 
                                                 
18
 The name of the organization differs in Czech and English language. It was used in these forms by 
the organization itself. 
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Luckily, as with the example of the German archives, the possibility exists for 
undertaking initial research of the American archives via materials available in 
the UK. The sources of the State Department Historian’s Office and Foreign 
Relations of the United States Series are both available in the British Library or 
online (history.state.gov). This will help to narrow down areas where research 
of Maryland sites will be most necessary. Subsequently, the researcher used 
archive offered copy services and ordered copies of microfilms identified as 
containing key documents for the research. These microfilms were then 
consulted on the old-fashioned reader machines still thankfully retained at the 
British Library. 
In all other repositories, the author collected data in person – a considerable 
challenge of time and resources but one that had to be met in order to do full 
justice to the subject and the related issues under investigation. The core 
research was carried out mainly between January 2011 and February 2012; 
some reconnaissance trips to archives and a visit to Institute for the World 
Economy in Kiel had earlier been conducted in 2008 and 2010. 
 
2.7 Method of analysis 
 
2.7.1 Selected method: discourse analysis 
Given the strides made in methodological approaches since the 1950s (so vast 
in its scope as to be almost unquantifiable), this research can employ cross-
disciplinary methods. In recent years, discourse analysis has gained popularity 
as a methodology in constructivist social sciences as well as critical geopolitics 
especially in the study of the formation of geopolitical identities (Newman 
2000). Gerard Toal demanded deeper theoretical engagement with discourse 
analysis to move critical geopolitics forward (Toal 2002). 
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Yet, a unified methodology for the conduct of discourse analysis is missing as 
yet and various authors use relatively loosely-defined approaches. In this 
research, discourse analysis is understood as method of analysis focused on 
“the link between text and context. For discourse analysis, texts 
are not containers of self-referential meaning, but the recorded 
traces of discourse activity, which can never be completely 
reduced to text” (Angermüller 2001: 8) 
This research thus examines the texts defining Central Europe, their context of 
origin as well as their potential impact on the context in order to close the loop 
of the discourse analysis. The discourse is treated as a continually evolving 
process. Every closure of a definition of Central Europe is understood to be 
temporary and contingent in the specific condition at the time of its fixation 
(Müller 2010: 27, Shapiro 1992: 38). Conversely, individual articulations of the 
notion are considered to constantly reproduce, challenge and transform its 
surrounding discourse (Mattissek and Reuben 2004, Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002). 
Analysis of the assembled data for the original research here focuses on 
interpretation of Central Europe as conceptualized and represented. The 
research assumes – in line with emerging principles of discourse analysis – that 
the geopolitical concepts of Central Europe are utilitarian in nature. To provide 
well rounded analysis, several facts need to be taken into account here: 
 The international, regional and national environment at the prevailing 
time of origin of the analyzed concept: 
Relevant actors, their interests and conduct in existing 
international context are taken into account to establish 
individual viewpoint for a particular concept. Appropriate 
secondary literature is used as a predominant source. 
 The overall objectives of theory and the concept of Central Europe itself: 
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This core section of the analysis focuses on the use of notions, 
formulations and definitions; structure of the text, referencing 
methods, data and illustrative material used (or any relevant 
features) will be evaluated to assess objectives of individual 
concepts. It is envisaged that besides original writings 
themselves, the secondary literature will be consulted. Also, 
archival materials will clearly be of high value. 
 Analysis of the influence of concepts upon the conduct of foreign policy 
and their impact on regional developments in Central Europe: 
This is based on archival research and analysis of the relevant 
documents of bodies concerned with the conduct of foreign 
policy. In addition, the secondary literature was also consulted. 
Outlined model of analysis is also used in Chapter 6, which discusses the notion 
of Central Europe in subsequent periods of the twentieth century – or at least as 
far as is practically possible, given time and resource limitations. 
 
2.7.2 Limitations of the elected approach 
The limitations of discourse analysis stem from its own epistemological roots 
considering all knowledge constructed (Müller 2010: 19). Assertion that 
geographical truths are created through discourses that are partial, if not 
outright political has been at the very heart of critical geopolitics and its 
application of discourse analysis (Toal 1998: 3, Dodds and Sidaway 1994: 516) 
Since there is no claim to absolute truth, competing claims are possible in 
regards of the same discourse. This could be considered a serious limitation 
until we consider that a similar limitation must logically apply to other methods 
of inquiry as well. (Powers 2001: 64) For example, an excellent study of genetic 
origin of a certain disease in medical science can be followed by an equally 
compelling study providing solid evidence for its viral origin.  
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In addition, similarities and differences between concepts may cause confusion 
and there needs to be an explanation of concepts and justification for their use 
in each and every analysis. (Morgan 2010: 4) This research addresses this 
particular limitation by its very focus – the detailed analysis of individual 
concepts of Central Europe and their impact in the discourse. The concept of 
dominant definition of the discourse is used to pinpoint the meaning of the 
notion and its changes in the examined period.  
Questions over possibility of generalization of findings of discourse analysis 
have also been raised by critics of the approach. However, given the wide 
variety of discourse analysis approaches ranging from narrow dialogue analysis 
to wide generalist inquiries, the limitations vary. This research remains modest 
in its envisaged generalization of conclusions. It merely suggests that the 
hypothesis could be applicable to other notions similar to Central Europe – 
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In terms of the overall argument, this chapter documents how the notion of 
Central Europe arose as a conceptualisation of regional identity replacing the 
notion of Deutschtum in the aftermath of the foundation of the German Empire, 
which excluded much of the German population in the region. The complex 
definitive discourse and its many tribulations are explored from Central 
Europe’s beginnings as a marginal pan-German notion in the 1880s to its 
evolution into a centre-point of public discussion (largely as a byword for a 
close alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary) during the First World 
War. However, the conclusions of the chapter observe only a minimal impact of 
Central Europe as a concept affecting the behaviour of policy makers, and 
thereby on international structure. 
 
The beginning of the chapter examines the common narrative, that typically 
traces the concept of Central Europe back to early 19th century German authors, 
especially Friedrich List and Karl Ludwig von Bruck. It is suggested that both of 
these authors operated with the geographical confines of Germany rather than 
Central Europe. 
Conversely, the writings of Constantin Frantz and Paul de Lagarde published in 
the 1870s and 1880s unveiled a direct link between earlier designs for 
Germany and later conceptions of Central Europe by Pan-German authors 
during the First World War. However, it is also observed that the link was far 
from straight forward.  
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At first, any vague definitions for Central Europe often included France or other 
non-German countries. Later on, the increasingly significant economic line of 
reasoning behind the union effectively gave birth to the idea of a ‘two-tier’ 
Central Europe – with its core of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the wider 
area in which the core’s economic influence would radiate in due course. 
It was only with the First World War that there would be a final and formal 
identification of Central Europe with the union of Germany and Austria-
Hungary, which would develop into an exaltation of the ambition of the German 
nation to become a common state. However, the chapter concludes that it was 
exactly this line of theorizing of Central Europe had least in common with what 
the German government was working towards – a wider continental customs 
union, where Austria-Hungary was to be only one of the countries included. 
 
3.2 The narrative of German Central Europe 
It is often claimed that the first conceptions of Central Europe reach as far back 
as the early 19th century. Friedrich List (1789 – 1846) is often presented as the 
first proponent of Central Europe, with his efforts followed up by the 
endeavours of Karl Ludwig von Bruck (1798 – 1860) and Felix Prinz zu 
Schwarzenberg (1800 – 1852) at the constitutional assembly in Frankfurt 
during 1848 – 49. Popular orthodoxy holds that this progression culminated 
with the late 19th century writings of Constantin Franz (Müller 2001: 14).  
Such assertions are typically found in works conceptualising Central Europe 
during the First World War, linking the notion and its rise explicitly with the 
struggle of German nation-building (Brechtefeld 1996: 12). Efforts to create a 
common German political or economic area are presented as precursors to the 
rise of Mitteleuropa concepts at the turn of the century and the invisible 
extended hand of Bismarck behind these plans often hinted at (Bascom 1994, 
Mommsen 1995).  
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Yet, other analysts of the concept point out that the German (and, indeed 
Austrian) intellectual environment was not the sole proprietor of the notion in 
the 19th century – the 1879 article by Gillaume de Molinari, a French economist, 
presented a well rounded proposal of an economic union of France, Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland (de Molinari 
1879). Thus, the link between the advocates of the great-German solution of 
1848 and the early 20th century notion of Central Europe is not necessarily as 
obvious or direct as often presented. 
The roots of the frequent repetition of this somewhat misleading 
representation are twofold.  
First, there was an equation of Central Europe (in its ‘Mitteleuropa’ 
permutation) with plans for a German-Austro-Hungarian customs union during 
the First World War. Analysts looking into First World War concepts of Central 
Europe tended to focus on works that used the notion in this particular sense. 
Eventually a tautology developed that lead to the equation of all plans for 
political economic union in the area with the concept of Central Europe.  
Second, many First World War authors expended considerable effort in 
establishing their credentials by linking their own proposals to earlier works of 
respected authors and historical political leaders (e.g. Gaertner 1911: 11 – 12). 
The uncritical re-reading and repetition of these links contributed to the 
reverse equation of all plans for political economic union in the area being 
associated with the concept of Central Europe.19   
Thus, while the early 20th century authors presented themselves as following in 
steps of List and Bruck, the later observers often adopted this narrative in their 
analysis. Yet, the fact that the German concepts of Central Europe became so 
strongly associated with the German nation building in the 19th century 
warrants an inquiry into how this all happened. 
                                                 
19
 This narrative can be traced back to inter-war period German analysts (Heller 1933), but has been 
repeated in following periods in publications of widely varied authors and organizations (English 
Goethe Society 1967), and can often be found in contemporary publications, too. (Cook and 
Stevenson 2005: 349) 
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3.3 ‘The German Question’ 
The year 1806 brought a formal end to the Holy Roman Empire, giving rise to 
the emergence of a “German Question” (Geiss 1997: 16) that would persist for 
decades to come: what kind of replacement political organization were the 
Germans to put in its place? The immediate reaction of many was to articulate 
the ambition to unite all territories in which “…the German language is heard”. 
(Arndt 1813) Yet, the task of bringing together a myriad assembly of German 
states of varying sizes and composition was no simple one and a youthful 
nationalism was rivalled and resisted by age-old dynastic ambitions and 
traditional allegiances, just as much as it was beset by practical difficulties.  
The Mediatization of 180320 brought consolidation of over 300 states of the 
Holy Roman Empire; however, significant fragmentation remained, both 
politically and economically. Friedrich Seidel estimated that there had been 
more than 1800 customs barriers in existence within the German speaking 
areas of the Holy Roman Empire in 1800, almost 70 of them within Prussia 
alone (Seidel 1971). Napoleon’s satellite creation, the Confederation of the 
Rhein (1806 – 1813), comprising 39 consolidated German states proved to be 
short-lived and an inadequate basis for political and economic unification. After 
its fall, autochthonous efforts in this direction started to gather strength.  
 
Establishment of the German Confederation at the Congress of Vienna on 8 June 
1815 opened a new chapter in the history of the German nation, one that was 
dominated by a power-struggle between its two dominant forces, Austria and 
Prussia. Significantly, both had vast territorial possessions that extended 
beyond the area of the confederation. Moreover, many small and middle-sized 
German states feared the dominance of either power. With meaningfully closer 
convergence hampered by these rivalries, the confederation remained loose 
structurally, even though it was institutionalised with a Federal Assembly. 
                                                 
20
 to use its official term, The Principal Conclusion of the Extraordinary Imperial Delegation 
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A search for economic consolidation started with the 1818 Prussian drive for 
abolition of internal customs barriers and the development of a common 
customs area that embraced the other Hohenzollern territorial possessions. 
This initiative would eventually become a cornerstone of the Zollverein, the 
German Customs Union, which by 1835 encompassed a majority of the states of 
the German Confederation.21 A gradual removal of customs barriers was 
associated with accelerated economic progress, especially for the previously 
overwhelmingly agrarian Prussia – so it won many advocates, with the 
foremost of them being Friedrich List. 
 
3.3.1 Friedrich List 
As has already been mentioned, List is often regarded as the forerunner in 
conceptualising Central Europe. For example, Gerard Delanty claimed that “the 
idea of Central Europe was popularised in 1914 by Friedrich List for whom it 
also included the Low Countries”. (Delanty 1995: 10322) Besides the obvious 
temporal mistake (List died in 1846), such an assertion also misrepresents the 
contents, tenor and aim of List’s work. When suggesting that List was one of the 
first to theorise Central Europe, Delanty and other authors typically refer to his 
seminal work, Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie, (The National 
System of Political National Economy, 1844)23. Yet, this particular work is more 
concerned with suggesting a continental economic system pitched against the 
trade supremacy of the British Empire, rather than a proposal for instituting 
any form of a Central European union. (List 1844: 558) List acknowledged the 
likely futility of attempting to introduce a continental economic system in 
                                                 
21
 Much earlier, in 1819, Baden put forward a proposal for creation of a customs union organized 
through the confederation, however, it failed to secure support of the Frankfurt based Federal 
Assembly. 
22
 Perhaps the 1916 book by Heinrich Theodor List, Deutschland und Mittel-Europa: Grundzüge 
und Lehren unserer Politik seit der Errichtung des Deutschen Reiches, is responsible for this 
confusion.  
23
 A recent edition of its English translation was published in 2005 by Cosimo publishing house, see 
List 2005 in the Bibliography. 
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Europe at such a point in time – even if Europe’s big 5 were getting on at the 
time, instead suggesting that: 
“Würde dagegen Deutschland mit den dazu gehörigen 
Seegestaden, mit Holland, Belgien und der Schweiz sich als 
kräftige commercielle und politische Einheit constituiren… so 
könte Deutschland dem europäischen Continent den Frieden für 
lange Zeit verbürgen und zugleich den Mittelpunkt einer 
dauernden Continentalallianz bilden.” (List 1844: 559)24 
While this sentence foreshadows precepts of later Central Europe conceptions, 
List proposed no constructs under any such banner. Instead, he suggested that 
the aforenamed territories be incorporated within a German Customs Union. 
List used the adjective of Central European (‘mitteleuropäische-‘) only very 
occasionally and, even then, in a pronouncedly vague geographical sense. It 
should not be forgotten that the focal point of List’s lifelong project was the 
German Customs Union and his enthusiasm for the realisation of a genuinely 
national German economy. Thus describing List as the author or advocate of a 
defining Central European concept is misleading – for he operated within 
notion of Germany (as ‘Deutschland’) and was an advocate of expansion of the 
Customs Union (as ‘Zollverein’).  
It should be acknowledged that List’s works featured some of the cornerstones 
of later conceptions of Central Europe: description of Britain as a ‘sea-power’ 
(‘Seemacht’), a preoccupation with rivalling Britain’s global economic 
dominance, suggestions for the expansion of German influence towards the 
Middle East, and an overall firm belief in the superiority of the German nation. 
(List 1844: 573) He also suggested that more German settlers should be sent 
into areas adjoining the Lower Danube to better guarantee that country’s 
access to the Black Sea and Asia Minor (List and Häuser 1850: vol. V, p. 547). 
                                                 
24
 - If, on the other hand, Germany could constitute itself with the maritime territories which appertain 
to it, with Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, as a powerful commercial and political whole… then 
Germany could secure peace for the continent of Europe for a long time, and at the same time 
constitute herself as the central point of a durable Continental alliance. -  
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The latter idea was consonant with the historical practice of German settlers 
across the region; however, by the mid-19th century, it was clashing with 
growing Hungarian nationalism. So List suggested a compromise view, in which 
Hungarians were portrayed as a constitutional nation of his proposed 
construct, gradually intermixing with Germans (List and Häuser 1850: vol. III, 
pp. 474 – 480).  
Given such hallmarks, it should come as no surprise that German theorists of 
Central Europe at the turn of the century quoted List as their intellectual 
inspiration. However, for any careful analyst it merely signalled that these 
underlying ideas and concepts were present in theorising the political and 
economic construct of Germany well before the word ‘Mitteleuropa’ entered 
into daily parlance. Contrary to all later propositions for a Central European 
construct, List -towards the end of his life, would suggest a strategic union of 
interests between Germany and the British Empire, directed pragmatically 
against the threat posed by any purported French-Russian alliance. (List and 
Häuser 1850: 267 - 296) 
 
3.3.2 The 1848-9 Revolution and the Frankfurt Assembly 
The tumultuous 1848-9 revolutionary wave brought a development that 
redefined the concept of Germany – the Frankfurt National Assembly.25 The 
intention was to lay a cornerstone for a future German nation-state - however, 
the rivalry of Prussia and Austria split the assembly. The main point of 
contention became the question whether Austria should be a part of any new 
union (‘grossdeutsch’ solution) or not (‘kleindeutsch’ solution). Even Austrian 
deputies themselves were divided on this question with some preferring 
inclusion of Austria, some against it and some abstaining from this debate 
completely (Katzenstein 1976). 
                                                 
25
 ‘Frankfurter Nationalversammlung’, 18 May 1848 – 31 May 1849 
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While initially, grossdeutsch sentiment at Frankfurt was strong, with even 
Bohemian representatives receiving an invitation on the basis that Bohemian 
crown lands had been included within the former Holy Roman Empire; 
eventually, final settlement favoured the kleindeutsch solution. Despite having 
the Habsburg Empire onboard, as embodied in the Bruck-Schwartzenberg plan, 
the kleindeutsch camp at the Assembly eventually prevailed with the pragmatic 
realization that including Austrian-Germans within any unified national state 
was so difficult that it would postpone unification indefinitely.  
Sure, some compromise ideas had emerged at the Assembly, with Heinrich von 
Gagern’s suggestion for a ‘narrower and broader confederation’ (Wigard 1848 – 
50: 2894 -96) and Julius Fröbel’s vision for a greater European confederation 
(Fröbel 1848)). Eventually, however, deliberations at the Frankfurt assembly 
eventually led to the decision to unify Germany without Austria, as embodied in 
the draft constitution of March 1849.  
The Frankfurt Assembly is often held up as a failed attempt to realise 
‘Mitteleuropa’. (Perraudin and Zimmerer 2011 14, Konstantinović 1999: 367, 
Hayes 1994: 35) However, this argument is flawed - the stenographic record of 
12 months-long assembly deliberations barely contains the word ‘Mitteleuropa’ 
or its derivatives. (Wigard 1848 – 1850) The Frankfurt Assembly was, indeed, 
called to resolve the question of Germany, not Central Europe.  
 
3.3.3 Bruck and the shifting identity of Austria 
Karl Ludwig von Bruck was a trade minister (1848 – 1851) in the government 
of Felix Schwarzenberg (1848 – 1852) during the crucial period of the 
Frankfurt Constitutional Assembly. In many Central Europe concepts and their 
subsequent analyses, Bruck is presented as the ultimate forerunner of concepts 
of Central Europe (Krejčí 2005, Berchtefeld 1996: 16, Stirk 1994: 7, Henderson 
1939: 202); however, closer inspection reveals that such accounts typically rely 
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on the works of early 20th century German and Austrian authors, who put 
forward this representation – especially Richard Charmatz in his biography of 
Bruck (Charmatz 1916).  
Interestingly, re-reading Bruck’s original works26 suggests that more than 
creating a concept of Central Europe, Bruck was presenting essentially practical 
considerations en route to a customs union between Austria and what he 
referred to as Germany27. In his most significant expose on the topic (Bruck 
1849a), Bruck uses the notion of Central Europe only once – as a reference to 
the geographical position of Austria within the region that his proposed 
customs union would become operative28; meanwhile, there are 12 different 
references to a “trade” or “customs union of Austria and Germany”. This fact is 
often overlooked in works analyzing his contributions, including Meyer’s 
notorious Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action (Meyer 1955: 16 – 17), as 
the authors tend to zoom in that particular sentence employing the word 
‘Mitteleuropa’(e.g. Brechtefeld 1996: 18).  
Bruck’s characterisation of the proposed customs union as German-Austrian29 
suggests the increasing othering of Austria from members of the German 
Customs Union (‘Zollverein’). The binary expression German-Austrian gives 
away a subtle shift in identity of the Austrian Germans. While List simply 
referred to a German Customs Union and suggested its gradual extension, Bruck 
felt it necessary to phrase his plan as a proposal for a union of two equal and 
                                                 
26
 Bruck published 4 memorandums contemplating reorganisation of economic life in the region, see 
Bruck 1849a, 1849b, 1849c, 1850 and one in his political testament written in 1859, shortly before 
his death (Bruck 1860) 
27
 ‘Zollvereinigung von Oesterreich und Deutschland’ 
28
 ‘Durch das handelspolitische Zusammenfassen Mittel-Europa’s wird Oesterreich vermöge seinen 
zentralen Lage zum Westen und Osten, zum Süden und Norden und der freien Entwickelung seiner 
Natur- und Geisteskräfte, nothwendig der Mittel- und Schwerpunct des grossten Weltverkehres, und 
die weiteren Folgen davon für die politische Gestaltung find unschwer zu übersehen.’ – Through the 
trade-political unification of Central Europe will Austria capitalize on its central position to the west 
and the east, to the south and the north, and will find it easy to see the free development of its natural 
and spiritual forces, the crucial central and focal point of the largest world transport, and other 
consequences for the political arrangement would be easily overlooked. - (Bruck 1849a: 1) 
29
 ‘Oesterreichisch-Deutsche Zoll- und Handelseinigung’ (Bruck 1849a: 1) 
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separate entities – ‘Germany’ and ‘Austria’.30 It suggests the unspoken 
recognition that by 1848, Austria was growing increasingly detached from the 
gradually consolidating group of German states to its north-west. In Bruck’s 
view, the German States31 as a group were different from Austria, and the 
Germans and Austrians were two separate peoples32. The notion of a Germany 
expressed as ‘Deutschland’ did not seem to cover Austria anymore. Austria was 
now a separate entity, an equal partner for the new Germany in the proposed 
union.  
Bruck’s second memorandum dealt squarely with ‘Zolleinigung mit 
Deutschland’ (Bruck 1849b: 2) and contained no references to Central Europe. 
Similarly, a third memorandum actually used the expression ‘Anschluss 
Österreichs’, rather than ‘Mitteleuropa’ (Bruck 1849c: 164 and 166). The fourth 
and longest memorandum, spreading over 28 pages, twice mentioned 
‘mitteleuropäischer Kontinent’ contextually, as a reference for the geographical 
location of Austria within the projected area of the economic union (Bruck 
1850: 188 and 204), otherwise operating with the notion of ‘Zolleinigung’, in 
referring to his proposal. Finally, in his political testament, Bruck used the 
actual expression ‘Mitteleuropa’ only once, in very similar fashion to his other 
works33, otherwise reverting once again to ‘Einigung mit Deutschland’. (Bruck 
1860: 250) 
To sum up, in all of Bruck’s five works collectively the expression ‘Mitteleuropa’ 
is employed only four times – and in all four instances, this is a vague reference 
                                                 
30
 ‘Deutschland und Oesterreich werden unermesslich wachsen auf Wohlfahrt und Kraft.’ (Bruck 
1849a: 2) 
31
 ‘…die freie Durchfuhr durch die Deutschen Staaten and Oesterreich und umgekehrt.’ (Bruck 
1849a: 2) 
32
 ‘Die Tarifreform wird hier mit eben so viel Umsicht und Energie, als mit grossartiger Auffassung 
der Lage und Bedürfnisse der Oesterreichischen und Deutschen Völker betrieben.’ – The tariff reform 
will be conducted here with as much care and energy, as with a greater view of the situation and 
needs of the Austrian and German peoples. - (Bruck 1849a: 1) 
33
 ‘Österreich bildet in Mitteleuropa die grosse Wasserscheide zwischen der atlantischen und der 
pontisch-mittelländischen Abdachung und deren beiderseitigen Flusssystemen…’- Austria builds in 
Central Europe the great watershed between Atlantic and Pontic-Mediterranean slopes and their 
respective river systems. – (Bruck 1860, pp. 263 – 264) 
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to the naturally central position of Austria in the economic life of the continent. 
While this may suggest use of the vague geographical notion of Central Europe 
in mid-nineteenth century parlance, Bruck was simply proposing a customs 
(and later a more comprehensive) union between Germany and Austria, rather 
than presenting a theory of Central Europe. 
At the Frankfurt Assembly, Bruck served as vice-chairman of its economic 
committee and argued forcefully for moves towards a customs union that 
included the Habsburg Empire (Stirk 1995: 7). In November 1848 he also 
became Austrian Minister of Commerce, which, in addition to his business 
interests – centring on a Trieste-based shipping firm – surely drove and 
explained his efforts in Frankfurt. His essential proposal focused on protection 
of an internal market for the Customs Union through the adoption of protective 
tariffs, while the simultaneous development of Trieste harbour would help to 
channel and increase trade with the Middle East.  He hoped, too, for a 
Mediterranean port within the territory of the empire to catch British trade 
stopping off en route to India as well. Austrian Prime Minister Schwarzenberg 
supported Bruck’s proposal, yet with somewhat different underlying 
motivations. His interest lay in creation of a larger union, where Austria could 
balance the influence of Prussia, thereby keeping its power in check.  
For the Prussian side, as represented by Rudolf von Delbrück, was 
fundamentally opposed to any such ideas. At stake was the dominant standing 
of Prussia among the German states. As was apparent from Bruck’s separate 
nomination of Germany and Austria, Prussia had managed to centre the German 
unification process on itself and exclude Austria in the process. Bruck’s 
proposal would bring Austria back into the union, counter-weighting Prussian 
influence. Moreover, Austria was also assigned with the key commercial role 
with development its priority.  
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Eventually, Bruck’s Frankfurt Assembly proposal was defeated alongside other 
parallel attempts to create a German customs union with Austria.34 Later efforts 
lacked any kind of audience as Austria was excluded from a territorially-
consolidating Germany. 
3.4 From Germany to Central Europe 
The definitive split between Austria and the remainder of the German states 
was sealed by the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and Bismarck’s pursuit of 
Prussian dynastic rather than national interests. (Stirk 1994: 6) More 
importantly, the defeat in this war forced Austria into its compromise with the 
Magyar aristocracy, the essential basis of their Compromise of 186735. This 
finally put to rest any remaining self-portrayals of the Habsburg Empire as an 
integral part of Germany.  
Following the proclamation of the German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at 
Versailles in 1871, only 5 years after the Battle of Sadowa, a definite answer 
had been provided to the German Question that had loomed for more than half 
a century. Germany now encompassed those German states that had been 
subsumed under the imperial power of the Hohenzollners.  
And it is perhaps from this point that the real Central Europe debate emerges. 
Interestingly, it takes on a different dimension in each empire, so necessitating 
their separate discussion. Here, we will focus on the development of the notion 
within the German Empire, leaving exploration of Austro-Hungarian concepts 
to Chapter 4. 
 
                                                 
34
 Mostly as a result of Austria‘s own reluctance to accept proposals put forward and disregard for the 
assembly itself (e.g. execution of the assembly member Robert Blum, despite the granted immunity). 
The last nail in the coffin of grossdeutsch plans was Schwarzenberg’s speech at the All-Austrian 
Assembly at Kremsier on 27 November, in which he declared his determination to build a truly 
unified Habsburg monarchy. This act convinced many members of the Frankfurt Assembly that 
Austria had no intentions to concede to a larger union with German states. 
35
 Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, by re-
establishing Hungarian sovereignty. The two parts of the country had two separate parliaments and 
prime ministers, and were unified in the person of the monarch. They also had three common 
ministries – foreign affairs, defence and finance. 
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3.4.1 Constantin Frantz – from Germany to Central Europe 
The works of Constantin Frantz (1817 – 1891) span a period that witnessed 
crystallisation of the German territories of the former Holy Roman Empire into 
a coherent German Empire with a separate Austria (Austria-Hungary). His 
writings show a clear shift from detailing the concept of Germany to that of 
elaborating a Central Europe as a political unit in the space lying between 
France and Russia - making Frantz’s writings a (or the) genuine fore-runner of 
Central Europe conceptions made during the First World War. 
The sheer volume of Frantz’s work makes interpretation complex. A majority of 
later authors analyzing his writing typically isolate and discuss one or two of 
his concepts, i.e., those which fit into the context of their analyses (e.g. 
Brechtefeld 1996, or Meyer 1955). Another layer complicating the 
interpretation of Frantz’s concepts is added by the early 20th century German 
advocates of Central Europe and a greater Germany, who purposefully chose to 
reprint particular works to showcase those of Frantz’s proposals that fitted the 
then contemporary discussion (e.g. Eugen Stamm’s edited collection of Frantz’s 
essays entitled Das Grössere Deutschland, 1935). Given the fact that Frantz’s 
influence in his own life-time was limited and therefore that surviving originals 
of his works are relatively rare, it is these reprints that are typically quoted in 
the later literature. For example, Meyer (1955: 26 – 27) chose to quote Stamm’s 
Konst ntin Fr ntz’ Schriften und Leben (1907) and Heinrich von Srbik’s 
Deutsche Einheit (1933), rather than the original works. The result is a 
misrepresentative singular focus on one particular federative conception of 
Central Europe developed by Frantz in the early 1880s and reprinted by the 
said authors.  
 
3.4.1.1 The revolutionary period and beyond 
Yet it should not be forgotten that between 1841 and 1891, Frantz published 78 
books. In the 1841 – 1848 period alone, Frantz’s writings span a variety of 
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topics ranging from philosophy (Frantz 1844) to financial systems (Frantz 
1848a). After opening of the Frankfurt Assembly, where Frantz presented his 
proposal for a loose federation including Austria (Frantz 1848b), his works 
concentrate almost exclusively on politics. Frantz continued advocating 
inclusion of Austria, regularly publishing works renewing his call for federation 
of German states (Frantz 1851, 1858a, 1858b, 1861, 1865).  
These works mirrored the European power context of the period where 
“Prussia unaided could not keep the Rhine or Vistula for a month from her 
ambitious neighbours” (Meyer 1955: 27). Frantz was preoccupied with the 
threat from France. The very starting point of his considerations was an 
insistence that the very purpose of German confederation was to protect its 
western borders36. The most elaborate presentation of his post-Frankfurt ideas 
is his 1861 treatise, Drei und Dreißig Sätze vom Deutschen Bund. In his view, the 
German confederation was failing on this task because of insufficient political 
integration, which was the result of outside imposition (post-Napoleonic wars 
Congress of Vienna 1815) and not an expression of the political ambitions of the 
German nation37. The only means to ensure its safety was for the German 
confederation to become a real power within a European context through the 
inclusion of both Prussia and Austria. (Frantz 1861: 22 and 126) Yet, history, 
politics and cultural differences would preclude Germany from becoming a 
successful unitary state. Frantz therefore suggested a federative structure that 
would make the best of the complementary strengths of individual German 
states.38 While Frantz observed that such a union would provide necessary 
protection from both France and Russia (Bruck 1861: 28), his primary concern 
remained France. He suggested inclusion of Netherlands, Belgium and 
                                                 
36
 ‘Sicherung der deutschen Westgrenze ist der vornehmste Zweck des deutschen Bundes.’ – Securing 
the German western border is the chief purpose of the German Confederation. - (Frantz 1861: 43) 
37
 ‘…der deutsche Bund und die deutsche Nation zwei sehr verschiedene Dinge sind. … Der deutsche 
Bund ist nicht aus der deutschen Nation entsprungen, sondern von den europäischen Mächten 
gemacht worden, man kann sagen, in Paris…’ – German Confederation and German nation are two 
very different things. German Confederation did not spring from the German nation, but it was made 
by the European powers – one could say – in Paris. - (Frantz 1861: 9) 
38
 “Foederalismus ist eben so positive als aktiv, und synthetisch im hochsten Grade”. – Federalism is 
as positive as it is active, and synthetic to the highest degree. - (Frantz 1861: 126) 
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Switzerland within the proposed federation was essentially in order to keep 
France in check as fully as possible39.  
In this work, Frantz dealt with reorganisation of the German Confederation, 
rather than any concept of Central Europe. He occasionally did use the 
expression as a general reference to the area lying between France and Russia, 
but the centre-point of his theorisation was still the German Confederation. His 
purpose was to design a political unit which could provide safeguards against 
potential French or Russian adventurism. Yet, as the notion of Germany 
gradually solidified as a short-hand for German Empire, a new expression 
needed to be found to describe Frantz’s desired political unit. 
 
3.4.1.2 Central Europe enters the scene 
In the post-1871 period, Frantz’s writings turned to criticism of Bismarck’s 
policy (Frantz 1871, 1873, 1874a, 1874b, 1875). He highlighted exactly the 
same failings that he had observed previously with the German Confederation, 
dismissing the German Empire, built on its kleindeutsch premise, as a mere 
continuation of the same old mistake.  
In a 1879 work with its unwieldy title - Der Föderalismus als das leitende Prinzip 
für die soziale, staatliche und internationale Organisation, unter besonderer 
Bezugnahme auf Deutschland, kritisch nachgewiesen und konstruktiv 
dargestellt40 - Frantz reiterated the need for any federation to include both 
Prussia and Austria. An overarching concern with the French threat remained a 
feature of his reasoning (Frantz 1879: 133). While Frantz continued here to 
                                                 
39
 “Dazu liegen grade diese Staaten in der Linie, von welcher die Gefahr kommt, und helfen gerade 
diejenige Seite Deutschlands decken, wo wir selbst am schwächsten sind. Gleich passend und wichtig 
ist es für den deutschen Bund sich mit diesen Staaten zu vereinigen, als es umgekehrt für diese 
Staaten selbst passend und wichtig ist, sich mit dem deutschen Bunde zu vereinigen.” – These are 
precisely the states in line, from which comes the danger, and they would help to shelter that side of 
Germany, where we are the weakest. It is equally appropriate and important for the German 
Confederation to unite with these states, as it is, conversely, appropriate and important for these states 
to unite with the German Confederation. - (Frantz 1861: 128) 
40
 - Federalism as a guiding principle of social, governmental and international organization, with 
particular reference to Germany; critically examined and constructively demonstrated. -  
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refer to Prussia and Austria, rather than the German Empire and Austria-
Hungary, this book introduced the notion of political union under the term, 
‘Mitteleupäischer Bund’41, an economic and cultural union of three politically 
federated and geographically separate regions: Prussia (with Russian Poland 
and the Baltics); Austria (governing Hungary and the Balkans) and the 
remainder of the German states. Besides these three core constitutive parts, the 
union was to be widened to potentially include countries he had earlier 
considered might form part of a German Confederation (Frantz 1861) – 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, together thereby comprising the Central 
European Union (Frantz 1879: 140). The purpose of the union was to enable 
the rise of a united power in the space between Russia and France (see the then 
contemporary map in Appendix 34). 
In this work Frantz also presented his vision of a future world consisting of 
large political units such as Russia, the British Empire or the United States. The 
need for wider union in Europe was substantiated on the grounds of necessary 
integration to face down the challenges posed by these super-powers in the 
future. In terms of trade, greater economic areas were to dominate the world. 
These lines of reasoning were to be picked up by subsequent Central Europe 
theories.  
Interestingly, the work also shows (as compared to his previous pieces) an 
increased dose of Christian universalism. This is used to substantiate the newly 
introduced culturalising role of Germans in their sphere of influence. The 
language is not dissimilar to the later organic theory of state: for example, the 
proposed federation was said to be ‘vigorous’ and the old empire ‘reborn’.42  
                                                 
41
 Chapter entitled ‘Erweiterung des deutschen Bundes zum Mitteleuropäischen Bund’ – Broadening 
of German Union into a Central European Union –  (Frantz 1879: 130 – 153) 
42
 ‘Eine lebenskräftige Föderation… würde erst die wahre Wiedergeburt des ehemaligen Reiches 
sein.’ – A vigorous federation would be the true reincarnation of the former Empire – (Frantz 1879: 
129) 
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If any particular work could be described as the forerunner of First World War 
conceptions it was this one, shifting smoothly from conceptualising Germany to 
theorizing Central Europe. 
 
3.4.1.3 Die Weltpolitik 
The final shift in Frantz’s theorizing of the space between Russia and France 
became obvious with his 1882 three volume work, Die Weltpolitik. Besides the 
further strengthening of organic references to nature, blood and even flesh 
(Frantz 1882: 37), this introduced another familiar feature of early classical 
geopolitics – the dichotomy between land- and sea-based power, essentially 
represented by Germany and the British Empire (Frantz 1882: 142). 
Importantly, this was Frantz’s only work to display a global reach rather than a 
regional focus, here theorizing the space between Russia and France from the 
grand perspective of world politics. 
Its second volume – Deutschland und Mitteleuropa – highlighted the ‘universal 
meaning’ of Germany in a regional cultural history mediated by the Holy Roman 
Empire (Frantz 1882: 134 – 136). The federation remains unchanged in its 
geographical scope (see Frantz 1879); however, there are new explanatory 
contextual features. Germany has now assumed the historical mission to unify 
the region43. Meanwhile, the previous concern over France is somewhat muted 
amidst recognition of the perceived need to create a regional federation that 
might counter the global powers of Russia, Britain and the USA.  
In fact, Frantz had even considered inclusion of France within his proposed 
structure. It was ultimately dropped in recognition of its own historical 
importance – with Frantz considering that France could not accept any lesser 
standing than centrality in any new union - yet this role had already been 
reserved for a Germany expressly defined as the ‘land of the middle’ (Frantz 
                                                 
43
 ‘Ist Deutschland in Europa das Land der Mitte, so ist es auch wie dazu prädestinirt, andere 
Nationen zu einer Vereinigung heranzuziehen.’- If Germany is the land of the middle in Europe, it is 
also predestined to bring other nations to unification. – (Frantz 1882: 161) 
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1882: 161 – 162), around which other nationalities would be united, so that the 
‘natural order of things’ might be realised (Frantz 1882: 163). The necessity of 
German protection for Hungary, the Southern and Western Slavs is re-
emphasised with the invocation of the Russian and Ottoman threats.  
More than anything, this last in a long line of major works of Constantin Frantz 
strongly resembles the works of Central Europe authors during the First World 
War. With the publication of Die Weltpolitik, Central Europe inadvertently 
entered the stage as a replacement notion for Germany, but one which notably 
did not succeed in encompassing the whole of the German nation. Frantz’s 
Central Europe was an expression of unfulfilled national ambition, mixed with a 
touch of cultural messianism and nationalist grandeur – all of these 
characteristics would underpin the many concepts of Central Europe that 
would follow. 
 
Despite the towering volume of Franz’s works, their impact during his life-time 
remained limited. His career in the civil and diplomatic services was cut short 
by his outspoken opposition to official policy lines in 1860s and 1870s and his 
reach was generally limited to journals and newspapers (Brechtefeld 1996: 28 
– 29). His works were really only rediscovered when reprinted by advocates of 
Central Europe in the early 20th century. 
 
3.4.2 Paul de Lagarde – the nationalist parallel 
A similar evolution to Frantz can be seen in the works of Paul de Lagarde. A 
biblical scholar and an orientalist by education, Lagarde presented his designs 
for the region in a collection of short works Deutsche Schriften. A first volume 
was published in 1878 and a second three years later (Lagarde 1878, 1881), 
before both would be revised and amended in 1892. The first proposed the 
creation of a Greater German Empire including   a lost and floundering Austria, 
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whose r ison d’etre Lagarde reckoned could only be rekindled by becoming a 
colony of Germany44 (Lagarde 1878: 84). While the term Central Europe (in 
form of ‘Mitteleuropa’) itself was not used, Germany is described as Central 
European. ‘Central European’ referred to that familiar old designation of space 
between France and Russia, with each characterised as posing a threat to peace 
in Europe: 
 
“den frieden in Europa ohne dauernde belästigung seiner 
angehörigen zu erzwingen, ist nur ein Deutschland im stande, das 
von der Ems- zur Donaumündung, von Memel bis Triest, von 
Metz bis etwa zum Bug erreicht, weil nur ein solches Deutschland 
sich ernähren, nur ein solches mit seiner stehenden Heere sowohl 
Frankreich als Russland… niederschlagen kann. Weil nun alle 
Welt Frieden will, darum muss alle Welt dieses Deutschland 
wollen, und das jetzige deutsche Reich als das ansehen, was es ist, 
als eine étappe auf dem Wege zu Vollkommenerem, eine étappe, 
welche zu dem endgültigen mitteleuropäischen Staate sich so 
verhalt, wie sich der einst bestandene norddeutsche Bund zum 
jetzigen deutschen Reiche verhalten hat.”45 (Lagarde 1878: 87) 
 
                                                 
44
 ‘Oesterreich hat längst kein existenzprincip mehr: man weiss nicht, warum es da ist. Es gibt keine 
andere aufgabe für Oesterreich als die, der coloniestaat Deutschlands zu werden. Die völker in dem 
weiten Reiche sind mit ausnahme der Deutschen und der südSlaven alle miteinander politisch 
wertlos: sind nur material für germanische neubildungen.’ – Austria does not have a reason for 
existence anymore: one does not know, why it is there. There is no other purpose for Austria besides 
of being a colony for Germany. Peoples in the wider Empire are with the exception of Germans and 
South-Slavs altogether politically worthless; they are only a material for Germanic renewal. - 
(Lagarde 1878: 84) 
45
 - Only a Germany, which stretches from Ems to Danube’s mouth, from Memel to Terst, from Metz 
to approximately Bug; is in position to ensure peace in Europe without constant harassment of its 
nationals; because only such a Germany consummates itself, and only such a Germany with a 
standing army can beat both France and Russia, with their armies. Because now the whole world 
wants peace, therefore, the whole world has to wish for this Germany, and view the current German 
Empire for what it is – a stage on the way to the more perfect, a stage, which relates to the final 
Central European state, as the former North-German Alliance related to the current German Empire. -  
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Demonstrating a speedy shift away from explicit conceptions of Germany itself, 
Lagarde’s second volume   expressly employed the notion of ‘MittelEuropa’ 
(Lagarde 1881: 91), even if his description of the construct closely resembles 
the one previously provided for Germany: 
 
“[Es] …ist auf jeden Fall möglich, zu begreifen, dass ein 
MittelEuropa geschaffen werden muss, welches von dem 
Augenblicke an die Gewähr des Friedens für den ganzen Erdtheil 
bietet, in welchem es Russland vom schwarzen Meer und damit 
von dem Südslaven abgedrängt, und deutscher Colonisation – 
denn wir sind ein Bauernvolk – im eignen Osten einen breiten 
Raum gewonnen haben wird. Nur durch eine wenigstens nach 
Süden hin vollständige Internierung Russlands kann uns 
überdies unser geborener Bundesgenosse, Oesterreich, in 
leistungsfähigem Zustande erhalten werden.”46 (Lagarde 1881: 6) 
 
Somewhat more respect is now shown to Austria, too - now characterised as an 
ally. The threat from Russia is now depicted as more pronounced, while France 
has pretty much gone missing in any calculations. However, the very purpose of 
forging a Central Europe is still to bring peace to Europe, as was earlier the case 
with Germany. The exact delineation of the proposed political unit is missing, 
but it is tentatively identifiable from the vague characteristisation he provides – 
such as when dividing Russia from the South-Slavs.  
                                                 
46
 - It is in every case possible to conceive that Central Europe has to be created, [Central Europe] 
which would instantly guarantee peace for the whole continent, in which Russia would be pushed 
from the Black Sea and that way from South-Slavs as well; and German colonization – because we 
are agricultural people – would gain wider space in the East. Moreover, only through this 
containment of Russia, at least towards the south, can we obtain a powerful position for our natural 
ally, Austria. -  
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Lagarde’s focal and terminological shift from Germany to Central Europe is 
often missed or overlooked, as a majority of subsequent commentators, starting 
with Meyer (1955) utilise 20th century reprints of the 1892 revised joint edition 
of both volumes of Deutsche Schriften. Yet, the original prints of his works 
clearly suggest that within the space of three years, Lagarde had moved from 
using the word ‘Deutschland’ to ‘MittelEuropa’, while his view of Austria 
changed from a mere, almost naturally subordinate appendage of Germany to a 
legitimate,  separate entity, which should be allied to Germany, rather than an 
integral part. It was this change of heart over Austria that seemingly explained 
Lagarde’s shift towards elaborating a ‘MittelEuropa’. Yet, while Austria was 
clearly no longer part of  ‘Deutschland’ in Lagarde’s mind, the need to 
conceptualise the space between France and Russia remained – with the goal of  
elaborating for Germany a spatial power position that might counter any 
perceived or emergent threats. A new notion had to be developed to replace the 
now redundant ‘Deutschland’ and ‘MittelEuropa’ must have seemed an obvious 
choice, since Lagarde had already described Germany as ‘mitteleuropäisch’ 
(Lagarde 1878).  
So Lagarde provides a parallel to Frantz’s dropping of the notion of 
‘Deutschland’ in favour of ‘Mitteleuropa’, proving this was no isolated case and 
that it was paralleled by other authors in the early 1880s. Yet, Frantz and 
Lagarde in no way constituted the mainstream in German intellectual thinking 
and the notion of Central Europe still had a long way to travel to the forefront of 
regional theorisation.  
 
3.4.3 The rise of Central Europe 
Of course, Lagarde and Frantz fit easily into the common narrative of the 
emergence of Central Europe – that it developed seamlessly from Grossdeutsch 
ideas and was essentially a replacement notion for a political unit including 
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both Austria and the German Empire, and then achieved its greatest popularity 
during the First World War. 
Indeed, it should be underlined that it was those advocates of a Germany 
inclusive of Austria who made the smooth transition towards employing the 
term, ‘Mitteleuropa’. However, one must guard against the impression that this 
was the only meaning ascribed to the term Central Europe in late 19th century 
Germany.47  
Many authors used this term in a completely different connotation than the 
resurrected Grossdeutsch project. Indeed, some considered it a basis for 
conceptualisation of a mainland Europe that included France (Le Temps 1890). 
In fact, neither Frantz nor Lagarde had very much influence during their life-
times (Brechtefeld 1996: 29 and 32) and a variety of geographical 
representations (and therefore divergent explanatory bases) of central Europe 
had been presented in the 1880s and 1890s. The definitive discourse that gave 
‘Mitteleuropa’ its meaning of the project of political and economic unification of 
the German Empire and Austria-Hungary spanned two decades and was hardly 
straightforward. 
For example, the works of Hermann Wagner and Albrecht Penck, both of which 
were published in the mid-1880s (1883 and 1887 respectively), presented 
Central Europe in its narrowest spatial expression as extending from the North 
and the Baltic Seas to the North-Western Carpathians and the Alps. This aligned 
with the underlying German-ness of the region, but obviously fell short of the 
wider area Frantz and Lagarde intended to include. In the same period Lujo 
Brentano presented a concept that went well beyond grossdeutsch ideas – a 
customs union between German Empire, Austria-Hungary and a number of 
Balkan states (Brentano 1885). This added an economic dimension that was not 
present in either Frantz’s or Lagarde’s works. Yet, a further and significant 
number of authors included France within their Central European constructs – 
                                                 
47
 Discourse of the political unit in the area was conducted also outside the notion, using descriptions 
such as “europaeischgermanisches Gebiet”.  
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a vision that lay far from the Francophobic tendencies of Frantz and Lagarde, or 
the Grossdeutsch plans of Bruck or List. For instance, Berthold Volz included 
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and the ‘upper Danubian basin’ (Volz 
1895), while Friedrich Ratzel included France within Central Europe in his 
work: Deutschland: Einführung in the Heimatkunde (1898a: 220). Moreover, in 
early usage as the notion was increasingly adopted, many authors continued to 
refer to it as a geographical area rather than any grand political plan. This was 
the case with Ratzel, for instance who used the term to designate the wider area 
within which Germany was located. 
In addition to this divergence in concepts, developmental change in the 
substance of the notion is evident in the 1880s and 1890s. Significant 
modifications to conceptions of Central Europe48 appear in the consecutive 
works of many authors. For example, Hermann Wagner changed his definition 
in 1900, even including Great Britain and Italy within his widened Central 
Europe. (Wagner 1900: 763)  
 
Yet, the mainstream of works on Central Europe was gravitating towards 
common characteristics: the belief in a leading role for the German nation in 
Europe and an underlying drive for conceptualisation of the area it should 
‘naturally’ dominate – a step beyond mere unification! By the end of the 
century, the notion was gradually permeating daily parlance as well as 
academic debate. The discourse was gradually shifting towards use of 
Mitteleuropa as a notion that described a political unit encompassing the whole 
of the German nation and the area of its influence. It was underpinned by 
organic theorisation of the state and prevalent geographic determinism. Put 
simply, since Germany was a young vigorous state in the middle of Europe, it 
would grow into a ‘Mitteleuropa’ encompassing the whole of the German nation 
to dominate the continent, finally giving the German nation the place among the 
                                                 
48 not necessarily in the linear manner towards the First World War association of Central Europe 
with the political unit consisting of Germany and Austria Hungary 
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great powers it naturally deserved. The growth process of the constituent 
political units of the German nation was thereby presented as a natural 
development from the small German states, through the North-German 
Alliance, to the German Empire and now beyond, in the form of Central Europe. 
So the German nation was to follow its destiny to greatness. 
 
Issues of Geographische Zeitschrift49 from the late 19th century amply 
demonstrate these tendencies. Within its first volume of 1895, a section 
appears under the title of Central Europe (accompanying a separate section on 
Europe), containing 39 separate articles and other items and forming a major 
part of the volume. Everything here was essentially focused on the Germans as 
an ethnic group, dealing with such issues as the historical Germanisation of 
Lithuania, for instance. The same, first volume featured an article by Ratzel on 
the development of states, essentially a more concise version of his organic 
growth theory (Ratzel 1895). Further organic growth theory articles would 
appear in the next (1896) volume (e.g. Hözel 1896) with the Central Europe 
section featuring Belgium, Switzerland and the Baltic, as well as Germany and 
Austria-Hungary.  
 
The 1898 volume features an article by Ratzel on the question of Central 
Europe in the context of the rising power of Russia and the global dominance of 
the British Empire. (Ratzel 1898b) He predictably defined Central Europe along 
the lines established in his Deutschland: Einführung in the Heimatkunde (Ratzel 
1898a) and – consistent with his social Darwinist convictions – suggested 
creation of a larger unit in Central Europe as necessary to counter the influence 
of larger empires. His comparison of France, Austria-Hungary and Germany 
resulted in the familiar observation that Germany had incomparably more 
                                                 
49
 Geographical Journal, 1895 – today, established and edited by Alfred Hettner, a professor at the 
university of Tübingen. The journal was printed by publishing house Teubner in Leipzig. Today the 
title is still in publishing under Frantz Steiner Verlag. 
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people per square kilometre than other countries and - being culturally strong 
and swiftly developing – necessarily had to be regarded as expansive. On the 
other hand, he described France as a country that had stopped growing and was 
thereby in relative decline (Ratzel 1898b: 147) While again falling short of 
offering any precise proposal for the organisation of the central European 
space, he called for a unification embracing all three regional “smaller great 
powers”, reminding the reader that “a whole literature has been written on 
United States of Europe and on Central European Union”, pointing specifically 
to the works of Albert von Schäffle (1895) and Alexander Peez (1898). (Ratzel 
1898b: 144) The article displayed a strong nationalist bent and invoked the 
image of Germany as the strongest leader in the region, the state with the will 
and energy to grow and lead. Yet, unlike later nationalist conceptions as well as 
the earlier works of Lagarde and Frantz, Ratzel’s central Europe definitively 
included France. 
 
Yet, by the turn of the twentieth century, the issue of geographical delimitation 
was being seen as less important than its driving vision. Discourse was settling 
on the understanding and aspiration for Mitteleuropa as an envisaged political 
unit (with all its distinctive organic reasoning) which spanned the area of the 
German nation. For the record, authors continued to differ on what the span of 
such an area actually was. Much of the definitive discourse of Central Europe 
was reflected in the Geographische Zeitschrift. The articles of Penck, Partsch and 
Ratzel and others published in the journal carried the main thrust of the 
gradual formation of the notion not by agreeing on a common definition, but 
more in the way of establishing the essential characteristics it carried. Besides 
identifying Central Europe with the area of German settlement in Europe, other 
unifying characteristics had emerged from the discourse by the early 20th 
century – glorification of the German nation’s unique qualities, proclamation of 
its historical mission as a leader of the region, the aim to cement an intervening 
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political unit between France and Russia, with all the underlying reasoning 
premised upon organic growth theory and geographic determinism. 
 
3.5 From a nationalist dream to a pragmatic customs union 
An emerging consensus on Central Europe as the region that was inhabited by 
Germans, however vaguely this might have been defined geographically, was 
strengthening by the early years of the 20th century. In the amended reprint of 
Ratzel’s Deutschland, published after his death in 1907, Central Europe was 
presented as consisting of Germany, the Austrian part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, German-speaking Switzerland, the Low Countries and Denmark. 
(Ratzel 1907) By this stage, France was clearly and definitively excluded.50  
The most famous articulation of Central Europe during this period is 
attributable to Joseph Partsch, a renowned German geographer. His Central 
Europe was published in London in 1903 as part of The Regions of the World 
Series edited by Sir Halford Mackinder and quickly became one of the early 
classics of traditional geopolitics. He positioned Central Europe between the 
Alpine ridges and the northern seas, describing it as an area defined by a tri-
layered belt of the Alps, lesser mountain chains and northern lowlands, 
stretching from Dunkerque to Sandomirz. (Partsch 1903: 2 – 3) It was to 
include contemporary Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, 
Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria.  
Partsch insisted that not only did Germans comprise 51 % of this area’s total 
population, but they were also the standard bearers of culture, knowledge and 
progress that other nations might aspire to within the region. In order to “reach 
greatness” (Partsch 1903: 141) the Central European nations had to unify on 
the common basis provided by the German language and culture. Partsch 
                                                 
50
 Ratzel presented two conceptualisation of German-dominated Mitteleuropa (1898, 1907), he was 
one of the leaders of Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League), succeeded by Partsch after his 
death in 1904) and a vigorous advocate of German expansion into Africa.  
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reckoned that Central Europe „consciously or unconsciously, willingly or 
unwillingly, belongs to the sphere of German civilisation“. (Partsch 1903: 142) 
Only unification under German leadership held the potential to safeguard it 
from Russian expansionism and British hegemonic ambitions, thereby 
delivering the promise of peace and prosperity. (Partsch 1903: 159)  
Partsch’s work introduced to an international audience some of the main 
themes that would be carried forward in conceptualisation of Central Europe in 
the German tradition – the uniqueness of the German nation and its culture; the 
need for unification of all areas inhabited by the German speaking population; 
the righteous, fatalistic historical mission to rise to greatness; with ‘natural’ 
German domination of the said area. The notion of Mitteleuropa gradually 
became part and parcel of German attempts to dominate smaller nations 
inhabiting the same area.  
 
3.5.1 The economic dimension 
About the same time as Partsch’s Central Europe went into print, a crucial, 
emergent aspect was gaining prominence within the discourse – economics. 
While economic considerations – such as the production of staple crops or 
industrial production – had also been a feature of the works originating in the 
1890s, the idea of a Central European Union wholy substantiated by economic 
order of the day was a new feature added after 1900. Growing protectionism 
and a scramble for markets can be viewed as a new and real influence on the 
notion of Central Europe, now cast as the vehicle for carving out a greater 
economic area for Germany in Europe, potentially offering a robust demand for 
industrial products and a powerful platform for global economic expansion.  
In 1902, Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft51 brought the thoughts of Albert 
Sartorius to a wider audience, here summarising economic assessments of a 
                                                 
51
 Journal for Social Science, published by Julius Wolf, later founder of the Central European 
Economic Association (Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein, 1904), between 1898 and 1921 
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possible federative future for Central Europe. (Sartorius 1902) His article was 
an epitome of contemporary thought on Central Europe with a novel economic 
twist. 
Sartorius’ work shows clear signs of Ratzelien influence – with a country’s 
economy itself clearly described as an organism (Sartorius 1902: 562) and 
transport as its blood circulation52 (Sartorius 1902: 558). Similarly, geographic 
determinism was another obvious hallmark of his methodology, with the claim 
that the essential preconditions for achievement of economic greatness are 
naturally bestowed – the presence of the sea and navigable inland waterways to 
mediate trade. He built his argument for creating a greater economic area on 
the assertion that a combination of terrestrial and maritime possessions best 
afforded the essential preconditions for economic growth (Sartorius 1902: 
675). Further influences quoted in his work included Friedrich List, Klement 
Juglar and Joseph Arthur de Gobineau.  
The combination of these influences translated into his reasoning that in 
anarchic global economic conditions characterised by regular crises, Germany 
needed to guard against the contingency of withering away by building up a 
larger economic area, which would provide it with the resources to grow and 
achieve prosperity. The benchmark to measure up to was, in Sartorius’s eyes, 
the United States of America. 
For Sartorius the main source of domestic economic growth was global trade. 
He considered the continued existence of a number of small coastal states along 
the North Sea an “anomaly of economic geography” (Sartorius 1902: 676), 
suggesting that the main production areas of the Rheinland, Westphalia and 
other regions of Germany could easily be cut off from world trade routes by a 
“political wall” (Sartorius 1902: 676). He maintained that both sides were 
damaged by perpetuation of a situation he characterised as “the chaos of small 
                                                 
52
 “Der Verkehr ist also eine Bethätigung der Volkswirtschaft wie die Blutzirkulation eine Funktion 
des lebenden menchlichen Körper ist.” – Transport is thus an exertion of the economy such as blood 
circulation is a function of the living human body. - Sartorius 1902: 558 
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states” whereby Germany depended on mediation of its exports by 
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, while these countries’ trade income 
depended on production in Germany. (Sartorius 1902: 676) Sartorius 
highlighted the example of the United States and its economic rise after gaining 
access to the sea in the east and west, immediately facilitating a doubling of 
access to world trade routes for its vast production areas. (Sartorius 1902: 676)  
The need to create a greater economic area was justified by observed changes 
in patterns of world trade, whereby Sartorius saw the “British principle of 
laissez-faire” as no longer workable. World trade was, in his opinion, heading 
towards a system of larger, protected economic areas fenced off from one 
another by high import duties. In a historical comparative exercise, Sartorius 
demonstrated that size of economic zones of individual states was the source of 
economic inequality among them (Sartorius 1902: 564). Therefore, he 
recommended smaller states should build larger economic areas through 
various forms of alliances. Quoting the research of Clement Juglar, Sartorius 
demonstrated that such areas (e.g. the United States or the French colonial 
empire) were better able to withstand global economic crises (Sartorius 1902: 
772) and survive each other’srecessions through protection of their large 
domestic market. 
Central Europe was envisaged as the larger economic area centred on Germany. 
In an idealised situation, Sartorius would have included France here. However, 
historical rivalries and conflicts over territory and, more specifically, the 
ongoing dispute over Alsace-Lorraine (Sartorius 1902: 881) meant this was not 
a practical possibility. Thus his Central European Customs Union was to be 
formed of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and eventually Denmark. 
Belgium was omitted for the political reason of the potential clashes with 
France its inclusion might unleash. (Sartorius 1902: 880) Interestingly, he 
decided to leave out Hungary since it only “offered inferior consumer markets” 
(Sartorius 1902: 880). On the other hand, he suggested that inclusion of Austria 
would facilitate access to “the quiet port of Trieste allowing trade to flow 
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through Elbe and railway connections for wide area from Bohemia to Hamburg” 
(Sartorius 1902: 677).  
Overall, Sartorius likened his proposed customs union to a cartel or alliance, 
which would stand the region in good stead to deal with the near anarchic 
global economic conditions he saw coming at the turn of the twentieth century - 
a vehicle for self-help for all parties involved. While the nationalist edge was 
generally not as sharp as with many other contemporaneous (though less 
economically-focused) works on Central Europe, it surfaced in his Gobineau-
inspired assertion that some races and nations were more suited (i.e., 
Germany) to economic success than others (i.e., the Slavs).  
 
3.5.2 The growing influence of the economists? 
A number of other works pursuing similar arguments for the creation of a 
customs union or greater economic area on the European mainland led by 
Germany were published in the same period. Most notable were the works of 
Josef Grunzel (1901) and Julius Wolf (1901, 1902), which recognised the 
absolute centrality of improving the interconnectivity between the German 
Empire and Austria-Hungary to maximise the potential for economic growth in 
conditions of increasing global competitiveness. The unifying aspect here is the 
view of world trade as ever more competitive and escalating, ‘brutally’ 
unrestrained and unregulated The rapacious dictates of organic theory held 
that those who did not grow would wither away. The logic of such an analysis 
was that small countries, with their limited economies, could not survive as 
they would be isolated with their small domestic markets by fast growing 
greater economic areas. To ward off such a prospect, Germany had to build its 
own greater economic area, addressing the conditions that would most likely 
facilitate further economic growth. 
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Julius Wolf became the leader of this economic Ratzelien strand of thought. 
Besides publishing a multitude of articles and books espousing such a position, 
he took it upon himself to oversee its realisation in practice. 
 
The 1903 issue of Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft carried Julius Wolf’s article: 
‘Ein Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein’ (Central European Economic 
Association, Wolf 1903). Here Wolf underlined that while “the idea of Central 
European customs union has been about for twenty-five years… its’ realisation 
has not been fulfilled until today.” (Wolf 1903: 232) While he did not specify the 
countries that should constitute any Central European customs union, he 
insisted it would need to begin with an economic federation of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. The main reason behind the failure to institute a Central 
European customs union before this time was, in Wolf’s opinion, a prevailing 
lack of appreciation of its potential value but also the systemic resistance of 
large German industrialists and the threat it posed to their vested interests. 
Wolf pointed out that similar obstacles must surely have been overcome in 
process of creating the German customs union back in the 19th century and that 
lessons must have been learned here. For this express purpose, he suggested 
the creation of a business chamber, Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein, 
representing all that was “healthy and valuable in the idea of an economic 
union”53 (Wolf 1903: 235).  
Its purpose was to unite and empower those industrialists and policy-makers 
who favoured the creation of a Central European Customs Union. It was to 
foster cooperation and pursue activities that might convince and convert the 
                                                 
53 “An der Spitze dieses Artikels steht das Wort “Ein mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein”. Es bezeichnet einen 
Plan der, seit einigen Jahren erwogen, Männer der einzelnen hier in Betracht kommenden Staatsgebiete auf sich 
vereinigt. Der mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein will, was hier als erforderlich bezeichnet wurde: was gesund 
und wertvoll an dem Gedanken einer wirtschaftlichen Union, durch das Mittel einer solchen aber nicht zu 
verwirklichen ist, in andere Gestalt zu retten suchen.” – At the top of this article are the words "A central 
European economic association". It means a plan that unites men from individual respective state 
entitites. The Central European Economic Association wants what would here be described as 
necessary: to save in other form, what is healthy and valuable in the idea of an economic union, but 
not possible to realize through this medium. - (Wolf 1903: 235) 
 109 
reluctant. Following his proposal, Wolf reminded everyone of the possibilities 
and opportunities that the economic federation of Germany and Austria-
Hungary would bring – with waterways under unitary control stretching from 
the Baltic to the Black seas. He highlighted that German industries should 
remember that the shortest way to their newly extended sphere of interest in 
Asia Minor and the Middle East “certainly does not lead through Gibraltar” 
(Wolf 1903: 237).  
Within a year (1904) the proposed association had been duly established and 
the 1907 issue of the journal carried Wolf’s report on its first annual 
conference, for which a wide array of supporters and important speakers had 
been assembled. (Wolf 1907) Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein (MEWV) 
would become one of the foremost organisations championing the idea of an 
economic federation between Germany and Austria-Hungary. In addition to 
contemplating the strategic and nationalist Central Europe concepts of the late 
19th century, its focus was on addressing practical business and economic 
interests to help pave the way for the envisaged future union.  
 
Wolf was the most active promoter of Central Europe in the pre-war period, as 
chairman of the MEWV, a publisher, an economist and an author. It was mainly 
through his activities that the economic vision for Central Europe became the 
prominent strand in the discourse during the early 20th century. Under his aegis 
the emphasis had shifted firmly towards actualisation of a customs union of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary as the vehicle by which a sizeable economic 
block would materialise, as well as direct access to eastern markets for German 
industrialists with the promise of ports on the Adriatic and Black seas. 
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3.6 Friedrich Naumann and wartime concepts 
The literature on Central Europe originating between 1915 and 1918 is 
voluminous, reflecting the peak in popularity that the Mitteleuropa concept 
enjoyed during this period. In alliance with Austria-Hungary and under 
wartime conditions of blockade, the public became highly receptive to the idea 
of Central Europe: its overtones of a shared identity, history and mission; its 
narrative of uniqueness and preordained destiny of greatness; and, its seeming 
guarantee of future great power status. These all lined up with what the 
German society was searching for in acrid conditions of unprecedented war, not 
to mention the country’s encirclement by enemies with nobody but their south-
eastern allies to look towards for support. Friedrich Naumann’s notorious 
Mitteleuropa (1916) would become the centrepiece of the hectic wartime 
discourse over Central Europe, elevating the notion to international scrutiny as 
its key precepts were increasingly regarded as the German design for Europe in 
the case of victory – now even Germany’s enemies were watching! 
 
3.6.1 The Central Europe of Friedrich Naumann 
Friedrich Naumann, a German politician and a Protestant priest, understood 
Central European space in its widest possible context as the body of the 
European continent without its peninsular and insular annexes. However, 
congruently with Joseph Partsch, he considered the Austro-Hungarian and 
German Empires as the essential inner core of such a region. 
Friedrich Naumann published his treatise on how a new political unit in the 
Central European space might materialise in a book simply entitled 
Mitteleuropa in 1916 (Naumann 1916). Almost immediately, the book was 
translated into English (Naumann 1917) and several other languages (e.g. 
Czech and Hungarian). He was basically urging the establishment of the Central 
European Union at the end of the war. For him the war would serve as the 
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‘creator’ of the Mid-European soul, ahead of any corresponding, more formal 
territorial definition.  
The primary purpose of Naumann’s Central European union was an economic 
and political union under the leadership of Germany. The construction of the 
envisaged economic bloc had to be regarded as inevitable if Germany did not 
want to become a poorer cousin separating the economic spheres of Russia or 
Great Britain:  
”[T]he world's economic system has become so much more 
narrow and everywhere the principle of syndicates and exclusion 
has made conditions very different from what they were in the 
individualistic atmosphere of the early beginnings of capitalism. 
… He who is alone today will find himself outside to-morrow.“ 
(Naumann 1916: 193)  
He expected the widespread adoption of protectionist policies by the great 
powers, the levy of tariffs and duties that would prevent German exports 
reaching their markets. Germany could save herself from bankruptcy only by 
creating its own customs zone and economic area. The core of this project 
would ideally comprise the territories of Austria-Hungary and Germany, under 
the leadership of the German nation.  
The establishment of the union was also presented as fundamental for the 
defence of the Central European nations. According to Naumann, a single state 
no longer held any significance within the international system by the turn of 
the twentieth century - only large powers could possess any meaningful 
sovereign power.  
More than just envisaging a mainstream customs union, Naumann famously 
proposed a union of states (Staatenbund), an effective supra-state (Oberstaat) 
with its own institutions (Naumann 1916: 233). These would eventually 
provide the basis of „something like a Central European central 
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administration“54. Yet Naumann also insisted  that the union should constitute 
no one new state55 – it was proposed as a union of existing states, a 
confederation with no prospects of becoming a federation. In his discussion of 
constitutional arrangements (Chapter VIII: Verfassungsfragen, Naumann 1916: 
229ff), Naumann argued that the organs of union could be established without 
there actually being any Central European state (Naumann 1916: 240). The 
downplaying of the political implications of his proposed plan is perhaps 
explicable by the need to overcome resistance to the creation of a supra-state 
unit and, especially, concerns over its domination by the Germans. Unlike 
previous authors concerning themselves more narrowly with the elaboration of 
a customs union, Naumann combined arguments of economic and strategic 
necessity en route to his proposal for a political supra-state union; yet, he was 
well aware that such proposal would meet with political opposition. It should 
not be forgotten that Naumann’s emphasis on German leadership of the union 
made him vulnerable to critique that he was not looking to establish a Central 
European Union for the good of all peoples concerned, but to further the 
economic and wider power interests of Germany.  
For this reason, Naumann insisted on the need for emancipation of all the 
nations involved in the project. Obviously, however, his comparison of the 
contemporary challenge of creating a Mid-European union with the earlier 
creation of the German Empire under Prussian leadership (‘Blut und Eisen’ et 
al) implied that his plans would entail a dominant German role in order to come 
to fruition. He was well aware of the fact that the Austrian and Hungarian Slavs 
did not expect too much benefit from fraternisation with the German Empire. 
On the other hand, he was convinced that they would prefer continued Austrian 
rule to the prospect of possible Russian domination. He expected the Slavic 
                                                 
54
 “Sobald man sich aber eine gewisse Mehrzahl solcher mitteleuropäischen Kommissionen oder 
Oberverwaltungen vor Augen stellt, bilden sie zusammen etwas wie eine mitteleuropäische 
Zentralverwaltung.” – But once you keep in mind a certain number of such commissions or supra-
administrations, they form something like a Central European central administration. – (Naumann 
1916: 241 – 242) 
55
 Naumann (1916: 233) made a difference between state union (Bundesstaat) and a union of states 
(Staatenbund).  
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nations living between the Russian east and German west to understand the 
likely impossibility of their survival as independent political units. This should 
logically lead them to accede voluntarily to the proposed project. The project of 
a Central European union was essentially premised on an exaltation of German 
national goals; thus to avoid accusation of hegemonic ambitions, Naumann 
suggested that Slavic nations should be allowed to fulfill their own national 
aspirations. 
Interestingly, Naumann’s book was delivered in a relatively restrained 
rhetorical fashion, avoiding the repetitive exclamation marks and emotionally 
charged phrases that were so typical of many of his contemporaries. While the 
nationalist underpinnings of his book are obvious, Naumann chose to frame 
them in a less overtly confrontational manner, tweaking the tone to suit his 
purposes. For example, chapter 4 of his book carries the title ‘Das 
mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsvolk’56. While the chapter mainly speaks of 
Germany’s trading expertise and productive virtues, its title was designed to 
invoke the picture of an economically productive and cohesive regional 
powerhouse. Indeed, in earlier chapters of the book, Naumann discussed the 
individual features of the peoples inhabiting the region, expressing his hope for 
the future rise of a “Central European type” (Naumann 1916: 61). Yet, despite 
his effort Naumann failed to enlist substantial support among the small nations 
of Austria-Hungary. Quite the contrary; their representatives would become the 
most eloquent opponents of his proposals. 
 
3.6.2 The wartime discourse 
Naumann was not the first commentator to offer a clear vision of the Central 
European project during the Great War – in fact, a significant volume of 
literature on Central Europe was published in the first year and a half of the 
conflict (see e.g. Ullmann 1915, Wolf 1915, Jesser 1915). Yet, it was Naumann 
                                                 
56
 - Central European economic people – (Naumann 1916: 102) 
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who successfully tapped into the economic and strategic headlines of the day to 
propose a plan whose timing could not have been more acutely judged: a loose 
political and economic union of the core Central Powers – Germany and 
Austria-Hungary – which would be dominated by the Germans and extended 
further, if practicable and expedient. Naumann published the right book at the 
right time, sparking an unprecedented debate on the topic, unleashing a flurry 
of articles and books. 
Some contributions to the debate were direct responses to Naumann (e.g. 
Eichhorn 1916, Jäckh 1916) though an even greater proportion was not – a 
great variety of authors with vastly diverging points of view raced to publish 
their particular take on the topic of the day. Both pre- and post-Naumann 
contributions empathised with greater-German sentiments, portraying 
Mitteleuropa as a necessity. So the underpinning core of the construct shifted 
firmly towards the union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, with many authors 
hoping for more – especially what seemed like a likely unopposable route to the 
Orient via the Balkans. The war-time body of works broadly comprised a 
mainstream of narrow concepts premised upon a union between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. If this supposedly was meant to herald a new, greater 
Germany  there was also a lesser but significant proportion of published 
material calling for this core area to provide the defining basis for Germany’s 
own extended sphere of influence to the southeast. While support for the 
mainstream relied typically on pan-German nationalist rhetoric and focused 
practically upon the mechanisms and institutions that could bring it to reality, 
the sub-stream calling for a more extended regional form held back on the 
language of German brotherhood gearing their reasoning towards non-German 
audiences as well. 
For example, Naumann’s liberal colleague (and expert on the Middle East), 
Ernst Jäckh presented his view of Central Europe as a direct consequence of 
Naumann’s book, under the following title: Das Grössere Mitteleuropa: Ein 
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Werkbund-Vortrag (Jäckh 1916). He suggested that the narrow economic union 
envisaged by Naumann was inadequate and, moreover, that a larger Central 
Europe was already in place with the then existent alliance of Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. (Jäckh 1916: 6) Its 
continuation and development was portrayed as the only way out of strategic 
encirclement in Europe for Germany57, bordered, as it was, by enemies to the 
west, north and the east. His justification and articulation bought into the 
geographic determinism of the previous two decades and was dotted with 
references to organic growth theories of the state. Interestingly, Jäckh was one 
of the first authors to quote Rudolf Kjellén and to employ the adjective 
‘geopolitical’ when arguing that Central Europe was not only a necessary 
political construct for Germany but for others too:  
“Die geographische Not, diese ‘gottgewollte Abhängigkeit’ führt 
zur politischen Notwendigkeit, wird zum geopolitischen Zwang – 
für Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn – wie für Balkan und 
Orient.”58 (Jäckh 1916: 8) 
In an effort to reassure his non-Germanic audiences, Jäckh depicted a German 
historical mission to protect Turkey and Bulgaria’s sovereign independence. 
This would be achieved through German leadership of a Central European bloc 
capable of fighting off the hegemonic ambitions of Russia, France and Britain. 
Yet, Jaeckh was an editor of the journal, Das Grössere Deutschland and had 
already commented that, compared to Germany, the smaller nations in the area 
were “not yet ready to build a state” (Jäckh 1916: 7), here presumably alluding 
to Austria-Hungary. Thus, his portrayal of Germany as a mere leader of equals 
within Central Europe was no more convincing than Naumann’s. 
                                                 
57
 “… der letzte, einzige Weg Deutschlands in die Welt!” – the last, the only way for Germany into 
the world! - (Jäckh 1916: 7) 
58
 - The geographical necessity, this "God-given function” leads to political necessity, [and] will 
become a geopolitical compulsion - for Germany and Austria-Hungary - as for the Balkans and the 
Orient. -  
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Another interesting variant on this theme was E. F. Karl’s Vereinigte Staaten von 
Mittel-Europa! Eine Denkschrift zu Frieden (1917), though here the focus was 
more plainly strategic through the prism of German war aims.  Again, aimed 
partially at potentially friendly non-German audiences, Karl outlined his vision 
for a strategic and political unit stretching from Calais to Lemberg, (Karl 1917: 
44). Eventually, and presuming a German victory, the United States of Central 
Europe would ideally have been extended to cover all of Europe to provide for 
the security and freedom of all of its constituent nations (Karl 1917: 51)59.  
 
By way of contrast, mainstream wartime conceptions of a Central Europe – 
encompassing just Germany and Austria-Hungary – typically derived their very 
definition from its ascribed German character. Robert Sieger started from the 
basis that: 
“[d]er geschichtliche Boden, auf dem sich die deutsche Nation 
entwickelt und vor allem betätigt hat, heist uns Mitteleuropa.” 
(Sieger 1917: 7)60 
Such characterisation of Central Europe as essentially German was then used to 
reason the need for economic and strategic unification of both empires in order 
to give unity to the area of the German nation. The realisation of such a union 
would then provide the springboard for Germans to realise their greatness 
among world nations, recognition of which was long overdue from a historical 
and cultural standpoint (Stern 1917: 11). Emphasis was typically placed here 
upon the stock phrases, “brotherhood of arms” and cultural unity (Diehl 1915). 
Other incarnations went a step further, presenting Austria as a mere annex of 
Germany or any extended Central Europe in the future as  the logical outcome 
                                                 
59 For illustration, he suggested that Italy would fall under British domination if his United States of 
Central Europe would not provide it with protection. Under Central Europe, Italian independence was 
to be guaranteed. (Karl 1917: 49) 
60
 - The historical ground on which the German nation has developed and primarily operated, we call 
Central Europe. - 
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of a protracted German national integration project – a unit encompassing the 
whole of the German nation. 
 
3.6.3 The interests of the German nation versus the ambitions of the 
German Empire 
Basically, all the works just discussed shared the common characteristics 
discussed earlier, referencing geographic determinism, organic theory, German 
uniqueness, etc. Yet, there was probably one crucial difference between 
extended regional conceptions of Central Europe and the mainstream focused 
solely on Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is the logic that lay behind them.  
Broadly speaking, the mainstream theories started from the assertion that all 
Germans are the same nation regardless of sovereign part of European territory 
in which they reside and therefore, should be united. This was a clear 
continuation of the grossdeutsch thought of the 19th century. Also, the emphasis 
these works placed on economic rather than political integration fell in line 
with the established model of German integration in previous decades. 
On the other hand, the broader regional conceptions started by questioning 
what needed to be done to secure a favourable future positioning for Germany. 
Within the constraints of organic theory demanding growth from the state to 
survive, the authors suggested the spatial expansion. Their reasoning was 
underpinned by geographic determinism and so the concepts aimed to endow 
the enlarged Germany with navigable rivers, land access to Asian markets, and 
natural borders where possible.   
Perhaps the mainstream authors were trying to articulate a pathway to unity of 
the German nation and overcome systemic resistance to it, while the less 
numerous authors advocating a wider geographical Central Europe were 
considering vehicles that might expand the influence of the German Empire. 
Generally, we can assume that the two sets of authors understood German 
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identity somewhat differently – with the mainstream authors concerned to 
address the then contemporary ramifications of their scattered German Volk 
and a second group more focused on interests of an extended German Empire.  
While this difference may seem subtle, it has important implications for 
analysis of influence of these concepts on the practical conduct of policy. The 
conclusions will demonstrate that German policy-makers were more concerned 
with the interests of the empire than the German Volk.  
 
3.7 The impact of the Central Europe concepts 
It has been suggested time and again that conceptions of Central Europe 
exercised an overwhelming influence on the practical policies of the German 
government. However, evidence for such influence seems thin at best. This 
subchapter gauges the potential influence of Central European conceptions in 
chronological order from the ascendancy of Otto von Bismarck through to the 
end of the First World War. 
 
3.7.1 The Bismarck period 
Various authors mention the iconic chancellor of the German Empire himself, 
Otto von Bismarck, when trying to evidence support for the profound influence 
of Central European conceptions during the late 19th century. (Young 2006: 76) 
Works such as Bascom B. Hayes’ Bismarck and Mitteleuropa (1994) convey the 
impression that Bismarck helped to foreground German concepts of the First 
World War period. 
However, any serious review of Bismarck’s policies and actions must conclude 
that the ‘Mitteleuropa’ idea had virtually no impact upon them. If there was any 
influence to be identified, it is only in the negative sense. (Brechtefeld 1996: 31) 
Numerous analyses of Bismarck’s era in office as the Prussian Chancellor 
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observe that his immense political talent was then aimed at maintaining the 
status quo in Europe, rather than challenging it. (Steinberg 2011, Lee 2008, 
Abrams 2006) His foremost interest was to protect and strengthen the German 
Empire within the existing balance of European power. His distrust of popular 
nationalism during the late 19th century was well known and this applied to 
German nationalism as well.  
The cornerstone of his foreign policy was maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe, with its most conservative forces  (as represented by the German 
Empire, Austria-Hungary and Russia) jointly keeping a check on France and 
ensuring continuing British non-involvement in the continent’s affairs. Indeed 
already Henry Cord Meyer observed in his 1955 Mitteleuropa in German 
Thought and Action that system of balance of power in Europe was significantly 
more important for Bismarck than potential expansion of the German Empire 
into an ‘all-inclusive’ German nation state (Meyer 1955: 47) – something that 
would involve the destruction of Germany’s closest ally. On the contrary, 
Bismarck’s interest lay in a strong but cooperative Austria-Hungary. 
Bismarck dismissed Central Europe-centred ideas on several occasions and in 
no uncertain terms. He expressed great misgivings over the ‘tactless’ activities 
of a bunch of pan-German activists (mainly journalists and academics) who 
were then publicising the purported oppression of Germans in Hungary and 
Transylvania (Rothfels 1934: 39). Hans Rothfels highlighted his 1894 speech to 
a group of Austrian German nationalists suggesting that the affairs of Germans 
in Austria were not a concern Berlin wanted to get involved with (Rothfels 
1934: 79). A year later, when speaking to an academic delegation of Austrian 
Germans, Bismarck argued that one of the strongest pillars of German national 
strength derived from its alliance with Austria-Hungary and the loyalties of 
their two peoples. Efforts to establish a homogenous nation state thus went 
against the interests of the German Empire as unification would deprive it of a 
key ally within the Concert of Europe. (Bismarck and Schüssler 1930: 568) 
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Given these unequivocal rebukes, searching for any policy making influence 
that theories of Central Europe might have generated in the Bismarck period 
seems a somewhat stretched idea. However, the notion does surface in the files 
of the Foreign Office, even if only sporadically (Reuss 1885). Unsurprisingly, it 
features in papers related to the attempted renegotiation of German-Austro-
Hungarian customs arrangements in the 1880s, yet it appears in the context of 
an alternative to these bilateral negotiations. It is presented in a vague 
reference to a potentially wider agreement reorganizing trade relations across 
Europe (Holtz 1885), notably including France.  
 
3.7.2 The Caprivi period and beyond 
Chancellor Caprivi is sometimes accredited with having made an official 
attempt to create a Central European Union in the 1890s. (Stirk 1994: 11) 
Again, however, such an interpretation is questionable, since Caprivi’s series of 
commercial treaties included one concluded with Russia, venturing well beyond 
the widest boundaries of any of the Central Europe concepts. In fact, Caprivi 
insisted on the inclusion of Russia within the preference system, against the 
advice of the foreign trade division of his Foreign Ministry. (Theiner 1984: 131) 
While the idea of Central Europe had undoubtedly found an audience by 1890s, 
rather than using this notion, Caprivi’s contemporaries dubbed the New Course 
represented by his foreign policy as a ‘United States of Europe’ (Fischer 1970: 
30) instead. Caprivi himself tended to employ the notion ‘zentral-europäisch’ 
rather than ‘mitteleuropäisch’. (Vagst 1935) 
Yet, the notion of Central Europe does occasionally feature in the files of the 
German Foreign Office from the period of the late 19th century. It is presented 
as a regional context for wider economic cooperation in Europe and appears 
alongside papers related to the attempted renegotiation of the trade agreement 
with Austria-Hungary. Unlike the Bismarck period, Central Europe is 
characterised early in the Caprivi period as expressly embracing France. (Lens 
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1890) This shows considerable divergence from notions that were then 
solidifying in the published literature; however, its presence in the files in the 
round of things is marginal.  
 
If anything, during the Caprivi era, the German public progressively lost interest 
in the pan-German cause. Austria-Hungary was gradually becoming a foreign 
country for Germans outside Germany but within the empire. Any interest in 
the Dual Monarchy’s internal concerns, including the fortunes of fellow 
Germans, was withering. As one contemporary observer noted:  
“Shortly before the war I had the opportunity of conversing with 
German politicians, among others, with Friedrich Naumann. I was 
most disagreeably surprised and astonished at the extent of his 
ignorance of Austrian conditions and difficulties.” (Zenker 1935: 
186) 
Yet, pan-German thought did not disappear completely and organizations 
emerged at the turn of centuries which resurrected the idea and promoted the 
concept of Central Europe. The most prominent of these was perhaps the 
Alldeutsche Verband, whose chairmen included Ratzel and Partsch at one stage 
or another; as well as the MEWV of Julius Wolf. As discussed in section 3.6.2, the 
idea of Central Europe was now on the march – finding both new advocates as 
well as followers.  
 
3.7.3 Wartime politics 
The idea of an economic alliance with Austria-Hungary resurfaced early in the 
war (Delbrück 1914). However, rather than being influenced or even triggered 
by the positive flurry of publications on Central Europe alluded to earlier in this 
chapter; the government’s Central Europe debate had preceded it. Moreover, 
motivations for (and framing of) the eventual drive for a customs union with 
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Austria-Hungary were based upon calculations very different to those of Pan-
German conceptions of Mitteleuropa. Rather, the themes underlying the 
government’s decision to pursue the idea of an economic bloc with Austria-
Hungary were very similar to those underpinning any rationale for Central 
Europe on economic grounds.  
A letter dated 12 April 1915 from Clemens von Delbrück (Vice-Chancellor and 
the Interior Secretary, 1908 – 1916) to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg 
(Chancellor, 1909 – 1917) sheds light on the German government’s regional 
designs and the debate which surrounded them at the time. (Delbrück 1915) 
Early on in the war, Bethmann-Hollweg had instructed Delbrück to investigate 
the likely economic relationship of Germany with its enemies and allies at the 
end of the war (Delbrück 1915: 1b). Delbrück observed rather obviously that 
all trade agreements concluded with Germany’s enemies had already been 
cancelled by this stage. On the other hand, the existing trade agreement with 
Austria-Hungary was up for renewal again on 1 January 1918, with 
renegotiation planned to commence during 1916. Delbrück suggested that 
trade agreements with “most of European and non-European states could be 
renegotiated to the same date” (Delbrück 1915: 1b). What Delbrück had in 
mind was a complete overhaul of Germany’s trade relationships with 
neighbouring countries (which, at that time, were clearly non-existent). The fact 
remained that the trade agreement with Austria-Hungary, which gave it a 
privileged relationship with Germany as compared with other countries, was a 
convenient one as the new agreement could be renegotiated with a wider 
customs union in mind. The main interest here was to secure European markets 
for Germany’s industrial exports, as opportunities in non-European markets 




3.7.3.1 Early wartime plans 
So as to examine the possibilities for German exports in Europe, Delbrück had 
already established a commission consisting of officials from the relevant 
ministries by the autumn of 1914. The commission undertook detailed reviews 
of Germany’s economic relationships with Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, 
Russia and Russian Poland; and contemplating a potential customs union with 
Austria-Hungary and Belgium, as well as compiling a report on the economic 
capabilities of Russian Poland. (R43/404: 26 - 304)  
The commission focused on production levels of various articles, and demand 
for goods in individual categories, as well as pre-war trade agreements and 
levels. In sharp contrast to the romantic Pan-German mood of the day, the 
commission’s files are technocratic in style and devoid of any nationalist 
language or concepts. The mismatch between the government’s wider 
functional approach and high-tide of nationalist Pan-German concepts of 
Central Europe that was surging in the public domain at the same time is 
conspicuous. 
In an attachment to his letter (Delbrück 1915a; R43/404: 1b – 7, Appendix 6), 
Delbrück summarised the commission’s deliberations from November 1914. In 
their course, six proposals for an economic bloc were put forward (R43/404: 
361 – 371), all of them premised on the firm belief that the days of free trade 
were over and that Germany needed to build a customs alliance to avert the 
possibility of being shut out from foreign markets after the war. Their outcome 
was a proposal for a customs alliance (as opposed to customs union, Delbrück 
1915a: 8) of ‘Central European states’ (Delbrück 1915a: 15), in the first 
instance with Austria-Hungary alone but eventually designed to encompass 
France, Italy and Switzerland. The commission was only too aware that – with 
the exception of Austria-Hungary – none of these states would enter into 
alliance with Germany willingly (Delbrück 1915a: 17) and several of its 
members therefore expressed scepticism over its plausibility (R43/404: 450). 
On the other hand, the commission’s evaluation of the projected customs 
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alliance with Austria-Hungary offered a bleak economic picture, mired with 
forecasts of its likely negative impact upon the German currency 
(Reichsbanksdirektorium 1914) and a resultantly low purchasing power for 
German industrial products. Yet, its ultimate conviction in the overriding 
necessity of establishing a German zone of economic influence led the 
commission to recommend the conclusion of a customs alliance with Austria-
Hungary61, with the potential accession of other named states an issue to be 
broached during or after the peace negotiations (Delbrück 1915a: 18). 
At a meeting of governmental officials under the chairmanship of Bethmann-
Hollweg on 5 June 1915 (German Federal Archive 1915), several officials, 
notably Delbrück, spoke against any customs union with Austria Hungary.62 
Yet, the fear of being shut out of foreign markets finally led the commission to 
conclude that while it would be best to pursue the possibilities afforded by a 
return to free markets, this path remained unlikely; thus the option of 
‘economic rapprochement’ (‘wirtschaftliche Annäherung’) with Austria should 
be pursued.  
 
3.7.3.2 Initial interactions aiming at closer economic relations 
Heinrich Leonhard von Tschirschky, German Ambassador to Vienna (and a 
former Foreign Secretary), suggested during 1914 that the Austrian society was 
ready for a “customs-Anschluss” with Germany. (Tschirschky 1914) His letters 
betray his personal bias in favour of German domination of the Austrian part of 
the monarchy and Pan-German Central European concepts in general. His 
reportage of the pro-German feelings of the Austrian public and the struggle of 
German Austrians to maintain predominance in their part of the Dual Monarchy 
                                                 
61
 The basis should have been the 1853 Prussian-Austrian trade agreement (R43 404: 428, overall 
conclusion of Director Johannes) as already suggested early on in the war by Delbrück (Delbrück 
1914: 3). 
62
 ‘Österreich-Ungarn könne uns nicht mehr bieten als was wir durch den Handelsvertrag erhalten 
haben,’ – Austria-Hungary cannot offer us anything more than what we have already achieved 
through trade agreement. – German Federal Archive 1915::77 
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(Tschirschky 1915a, Appendix 9) clearly inspired the language of the German 
memorandum to Austrians proposing closer economic relations. (Jagow 1915c) 
This memorandum picked up on the received nationalist rhetoric of 
conceptualising Central Europe, speaking of a brotherhood in arms sealed by 
blood and promising Austrian Germans support in their fight against the 
impending Slavicization of Austria. A closing sentence that described Austria as 
an ‘eastern Germanic mark’ (Jagow 1915c: E585814) was predictably digested 
none too well by an Austrian side, that refuted such a slur in a sharply worded 
note of their own (Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Berlin 1915). This sought to 
highlight the multinational character of the monarchy and suggested that 
growth and flourishing of its non-German national elements was welcomed by 
the Austro-Hungarian government.63 When informed about the note, 
Tschirschky himself observed that the Austrian prosecution of Czech national 
activists suggested otherwise. He labelled the note as a mere positioning device 
ahead of the forthcoming negotiations. In his opinion, Austria’s categorical 
refusal to entertain any use of the term ‘east Germanic mark’ hinted at an aim to 
position Austria-Hungary on an equal footing with(in) the German Empire. 
(Tschirschky 1916a, Appendix 12) Following the spat, this type of nationalist 
rhetoric would never resurface in official correspondence that was decidedly 
functional, limiting itself strictly to technical negotiation of tariffs and 
mechanisms.  
The negotiations proved to be tedious. The Dual Monarchy’s unique national 
composition entailed complex domestic calculations, even before unified 
positions vis-à-vis Germany could be contemplated. The Hungarian Prime 
                                                 
63
 ‘Die hervorragende Stellung der Deutschen in Oesterreich beruht auf ihren ziffermässigen und 
spezifischen Geschichte. Die Zuhnahme der Bedeutung anderer Völkerelemente ist eine Folge ihrer 
zunehmenden Kultur und kann nicht zurückgedrängt, sondern muss im Gegenteil mit Befriedigung 
begrüsst werden. … Monarchie… nicht blos “eine germanische Ostmark” ist.’ – The prominent 
position of the Germans in Austria is based on their numeral and specific history. The growth of 
importance of other ethnic elements is a consequence of their growing culture and can not be pushed 
back, on the contrary, it has to be welcomed with satisfaction. Monarchy is not merely "a Germanic 
eastern mark". – (emphasis original, Austro-Hungarian Embassy Note, 24 November 1915, E585864 
– 865) 
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Minister Istvan Tisza wrote to German Foreign Office State Secretary Arthur 
Zimmermann, stressing that while he wished for friendship with Germany, 
Austria-Hungary could never be its vassal. (Tisza 1915a) By this stage, too, the 
Austro-Hungarian state agreement was coming up for renewal and Tisza was 
determined to negotiate the best conditions possible. This stalled negotiations 
with Germany, as Tisza insisted that internal relations in Austria-Hungary had 
to be renegotiated first. So at the time when public enthusiasm for the concept 
of Central Europe was at its greatest, talks were stalled, more than anything, by 
the problems on the Austro-Hungarian side. 
 
3.7.3.3 The influence of Central Europe advocates 
Meanwhile, a significant volume of letters of support or opposition to 
negotiations with Austria-Hungary was accruing in all the relevant 
governmental offices. (e .g. German Hop Growers Union 1916, or Union of 
German Linen Industrialists 191764). While note of all received opinion was 
taken, there was only a handful of organisations that the German Foreign Office 
took seriously and whose opinion it followed systematically: namely, the 
Central European Economic Union (‘Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein’, 
MEWV); the German-Austrian-Hungarian Economic Union (‘Der Deutsch-
Österreichisch-Ungarische Wirtschaftsverein’, DÖUWV) and; the Working 
Committee for Central Europe (‘Arbeitsausschuss für Mitteleuropa’, AAfME). 
Yet, even then, there was never any real prospect that advice from these 
organizations would work into policy formulation. The ministry merely 
monitored their activities and collected their publications.65  
                                                 
64
 Multitude of such letters can be found in German Federal Archives in Berlin under shelfmarks 
R901/3988 and R901/3994 
65
 The most informative files in this regard are in collections of the German Federal Archive R 43/405 
– 407 and a special MEWV file 2254, which contain MEWV files and various files on all three 
organizations within holdings of the German Foreign Office Political Archive – AA PA Germany 180 
2593 – 2598 – and the German Federal Archive – R901/3994, 3995 and 3998. 
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The most voluminous material in the archives details the activities of MEWV, 
spanning three dedicated files (German Federal Archive R43/405-407) as well 
as more scattered documents in various other files of the German Federal 
Archive and Political Archive of the Foreign Office. It is clear that the German 
government was following the activities of the MEWV very closely - it was the 
most established organisation, dating back to 1904, to advocate an economic 
concept of Central Europe with many high ranking Austro-Hungarian 
politicians and businessmen within its ranks. Among its membership included 
Richard Riedl, Director of the Trade Policy Department of the Austrian Trade 
Ministry. (Delbrück 1915b, Appendix 7) Thus the MEWV was a convenient, non-
official channel for the gathering of intelligence on the moods in Austria-
Hungary towards the German Empire as well as spreading the empire’s 
influence.  
Yet, the organisation evidently exercised little influence on German 
governmental policy and decision making beyond meetings with governmental 
officials or occasional congratulatory ‘thank you’ letters to MEWV for its reports 
(e.g. MEWV 1916) and memoranda (e.g. MEWV 1915). The high ranks of 
members in Austria-Hungary were not mirrored on the German side. With the 
obvious exception of Julius Wolf – a governmental aide during the war– the 
MEWV did not manage to recruit significant political figures. Perhaps the 
greatest accreditation MEWV receives from government arrives in a letter from 
Bethmann-Hollweg dated 27 February 1917. Here it is commented that the 
memorandum sent by MEWV earlier that month was “a very valuable material 
for examination of difficult questions of our future economic policy” 
(Bethmann-Hollweg 1917).  
Among individual advocates of Central Europe, the German government 
maintained by far the most frequent contact with Friedrich Naumann; not 
surprisingly, since he was himself a liberal member of the parliament. 
(Retallack 2008: 160) Yet, even here, the evidence for actual influence is 
relatively limited. His AAfME had, on paper at least, the best chance of swaying 
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the government though its influential membership66. Again, however, this 
organization could only claim a limited impact through its reports and 
memoranda. Naumann himself routinely communicated with Foreign Office 
Undersecretary Zimmermann and Bethmann-Hollweg (e.g. Naumann 1916b, 
Naumann 1916c and Naumann 1917b). During the war he also posted several 
books and memoranda on Central Europe that he had written or co-authored 
(e.g. Naumann et al. 1917).  
Yet, none of the policy or decision-making related documents in the archival 
evidence suggests that Naumann’s memoranda or, indeed, the opinions he 
expressed in his letters, exerted any direct influence. In fact, towards the end of 
the war, some influential figures within the government increasingly began to 
comment that both his publications on Central Europe and his promotional 
activities were damaging for the interests of Germany. (AA PA 1917) 
 
3.7.3.4 Tedious negotiations 
With renegotiation of the Austro-Hungarian treaty largely resolved by 1917 
(Wedel 1917, Boyé 1917) and talks on duties and customs regimes for 46 
individual categories of goods and services well advanced (Schoenebeck 1917), 
it was a ‘Polish’ (rather than any Central European) question that would emerge 
to complicate the political background to negotiations.  
German interest groups in Eastern Prussia, as well as the military, were 
pressing for Russian-occupied sections of Poland to become a part of Germany 
(e.g. Lersner 1917, Hamburg Chamber of Commerce 1918). However, Austrian 
officials were demanding the same territory for the monarchy. The German 
government was concerned over the potential erosion of Austrian German 
power within their part of the dual monarchy, if further Polish sections of the 
population (and additional members of parliament) would be added to the 
                                                 
66
 For example Max Weber, Prince Eulenburg, or Naumann himself. (German Federal Archive, 
Nachlass Naumann N 3001/29, folio 94) 
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already existing Slav population of Austria-Hungary (see files in German 
Federal Archive R 901/3998, folio 29 – 58; and AA PA Germany 180 R 2593 – 
2597). So the main German concern remained not just the ability of the Dual 
Monarchy to maintain control of increasing national tensions but a potential 
increase in its constituent nationalities. (AA PA 1915c, Tschirschky 1916b) In 
November 1917 the German government agreed to a Austro-Polish solution, 
albeit one with several conditions: the constitutional arrangement of union 
would be of a purely personal character67; in return, Germany’s sole rights of 
influence would be admitted in Romania, as would preferential access to the 
Adriatic sea, a direct railway connection to Hungary and a port for its fleet at 
Valona; additionally Austria would abandon any further interest in Belgium. 
(AA PA 1917b, Appendix 13; Johannes 1917b) 
Yet by the time German government had cleared its stance over the Austro-
Polish solution and related packages, the conviction had hardened that Austria-
Hungary itself was in such deep peril that it would not survive another year. 
(Treutler 1917, Stolberg 1918) The increasing tensions between its many 
nationalities and the plainly horrific economic situation described in 
Ambassador Wedel’s many letters further eroded Germany’s threadbare 
confidence in their ally’s potential for stability. The opinion that the economic 
alliance was simply impracticable (‘undurchführbar’) – present in some 
governmental documents since the beginning of the negotiation process 
(Tschirschky 1916, Johannes 1916) – was now quickly gathering strength.  
 
3.7.3.5 Faltering commitment 
With the realization that post-war Austria-Hungary could not be a strong and 
stable trade partner, the preferences of German political and economic circles 
shifted back to concluding a free trade arrangement. (AA PA 1917) Since the 
very start of the process, the German government had received reports that its 
                                                 
67
 Many remained unconvinced. In May 1918, General Erich Ludendorff noted that “from a strictly 
military standpoint, there is strong interest in seeing the Austro-Polish solution fail.” (GHDI 1918) 
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wartime enemies – especially the United States – would not tolerate the 
creation of any customs union with Austria-Hungary or, indeed, with any other 
European state. (Luxburg 1915) Hopes that Germany could conclude the 
alliance with Austria-Hungary and then negotiate free trade conditions more 
widely at or during any forthcoming peace negotiations, were fading.  
By 1916, highly publicised talk of a German-dominated greater economic area 
under the banner of Central Europe was engendering strong opposition from 
Britain, France and the USA (Kühlmann 1916). This realisation motivated 
strong critique of “Mr Naumann and his friends” among German governmental 
officials. The November 1917 assessment of progress on negotiations with 
Austria-Hungary elaborated by the Foreign Ministry blamed Naumann’s 
frenetic Central Europe agitations for blocking any post-war attempts to foster 
free trade. (AA PA 1917: E569131) The whole idea of the customs union and 
especially the pan-German tenor of proposals for a German dominated Central 
Europe were fast becoming an impediment to projected post-war economic 
relations with other countries, most crucially the United States. (German 
Federal Archive 1917: folio 207) 
As Herman Johannes, a director with the German Foreign Office observed in his 
notes dated 7 January 1917: 
“Je lange der Krieg dauert, desto schwerer wird es werden, 
unsere alten Export-beziehungen im entfernteren Ausland 
wieder anzuknüpfen; desto mehr werden wir aus den 
verschiedenen Gründen auf Autarkie angewiesen sein und desto 
mehr in die Notwendigkeit kommen uns mit unseren Nachbarn 
und Verbündeten zu einem mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsgebiet 
möglichst eng zusammenzuschliessen. … Mann könne nicht mehr 
zurück; die Lobby für ein Mitteleuropa sei bereits zu stark und 
überdies habe die ‘Naumannsche Agitation’ die Alliierten zu den 
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Beschlüssen von Paris veranlasst und den Rückweg zu einem 
freien Welthandel deutlich erschwert.” (Johannes 1917)68 
In this context, there was a growing sense among officials that concluding a 
customs treaty with Austria-Hungary prior to any peace negotiations would 
bind Germany’s hands in negotiating convenient trade conditions with its 
former enemies (AA PA 1917, Schoenebeck 1917). While such negotiations did 
not appear very likely and such suggestions might have been nothing more than 
wishful thinking, the concern was real. The peace negotiations with Russians at 
Brest-Litowsk confirmed this view as the constraints of an emerging 
relationship with Austria-Hungary proved to be an impediment in negotiations 
(Koerner 1918). Following Brest-Litowsk, the German preference shifted firmly 
towards postponing the conclusion of negotiations until after the end of the 
war.  
Indeed, negotiations as such continued, but without much commitment from 
the German side (Hertling 1918) – the only motivation remaining was the 
perceived lack of any viable alternatives should, as seemed likely, a post-war 
return to free trade prove impossible. In 1918, ever worse news was arriving to 
the German Foreign Office from its embassy in Vienna and consulate in 
Budapest about the economic situation of the country and prevailing hunger on 
the streets. (Stolberg 1918b, Wedel 1918b, Fürstenberg 1918) Business circles 
were growing increasingly negative about the prospect of a customs alliance 
with Austria-Hungary (various letters in German Federal Archive R 901/3998, 
folio 6 – 31, 143 – 162) - to the extent that Berlin began to look for alternatives, 
even discussing a  union with Poland. (AA PA 1918)  
 
                                                 
68
 – The longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be to rekindle our old export relationships with 
distant countries, the more we will be for various reasons relying on self-sufficiency, and the more 
necessary it will be for us to bind ourselves as closely as possible with our neighbors and allies into a 
Central European Economic Area… There is no way back anymore; the lobby for Central Europe 
was already too strong and ‘Naumann-like agitation’ caused the Allies to take decisions in Paris and 
significantly complicated the return to a free world trade. – 
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3.7.3.6 An unexpected turn of events and the ultimate failure 
April 1918 brought the spill-over of the worst scandal to have existed in recent 
memory between Germany and Austria-Hungary. After a spat with Czernin, 
French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau published a letter signed by the 
Austrian Emperor proving that Austria was in secret negotiations towards a 
separate peace with the Entente.  
The fallout from the so-called ‘Sixtus Affair’ brought about what was hailed as a 
final coming for Central Europe by its advocates. To placate his ally, Karl I had 
to undergo the humiliating experience of apologizing to Wilhelm II in Spa 
during May 1918. Yet, an apology was not enough; Austria-Hungary was now 
considered an unreliable ally for Germany. (Broucek 1979: 463, Krizman 1970: 
102) The solution was now seen as binding the Dual Monarchy to Germany by 
both political and economic treaties. These eventually became known as the 
1918 Spa Accords.  
The Minutes of the 11 May 1918 meeting of the Supreme Army Command, held 
just prior to this meeting of sovereigns, shed light on the decision-making 
motivations on the German side. As the minutes stated: 
„State Secretary von Kühlmann thinks... it is now essential to 
demonstrate both to the domestic population and the rest of the 
world that Austria-Hungary is willing and compelled to remain 
on Germany’s side.“ (GHDI 1918: 1) 
Chancellor Georg von Hertling had commented that the forthcoming conference 
of the two emperors would need to deal with political, economic and military 
dimensions of alliance.  Yet priority would be accorded to top-level political 
agreement, over economic and military goals. All participants in the meeting 
(including military command, the German Ambassador to Vienna, the 
Chancellor and representatives of the Foreign Ministry) agreed that the 
emperors should discuss the principles lying behind these agreements, which 
would be signed up to to by both states withthe actual details of agreement 
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hammered out subsequently. The Polish question featured prominently in the 
discussions, but the final consensus was that it should be avoided during the 
emperors’ meeting to avoid increasing the potential for failure of the three key 
agreements under consideration. While it was agreed that any economic 
alliance should be as close as possible, the Chancellor observed that concluding 
a direct customs union would be difficult due to widespread public opposition 
in Germany. On the other hand, the military commanders recommended that 
any military union should be as flexible and pragmatic as possible, given the 
unresolved structural issues confronting the Austro-Hungarian Army. 
Along the lines agreed therefore, the three agreements – an overarching 
political one, aneconomic one elaborating a tight customs union and a looser 
one over military cooperation – were presented to and signed by both the 
emperors a week later. The negotiations of their particulars of these had started 
back in June.  
Yet, only a month later – during July, the German Ambassador to Vienna 
reported his conviction that Austria-Hungary was going to be dismembered 
(Wedel 1918), amidst Hungarians calls for their own sovereign vehicle. 
(Fürstenberg 1918b) By September, Germany’s Ambassador to Vienna reported 
that the Austro-Hungarian government itself was convinced that the end was 
near. Pro-German feelings were all but gone with even Austrian Germans 
preferring now to surrender to the British and their allies existentially (Wedel 
1918b) – so any economic alliance was completely out of the question. 
(Fürstenberg 1918)  
Yet despite and throughout all of this, negotiations at a more junior civil servant 
level were continuing. The Austrian negotiators were particularly half-hearted, 
having beeninstructed to negotiate the most loose conditions for any customs 
union possible by the new Seidler administration. They lost out to their German 
counter-parts, who were in a much stronger negotiating position and had been 
instructed with quite the opposite advice. So, the ‘Guidelines for Customs and 
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Economic Union’ were signed in September, stipulating very tight union 
between the two empires (Gratz and Schüller 1925: 93).  
But the proposal was by then clearly out of touch with reality – Austria-
Hungary was on the verge of dismemberment and the German public now 
opposed to strengthening ties with what was now an uncomfortable ally. 
Negotiations never made it past the formulation of guidelines. The idea of 
Central Europe was finally abandoned in the chaos of a lost war.  
 
3.7.3.7 The notion of Central Europe within the German government 
In governmental use, the term Central Europe appeared only occasionally, in 
notably vague and variable contexts. In the tentative 1915 draft of the treaty on 
the customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the contractual 
parties were described merely as “customs allies” (‘Zollverbündeten’). (AA PA 
1915b) Central Europe was not used to describe or characterise any alliance 
with Austria-Hungary by governmental officials. In fact, the only time the 
notion was used consistently was in Delbrück’s report of April 1915 (Delbrück 
1915a), which suggested an economic alliance of Germany with Austria-
Hungary, France, Italy and Switzerland. 
Overall, the language of files dealing with negotiations with Austria-Hungary is 
highly technical. It does not resonate with the nationalist language of pan-
German Central Europe concepts and shows a remarkable lack of regard for 
nationalist themes. It is virtually impossible to find any document that would 
highlight the national affinity of Austrian Germans with their imperial brethren, 
whether ethnic, historical or cultural. The talk is of production of maize, railway 
tariffs for coal transport, impact on hop farmers in Bavaria and the financing of 
dams on the Danube; rather than unique German nation or its historical 
mission.  
This is in stark contrast to the surge of nationalist Pan-German concepts 
overflowing with romanticism and promising unification as a road to greatness 
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for the scattered German Volk. The supporting background materials prepared 
to assist in negotiations did not contain historical studies of German settlement 
or its cultural reach. Their content was strictly functional, dealing with 
technical aspects of tariffs for 46 different product categories, filling hundreds 
of pages with detailed charts and calculations. A pedantic and somewhat 
mechanical tradition of German officialdom is often stereotyped, but, as these 
documents show, is perhaps not without an ounce of truth. 
 
Even the overarching political questions were dealt with in a practical rather 
than an ideological manner. For example, in the midst of the complications 
surrounding internal treaty renegotiations in Austria-Hungary, the debate 
revolved around issues of convincing the Hungarian government to buy into the 
process. The German government considered promising development of 
railways to Hungary and trade-offs in the shape of offering non-tariff 
advantages to Hungarian agricultural producers.  
While this could all be dismissed as dealing with technicalities while pursuing 
the aim of establishing a political union of dissipated German nation; the 
evidence suggests otherwise. In fact, the files tell a completely different story to 
the one told by popular Pan-German conceptions of Central Europe or their 
interpretations abroad (e.g. Chéradame 1916).  
The very first file of material collected by Delbrück’s commission focused on 
patterns of production in surrounding countries and their trade exchanges with 
Germany. The countries considered here included France and Russia but any 
kind of consideration of Germans lying beyond imperial borders was 
conspicuously missing. Indeed, the customs union with Austria-Hungary was 
not recommended, attracting a negative evaluation from the 
Reichsbanksdirektorium (1914).  
This is not to say that the pan-German nationalist thought was entirely absent 
from imperial policy-making circles. Indeed, as with anywhere else in German 
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society of the day, this strand of thought was to be found across the board, 
including politicians too. Memoranda and other documents showing the 
influence of the pan-German thought are scattered across archival files (e.g. AA 
PA 1915d). Yet, they tend not to appear in the core decision-making documents, 
rather as the opinions of relatively peripheral governmental officials.69 
On the other hand, an example of German government activity that could be 
interpreted as being influenced by the Pan-German thought was its obvious 
support for the maintenance of German domination in Austria. Yet 
correspondence exchanged between ambassador Tschirschky and the Imperial 
Foreign Office reveals that rather than supporting German predominance in 
Austria out of any great nationalist convictions, the main interest of the German 
Empire was a strategic one. In their view, the growing influence of Slav 
nationalities would destabilize Austria and draw it away from Germany. Thus 
rather than merely preserving the domination of Germans in Austria, it became 
a strategic imperative for the German Empire to prevent a regional rise of the 
Slavs. This was indeed the opinion expressed by Tschirschky in his letter to the 
German Foreign Office dated 20 January 1916 (Tschirschky 1916a), in which – 
for this very reason – he suggested that Germany should not only help to 
safeguard the predominance of Germans in Austria, but, crucially, also that of 
the Hungarians in Hungary. 
 
To sum up, rather than being driven by the dream of any greater economic or 
political area for a unified German nation, German thought, policy and actions 
over the question of an economic alliance with Austria-Hungary were clearly 
the result of more practical considerations. Indeed, the files rarely mention a 
concept of Central Europe, whose occurrence is largely limited to documents 
originating in the early months of the war and in documents arriving from 
                                                 
69
 For example, even Tschirschky occasionally displayed such tendencies, as apparent from the 
wording of some his official letters (e.g. Tschirschky 1915a); yet, he eventually made policy 
suggestions that went head on with ideas of German domination of Central Europe (e.g. Tschirschky 
1916a). 
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outside inner government circles (letters from Friedrich Naumann, the 
concepts of Austrian authors and articles from Hungarian newspapers, etc).  
The bid for a larger economic area can thus be considered an effort 
independent of contemporaneous and historical attempts to conceptualise 
Central Europe. The only set of documents that evidences a consistent 
employment of the notion, Central Europe, is Delbrück’s initial report in 1915 
(Delbrück 1915a), which suggested a wider economic alliance in Europe, 
including France, Switzerland and Italy. Yet, the government’s drive for such 
zone stemmed from the very same perceived necessities as the lesser strand of 
Central Europe concepts presented in section 3.6.2. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
To sum up, the chapter demonstrated that conceptualisations of Central Europe 
in the German environment evolved with a definite geopolitical aim; effecting a 
change in the international structure on the ground. While the aim varied 
across time and among authors (causing changes in the territorial reach and 
characteristics of the proposed new arrangement) it eventually coalesced  
during the First World War into a rallying call for the establishment of an 
economic and political union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, a sense 
of the new Self as defined in relation to the hostile surrounding Other (the 
Entente powers). Yet, the German establishment had its own well-established 
functional definition of Central Europe – a contitental customs union – and the 
public discourse clearly exercised very little influence on its decision making. 
The 1918 Spa Accords were motivated by necessity to tie a wavering ally into 
the German orbit, rather than any especial pro-Central Europe enthusiasm. 
 
At the beginning of the chapter, the misleading nature of common narratives 
tracing the concept of Central Europe back to early 19th century German 
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authors, especially Friedrich List and Karl Ludwig von Bruck, was established. It 
is suggested that both individuals were in fact operating with the notion of 
Germany rather than Central Europe. While List was theorizing enlargement 
and development of the Customs Union, Bruck was operating in the conditions 
of an emerging German nation state and was conceptualising Austria’s role in it. 
Only after the process of othering Austria from Germany resulted into its self-
identification as a separate entity did the need for a replacement notion 
expressing ambitions for a political and economic unit encompassing all 
German people arise.  
The shift towards the concept of Central Europe is directly observable in the 
writings of pan-German authors in the late 1870s and early 1880s, 
demonstrated in the analysis of works by Constantin Frantz and Paul de 
Lagarde (section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). The notion itself was certainly not invented 
by these authors – references to Central Europe or descriptions of something 
being Central European had been present in German and non-German 
environments alike as generic geographical references well before pan-German 
political constructs started to emerge. Similarly, they continued to be used as 
such afterwards.  
Gradually, however, the notion started to be associated with the political 
project of a wider unit lying in the middle of Europe, whether in a pan-German 
or wider geographical sense. This trend became visible in academic journals 
and volumes from the 1880s onwards, occasionally appearing in the relevant 
governmental documentation as well. In the late 19th century, the definitive 
discourse of the notion was led by the pan-German authors and Central Europe 
emerged as a concept of political unit, which should be ‘naturally’ dominated by 
Germans. The dissipated German nation was presented as having a historical 
mission of unifying the area under its lead. Due to the characteristics of German 
settlement in Europe, the core of the concept gradually shifted from a German 
Empire towards the combined territories of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The 
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distinctive features of these concepts were their theoretical underpinnings in 
geographic determinism and the organic growth theory of the state. 
Yet, in the early 20th century, an added line of reasoning appeared – the 
economic one. While authors pushing this line of argument bought readily into 
the existing discourses of Central Europe, they argued that any final borders 
must be kept flexible and fuzzy. Their thoughts were framed in convictions 
about the changing nature of international trade and the necessity to build a 
greater economic area dominated by Germany - if the latter was not to lose out 
in an envisaged customs duty war with British Empire, Russia and the United 
States. Austria-Hungary was losing its importance as a trading partner for 
Germany and, in economic terms, ethnic ties, in any case, secondary to 
consideration of trade patterns and prospects. While social Darwinist theory 
and geographic determinism continued to underpin their concepts, the 
economic authors perceived the interests of Germany primarily in terms of 
establishing a strong European base and securing the requisite structural 
conditions for success in global trade. Given existing ties between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, the centre of gravity remained on their combined territory 
but the desired extent typically extended well beyond. The economic line of 
reasoning was growing in importance as its proponents became active in 
promoting their concepts through various associations, most prominently the 
MEWV.  
As has already been suggested in section 3.6, the First World War period 
witnessed a peak in popularity for concepts of Central Europe. By then, the 
economic basis of the idea of Central Europe was well established. Yet, the war 
brought about a revival in the pan-German thought and shifted the mainstream 
of theorisation of Central Europe back towards strong pan-German nationalism. 
Broader concepts of Central Europe soon became the minority, pushed by 
authors whose priority was securing convenient positioning for Germany, 
rather than unification of any German nation. While the mainstream could now 
be identified as a continuation of grossdeutsch thought and projects of the 19th 
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century, the lesser strand had largely resulted from observations of the realities 
of war – the blockade, isolation, and the perceived need to either establish a 
greater economic area or wither on the vine.  
Interestingly, it follows from the archival evidence that the considerations of 
the Berlin government were remarkably devoid of pan-German underpinnings. 
Indeed, the rare use that was made of such rhetoric, as evidenced in the 
Memorandum of November 1915 (Jagow 1915), was seen as a diplomatic 
blunder and never employed again. The decision to pursue economic alliance 
with Austria-Hungary was driven by the necessities of the day and a firm belief 
that the days of free international trade were numbered – here, Germany had to 
establish a larger economic zone in order to secure survival of its industries 
after the war. While Austria-Hungary was seen as the inferior partner in any 
envisaged union, it was also regarded as a stepping stone providing access to 
the Middle East and ports on the Adriatic Sea. Equally and much more 
pragmatically, Austria-Hungary was for the time being the only neighbouring 
state that would consider an economic alliance with Germany of its own 
freewill and there already existed a track-record of attempted negotiations 
towards such arrangements.  
So, a distinctive lack of pan-German nationalism set it apart from the 
mainstream romantic Central Europe concepts that characterised the peak 
wartime debate. Governmental considerations had been consonant with pre-
war economic concepts of Central Europe, and to a certain degree, to the lesser 
wartime strand. Yet, the design put forward by Delbrück’s commission (as well 
as the reasoning that lay behind it) demonstrably lacked the theoretical 
underpinnings shared by all Central Europe concepts – their social Darwinism 
and geographic determinism. Instead, it was built on patterns of trade and a 
practical reading of the contemporary political and strategic situation.  
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It only remains to be commented here that while the German government’s 
wartime designs were aligned with economic concepts of Central Europe from 
the pre-war period, they were constructed on a very different basis – that of 



















Central Europe:  
forging a concept in time and space 
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The evidence presented in this chapter enforces the argument that 
conceptualisations of Central Europe are exercises in geopolitics, as in the 
Austrian environment their formulation clearly sought changes in the 
international structure. In this case, the creation of an economic and political 
unit encompassing all Germans was sought, largely since the notion was pushed 
by pan-German authors. In addition, this chapter advances the argument that 
such conceptualisations actually displayed an impact on the behaviour of 
political actors (both positive and negative).  
 
The chapter starts necessarily with the establishment of the context in which 
the concepts of Central Europe developed in the late 19th and early 20th century 
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
The chapter draws a parallel between the developments of these concepts: first, 
more widely within the pan-German movement in Austria and Germany; 
however, it also observes important differences stemming from the diverging 
conditions in which they were conceived, and the influences upon them. The 
concerns for Austro-Hungarian sovereignty, the changing standing of Austrian 
Germans within the empire and the recurrent efforts at internal reform form a 
background to the notions of Central Europe put forward by Austrian German 
authors.  
A significant part of the chapter presents the reactions to the Central Europe 
movement in the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the perspective of its non-
German nations. It focuses on the concentrated effort of Tomáš Garrigue 
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Masaryk, who consistently used the notion of Central Europe to influence 
Entente policy makers to favour his policy implorations for dismemberment of 
the dual monarchy. 
Importantly, the chapter finds that, for a long time, conceptions of Central 
Europe were actively suppressed by the Viennese government, due to concerns 
their identity calls might pose for internal security and sovereignty. It was only 
in 1917, that the standing of those who advocated a Central Europe changed to 
the dramatic tune, as they stepped directly into positions of power.  
As this chapter concludes, despite several months in power, they were unable 
to deliver their project. The signature of economic and military treaties with the 
German Empire only came about as a fallout from revelations of Emperor Karl’s 
secret separate peace negotiations in spring 1918. This was perhaps too little, 
too late, for Central Europe enthusiasts.  
 
4.2 The legacy of 1848 
As suggested in the previous chapter, considerations of the customs union in 
the German inhabited area resurfaced several times in the 19th century, the 
most prominent of these discussions being the deliberations of the Frankfurt 
constitutional assembly. Yet, these did not feature or elaborate any notion of 
Central Europe explicitly, operating within the framework of the German 
Customs Union. 
In addition to Karl Ludwig von Bruck – a German by birth – there were other 
Austrian representatives present in Frankfurt forwarding their proposals for 
including Austria within the German customs union. Just like in the case of 
Bruck, their links to later conceptions of Central Europe are at best indirect. 
The radical right-wing Viennese representative in the Frankfurt assembly (and 
future liberal leader), Eugen Megerle von Mühlfeld, also called for a 
grossdeutsch solution, but with guarantees for the unimpaired sovereignty of 
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Austria. Mühlfeld also proposed federalisation of Austria to contain nationalist 
tensions. (Kann 1950a: 76) In contrast, Count Friedrich Deym, a representative 
of the Austrian crown-land estates, proposed that the empire should first weld 
all its nationalities into one state-nation which would help it to consolidate its 
power and only then could treaty with the German federation be contemplated. 
(Deym 2010) 
The centre of the political spectrum was represented by Carl Möring and Anton 
von Schmerling. Möring promoted federalisation of Austria on the basis of 
combined crown-land and ethnic boundaries, and inclusion of the whole 
federation into a wider German association. Interestingly, he described this 
final construct as a central European super-power, yet, similarly to Bruck, failed 
to use this expression consistently or as the main descriptive geographical basis 
of his proposal. (Möring 1848) Schmerling favoured inclusion of only those 
parts of the Austrian Empire that had previously belonged to the Holy Roman 
Empire within the German federation. In his view, this would suffice to secure 
Austrian supremacy within the federation as well as guarantee German 
domination within the Austrian Empire. (Arneth 1895: 128) 
Finally, on the left, Franz von Sommarunga, doubting the possibility of a 
complete inclusion of the whole Austrian Empire within a German federation, 
proposed a vehicle that had both narrower and wider federal components. The 
former (narrower and closer knit federation) was to include Austria’s German 
lands and the latter (territorially wider and looser political construct) would 
also comprise the remainder of its territorial possessions. (Sommarunga 1848) 
However, the best known proposals are perhaps those of Julius Fröbel and 
Heinrich von Gagern, whose conceptions, just like Bruck’s, are often linked to 
later notions of Central Europe (e.g. Meyer 1955: 21). While Gagner presented 
his proposal orally at the Frankfurt Assembly (Wiggard 1848 – 1850: 2894 – 
2897), Fröbel preferred to put it down on paper (Fröbel 1848). Gagner spoke of 
the need for unity and a historical mission to spread German culture, language 
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and customs down the Danube River; while Fröbel proposed a confederation 
encompassing Germany, Poland Hungary, the South Slav territories and 
Walachia – yet neither of the two individuals used the notion of Central Europe 
to describe their respective constructs. Both spoke of Germany and Europe, and 
Austria’s future in both.  
In fact, in the works of all the above mentioned authors, with the marked 
exception of Möring, instead of being a hallmark, any notion of Central Europe 
is conspicuously absent.  
 
4.3 The Pan-German movement and Central Europe 
In defying all the grossdeutsch projects placed before it, the Frankfurt 
Assembly effectively excluded Austria from the ensuing integration of German 
space. Central Europe would replace the notion of an extended Germany as the 
byword for the shared economic and political union of all Germans. 
The key to interpretating the undercurrents of Austrio-German thought about 
Central Europe as a political concept lies in appreciating that while Austrian 
Germans viewed the Habsburg Monarchy as multinational, they understood it 
would always be dominated by its German national component. This was not 
only viewed as an established fact, but as historically and culturally justifiable 
(Kann 1950: 64) The Compromise of 1867, which restored the sovereignty of 
Hungary (see map in Appendix 14), seriously challenged this established view. 
In their own part of the redefined monarchy, Austrian Germans remained in a 
minority (KuKSZ 1915), facing increasing nationalistic pressures from other 
ethnic groups.  
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4.3.1 The rise of Austrian German nationalism 
The confidence of Austrian Germans was shaken by the combined tremors of 
exclusion from German unification, their declining power position and, above 
all, the virtual loss of half of the empire in 1867, as Hungary regained its 
sovereignty (see Appendix 16).  
The links with their brethren in the German states were also diminishing – the 
steady, routine flow of immigrants from this source, that had traditionally 
provided the Austrian intelligentsia as well as its statesmen and businessmen, 
dried out following the battle of  Sadowa in the mid-1860s. (East 1950: 275) 
Austrian Germans felt cut off from their kinsmen in a unifying Germany and 
exposed to the ambitions of rival nationalities within their own unstable 
empire. With this heightened sense of insecurity, many in Austrian-German 
society perceived the growing national ambitions (and numbers) of the Slav 
social elements as the “threat of Slavicisation” (Lindström 2008, Vysny 1977) 
and started to organize themselves to safeguard their own national interests 
and traditional privileges. 
The first associations that aimed to reconsolidate the diminished position of the 
Austrian Germans’ emerged in this context of heightened national anxiety, 
among them the Deutscher Volksverein established in Vienna in 1867 and the 
Verein der Deutschnationalen in Graz in 1869. (Schäfer 2007: 15) Austrian 
German nationalism, which would later take on a form of Pan-Germanism, was 
thus born out of reaction to their changing political and social standing after the 
decline of Habsburg power. 
Yet, political activism only developed gradually, in reaction to the changing 
political landscape of Austria in the following decades. The pan-Germans split 
from the German Liberal Party in 1879, following the unsuccessful bid of 
emergent leader Georg von Schönerer to propose customs union with Germany 
as a central tenet of party policy (Carsten 1985: 223). The parallel efforts of 
Count Eduard von Taaffe to build his cabinet on the support of Slav parties 
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caused obvious consternation in Austrian Germans and prepared fertile ground 
for Schönerer’s ideas. The idea, that from then on Austrian Germans had to rely 
on their own strength (Selbshilfe) rather than government support, resulted in 
the formation of an increasing number of nationalist associations. One of them 
was the Deutscher Klub in Vienna led by Schönerer - aided here by Engelbert 
Pernerstorfer, Victor Adler and Heinrich Friedjung, all future power-players in 
Austrian politics. (Cohen 2006: 119)  
Within three years (September 1882), this group, headed by Schönerer, 
formulated its famed Linz Program. This postulated Austria’s complete 
separation from Hungary and the consolidation of Austrian German political 
power in Austria by its separation from Polish territories but advocated the 
forging of a customs union encompassing Germany, Austria, Hungary and the 
Balkan states. (Roman 2009: 512) This proposal was not too different from the 
concepts of Gagner or Fröbel presented some forty years earlier and heralded 
the comeback of the idea of bringing Austria back together into a wider union 
with Germany.  
Schönerer’s star had dimmed by the late 1880s and early 1890s, as the 
Deutschnationale Bewegung grew, both in the number of constituent groups 
and the heightened profile of its leaders. The German National Party was 
founded in 1891, followed by the German Peoples Party in 1896. The fight for 
maintaining German national privileges was fought through Deutscher 
Schulverein, Bund der Deutschen and other social groups, as antagonism 
between Slavs and Germans in Austria gained momentum.  
Schönerer’s day came again with the controversial Badeni Language Laws of 
1897, which placed the Czech language at the same level as German. A 
nationalist explosion followed in the Bohemian crown lands and Schönerer and 
his group were expelled from the parliament. By the time the Badeni Laws were 
repealed in 1899, it would be too late to placate the outraged Austrian 
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Germans, who felt betrayed by their government. Schönerer launched an 
outright attack on the monarchy, calling for its dissolution and the unification of 
the Empire’s German territories (including Bohemian crown lands inhabited 
mostly by Czechs) with Germany. (Alexander 2012: 257) Schönerer’s new 
Alldeutsche Vereinigung heralded a new chapter in Austrian German 
nationalism and the quest for union with Germany. (Ingrao and Szabo 2007: 
172) 
 
4.3.2 A Definitive discourse of Central Europe 
The notion of Mitteleuropa with its relatively loose meaning was present in 
Austrian daily parlance and academic writing well before its political meaning 
was developed70. Central Europe as a concept - if not yet a political project – 
had started to appear in Austrian academic writing by the 1870s. A General Map 
of Central Europe (General Karte von Central-Europa, 1875) was produced by 
the Austrian Military Geographical Institute in 1875. However, its title did not 
employ the notion of Mitteleuropa as yet. Mitteleuropa as a notion only started 
to appear consistently in Austrian writing by the end of the 1870s and into the 
1880s (e. g. Woldrich 1886), in parallel with the rise of the notion in Germany 
and temporal proximity to foundation of the Dual Alliance (Zweibund) in 1879.  
Austrian geographers were among the first to enter the discourse over Central 
Europe. Their concepts were not necessarily political and were elaborated in 
maps, geographical handbooks and school text books (e.g. Peucker 1893). On 
the other hand, the delimitation of Central Europe in these texts was often 
based on political or economic geography rather than physical criteria. One 
example using political criteria for delimitation was Ludwig Neumann’s 
description of Central Europe as consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Switzerland, the Low Countries, Luxemburg and Lichtenstein. (reprinted in 
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th
 century Austrian newspapers employing the notion as general 
geographical term, see Gaertner 1911, pp. 11 – 12; or Wiener Zeitung, 1 – 10 July 1848. 
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Scobel 1908) An example of economic criteria being used is Ernst Friedrich’s 
delimitation, which spanned approximately the same area. (Friedrich 1907) 
Yet, geographers were significantly outrun in the volume of writing on Central 
Europe by the pan-Germans (indeed, some authors belonged to both groups at 
the same time), even though their writing is still limited as compared to works 
published in Germany. Pan-German propaganda was severely restricted by the 
governmental censorship (Kann 1950a: 99, Müller 2001: 159), as the 
government was careful to cap the simmering conflict of nationalities within 
the empire. Instead, Pan-German pamphlets and books were being smuggled in 
from Germany, among them those detailing the emerging concept of Central 
Europe. Moreover, some of the foremost German proponents of the notion lived 
and worked in Austria-Hungary or visited on a regular basis. Among them, for 
example, was Albrecht Penck, a geography professor at the University of 
Vienna. Intellectual exchange was lively and Austrian authors often figured 
among those contributing to the Geographisches Zeitschift, which would carry 
the thrust of articles arguing for a redefinition of the notion of Central Europe 
into the early 20th century. Despite existing censorship, Austrian pan-Germans 
produced a significant number of political conceptions of Central Europe, the 
majority of them remarkably consistent in their interpretation of Central 
Europe as an economic and political union of Germany and Austria even before 
the end of the 19th century (e.g. Vernaleken 1898). It was both this consistency 
and prevalence within the definitive discourse that helped to gradually steer 
interpretation of the notion their way.  
One of the authors falling into this category was Alexander von Peez, an 
Austrian German industrialist and politician. He considered that the 
strengthening of Austria-Hungary could only be achieved by fostering and 
protecting the predominance of Germans in the monarchy. He presented his 
Central Europe project, comprising the states of the Triple Alliance, as the only 
option to successfully face down the competition from other great powers in 
the economic field. (Peez 1895) 
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Among later entrants into the debate was Albert Ritter - his pamphlet Berlin-
Bagdad: Neue Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik (1914) really stood out. The 
fervently written pamphlet aroused considerable interest and was reprinted 
several times just before the outbreak of the First World War (Meyer 1955: 
108). Ritter considered any concepts defending Germany and Austria-Hungary 
as outmoded, since they were just two parts of the larger whole – the German 
nation. He called for the immediate implementation of the Central European 
project, defined as both the economic and political union of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. In line with prevailing organic theories of the state, Ritter 
insisted that Germans had to either grow or wither away, making creation of 
Central Europe a matter of their ‘life and death’ (Ritter 1914: 18). 
Under the influence of its pan-German lead, the notion of Central Europe settled 
relatively early along the lines of the economic and political union of Austria-
Hungary and Germany. It was often employed by the daily press in supporting 
arguments for a customs union in the 1880s and 1890s.  
Thus, while the process of othering after 1848 created a perception of two 
separate German nations (Vernaleken 1898), the end of the century brought 
them back together in what was (in an Austrian context at least)  being 
presented as a shared strategic, economic, cultural and historical space for all 
Germans – Mitteleuropa. Tellingly, when the Austrian Military Geographical 
Institute updated its General Map of Central Europe in 1903, it would opt this 
time for the title, General Karte von Mittel-Europa.  
 
4.3.3 MEWV in Austria-Hungary 
After Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein (MEWV) was founded in Berlin in 
1904, its first conference met later during the same year in Vienna. Julius Wolf, 
its founder, had in fact been born in Bohemia, even though he spent most of his 
life in Germany.  
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Austrian branches of MEWV promoted the idea of closer economic cooperation 
by the way of harmonization of regulations, procedures and schemes for trade, 
transport and communication, rather than calling for a customs union. In this 
way, they could avoid the many pitfalls that pan-Germans would fall into, 
especially the censorship, as their proposals did not represent such a threat to 
Austro-Hungarian sovereignty.  
MEWV focused on practical proposals and its propaganda in favour of Central 
Europe was relatively limited, especially in Austria-Hungary. In fact, Wolf set 
out rules for MEWV societies, which specifically instructed members of the 
newly founded association not to conduct political agitation, provoke any 
suspicion of impinging on the economic sovereignty of any state, or put forward 
aggressive designs (Wolf 1905; 8 – 9).  
The focus on simplification of trade and investment relations between Austria-
Hungary and Germany, rather than any agitation for grand political designs, 
steered MEWV activities towards working out the details of individual pieces of 
regulation and tabling proposals for relevant policy makers. However, their 
impact was very modest. The practical results of their work were limited to 
simplification of banking procedures and customs formalities in trade with 
Germany (Patzauer 1911). 
Overall, while activities of MEWV, unlike the pan-German movement, did not 
threaten sovereignty of Austria-Hungary and thus avoided censorship, they did 
not have much impact on policy-making either. As a result, MEWV’s 
infrastructural effect in the monarchy was, in fact, negligible. 
 
4.4 The reformist efforts 
Even though the monarchy was said to be on the verge of collapse for decades 
(e.g. Sorel 1878 or Leroy-Beaulieu 1888), in the early years of the twentieth 
century the plans of Pan-Germans did not attract overwhelming support even 
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among their own followers. In the first elections with general suffrage for men 
in 1907, the Pan-German and radical parties achieved only 2.8% support. 
(Morgenbrod 1994: 22)  
Repetitive outbursts of nationalism by Austrian Germans against their Slav 
compatriots did not necessarily translate into political support for union with 
Germany and Austrian Germans generally remained loyal to the Habsburg 
sceptre. Nationalist struggle translated itself into support of nationally defined, 
yet, not anti-dynastic parties. While parliament was deadlocked in national 
struggles most of the time, calls for dissolution of the monarchy were rarely 
voiced. For the most part, power-struggles focused on petty local issues, and 
safeguarding or advancing of competing ethnic privileges.  
While the Pan-Germans conspired and the rest of Europe debated the break-up 
of the empire (Tille 1895, Benoist 1897, Hirst 1898, Beaumont 1901, Brooks 
1901, Chéradame 1901), the Austrian government was busy trying to defuse 
and stabilise a simmering melting pot of national tensions. Pan-German 
conceptions of Central Europe under a unified German leadership certainly did 
not align with the efforts of the Austrian government to stabilise its shaky 
empire.  
 
4.4.1 Growing pressures 
Discussion of reform under the Habsburg Monarchy was a recurrent theme in 
the 19th century and successive Austrian governments were notorious unable 
to keep pace with the increasing pressures for change. The flourishing of 
modern nationalisms and the ossified, ages-old empire clashed violently – for 
instance, the 1848/9 revolution could only be suppressed with the help of the 
Russian imperial army. The 1866 defeat by Prussia shook Austrian power to its 
foundations. The result was the 1867 Compromise; the only reform that 
addressed nationalist pressures with some degree of success. The Compromise 
brought restoration of Hungarian sovereignty and restructuring of the Austrian 
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Empire into a dual monarchy under a shared monarch and three key ministries. 
Its likely effectiveness in meeting the pressures of rising nationalisms always 
seemed questionable, and the regular renegotiation of the compromise 
(scheduled every 10 years) predictably brought about renewed constitutional 
crises.  
The pressures posed by the Slav nationalities in the Empire were also rising and 
the Vienna government had to increasingly engage in a fine balancing act to 
hold the situation under control. It should not be forgotten that Austria was 
dominated by its German population, who considered it their prerogative to 
maintain a dominant position. Yet, the necessity of placating the Slavs required 
implementation of reforms in their favour. This, in turn, was sure to result in a 
negative reaction from the German population. A heightened sense of 
vulnerability on the part of Austria’s Germans led them to increasingly doubt 
the court’s dedication to advancing the interests of their own kin. The reforms 
thus implemented were partial and often reversed, owing to the competing 
pressures of national groups on the government.  
By the end of the 19th century it was clear that tensions between the 
nationalities of the empire would sooner or later force stronger changes in the 
empire’s structure. The common expectation was that these would arrive with 
the demise of the elderly Emperor Franz Joseph, placing growing pressures on 
the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand d’Este. 
 
4.4.2 The Belvedere Circle 
The heir to the throne surrounded himself with a group of advisers, who 
analysed, debated and developed proposals for imperial reform. The so-called 
Belvedere Circle was a heterogeneous collective of young conservatives and 
representatives of national minorities (chiefly from Hungary), who strove to 
preserve the empire’s threatened position in the face of radicalising social 
forces. Their efforts centred on devising a federal structure for the empire, one 
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that would be able to meet the demands of radical nationalisms in the country 
and, at the same time, preserve the empire as such.71  
The debate within the circle was significantly influenced by the ideas of Aurel 
Popovici, a Romanian from Hungary, who joined the group after being exiled for 
his reformist views (Castellan 1989: 149). In 1906, Popovici published his Die 
Vereinigte Staaten von Grossösterreich (Popovici 1906), in which he renounced 
the Compromise of 1867, proposing instead a federalist structure for the whole 
of the monarchy. Its territory was to be divided into 15 federal units joined 
together by strong centralistic elements. His aim was to restore Austria to its 
former power status, resolve its nationality question and avert the spectre of 
potential future Russian influence over the monarchy’s Slavs. The major 
challenge here was the implicit degradation of the status of Hungarians and 
Germans in such arrangements, which was always unlikely to go uncontested. 
This broad view was apparently shared by the heir to the throne as well. One of 
the most interesting works of the Belvedere Circle was its Manifesto for the 
Austrian People (Eichhoff 1926: 1 - 3)72, which was drafted by the director of 
the Archduke’s military chancellery, Alexander von Brosch, and presented as 
the plan Franz Ferdinand would follow after his succession to the throne.  
The basic objective of the plan was to strengthen the cohesive forces of empire, 
implying a stronger position for the crown, the lesser status of Hungary, now 
levelled with all other imperial nationalities. Essentially, federalisation was to 
be carried out along ethnic territorial lines, more or less consistent with 
Popovici’s proposal. The federal structure was to be dominated by a strong 
central power: Franz Ferdinand intended to end the permanent constitutional 
conflict in the country, restore the empire to its pre-1867 homogeneity and 
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its origins between 1908 and 1911. The document carries ideas, whose authorship is ascribed to 
several members of the group, including Count Czernin, Heinrich Lammasch and Gustav Truba. The 
manifest is also mentioned by another member of the group, Milan Hodža, in his Federation in 
Central Europe (1942). 
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regain Austria’s former glory as a great power within the Concert of Europe. To 
this purpose, a manifest series of legal tricks was concocted to enable the 
ascending monarch to avoid an oath of loyalty to the Hungarian constitution. 
Avoiding the oath would allow him to carry out the envisaged reform. Indeed, 
the manifesto even stipulated the potential use of force, if necessary.   
The aim of the Belvedere circle was to safeguard the monarchy and not the 
leading role of Germans, as would have been hoped for by the pan-Germans. 
While Franz Ferdinand’s death prevented realisation of any such plans, the 
work of the group evidences quite clearly that rather than striving to maintain a 
German hold on Austria, the monarchy was striving to maintain Austria’s hold 
on all its nationalities – not just the Germans but the Czechs, Poles, Slovenians 
and the increasingly confident Magyars. Similar attitudes were apparent across 
cabinets of Franz Joseph, which showed a preference for fostering the empire 
over advancing the interests of the German population. 
Pan-German plans for Central Europe would at the very least have made 
Austria-Hungary a junior partner to Germany, if not annexed altogether.These 
were demonstrably not in line with the interests and policies of the Austrian 
throne and government.  
 
4.5 The First World War 
In the run up to the war, the focal point of the debate over Central Europe was 
Schönerer’s Deutscher Klub in Vienna (Samassa 1917: 6). The club became a 
centre for various groups of German nationalists and on 19 September 1914 at 
an event organized by the club, the chairman of the Alldeutschen Verband, 
Heinrich Class introduced his ‘Six Point Program’ for Austria-Hungary. While 
many of his propositions evoked a mixed response, point five – advocating 
customs and economic union with Germany – met with general acclaim 
(Baernreither 1914: 19 and 20 September). From then on, proposals for 
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actuation of such a union became virtually the sole theme of debates in the club. 
(Müller 2001: 35)  
The German National Union (Der Deutsche Nationalverband) was the first 
political organisation that actively promoted the idea of a Central Europe73 
(Müller 2001: 28). In the days after the outbreak of the war, Gustav Gross, the 
chairman of the union, sent its members a memorandum in which he outlined a 
comprehensive program: political union with Germany was to be established 
and recognized in the constitution, while economic union under a customs 
parliament was to be created with German language elevated to the role of state 
language (Gross 1914a). His letter met with enthusiasm from union members, 
responding to Gross’s memorandum with their own proposals for how the 
union should be achieved. (Beurle 1914) While the usual problem of reaching 
consensus over an exact form for Central Europe persisted in this group as well, 
several members suggested in their written replies that the union should insist 
on German leadership of Central Europe (Dobering 1914a, Freissler 1914).  
Pan-German writers produced a positive flurry of concepts for Central Europe 
in the following four years of war, the main features of which will be explored 
in the following sections. 
 
4.5.1 Early wartime concepts 
German ambassador Tschirschky reported to his superiors in Berlin on 1 
September 1914 that the idea of a customs integration with Germany74 was 
gaining traction in the Austrian society. (Tschirschky 1914a, Appendix 8) 
                                                 
73
 Der Deutsche Nationalverband was an umbrella organisation for the national and liberal parties 
established just before the parliamentary elections in 1907. The purpose of the union was to represent 
political interests of Austrian Germans in the domestic political struggle. By 1911, the union included 
five parties
73
, which among themselves gained 105 seats in the 514 seats strong Chamber of Deputies, 
followed by Social Democrats and Christian Social Party. (Uckar 1985: 362) 
74
 Tschirschky used the expression “Zollanschluss an Deutschland”, subconsciously indicating that in 
his view Austria should be attached to rather than form equal partnership with Germany. 
(Tschirschky 1914b) 
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Indeed, the proposal resonated not only among the Pan-German members of 
the Viennese parliament (e.g. Medlinger 1915) but also in the daily newspapers 
(Tschirschky 1914b) in the early months of the war.  
A flurry of pan-German concepts calling for of union with Germany was 
published in this period. The first formulation of the Pan-German idea of 
Central Europe to attract major public attention was the Heinrich Class’s 
‘Denkschrift zum deutschen Kriegsziel’ published as on 28 August 1914. 
(Fischer 1969: 647, Kruck 1954: 71) In an outburst of feeling founded on the 
new unity to be founded between the Austria-Hungary and Germany, Austrian 
pan-Germans called for union on political grounds and not just economic 
reasons. Professor Eugen Philippovich, an Austrian German political economist 
and one of the foremost advocates of closer relations with Germany, wrote: 
“Wir wünschen die Verbindung nicht allein aus wirtschaftlichen 
Gründen, sondern auch darum, weil dann naturgemäss die 
Stellung der Deutschen in Österreich gestärkt wird.” 
(Philippovich 1915: 2)75 
Some went so far as to claim that political union with Germany was necessary 
in order to help Austrian Germans “fight the second war with German-hating 
Slavs and Magyars” (AA PA 1915b). Joint manifestos on the endangered 
position of Austrian Germans within their own state were written by pan-
German members of parliaments in both countries. (Erzberger 1915) The 
language used was particularly charged: 
“Der schönste Staatsvertrag ware ein Blatt Papier gegen eine 
slavische Majorität und einen slavophilen Regierunskurs in 
Oesterreich.” (Erzberger 1915: 15)76 
                                                 
75
 - We wish for the union not only for economic reasons, but also because it will naturally strengthen 
the position of the Germans in Austria. - 
76 - The most beautiful state treaty would be one sheet of paper against a Slavic majority and 
Slavophil orientation of the government in Austria. - 
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Interestingly, the expression Central Europe did not feature in these documents 
exclusively, as write-ups typically focused primarily on internal reforms within 
Austria-Hungary (e.g. Philippovich 1915); it appears alongside expressions 
such as wirtschaftliche Vereinigung (economic union), wirtschafliche 
Annäherung (economic rapprochement) or Zollunion (customs union). The 
necessity of forging the unity and kinship of a German nation divided into two 
states was over-emphasised. Tediously long expressions using the names of 
both states were used alongside references to the German nation as one unit. 
The importance of Austria in such schemes was typically highlighted by 
assertions that it was “the bearer of German culture” or “medium of German 
supremacy in the East” (Brandt 1915: 2, Jesser 1915: 16, Gross 1915). Austrian 
pan-Germans now ‘felt German again’, and took advantage of a lighter hand of 
the censor to voice their grievances and reassert their identity.  
Many proposals, as suggested above, stemmed from envisaged internal reform 
of the monarchy: Austria was to reassert its former German character and the 
dual monarchy remodelled to increase Austria’s relative power. (Jesser 1915) 
Closer military and economic alliance with Germany was discussed only after 
proposals for reassertion of Austria’s German character were laid out and 
wider Central European economic area was finally alluded to, highlighting the 
envisaged role of Austria in the further expansion of influence (as the German 
power in the East). (Gross 1915) A typical example arrived with the ideas of 
Alois Brandt, a Bohemian German academic, who spent 9 of his 16 page treatise 
addressing German demands for the reorganization of Austria after the war, 
discussing internal reforms in Austria, then devoting 2 pages to the 
restructuring of Austria-Hungary, a further 2 pages on the future relationship 
with Germany and 2 more pages on relationships with neighbouring states, 
including proposals for a Central European economic area.77 (Brandt 1915)  
                                                 
77
 Austrian Germans were not the only ones obsessed with reform of the monarchy to restore its 
former great power standing. Even though from a different point of view, and with obviously 
different proposals for internal reform, Hungarian authors were trying to resolve the same problem – 
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On the other hand, an almost equal body of Austrian German writing on Central 
Europe fell firmly in line with the definition of Central Europe as the union of 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, emphasising its German character; essentially, a 
replacement notion for ‘Deutschland’. Edmund Steinacker’s analysis of such 
proposals during January 1916 (Steinacker 1916) observed that they typically 
embraced two elements – military alliance and economic union. Such concepts 
reasserted the need for a close alliance of the two empires in an envisioned 
post-war world comprising enlarged and antagonistic economic areas. Authors 
were conscious of the lesser economic and military strength of Austria-Hungary 
compared to Germany and were careful to portray the important role Austria 
could play in mediating any future alliances radiating to the south-east of 
Europe or even  the Middle East. (Rechenberg 1916) Sustaining the dual 
monarchy’s sovereignty was a non-negotiable condition even for Austrian 
German writers in the early war-time debate over the concept of Central 
Europe. 
 
4.5.2 The post-Naumann debate 
It was only after the publication of Naumann’s book that Central Europe 
became a real buzz-word. The number of works on Central Europe published 
within just a small matter of months soared following publication of this iconic 
book. Broadly, they could be divided into three broad groups – those works 
endorsing and building upon Naumann’s concept, critiques of his work and the 
works of authors proposing alternative concepts within the context of the 
debate that had hereby been triggered.  
It was also at this point that the discourse over Central Europe transcended its 
traditional pan-German boundaries and spilled over into daily parlance. 
Authors outside this narrow movement entered the discourse in a manner that 
                                                                                                                                         
to restore the monarchy as the power in the east and equal partner for Germany in a future military 
and economic union. (e.g. Kristoffy 1916) 
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unsettled the established characteristics of the debate. Central Europe was 
paired with a multitude of synonyms, such as the above mentioned 
wirtschaftliche Vereinigung (economic union), wirtschafliche Annäherung 
(economic rapprochement) or Zollunion (customs union). The economic line of 
argument became particularly pronounced and popular, as it did not contradict 
Austria’s political sovereignty and was considered a necessary addition to the 
military alliance, with a post-war return to free trade now deemed unfeasible. 
 
4.5.2.1 N um nn’s followers 
Authors in the first category would typically firmly assert their belief in the 
German character of Central Europe: 
“Der geschichtliche Boden, auf dem sich die deutsche Nation 
entwickelt und vor allem betätigt hat, heisst es Mitteleuropa.” 
(Sieger 1917: 7)78 
As such, they included Germany and Austria-Hungary within Central Europe 
and alluded to the option of potentially extending its reach, contingent upon 
future economic developments. After Naumann, the world war was presented 
as the instrumental event in forging a future Central Europe.79  
Some, like Alfred Gürtler, took it upon themselves to elaborate the internal 
processes of Naumann’s construct. Gürtler’s work is exceptional for its 
comprehensiveness and complexity, as well as its legalistic rather political line 
of enquiry. He focused on the legal underpinnings of the Dual Monarchy, 
especially the Pragmatic Sanction80, Compromise of 1867 and its later 
renegotiation. For Gürtler concluded that when these legal norms are analysed 
                                                 
78
 - The historical area, in which the German nation developed and primarily operated, we call Central 
Europe. – (Sieger 1917: 7) 
79
 “Österreich-Ungarn und das Deutsche Reich sind durch das Feuer des Krieges zu einer 
militärischen Einheit zusammengeschmiedet worden.” – Austria-Hungary and the German Empire 
have been forged together into a military union by the war. – (Succovaty 1916: 16) 
80
 An edict issued by Emperor Charles VI to ensure a female heir could inherit Habsburg possessions, 
issued 1713 
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and compared to Naumann’s proposal, Austria-Hungary already constituted a 
small version of Central Europe (Gürtler 1916a: 27). In its conclusions, he 
asserted that organisational schemes developed in Austria-Hungary should 
become the model for Central Europe. Thus Central Europe would offer the 
solution for the monarchy’s chief problem – national tensions – and the 
monarchy would offer a solution for the chief problem of Central Europe – its 
organisational structure. Gürtler further elaborated his ideas in later works, 
proposing a model for the future customs union of Germany and Austria-
Hungary built upon existing legal norms in Austria-Hungary. (Gürtler 1916b) 
Yet, not all works building on Naumann were oriented towards putting the 
concept into practice. Some of them, like Karl Schneider’s Mitteleuropa als 
Kulturbegriff (Schneider 1916), were also highly academic works, introducing a 
layer of philosophical reasoning behind the idea of Central Europe. Schneider 
started by defining it as a combination of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This 
central state union81 was later to be enlarged with the addition of Bulgaria and 
Turkey (Schneider 1916: 13). Yet, cultural unity first needed to be achieved 
within Central Europe, as it was not only to be a state union (in the classical 
nation-state sense) but the ‘first line of military defence’ in any future fight 
against Russia. Russia was cast as the polar other when set against Central 
Europe, determined to extinguish the beacon of pure culture that this new 
order would represent. Schneider’s original gloss for the scheme was his 
concept for a ‘new Christianity’, which Central Europe would embody in its role 
as a new cultural form. Schneider’s novel take on the historical mission of 
Central Europe was otherwise accompanied by relatively repetitive and routine 
insistences on the central role for Austria-Hungary in mobilising any new 
political union to project its power to Asia and Africa. Yet, between the lines, it 
becomes obvious that for Schneider the value of Austria was in providing a 
land-bridge for further expansion.  
                                                 
81
 ‘Zentraler Staatenbund’  
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Finally, Austrian authors also elaborated practical proposals for implementing 
the Central Europe idea, aimed at influencing and guiding policy makers.  An 
interesting addition to this part of the debate was the Denkschrift aus Deutsch-
Österreich of Austrian historian, Heinrich Friedjung82 (Friedjung 1915). 
Friedjung was one of the earliest adherents of Central Europe: in 1880, he had 
co-authored the program of the Austrian German People’s Party (‘Deutsche 
Volkspartei’), which incorporated the idea of a Central European economic 
union (Müller 2001: 157). Proposing a Central European Union between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, Friedjung had openly championed Austrian 
German preponderance in the dual monarchy. Wider union with the German 
Empire should have been, in the first place, German in its national character. 
The first step would have been an immediate creation of customs union for at 
least 25 years, initiated by the Bavarian king, as a mediator between the 
Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs. So as to avoid censorship, the paper was 
only sent to 200 carefully selected and influential politicians. A unique feature 
of Friedjung’s proposal is the fact that it was the collective outcome of the 
Baernreither group that included Eugen Philippovich, Michael Hainisch and 
Hans Übersberger. It was also one of very few works on Central Europe by 
Austrian German authors that attracted the serious interest of German policy 
makers (see Friedjung 1915 in AAPA R2594, doc. no. 368/0). 
 
4.5.2.2 N um nn’s critics: K rl Renner 
Not all Austrian German authors agreed with Naumann. The Austrian socialist 
community was an especially fertile ground for his critics. Foremost of these 
was Karl Renner (usually writing under his pseudonym of Karl Kautsky). 
Renner had written on the subject of customs unions, using the notion of 
                                                 
82
 Friedjung was a part of the closely knit community of Central Europe proponents surrounding J. M. 
Baernreither and Edmund Steinacker. (Steinacker 1937: 234) 
 164 
Central Europe, even before Naumann’s book was published (Renner 1915, 
Appendix 5). He rejected Naumann on ideological grounds. 
Renner viewed Naumann’s proposal as a capitalist plot, one which would 
certainly not lead to a ‘United States of Central Europe’ (Kautsky 1916: 43); 
rather, it was just another political construct promoting the interests of large 
capitalists. He observed that Naumann’s starting point was the perceived 
detrimental effects of high customs duties levied by other countries for German 
industry. Kautsky insisted that all Naumann really had in mind were the 
interests of large industries, for whose purpose he devised protection in the 
form of a larger economic zone, one from which the large industries of other 
countries would be excluded. Renner (Kautsky) reckoned that by doing so, the 
larger domestic market would be ring-fenced to the detriment of the 
population, as large producers would be able to maintain high prices and even 
monopolies, building trusts and cartels. Thus Naumann’s proposal, instead of 
eliminating the negative effects of foreign capitalist influences, would cement in 
place the negative effects of domestic ones. (Kautsky 1916: 24 – 25) He insisted 
that it was not Naumann but proponents of a “workers’ democracy” that were 
the true advocates of “United States of Europe” and had been for half a century. 
(Kautsky 1916: 43) 
In conclusion, his critique suggested: 
“Sollte der mitteleuropäischer Staatenbund je zu seiner 
Verwirklichung gelangen, so könnte er nur ein 
Übergangsstadium sein. Denn dieselben Tendenzen, die allein ihn 
zu schaffen vermochten, müssten nach seiner steten Erweiterung 
in der Richtung eines Weltbundes bringen.”83 (Kautsky 1916: 48) 
                                                 
83
 - Should the Central European State Union ever be realized, it could only be a transitional stage. 
For the very same tendencies, which facilitate its creation, must bring its further enlargement in the 
direction of a global union. - 
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Renner had also voiced his critique at a meeting of Austrian and German social 
democrats in January 1916 (Renner 1916) and many of his colleagues agreed 
with him. At the meeting, speakers avoided any mention of Central Europe, 
preferring to refer to a “wirtschaftliche Annäherung”, even though they would 
have used the notion previously (just like Renner). They were now clearly 
dissociating themselves from the political baggage that Central Europe now 
carried. (SDPD 1916)  
Renner was not the only critic of Naumann’s concept. The most radical pan-
Germans were also unconvinced by his scheme and accused Naumann of being 
insufficiently ambitious and excessively accommodating of the small nations in 
the region. (Dodds and Atkinson 2000: 44; see e.g. Spahn 1925) Conversely, 
some of his most outspoken critics came from the representatives of the small 
nations - Tomáš Gariggue Masaryk, to name but one – his The New Europe: The 
Slav Standpoint (1918) was pitched directly against Naumann’s proposal. 
 
4.5.2.3 Independent definitions 
Many authors aired their definitions and visions of Central Europe before the 
public in the noisy debate following the publications of Naumann’s work. While 
the bulk of the discussion was led by Naumann’s supporters and opponents, 
there were also those, who offered visions for Central Europe of their own.  
One of these authors was Erwin Hanslik, who argued that Central Europe was 
not an area with set boundaries, but a transitional area between the East and 
the West. These two anti-poles represented in Hanslik’s view opposing 
geographical, climatic and cultural characteristics and Central Europe would be 
the area of their transition. Hanslik contrasted the bourgeois culture of the 
West and the backward feudal structures of the East; the industrial society of 
the West and rural society of the East; the maritime climate of the West and the 
continental climate of the East, etc. The net effect of such transitions delimited 
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his Central Europe in a geographical area whose coastal outposts were Trieste, 
Odessa and Danzig. (Hanslik 1917: 94) 
Hugo Hassinger presented a dynamic model for developing a Central Europe as 
defined by its geographic and socio-political characteristics. His Central Europe 
consisted of two components – a core defined by Germanic culture (consisting 
of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland) and the Low Countries; and a 
periphery, which, while falling under the influence and supervision of the core, 
was located around   the lower Danube basin and to the south of it. Hassinger, 
like Gürtel, insisted that Austria-Hungary served as an ideal model for the 
future political organisation of the space, which would drive its future economic 
prosperity from its positional centrality - allowing access to sea lines of trade as 
well as controlling a ground route to the Middle East. (Hassinger 1917: 476 - 
493) 
However, these independent voices were peripheral to the main discourse of 
Central Europe, which had by then firmly been associated with the notion of a 
projected military, economic and political alliance between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, one that was to be dominated by the Germans and expanded 
south-east down the Danube, should an opportunity arise.  
This association was so strong that Albrecht Penck, at the time a geography 
professor at the University of Vienna, decided to drop mention of the notion in 
his geographical works, suggesting that it had now become unfit for the 
purpose of geographical differentiation. (Penck 1915)  
 
4.5.3 Avoiding the label 
As negotiations on a customs union between Germany and Austria-Hungary 
progressed in 1916 and 1917, more and more practically oriented studies of its 
likely effects, processes of conversion, individual product groups, etc. were 
undertaken. (Matlekovits 1916, Reichenberg HuGK 1916, Carus 1916) The 
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conviction that the economic future of Austria-Hungary depended on a customs 
union with Germany was now deep-seated84 and academics as well as 
politicians now debated the details rather than the principle of such 
unification85. However, these tended to avoid employing the notion of Central 
Europe, by now firmly associated with characteristics assigned to it in the post-
Naumann discourse, instead often opting for replacements such as 
‘wirtschafliche Annäherung’, ‘zollpolitische Annäherung’, ‘Zollbund’, 
‘Witschaftsverband’ and  others.  
Economic reasoning behind the idea of an enlarged Central Europe was 
gathering strength in Austria. Yet, rather than simply endorsing the idea of a 
customs union, authors promoted Austria-Hungary as a gateway to the east, 
emphasising the importance of the Danube and the place of the Balkans in any 
new customs union. As Dietrich Berl, director of the coal mining company, Berl, 
wrote in a letter to the German Embassy: 
“Es ist selbstverständlich dass jedermann, ohne sich etwa von 
Gefühlsmomenten leiten lassen zu wollen, Deutschland und 
Österreich-Ungarn in einem einheitlichen Zollgebiet vereinigt 
sehen möchte. Es würde wohl noch von weitergehender 
Bedeutung sein, wenn auch die Balkanstaaten nach 
Friedensschluss dieser Zollgemeinschaft angehören wurden, so 
dass von der Nord- und Ostsee bis zum Schwartzen Meere ein 
einheitliches Zollgebiet bestünde.”86 (Berl 1916: 4) 
The weight of Berl’s proposal was centred on the ‘customs area’ (‘Zollgebiet’) 
rather than Central Europe. He was also ultimately concerned about the balance 
                                                 
84
 ‘Unsere ganze wirtschaftliche Zukunft liegt in einem zollpolitischen Annäherung an Deutschland’ 
– Our whole economic future lies in customs-political rapprochement with Germany. – (Carus 1916: 
2) 
85
 For comparison with earlier debate on principle of customs union see Szterenyi 1915 
86
 It goes without saying that everyone, without wanting to be somewhat led by emotional moments, 
xould like to see Germany and Austria-Hungary in one united customs area. It would probably be of 
still broarder significance, if also the Balkan states belonged to this customs union after the 
conclusion of peace, so that there would be one united customs area from the North and Baltic Seas to 
the Black Sea. 
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of power in the post-war global market and saw the only chance for Austria-
Hungary as rivalling Britain and France in forging such an economic block.  
In Hungary, where these concepts were far less prevalent, former Prime 
Minister Ladislaus von Lukács published his concept in Pester Lloyd in spring 
1916. In this article he suggested that a customs union of Germany, Hungary 
and Austria was the ideal constellation to counter the likely teaming up of other 
countries against the Central Powers in the post-war economic arena. Its 
bottom line was its contained warning against potential future customs duty 
war: 
“Möglich, dass die Verbandmächte durch den Hass, der sie alle 
gegen uns erfühlt, sich wie in der allgemeinen Politik, so auch auf 
wirtschaftliche-politischem Gebiete in eine ihren eigenen 
Interessen zuwiderlaufende Richtung werden hinreissen lassen, 
was einen gegen uns gerichteten, unnatürlichen 
wirtschaftspolitischen Bund zur Folge haben würde.”87 (Lukács 
1916: 20) 
Interestingly, while Lukács referred to Central Europe in the title of his article 
(‘Die wirtschaftliche Zukunft Mitteleuropas’), in the text itself he preferred to 
use ‘Zollunion’. This suggests that he used Central Europe as a reference to its 
geographical area, the site of his envisaged bloc and ‘Zollunion’ as the title of 
the proposed construct. He was also careful to highlight that each component 
state of the customs union maintain its full sovereignty. 
 
This pattern is present in many proposals published during the latter part of 
the war: emphasis on economic integration in an anticipated future customs 
                                                 
87
 - It is possible that Allied Powers - through hate they all feel against us -, just as in general politics, 
also in the area of economic policy will be carried away by their own interests in the clashing 
direction, which pitched them against us, forging an unnatural economic policy union. -  
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war, the highlighting of the role Austria might play within the construct and 
reference to customs union or derivative notion instead of Central.88  
One explanation for such term avoidance is political correctness. Given the 
combustible national mix of Austria-Hungary, escalating tensions during the 
war and the long-standing governmental policy of capping nationalist language, 
this requirement simply precluded the use of Central Europe as soon as it 
became widely associated with the vision of German domination over Austro-
Hungarian non-German nationalities. However, an alternative explanation 
offers itself as we read through the Austrian German concepts – the notion was 
simply not in line with the ambitions of Austrian Germans at the height of the 
war, when their eyes were set on a south-eastward expansion well beyond 
what was possible to include under any heading of Central Europe: 
“Der Weltkrieg hat die Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen 
Monarchie und jene des deutschen Reiches aneinander 
geschmiedet und schon treten die Umrisse vor, welche die 
weitere Ausgestaltung des neuen Gefüges vorausahnen lassen. 
Um Balkan und in nahen Osten reihen sich schon organisch neue 
Bestandteile des grossen Wirtschaftskörpers an, dessen 
Bezeichnung als ‘Mitteleuropa’ eigentlich schon überholt ist, da 
seine Wirtschaftsgrenzen schon weit, nach Asien 
hinausreichen”89 
Austrian German authors emphasised Austria-Hungary’s importance in the 
envisaged drive to south-east Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean or 
even Africa. The view that the two empires could and should have ambition 
                                                 
88
 For example, Karl von Frey wrote: ‘Wenn ich vom Wirtschaftsbunde oder vom Bunde kurzweg 
sprechen werde, so verstehe ich darunter: Oesterreich, Ungarn, Deutschland, Bulgarien und die 
Turkei.’, - When I speak of economic union or, shortly, union, I mean Austria, Hungary, Germany, 
Bulgaria and Turkey. -  and continued on emphasizing the crucial role the port of Trieste would play 
in future of his economic union as a gateway to the East. (Frey 1916: 38) 
89
 The World War forged together the history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and that of the 
German Empire, outlines that foreshadow future development have already appeared. In the Balkans 
and the Middle East, new composite parts are already lining up organically to present themselves as a 
large economic body, whose name ‘Central Europe’ is already outdated, because its borders already 
reach further, to Asia.  
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beyond the boundaries of Europe was widespread in 1916 and 1917; and 
consonant with prevailing territorial and colonial ambition within Europe 
generally.  
 
The discussion remained dense along the more technical lines until the last 
months of the war. The debate revolved around how to model, organize and run 
the customs and economic union, rather than turning on the questions of a 
larger philosophical or ideological context of the plan. It also narrowed down in 
scope as the ambitions of Austrians became more sober in the light of 
development of the war. The emphasis shifted back to the partnership of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary rather than visionary exploits to the south-east. 
(e. g. Lusensky 1918) 
In May 1918, when the two Emperors signed agreements on military and 
economic union, Central Europe supporters rejoiced at this progress towards 
their theoretical schemes. However, only six months later, the outcome of the 
war reversed the trajectory completely. 
 
4.5.4 Central Europe the Austrian way 
Debate over the notion of Central Europe during wartime differs from the 
German experience. Naumann’s book, as in Germany, prompted a boom in 
Austrian publications: whether these were elaborating the practicalities of 
creating a German – Austro-Hungarian union, examining its philosophical 
background, criticising it, or presenting alternatives. Yet, employment of the 
notion was somewhat patchier than was the case in the contemporaneous 
German debate. Alternative notions used by individual authors included mainly 
the following expressions: customs union, economic union, and Germany-
Austria. The specific characteristics that influenced participants in the Austrian 
discourse of Central Europe can explain this obvious discrepancy. 
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First of all, the pan-German authors saw in Central Europe a tool to foster and 
further the German role in Austria-Hungary. Pre-Naumann concepts were, in 
fact, often intertwined with proposals for reorganisation of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. (e. g. Brandt 1915) In some cases, they were directly pitched 
against the Slavs and Magyars. (e. g. Erzberger 1915) Here, pan-German 
authors were trying to resolve the long-standing problem of the deteriorating 
standing of Germans within the monarchy and the growth in parallel national 
tensions through the assertion of  a Central Europe dominated by a German 
majority character and distinguished by a Germanic character. 
Second, the role of Austria as an organisational model, a gateway to South-
Eastern Europe and a bridge to the Middle East was highlighted, as Austrian 
authors struggled to establish structural equality with Germany within the 
envisaged union. Particular attention was paid to highlighting the sovereign 
preservation of both empires as ‘Central Europe’ was often seen, 
understandably, as a challenge to Austria’s independence. It would be relatively 
easy to dismiss these statements as mere compliance with political correctness 
and efforts to avoid censorship. However, it seems more plausible that Austrian 
German authors actually had ambitions for their empire in the projected union 
and beyond. 
Finally, such reasoning would also help to explain, why, later on in the war, 
references to customs union or economic rapprochement (referring to 
negotiations between Germany and Austria-Hungary) were used in many 
works instead of Central Europe. The notion of Central Europe, influenced by 
the German (as much as any local) debate, was increasingly interpreted as 
project dominated by the German Empire, where Austria was just a junior 
partner, a sort of German periphery. A strong association was observed here by 
several authors outside the pan-German movement, who consciously dropped 
the notion conspicuously because of such attendant baggage. (e. g. SDPD 1916, 
Penck 1915) The German mainstream was certainly not in line with the 
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ambitions of Austrian Germans at the height of the war in 1916-17, who saw 
Austria-Hungary reaching out to the Balkans and beyond. 
 
4.6 Non-German debate over Central Europe 
During the early 20th century, ‘Central Europe’ also entered the parlance of 
Austro-Hungarian minorities. (Zunkovic 1904) However, like many of their 
German compatriots, national minority writers in Austria-Hungary were 
preoccupied with a constitutional restructuring of the monarchy rather than 
any grand designs of enlarged economic areas. 
The best known of these authors was obviously Aurel Popovici, whose work has 
already been discussed; however, there were many others across the decades 
from a variety of ethnic backgrounds - from the Czech František Palacký to the 
Slovene Bogumil Vošnjak (Vošnjak 1917 and 1918). Works of these two writers 
best demonstrate the long way the leaders of small nations took in their 
relationship to the monarchy: While Palacký insisted that if Austria did not 
exist, it would have to be invented for the sake of its small nations (Palacký 
1848); Vošnjak openly called for its dismemberment (Vošnjak 1917: 253 – 
254).  
While the minorities did not really make a sizeable contribution to the 
discourse over Central Europe with any autochthonous concepts90, their 
involvement with the notion is an intriguing and very significant story, 
especially since it was their understanding and employment of the term that 
would essentially shape the subsequent interpretation of the Entente countries.  
 
                                                 
90
 Besides the federative concepts of the Masaryk group (especially Edvard Beneš) drafted in the final 
months of the war, see below, section 5.6.3. 
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4.6.1 The role of Karel Kramář 
Karel Kramář was one of the leaders of the Young Czech Party and member of 
the Viennese parliament. Kramář was a liberal nationalist and used his strong 
political connections to pursue a policy of cooperation with the central 
authorities in Vienna. He resigned as chairman when party policy shifted 
towards the more radical positions opposing central power in 1914. This did 
not save him from being tried and sentenced for treason in 1916, only to be 
released in Emperor Karl I’s general amnesty of 1917. 
In 1899 Kramář published an article in Revue de Paris in which he highlighted 
the threat of any alliance with Germany to the sovereignty of Austria, 
potentially resulting in its de facto annexation. (Kramář 1899) In what was the 
only one of his articles published in foreign newspapers, he highlighted that the 
empowerment of Czechs was essential to keep the spectre of Pan-Germanism in 
check: otherwise “Germany would become the sole mistress of the destinies of 
the entire world” (Kramář 1899).  
The archival evidence from his 1916 trial suggests that through his articles in 
foreign newspapers, Kramář had become the preferred contact for several 
foreign journalists covering of the Austro-Hungarian and Pan-German 
questions (Abrams 1944: 192) The most prominent of these was Andre 
Chéradame, who would later himself become an influential source of 
information on Pan-Germanism and conceptions of Central Europe for Entente 
policy makers.91 
Kramář helped Chéradame from 1897 in gaining essential contacts for his 
research on Pan-Germanism. Correspondence confiscated for the purposes of 
the trial showed that the pair was in frequent contact with Chéradame 
frequently alluding to their common program and shared ideas for opposing 
Pan-Germanism. Letters suggest that Kramář was Chéradame’s ears on 
                                                 
91
 Kramář also had strong influence over several other foreign publicists, such as a René Henry 
(Henry 1900), a leading opponent of Pan-Germanism in France, or William Lavino, The Daily 
Telegraph and later The Times reporter. 
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developments inside the monarchy. (Abrams 1944: 193) Chéradame’s works, as 
essential mediations of Kramář, will be discussed in the following chapter, since 
they were instrumental to Anglo-US policy interpretations of the Central 
European concept. 
Kramář opposed the idea of a German-dominated Central Europe. In May 1914, 
even before the war started, he had proposed the creation of a Slavic Empire 
headed by the Russian Emperor and stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the 
forests of Šumava. The Bohemian crown lands of the Austrian Empire, Prussian 
Silesia, the Lusatian areas of Saxony and Slovak districts of Hungary should 
have been its westernmost outposts. (Krejčí 2005: 193) However, the Russian 
revolution of 1917 swept away the cornerstone of Kramář’s scheme, and he 
was under arrest at this time. He would eventually go on to become the first 
prime minister of an independent Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. 
 
4.6.2 Reactions to Naumann 
The idea of Central Europe as presented by Friedrich Naumann occasioned 
heightened debate among the leaders of Austria-Hungary’s smaller 
nationalities. Naumann met Slovak politician Milan Hodža (a former member of 
the Belvedere Circle), only days after publishing his book. As Hodža later 
recollected, this was the interaction that pushed him to develop his own idea 
for Central Europe, one he would later publish during the Second World War 
(Hodža 1942); yet that is where the positives began and ended – Hodža and 
Naumann apparently could not agree even on the most elemental aspects of the 
concept. (Tobolka 1937: 84) Hodža’s Central Europe was to be a federation of 
independent, predominantly agrarian, Danube valley states that excluded 
Germany. 
Given the ongoing struggle of Slav nationalities for equality under the 
monarchy, it would only have been natural for this national component to 
oppose a political and economic supra-state agenda that was perceived to 
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foster future German domination. (Kořalka 1995: 28) This was, indeed true; yet, 
there were those, who were willing to lend Naumann an ear as his concept 
ostensibly equally provided for the facilitation of national emancipation within 
Austria-Hungary. 
In Bohemia, for at least two decades, many Czechs had differentiated between 
‘our Germans’ and ‘imperial Germans’ (Seckendorff 1899, Fellner 1953); while 
they led a struggle against the former, the latter were often portrayed as 
potential allies. This opinion was broadly replicated among Czech liberals and 
social democrats, who maintained vibrant links with their imperial German 
counterparts. (Marek 1991: 272)  
Bohumír Šmeral, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic 
Party in Bohemia (1916 – 1918), was one such politician (Galandauer 1986). In 
fact, he and other leading Social Democrats had been in touch with Naumann 
even before the publication of his seminal work, expressing an interest in the 
furtherance of closer ties between Germany and Austria Hungary. (Naumann 
1915b) Naumann informed the German Foreign Office about Šmeral’s interest 
in the idea and the latter was invited immediately for a meeting at the German 
embassy in Vienna. (Tschirschky 1915) Šmeral sought publishing opportunities 
to present his views in Germany, something Naumann and the embassy were 
happy to help him with. On one hand, he presented the opinion that rising 
Czech nationalism was not the only option on the table for his compatriots and 
there were potential benefits to be sought from the envisaged relationship 
between the two empires. On the other hand, Šmeral wanted to educate the 
German public to understand that Czechs were not necessarily their enemies, 
but could work towards common cultural and economic goals. He also called for 
imperial German members of parliament to influence their Austrian German 
partner parties to work towards national harmony in Bohemia. (Theiner 1983: 
241) 
Naumann visited Prague in April 1916 and held a meeting with several reform-
minded Czech politicians including Šmeral and Zdeněk Tobolka – member of 
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the Reichsrat and a leader of the Young Czech Party. However, the Czechs left 
disappointed from the meeting. In retrospective, Tobolka recognised that it had 
been Naumann’s visit that convinced the Czechs they could not rely on imperial 
Germans to help them advance their interests. In his recollection, the Czechs 
were disappointed that Naumann had little empathy for their national 
ambitions within the framework of his Central European political construct. 
(Tobolka 1937: 84) 
This highlights that reactions to the idea of a German-led Central Europe were 
not necessarily negative, at least to start with. At least some leaders of 
nationalities of Austria-Hungary had been prepared to contemplate the idea, if 
it offered them space to further their own interests. But looked at in another 
way,, Naumann had spectacularly missed an  opportunity to enlist Austro-
Hungarian nationalities on his side. In fact, they turned into the bitterest 
opponents of his idea for Central Europe. And most crucially, they would be the 
ones who would be listened to by the Entente governments.  
 
4.6.3 Central Europe in the hands of minorities 
By the time Naumann’s Central Europe was published, some of the foremost 
political leaders of Austro-Hungarian Czechs and Slovaks were already lobbying 
for complete dismemberment of Austria-Hungary while exiled to the Entente 
countries.92  
Their leader was Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, a member of the Austrian 
parliament and a professor at the Charles University in Prague. Early in the war, 
and well before the Central Europe movement picked up, Masaryk decided that 
the dismemberment of the monarchy and establishment of an independent 
                                                 
92
 For other nations of the monarchy, the aims of their national movements were not that clear. Polish 
demands were during the war placated by the promise of a united kingdom under German or Austrian 
suzerainty and their political representatives remain disunited in their demands and loyalties. 
Serbians, Slovenians and Croatians had a difficulty getting along and especially their exile 
representatives engaged in much mutual bickering. 
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nation-state was the only way to assert the national rights of his nation. 
(Hájková and Šedivý 2004: 15) 
Considering that Britain was likely to wield the most decisive future political 
influence (Masaryk 1938: 79), he enlisted the help of his friends – Wickham 
Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson - to try and win support for an ‘independent 
Bohemia’.93 . In a secret meeting in Rotterdam during October 1914 he outlined 
his arguments to Seton-Watson for the first time. (Seton-Watson 1943: 21) The 
reasoning behind dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was still relatively crude 
at this stage but Masaryk was already maintaining that “[t]o weaken or crush 
Austria-Hungary is the effectual way of weakening Germany.” (Seton-Watson 
1943: 43 – 44) Seton-Watson wrote up a memorandum for the Foreign Office94, 
though this did not gain much traction at the time.  
It was the developing debate over Central Europe that allowed Masaryk to 
reframe his argument in a language more conducive to attracting the attention 
of British policy-makers. Essentially, Masaryk bought into the discourse of 
Central Europe from the other side –i.e.,  he presented his plan for an 
independent Bohemia as the perfect antidote to schemes for a  German 
dominated Central Europe95, presented either as a remorseless ‘Drang nach 
Osten’ or the  ‘Berlin-Bagdad axis’, which the British establishment was already 
all too familiar with. Both notions implied a challenge to the interests of the 
British Empire. Masaryk consistently used this inherent if intermittent threat to 
support plans for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary in communication 
with the British government. For other audiences, as discussed below, he varied 
his nuances to target their individual concerns.  
 
                                                 
93
 Wickham Steed used to be the Times correspondent in Vienna and Seton-Watson was an 
established champion of the cause of small nations of Austria-Hungary (Viator [Seton-Watson] 1907, 
1908a, 1908b; Seton-Watson 1911a, 1911b). 
94
 Text of the memorandum was later reproduced in Seton-Watson’s Masaryk in England (Seton-
Watson 1943: 43 – 47). Copy of the original is stored in the National Archives in Kew (Seton-Watson 
1914) 
95
 as described by Sidney Mezes (Unterberger 2000: 61), the head of The Inquiry, analytical unit set 
up by President Woodrow Wilson to prepare materials for the eventual peace conference. 
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Shortly after his exile to London, in March 1915, Masaryk produced his first 
concise document written specifically for the Foreign Office. A memorandum 
entitled Independent Bohemia (Masaryk 1915a) foresaw the respective creation 
of an independent Polish, a Czechoslovak and a Serbo-Croat state as collectively 
constituting a barrier against any “German march on Constantinople and 
Bagdad”. Identifying Germany as the continental-power - opposed to England’s 
sea-based power96 - he argued that:  
“As a Continental, overpopulated, Power Germany presses 
constantly on Austria and uses her. Bismarck’s policy towards 
Austria is the diplomatic and political formulation of the constant 
pressure of the Prussian North on the Austrian South. Lagarde, 
the father of modern Pan-Germanism, formulated the German 
programme: ‘Colonisation of Austria by Germany.’ By colonising 
Austria Germany aspires to colonise the Balkans and thus to 
reach Constantinople and Bagdad. This ‘Drang nach Osten’ 
explains the policy of Berlin towards the Magyars, towards 
Roumania, towards Bulgaria, and towards Turkey. The 
watchword Berlin-Bagdad denotes the real aim of Germany, the 
direction of the ‘Drang nach Osten’. The alliance with Turkey in 
the war is the final result of the German invasion in 
Constantinople and in Asia Minor (financial policy, railways, 
schools and hospitals, etc.).” (Masaryk 1915a: 4 - 5)97  
Masaryk proceeded to describe Austria, a colony of Germany, as an artificial 
state destined for progressive dismemberment, from which an independent 
Poland, Bohemia and Serbo-Croatia should arise. The latter two would then be 
interconnected by a corridor running between Austria and Hungary, one which 
would possess economic as well as military significance. Thus a “Slavic barrier 
coincident with the interest of the allies in Asia” (Masaryk 1915a: 14) would be 
                                                 
96
 While Masaryk did not refer to any academic work in his paper, it is likely he was aware of the 
works of both Alfred T. Mahan and John H. Mackinder. 
97
 Text quoted including grammar and spelling mistakes made by the original author. 
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formed to stop the eastward march of the German Empire. The employment of 
‘Central Europe’ was not yet pronounced in the document, with the elected 
emphasis placed rather upon ‘Drang nach Osten’. The boom of the Central 
Europe debate later on in the year would eventually better facilitate Masaryk’ 
argument, as it provided a direct and imminent anti-thesis to his proposals.  
 
In his next memorandum, At the Eleventh Hour (Masaryk 1915b), published in 
November 1915 just after Naumann’s book – he called for a clear strategic plan 
to counter plans for a pan-Germanist Central Europe: it was suggested that the 
Entente should present its own Central European plan  involving the forging of 
a series of independent nations between Germany and Russia. In this work, 
Masaryk used the notion of Central Europe to describe and characterise “the 
German political programme” (Masaryk 1915b: 25) that might result in a 
Berlin-Baghdad axis, warning that Germany was close to achieving such an aim: 
“This grand scheme of Berlin Baghdad was drawn up and 
elaborated by the Pan-German politicians; there are numerous 
authors of untiring energy, who popularised these political 
aspirations realised finally in the present war, for Germany 
controls practically at this moment the area of the Pan-German 
‘Central Europe’.” (Masaryk 1915b: 27) 
The only way to prevent the materialisation of such a plan and German world 
domination was, in Masaryk’s view, by creating a line of independent Slav 
states: Poland, Bohemia and Greater Serbia. (Masaryk 1915b: 29) 
 
Masaryk employed a somewhat different but rather more refined portrayal of 
an independent Bohemia as the polar opposite to plans for a pan-German 
Central Europe when addressing the French government, in 1916. In 
preparation for his meeting with Aristide Briand in February of that year, 
Masaryk penned his L’Europe centrale pangermanique, ou une Bohême libre? 
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(‘Pan-German Central Europe or independent Bohemia’, Masaryk 1916b) that 
painted the threatening picture of a unified pan-German Central Europe as the 
future neighbour of France, a prospect that had to be thwarted. As the only real 
alternative, an independent Bohemia, together with Poland and a Yugoslav 
state would help France contain this aggressive prospect through their 
constitution of an “effective barrier against Prussia… from which the Allies 
would profit politically as well as economically.” (Masaryk 1916b: 116) Finally, 
he asserted that in its fight against Germany, “Bohemia is disposed towards 
close alliance with France and Russia”. (Masaryk 1916b: 118) 
 
Finally, in communication with US President Woodrow Wilson, Masaryk yet 
again tailored his portrayal of the spectre of Central Europe tailor to suit that 
constituency. Masaryk actually finalised his New Europe (first printed in 1918) 
en route to the United States. In this version, any realisation of an enlarged 
Central Europe was represented as negation of the rights of small nations to 
self-determination (Masaryk 1920: 93 – 95) – a notion cherished and promoted 
by Wilson. So, the realisation of independent nation states in lieu of any pan-
German Central Europe could only be regarded as the ultimate exaltation of 
such a principle. Masaryk argued vigorously that as per Wilson self-proclaimed 
principles, he had to recognize that continued existence of Austria-Hungary was 
a negation of freedom of nations:  
“an ordinary president must not know that, but Wilson as 
President is bound to express in his war program the moral 
judgement of history”. (Masaryk 1918a) 
 
In all three of these lines of presentation, the argument is constant and 
consistent; it is just the emphasis that changes. For example, we can locate the 
threats posed by the Berlin-Baghdad (railway) plan in the memorandum 
tailored for the French government (Opat 2003: 271, Klimek et al. 1994: 13) as 
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well as in communications with US officials (e. g. Masaryk 1918a) but the focus 
was on the aspect that Masaryk considered to be the closest to the heart of his 
audience. In the case of the French, this was the looming threat of a large enemy 
bloc on its borders; then, when addressing US officials, he focused on the 
strategic advantages Germans would gain at the expense of a US-allied British 
Empire, all the time playing to the logic of the self-determination rights of 
nations advocated by President Wilson. 
In summary, Masaryk portrayed a negative image of a pan-German Central 
Europe to argue that dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the 
only alternative to safeguard the vital interests of the allies. This message was 
augmented by the delivery of a coordinated, supporting narrative from other 
members of the Czech independence movement in communication with the 
allied governments. The same stark contrasts between a dark, expansionist 
pan-German Central Europe and a bright assembly of aspiring small nations 
within the imperial rump of Austria-Hungary are articulated in the memoranda 
sent to British Foreign Office by Emanuel Voska98 (Voska 1917), Edvard Beneš 
(Beneš 1917) and Štefan Osuský (Osuský 1918)99. Close coordination is a 
hallmark of these works, with many including exactly the same maps of the 
intended future Bohemian state (e.g. Beneš 1917 and Voska 1917). Milan R. 
Štefánik100 also used the same basis of articulation in his communication with 
the Italian government (Štefánik 1916), as did Beneš with the French (Beneš 
1917). 
However, none of the allied governments were actually that keen on the binary 
choice presented to them by Masaryk and his colleagues. Sure, the allies would 
                                                 
98
  Emanuel Voska was Masaryk’s contact in the United States, where he was in close communication 
with the US government. His value for the US government lied in Voska’s personal network of 
contacts in Austria-Hungary, which he used to obtain valuable intelligence. Voska was also largely 
responsible for organizing the crucial financing for the Czech independence movement and personal 
funds for Masaryk. He was reportedly working with André Chéradame on CNC strategy to discredit 
Austro-Hungarian federalization plans in autumn 1918 (Unterberger 2000: 107).  
99
 Osuský was also a member for Masaryk’s inner circle and would eventually become the first 
Czechoslovak ambassador to London. 
100
 General M. R. Štefánik was a member of the three-man leadership of the CNC and later became 
the first Czechoslovak Minister for War. 
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have preferred to detach Austria-Hungary from Germany and see its 
development as a European counter-weight. But the efforts of Masaryk and his 
wing-men, especially Edvard Beneš101, only gained the genuine support of the 
allies in the latter stages of the war.   
Masaryk’s fortunes changed after negotiations broke down with Austria-
Hungary in the spring of 1918. In May 1918, Beneš wrote a letter to the Foreign 
Office in which he reacted to the aftermath of the Sixtus Affair102 and the 
announcement of a military and economic alliance between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary: “The definite plan of the Central Empires is at last clear to the 
whole world!”103 (Beneš 1918a: 126) Proclaiming the alliance a “new system of 
oppression, which places Austria-Hungary under the control of Germany” 
(Beneš 1918a: 127), he reiterated the Czech vision for the reorganisation of the 
region. Beneš characterised it explicitly as a “Pro-Entente Central Europe: 
against a German-Magyar Central Europe”, underlining that if the allies were to 
win the war, they would need to adopt a “policy favourable to the oppressed 
nations of Central Europe” (Beneš 1918a: 130)  
 
The actual effectiveness of pushing the anti-Central Europe line of argument as 
the most likely means of breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire might 
reasonably be questioned. Looking at the timeline of decision making in Paris, 
London and Washington, it seems that by far the more persuasive argument in 
Masaryk’s toolkit was the existence of a sizeable army of Czech and Slovak 
deserters and prisoners-of-war. Its units were located in France, Italy and 
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 Edvard Beneš was the right-hand man of Masaryk, a general secretary of the Czechoslovak 
National Council in Paris, which would eventually be recognized as an interim government of 
independent Czechoslovakia in 1918. He would go on to become the first Foreign Affairs Minister 
and later on a president of Czechoslovakia (during the Second World War). 
102
 The April 1918 publishing of letters suggesting separate peace between Austria-Hungary and 
France, exchanged between Emperor Karl and his brother-in-law Sixtus de Bourbon in 1917. The 
affair led to the humiliating episode for Karl, who was forced to control the damage from the 
revelations by a visit to the German Emperor and signing of the agreements, which were designed to 
place Austria-Hungary firmly in the German orbit. 
103
 Original text as written by Beneš. 
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Russia. By the end of the war, the US government, especially, remained 
unconvinced about the desirability of introducing a system of small, 
independent nation states while both Masaryk and Beneš presented their own 
visions for a federative Central or Mid-Europe. (Beneš 1918a, Masaryk 1918c) 
Chapter 5 will discuss these interactions in more detail; however, the bottom 
line of these considerations was the observation that allied leaders were not 
convinced that dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was the best way to 
counter the threat presented by a German-led Central Europe.  
 
4.6.4 Hungarian perceptions of Central Europe 
During the war, conceptions of Central Europe gained significant traction in the 
Hungarian half of the multinational monarchy. The 1916 Hungarian translation 
of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa was printed at the height of a debate engaged in by 
over 100 articles in leading Budapest newspapers that had been published 
since its original German publication six months earlier. (Diószegi 1995: 63) 
The Hungarian discourse of Central Europe has been well documented, 
especially in the works of Károly Irinyi (Irinyi 1963 and 1973), and provides an 
interesting point of view as Hungarian cooperation was essential in the plan.  
While many leading politicians were predictably suspicious about the 
proposition, seeing Naumann’s Central Europe as a vehicle to establish German 
supremacy over Hungary, there were adherents of the concept to be found in 
fringe political movements. The so-called civic radicals104, especially, showed 
some enthusiasm for Naumann’s proposal. Oszkár Jászi – who would later 
publish several theories espousing regional reorganisation himself (Jászi 1918, 
1941, 1949) – belonged to this group, believing that Hungary had much to learn 
from Germany. In their opinion, the union would ensure the transfer of German 
                                                 
104
 Civic Radicals did not establish themselves formally as a party nor did they have any 
representation in the parliament; yet, the movement featured many leading intellectuals and public 
figures of contemporary Hungary. 
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know-how in terms of organisation of industrial production, scientific research 
and technology; Hungary would benefit from an implantation of German 
discipline and its strong sense of duty.  
On the other side of the political spectrum, Ervin Szabó, a leading social 
democrat, suggested that realisation of the union with Germany would help to 
shake up Hungary’s ossified social structures, strengthening the influence of the 
bourgeoisie and sidelining the traditional feudal elites. A union would also 
serve as a guarantee against alleged pan-Slavist pressures and the advancing 
influence of Russia. (Szabó, Litván and Bak 1982: 136)  
Guyla Andrássy the Younger saw Naumann’s scheme as potentially both 
economically advantageous and militarily significant (Baernreither 1915d: 31 
October) and suggested that such a union could offer its constituent states 
adequate protection as well as to promise a post-war balance of power for 
Europe. (Diószegi 1995: 64) Another supporter of Central Europe in Hungary 
was Albert Apponyi, the former Hungarian education minister (1906 – 1910), 
who had become notorious for implementing a policy of Magyarisation in the 
Hungarian educational system. (Heuss 1949: 376) 
Economic lobby groups were divided. While industrial unions supported the 
idea of a common market, agrarian groups opposed it, since their very 
prosperity depended on artificially high prices for agricultural produce – a 
practice that wouldn’t be sustained once any customs union had been put in 
place. Both supporters and opponents of the plan focused their reasoning on 
the economic aspects of any Central European project, rather than its political 
implications. General preference laid in fostering a pragmatic relationship with 
Germany that would see the introduction of a system of preferential custom 
duties, as proposed by Josef Szterényi, later to become Hungarian Trade 
Minister, (Szterényi 1915b); or the continuation of some form of internal 
customs duty to protect the internal Hungarian market and its youthful 
industrial sector. (Rajnik 1914, Lukács 1916b) 
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Yet, most Hungarian authors were to reject the idea of Central Europe, warning 
against the pan-German threat and highlighting that in any form of union with 
Germany, Hungary would lose out since it could only ever play a subordinate 
role. This position was expressed, for example, by Péter Ágoston, the future 
Foreign Minister of Hungary (1919) in many of his articles penned for the 
Népszava newspaper. (Diószegi 1995: 65) The aim of the majority of Hungarian 
was to safeguard their kingdom’s sovereignty, not to fall under German 
domination.  
 
4.7 The influence of Central Europe in practical politics 
The bitter disputes of 1848 – 1849 had left Austrian Germans out in the cold, as 
their German brethren were gradually heading for economic and political 
integration. The first trade agreement between Austria and what was to 
become the German Empire was signed in October 1853. (Katzenstein 1976: 
81) Karl Ludwig von Bruck interpreted this event as a turning point, from 
which the full integration of Austria into the customs union would ensue. (Beer 
1891: 161) This was certainly an optimistic assessment – any relationship 
between Prussia and Austria was bound to get much worse before it got better. 
The Austro-Prussian war in 1866 resulted only in Austria’s expulsion from the 
customs union. However, following the foundation of the German Empire, the 
idea of a customs union with Austria was discussed several times in the 1880s 
and 1890s. (Auswärtiges Amt 1885, Reuss 1885b, Auswärtiges Amt 1890, 
Reuss 1890) By the end of the century, the idea of a customs union with 
Germany was a familiar one in an Austro-Hungarian context, but so too were its 
recognised risks.  
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4.7.1 Customs union vs. Central Europe 
Tschirschky had been correct in recognising that the Austro-Hungarian 
government was ready to discuss customs union with Germany in the early 
days of war (Tschirschky 1914a and 1914b). The political calculations made in 
Vienna were very similar, if less structured, than those made in Germany. The 
Austrian policy makers also looked to establish a strong economic bloc as a 
base to further project their power to the south-east. A baseline expectation 
was that the post-war global market would be divided into larger economic 
areas and the widest possible territorial footprint was needed to gain the 
necessary edge in any such environment. However, as had been the case in 
1848, Austria was not prepared to surrender its sovereignty to Prussia, which 
had only become even more powerful in its latest imperial reincarnation. 
If, indeed, they were ready to discuss a customs union with Germany, the 
Viennese ruling circles were not necessarily supportive of the idea of a German 
led Central Europe, as proposed by the Pan-Germans. In fact, conceptions and 
promotion of the idea of Central Europe were subject to official censorship 
imposed by the government of Prime Minister Karl von Stürgkh. (Dobering 
1914b, Stolper 1915) 
From Stürgkh’s point of view, the Pan-German version of Central Europe was 
dangerous for two reasons. First, the insistence on the leading role of Germans 
and the definition of Central Europe as the final unifying fate for all Germans 
attracted the strong resentment of the monarchy’s non-German nationals and 
had a potential to exacerbate already escalating national tensions. Second, 
Central Europe presented a threat to Austrian sovereignty, as it would likely 
lead to domination of by the German Empire.  
Stürgkh also strove actively to limit promotion of the idea of Central Europe in 
political circles. Stürgkh’s master-stroke was his neutralisation of Gustav 
Gross’s initiative, by which the latter proposed his Central Europe program to 
members of the German National Union in August 1914 (Gross 1914a). The 
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letter and the union membership’s enthusiastic response to it (Beurle 1914, 
Dobering 1914a, Freissler 1914, etc.) were in marked contrast to the lack of any 
real effort to puts such ideas into practice, despite the strong parliamentary 
position of the union (105 of 514 seats). At Stürgkh’s behest, Gross not only 
dropped promotion of Central Europe, he also started to prevent the rest of his 
group from doing so in September 1914, i.e. within a month of formulation of 
his Central Europe program. Josef Maria Baernreither105 noted in his diary that 
Gross blocked all efforts for organisation of proper internal discussion on 
various sketches of Central Europe presented by the members of the union, 
preventing formulation of a common program. Baernreither’s suspicion was 
that Gross’s change of heart had been due to his links with Stürgkh. 
(Baernreither 1914: 20 September)  
While the official archival documentation held in the Austrian State Archive 
does not provide direct evidence to support Baernreither’s suspicions, Gross 
was admittedly a close confidant of Stürgkh’s. The prime minister had spoken 
to him to express concerns that open political discussion of Central Europe 
might galvanize the opposition of smaller national groups and cause upheaval 
in the monarchy. (Licht 1914) Baernreither speculated that Gross then blocked 
all activity in this direction out of regard for the concerns of his close friend. 
(Müller 2001: 31) In his letter to the union membership on 26 October, Gross 
did indeed used the very same arguments to dissuade internal debate on the 
topic (Gross 1914b), providing circumstantial evidence to support 
Baernreither’s words.  
Baernreither decided to take things into his own hands – for while Gross could 
block official union debate, he could not stop individual members from 
discussing proposals for Central Europe in fora outside the union.  
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 Liberal politician, member of both houses in various periods, twice a minister of trade (1898 and 
1907), later minister without portfolio (1916 – 1917), chairman of Mitteleuropäischen 
Wirtschaftsverein and later Arbeitsausschusses für Mitteleuropa. 
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Baernreither and Gustav Marchet took the leadership in advocacy of Central 
Europe. The founding chairman of the German Club and a departmental 
director at the Trade Ministry, Richard Riedl, joined Baernreither and Marchet 
in their efforts, as did several German National Union members of the 
parliament -  including Robert Freissler, Stephan Licht, Joseph Redlich, Karl 
Urban, Heinrich Janotta and Otto Lecher. Yet, rather than debating and refining 
its conception, the group ended up promoting the general idea of Central 
Europe and trying to enlist support for it in political circles. 
 
4.7.2 Berlin pilgrimages 
The efforts of this group are well documented in the diaries maintained by 
Baernreither and Redlich (Baernreither 1914, Redlich 1953), especially the 
contacts made with political circles and decision makers in Berlin. Early on in 
the war, during November 1914, Baernreither travelled to Berlin to sound out 
support for the idea of Central Europe. While he observed that the idea of larger 
economic area was well entrenched in Berlin political circles, he was relatively 
pessimistic about the potential for any early rapprochement between the two 
empires. In his view, the interests of both Austrian and German industry 
clashed with the idea of a customs union, while German policy-makers had little 
understanding for Austrian power interests. (Baernreither 1914: 3 – 7 
November) Moreover, he was already aware that the Germans were bent on a 
larger Central European economic area, rather than expressly landing 
themselves with weak and crisis-ridden Austria-Hungary. (Baernreither 1914: 
17 October) It was clear that Austria-Hungary was to be but one of Germany’s 
junior allies, rather than its equal partner; a position hard to accept for Vienna.  
In the first six months of the war, dozens of Austrian advocates of Central 
Europe made the trip to Berlin – among them Riedl, Max von Tayenthal 
(chairman of the Viennese Trade Chamber), and even Gross. (Molisch 1926: 
240) Many approached German ruling circles with definite plans in mind: for 
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example, Richard Riedl openly suggested a customs union with his detailed 
proposal for double tariffs and differential external duties. (Müller 2001: 40) 
However, in the absence of proper debate early in the war, these proposals 
tended to differ from one another quite widely. The cacophony of Austrian pro-
Central Europe voices frustrated the German Foreign Office fairly quickly with 
its officials suggesting that Austrian Germans should first make up their own 
minds at home and come with a single proposal. (Dobering 1914c) 
At the same time, the acts and attitudes of these Austrian advocates of a Central 
Europe and their overtures towards Berlin irritated the Austrian government. 
The counsellor of the Austrian Embassy in Berlin, Gottfried zu Hohenlohe-
Schillings, protested verbally against this “second channel of diplomacy” in his 
meeting with German Foreign Minister Jagow. (Delbrück 1915b, Appendix 7) 
However, these protests did not have much effect in stopping these “Berlin 
pilgrimages” by Central Europe enthusiasts. (Hohenlohe-Schillings 1915) At the 
same time, their influence was not far-reaching - German governmental officials 
saw their visits as a valuable source of information, but little more. (Delbrück 
1915b) 
 
4.7.3 The complex position of the Austro-Hungarians 
By November 1914, Richard Riedl, a departmental head at the Trade Ministry, 
had elaborated his plan for the union of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Switzerland, Romania and part of Serbia (Riedl 1914). This proposal was in line 
with his (already mentioned) preference for the concepts of Austrian authors 
awarding Austria-Hungary a role in projecting the union’s power to the south-
east. However, his enthusiasm for Central Europe was not necessarily shared by 
a majority of core members of the government in the early days of the war. 
Indeed, while Stürgkh’s ministry looked to project its power towards the south-
east and to Poland, its approach to negotiating a closer union with Germany 
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was considerably more cautious. As demonstrated above, Stürgkh was wary of 
the idea of a German-led Central Europe to the point of making it a subject of 
censorship and personal interventions. The prospect of curbs on Austrian 
sovereignty, coupled with likely escalations in conflict with the non-German 
nationalities was an uncomfortable one for the Vienna government. 
On top of this, Stürgkh also had Hungary to take into account. There, a 
heightened sense of national interests dictated attitudes to the concept of 
Central Europe as a German led larger political and economic entity. 
István Tisza, the prime minister (1903 – 1905 and 1913 – 1917), was in favour 
of a customs union with Germany, but could not bring himself to agree with the 
idea of Central Europe as presented by Naumann – in his view, such a union 
would undermine Hungary’s sovereignty and economic interests. He likened it 
to ‘a larger version of Austria’, which he certainly did not wish for. (Tisza 1915) 
Interestingly, Mihály Károly, Tisza’s longstanding opponent, shared his opinion 
on the issue. In Károly’s view, Naumann’s Central Europe was not a union of 
equals; on the contrary, it would make Hungary a vassal of the German Empire 
and turn it gradually into a colony. (Müller 2001: 101) Károly, a supporter of 
full Hungarian sovereignty was thus never likely to favour a plan that, in his 
view, would place his country in yet another unequal constitutional 
relationship.  
Prevailing opinion in Hungary was always going to be an important factor in the 
realisation of Central Europe, whatever form it might take – therefore the main 
proponents of the idea had to make an effort to get Hungarians on board. 
Friedrich Naumann conducted talks with prominent Hungarian politicians long 
before the publication of his iconic book: upon his visit to Budapest in February 
1915, he discussed his ideas with Tisza and Andrassy, as well as Apponyi. 
(Müller 2001: 144) While his project found support from Andrassy and 
Apponyi (see 5.6.4), Naumann decidedly failed to convince the most important 
of the three – Prime Minister Tisza. A renegotiation of the Austro-Hungarian 
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Compromise of 1867 was due in 1916 and its successful renewal became a pre-
requisite for any further negotiations with the German Empire.  
 
4.7.4 An uneasy start for customs union negotiations 
The first draft of the customs union treaty had been prepared as early as March 
1915 (Riedl 1915) but negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Germany got 
off on the wrong foot. German reports from Vienna just days before the first 
scheduled negotiations early in November 1915 suggested that the Austro-
Hungarian government – and especially Prime Minister Stürgkh - was 
preoccupied with the political influence Germany would acquire within the 
monarchy through this deal (Hatzfeld 1915, Zöllner 1915). Reports observed 
the “distrust and antipathy” of the Austrian government towards Germany and 
even cautioned that in the foreign policy arena, the monarchy might turn 
against Germany once the war was over. (Hatzfeld 1915: E585780) Zöllner 
wrote that the Austrian court continued to maintain links with royals in enemy 
countries and still cherished the possibility of allying the monarchy with 
France, England and Russia, rather than Germany.106  
The available archival evidence does not provide a satisfactory explanation as 
to why the German government disregarded such warnings and proceeded to 
bet on the language of pan-German brotherhood in the Memorandum of 13 
November 1915. (Jagow 1915, Appendix 10)107 The Viennese government was, 
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 ‘Es is für Deutschland ein Glück, dass Franz Ferdinand nicht zur Regierung gekommen ist, denn 
er war der Hauptvertreter der Idee, dass Österreich-Ungarn einen Anschluss an Russland, England 
und Frankreich, auch auf Kosten Deutschlands, suchen müsse.’ – It is a luck for Germany, that Franz 
Ferdinand did not come to power, because he was the main proponent of the idea  that Austria-
Hungary has to seek alliance with Russia, England and France, at the expense of Germany. – Zöllner 
1915 
107 Indeed, the Pan-German propaganda of Austrian Germans was at its height in autumn of 1915 
(e.g. Baernreither 1915, Jagow 1915) and Naumann’s Central Europe was fresh off the printing press. 
Moreover, the same reports as quoted above also highlighted that Austrian Germans looked ever 
more towards Germany for protection of their interests within monarchy. (Zöllner 1915) High food 
inflation, fallouts in basic services, post, telegraph and railway were highlighted and suggestions 
floated that only full unification of Germany could help to alleviate situation. (Hatzfeld 1915: 
E585784) 
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indeed, reportedly furious at being reduced to a ‘German mark in the East’ in 
the text of that memorandum. (Austro-Hungarian Embassy 1915)  
On the other hand, as poignantly noted by Tschirschy (Tschirschky 1916a), 
Vienna did not possess any viable alternatives to closer ties with Germany so 
negotiations continued – however, these were characterised strictly as trade 
agreement negotiations by the Austrians. The files relating to the process 
remain archived under the classification of ‘trade agreement’ (Handeslvertrag) 
negotiations108, while in the German archives the corresponding folders are to 
be located under the category of Central European Economic Federation 
(Bundesarchiv, Imperial Chancellery files R901/403 – 407) or even the 
European State Federation (AA PA Germany 180 European State Federation). 
The titles of files holding corresponding documents in the Austrian State 
Archive avoid any reference to Central Europe or any hint of political 
implications in negotiations with Germany. They keep strictly to labelling these 
records as pertaining to the customs union negotiations, painting a functional 
picture of ordinary trade agreement negotiations on harmonisation of trade 
and tariffs, etc. The Austrians actually harboured many of the same concerns as 
Germany – it was the opinion of many that after the war, free market 
arrangements would not be restored and the world would divide into larger, 
mutually exclusive economic areas (Baernreither 1914: 28 July). So, Austria-
Hungary needed to take actions to secure future markets for itself and the most 
obvious step here was to ally with Germany and secure the likely projection of 
economic power as far as Poland and the Balkans. (Komjáthy 1966: 191) 
This is not to say that the Central European project would have had no 
supporters in the Austrian government under Stürgkh – indeed, there were 
those who, like Richard Riedl, thought that the customs union represented the 
only possibility for survival of the monarchy (Riedl 1915). Yet, as late as July 
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 The files relating to actual negotiations with Germany are in the Austrian State Archive filed as 
‘Fach 37: Handelsverträge nach Staaten ab 1909, Karton 94: Deutsche Reich’; in contrast, 
corresponding files in German archives as ‘Auswärtiges Amt – Politisches Archiv, Deutschland 180, 
Geheim, Europäischer Staatenbund’.  
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1915, the Stürgkh government maintained that discussion over Central Europe 
was undesirable and talk of a customs union premature. (Plener 1915, 
Appendix 4)109 
 
4.7.5 Vienna’s balancing act 
The potential strengthening of economic ties with Germany was the topic of the 
Joint Ministerial Council on 18 June 1915, with Tisza denouncing the idea - 
suggesting that Germany was only interested in driving Austria-Hungary into 
ever greater financial and economic dependence, with further political strings 
attached, undermining the sovereignty and great power status of the monarchy. 
(ÖMRP 1915)  
Records in the German archives confirm that Vienna was performing a delicate 
balancing act between the competing interests within the monarchy to 
maintain its own stability and position vis-à-vis its stronger partner in Berlin. 
Bethmann-Hollweg was warned not to push too hard for recognition of German 
superiority in the relationship, which would likely challenge the sovereignty of 
the Viennese court. This might have lead to further destabilization of the 
already tense situation in the monarchy (Treuler 1915) and upset the balance 
of power in the wake of crucial renegotiations of the 1867 Compromise 
(Tschirschky 1915b). These renegotiations – reconvened every 10 years – were 
vital, as they would necessarily specify the internal and external customs policy 
of the monarchy. (Müller 2001: 110) 
Besides having to manage the relationship with Hungary, Austria was 
increasingly conscious of the growing alienation of its Slavic minorities. Vienna 
was not unaware of Masaryk and Benes activities in London and Paris 
(Erzberger 1915). Stephan Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 
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 Stürgkh’s opposition to Central Europe resulted in attempt to oust him, to which purpose Marchet, 
Baernheiter and Friedjung tried and failed to enlist the support of the high army command in late July 
1915. (Rauchensteiner 1993: 277) 
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reportedly contemplated appeasing the Slavic minorities by emancipating their 
status, thus curbing the power of the Hungarians (Tschirschky 1915b, Jagow 
1915b). Fostering of the monarchy through internal reorganisation was an aim 
of many patriotic officials, who, once again, dusted down old plans of the 
Belvedere Circle. (Schlitter 1914: 3 November, Zöllner 1915, Stolzenberg 1916) 
Conversely, the Hungarians were sure to defend their privileges, and probably 
set on asking for further advantages or concessions (Tisza 1915a, Tschirschky 
1916b, Auswärtiges Amt 1916). A successful renegotiation of internal questions 
between the two parts of the monarchy was the necessary precondition for 
progress in negotiations with Germany. (Tschirschky 1915b)  
In the end the Austrian government decided to proceed with negotiations 
towards a customs union and closer economic ties with Germany after several 
sector ministers110 spoke in favour of its institution at a special ministerial 
conference called by Stürgkh on 24 August 1915 (Riedl 1915b). Their 
arguments were linked to concerns and interests served by their respective 
governmental departments (industry, trade, transport, etc.): the potential 
advantages for Austro-Hungarian industry from the itinerant transfer of 
technology, an ability to participate in wider market for producers and better 
possibilities for modernisation of railway network.  
 
4.7.6 The 1867 Compromise renegotiations and the Polish question 
In November 1915, Alexander Spitzmüller, an outspoken advocate of the 
Central European project, became Trade Minister in Stürgkh’s government and 
things immediately looked up for the plan. (Baumgartner 1967: 109) However, 
not only did Stürgkh continue to frustrate Spitzmüller’s effort to mobilise 
speedy negotiations (Müller 2001: 195) but the opposition of Hungary still 
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 Finance Minister Engel, Agriculture Minister Zenger, Railway Minister Forster and Trade 
Minister Schuster 
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remained to be overcome as the main precondition to inaugurating 
negotiations with Germany.  
Many proponents of Central Europe noted in 1915 that after it has been linked 
to the renegotiations of the 1867 Compromise, the project of closer union 
between the monarchy and Germany was essentially stalled. (Baernreither 
1915b, Marchet 1915, Redlich 1953: 14)  
The renegotiations of the Compromise started in late January 1916. Stürgkh’s 
baseline was the maintenance of the status quo and a 20-year duration for any 
resultant new treaty, so as to provide a more stable basis for negotiations with 
Germany. (Burián 1916, Stürgkh 1916b) Tisza pushed for more effective 
Hungarian autonomy, changes in agreed internal duties and quotas as well as 
the formal attachment of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Hungary -  conditions that 
Austrian negotiators saw as an opening gambit in negotiations rather than a 
realistic demand. (Gratz and Schüller 1925: 18) Both sides fell under German 
pressure to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible (Burián 1916b); 
however, given the gap in both trust and demands between the two sides, this 
was always unlikely. So it was that both Tisza and Stürgkh agreed that 
negotiations with Germany could be pursued parallel to the Compromise 
renegotiations (Stürgkh 1916b, Tisza 1916).  
This allowed commencement of preliminary German-Austro-Hungarian 
negotiations in late April 1916. The agreement on a customs duty scheme was 
achieved within a month. (HHSA 1916) The negotiated scheme was to be taken 
into account in renegotiations of the Compromise as well. However, this first 
success in negotiations was not to be the vanguard of things to come.  
 
Renegotiations of the 1867 Compromise were not the only issue that 
complicated dealings with Germany; another hurdle was the question of 
Poland, which had been a point of contention since early on in the war 
(Naumann 1916, Jagow 1916 Auswärtiges Amt 1916) German officials 
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expressed their concern that if Russian Poland was awarded to Austria, the 
strengthening of the Polish ethnic group would further erode the standing of 
Austrian Germans within the monarchy (Baernreither 1915c: 9 November). 
Moreover, Austria demanded influence in the Balkans (Burián 1915). Yet 
Germany now also was demanding power in the Balkans and a strong strategic 
case was made in Berlin for attaching Russian Poland to Germany (Lersner 
1917) The issue frustrated negotiations in the period (Schérer and Grunewald 
1962: doc no. 227, 251, 261, 267; also Auswärtiges Amt 1916) leading up to the 
November 1916 declaration of future Polish state on the initiative of the 
Germans. However, the issue of whether and what form Polish state should 
take, or who was to have an upper hand was never really resolved, even though, 
Germany essentially agreed that Austria could have Poland during November 
1917 in exchange for the admission of German influence over Romania (AA PA 
1917b).  
 
4.7.7 Negotiations within the souring alliance 
The end of 1916 brought with it events that promised to speed up the 
negotiating process. After Stürgkh’s assassination in October 1916, Ernst von 
Koerber – an advocate of Central Europe – became his successor, shortly 
followed in January 1917 by Heinrich von Clam-Martinic111, whose cabinet 
included several Central Europe enthusiasts in key positions.112 Germany’s 
invitation to the main negotiations followed almost immediately and Foreign 
Minister Czernin wasted no time in accepting it. (Czernin 1917)  
In February 1917 the Compromise renegotiations were finally concluded (Gratz 
and Schüller 1925: 21) – with the Austrians achieving their desired 20 year 
duration for the renewed Compromise and the Hungarians winning a reduction 
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 For more details on dates for changes of prime ministers, please see Appendix 15 
112
 The position of Trade Minister was occupied by Karl Urban, Alexander Spitzmüller took Ministry 
of Finance and Joseph Maria Baernreither became a minister without portfolio. The position of 
Foreign Minister went to pro-German Ottokar Czernin.  
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in contributions to a common budget. Moreover, the governmental crisis in 
Hungary in May 1917 brought to power the foremost of Central Europe 
advocates in Hungary – Sándor Wekerle, the chairman of the Hungarian Central 
European Economic Union (MEWV). With Wekerle now the prime minister, 
many supporters of the Central European project rejoiced at the prospect of a 
speedy conclusion to negotiations. (Redlich 1953: 232) 
However, the new Compromise treaty entailed changes in the levy of customs 
dues that were directed decidedly against German competition; such as 
livestock duties or various protective industrial duties. It was these changes in 
duties that set a very high hurdle for the main negotiations of the customs 
union with Germany. (Müller 2001: 255) These would be hurdles that were 
almost impossible to overcome in the context of faltering support for the 
customs union in Germany and rising opposition to the plan in Austria.  
Clam-Martinic fell from grace due to his perceived inability to handle the 
intensifying nationalist tensions in the Empire, lasting only something over five 
months in the office. This short period brought substantial and visible progress 
in negotiations of the alliance with Germany, but many Central Europe 
advocates lost their decision making powers and much political access with 
Clam-Martinic’s downfall. Only Czernin and Riedl managed to hold onto their 
positions.  
The alliance was gradually souring by the winter of 1917/18, as German peace 
negotiations with Russia pushed the question of German-Austro-Hungarian ties 
into the background. The haggling over Poland, the growing personal animosity 
between officials on both sides113 and finally the Sixtus Affair in April 1918 
were indicative of an increasingly difficult relationship between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. The Austrian government was aware of changing attitudes in 
Germany. Burián, now a finance minister, opined that Germany would readily 
abandon the plan, should there be a realistic prospect of return to free trade 
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 Hindeburg was recorded as threatening Austrians with waging war on them, should they oppose 
German interests in February 1918 (Kühlmann 1948: 516) 
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after the war. (ÖMRP 1917) While Czernin, as foreign minister, insisted that 
closer ties with Germany were essential for the monarchy; the weakening 
strategic, economic and internal position of the Austrian government 
increasingly exacerbated concerns over a loss of independence in the 
relationship with Germany. (Gratz 1918: 23 and 26 January) These concerns 
were exacerbated, when Germany raised a whole host of new conditions in 
exchange for agreeing to Austria having upper hand in Poland in late 1917. (AA 
PA 1917b) 
The Sixtus Affair fatally undermined Emperor Karl’s authority and he 
eventually submitted to the political (as well as economic) union with Germany 
in May 1918 (Broucek 1979: 463, Krizman 1970: 102). The set of agreements 
was hailed by the concepts advocates as the definitive fruition of Central 
Europe. Though there was no denying its significant political weight, the 
Austrian Emperor had committed to a project he essentially did not agree with 
only in the aftermath of his failed negotiations of a separate peace with France. 
The capitulation of Austria-Hungary to German domination seemed all but 
complete. 
Politically at least, Central Europe advocates might have regarded their dreams 
fulfilled. Yet Germany’s priority was now very obviously to renew the pre-war 
status quo. The union with impoverished and internally unstable Austria-
Hungary might have been forsaken, should it complicate the peace negotiations. 
 
4.7.8 Ultimate failure 
Enthusiasm for economic union with Austria-Hungary was gradually abating in 
Germany by early 1918 (see section 3.7.3.5), with many starting to argue that 
any return to a free international market would be more convenient for 
Germany than union with an impoverished neighbour, a proposal that was 
attracting stark opposition from the Allies. Yet, the return to a status quo ante 
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looking at any post-war global market seemed unlikely. So negotiations 
continued, but with much less enthusiasm on the German side.  
Ironically, enthusiasm for union with Austria-Hungary had declined 
considerably by the time Emperor Karl signed the much trumped up and 
celebrated agreements with Emperor Wilhelm II. The monarchy was becoming 
increasingly instable internally and Germany’s preference returned to renewing 
pre-war free trade levels and aspirations. Moreover, this political gesture still 
needed to be followed up with final a conclusion of the negotiations towards a 
customs union agreement, which had been dragging on for a good year or so.  
Despite the signing of agreements in May 1918, position of the new Austrian 
government under Ernst Seidler (23 June 1917 – 27 July 1918) was in favour of 
a more limited system of preferential custom duties, rather than the originally 
envisaged fully-fledged customs union. (Gratz and Schüller 1925: 63)  
The last talks over the projected customs union took place during the summer 
of 1918 in Salzburg. The Austrian side was led by Gustav Gratz and Richard 
Schüller. Agreement was ultimately reached in the form of a document, 
‘Guidelines for Customs and Economic Union’, that stipulated the closest 
possible economic and customs union between the two empires (Gratz and 
Schüller 1925: 93). Richard Riedl led parallel civil servant’s conference in 
Vienna and noted that Austria-Hungary had no real alternative other than to 
enter this union. (Riedl 1918) Yet only three months later, an alternative would 
offer itself in a form that represented the worst possible outcome for the 
monarchy – its very dissolution! 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter clearly advanced the argument presented in the second part of the 
hypothesis: that conceptualisations of regional identity do exercise an impact 
on the behaviour of political actors and that perceptions of the Self and Other 
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play a major role in this. The narrative presented shows a mostly negative 
impact of Central Europe on decision makers in Vienna, who perceived the 
notion as the concept that would likely formalise Austria’s subservience to the 
German Empire. Pan-German authors pushing the concept were viewed as 
representatives of the Other rather than the Self by Stürghk and his 
government. In sharp contrast (and with no little irony), the shortlived 
government of pro-Central Europe enthusiasts in the early 1917 provided a 
substantial boost to customs negotiations. This period marked the high tide of 
influence of Central Europe proponents in the period of the core research. 
The highlight of this chapter is Masaryk’s active use and nuanced presentation 
of the notion to influence great power policy makers.  Yet, the evidence of 
concepts impact on the international structure remains ambiguous as the plans 
for close alliance of the German and the Austro-Hungarian empire were 
ultimately quelled by the result of the result of the First World War. 
 
To sum up, conceptualising Central Europe in Austrian and its imperial 
environs clearly developed in parallel to the shaping of the discourse in 
Germany. The main thrust of the formulation of the notion in the late 19th 
century was carried by the pan-German movement, which presented Central 
Europe as a replacement notion for ‘Deutschland’ itself, an area belonging by 
rights to the greater German nation, whose branches needed to be brought 
together in one economic and political unit. However, the Austrian debate was 
necessarily moderated by specific socio-political conditions in Austria-Hungary.  
First of all, the proposed union with Germany was characterised predominantly 
as an economic and the assured sovereignty of Austria-Hungary within such a 
block was overemphasised. The idea of an economic union seemed natural, 
given the history of a customs union build-up of German states in the 19th 
century. After Austria was ousted from the process in 1866, the possibilities for 
customs union resurfaced several times, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, 
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when its contextualised mention was frequently labelled ‘central European’ by 
the Austrian media. The problem of maintaining Austrian sovereignty had been 
the main issue in 1848 and, of course, remained the main concern of Austrian 
policy makers involved in negotiations with Germany even going into the First 
World War. Such insecurities had only increased, however,  as the German 
Empire was infinitely more intimidating to a declining Austria-Hungary at the 
time of the Great War than Prussia had been in the days of the Frankfurt 
Assembly.  
Second, as was highlighted in the short analysis of wartime Austrian German 
concepts (section 4.5.4), many authors preferred to employ alternative notions 
to Central Europe. It was important to show, if only nominally, that Austria-
Hungary was an equal partner to Germany in the proposed economic union. 
Similarly, the capacity and presumed responsibility of the dual monarchy in 
projecting the power of the union towards the Middle East was highlighted. The 
censor’s hand would come down heavily on any publications that might suggest 
(or even admit) subjugation of Austria to the German Empire (a fate many of 
the pan-German authors privately aspired towards). As Central Europe was 
being increasingly interpreted as the new articulation of the pan-German 
project, many authors went to great lengths to avoid depicting such an image; 
and on the other, they highlighted ambitions they naturally held for their own 
country. 
Third, literary Austrian German conceptions of Central Europe also betrayed a 
preoccupation with a perceived decline in the socio-political standing of 
Germans within the monarchy and consideration of the likely painful 
implications of any internal reforms that were required for its survival. Central 
Europe was presented as a union that would foster the standing of Austrian 
Germans in their own country and, moreover, present them with the upper 
hand in its reform. 
However, the Franz Josef governments did not necessarily strive to foster the 
German social element within the empire; their foremost concern was to ensure 
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the survival of empire itself. While they could rely on Austrian Germans to be 
their most loyal and reliable subjects, changing demographics and the 
increasing national consciousness of Slavs had to be addressed at least partially 
to avoid an inevitable exacerbation of tensions.  And that was to say nothing of 
the Magyars, who had won virtual sovereign recognition back in 1867. The 
undertones of Central Europe as a German-dominated union were sure to upset 
the delicate equilibrium and successive governments understandably strove to 
keep public discussion to a minimum, especially since a surge in pan-German 
empathy and increasing calls for union with Germany had largely coincided 
with the outbreak of war. The exhaustive efforts of Stürgkh and Tisza to keep a 
lid on things illustrate this delicate predicament only too well.114 
Significantly, archival research has unveiled Stürgkh’s concern that the leading 
role of Germans in conceptualisng Central Europe was likely to mean a leading 
role for the German Empire in practice, curbing Austrian sovereignty. This 
realisation resulted in a strong personal opposition to negotiations on the 
express topic of Central Europe and also made him weary of customs union 
negotiations. The German memorandum portraying Austria as an eastern 
German mark (border march) certainly worked only to increase such concerns. 
Emperor Franz Josef also considered the Central European plan a danger to the 
sovereignty of Austria-Hungary – claiming that proposals for a Nationalverband 
would reduce the standing of Austria even below Bavaria (Redlich 1953: 91), a 
concern that had been shared by his successor Karl, who was set against the 
customs union, never mind any grander political scheme. Moreover, Burián was 
convinced that the Entente would use Mitteleuropa as a pretext for an economic 
offensive, depicting it as another hostile move (Kapp 1984: 132). 
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 In addition to Gross episode quoted earlier in the chapter, the Austrian government also warned 
Gustav Marchet that it did not wish for any public debate on Central Europe at that particular point in 
time, i.e. 1915, when the enthusiasm for such political project was at its peek in Germany. 
(Hohenlohe 1915b, Burian 1925: 263) Similarly, István Tisza imposed strict censorship of Central 
Europe debate in Hungary and suggested that activities of private individuals in this regard should 
held back as much as possible in both parts of the monarchy (Tisza 1915b, Tisza 1915c, Baernreither 
1915c: 19 April, Stresemann 1916) 
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As regards the influence of Central European advocates in Austria-Hungary, 
Baernreither himself noted that with regards to the mindsets of either PM 
Stürgkh or his Foreign Minister Burián, it was negligible (Baernreither 1915c: 9 
February). Both of them, as well as Tisza in Hungary, were keen to block public 
debate on Central Europe. The u-turn in the level of their influence came with 
Stürgkh’s assassination in late 1916, leading to the fated Clam-Martinic 
government in early 1917. Clam-Martinic’s cabinet included several of the 
foremost advocates of Central Europe, most importantly Baernreither and 
Riedl. At the same time, another Central Europe enthusiast, Wekerle, came to 
power in Hungary. Such a formidable concentration of power in hands of the 
leaders of Central European movement led immediately to the restart of talks. 
However, this was soon stalled by the problem of aligning the renegotiated 
Compromise (due to complex internal customs duties) with the envisaged 
customs union, as well as the Polish question and faltering interest on the 
German side. Yet, this period marks the high point of the Central Europe 
movement in Austria, when its advocates were directly in policy making 
positions. That is, it was briefly empowered. 
The break in negotiations, at the time considered as the final moment of 
creation of Central Europe, was the signature of the agreements on the 
economic and military union by the two emperors in the aftermath of the Sixtus 
Affair during May 1918. This political gesture was challenged only three weeks 
later, as the new Seidler government decided to push for a preferential customs 
agreement rather than a full customs union. This clearly showed a lack of 
government commitment to the political agreements signed by the emperor. 
Yet, Austria-Hungary lacked viable alternatives to closer alliance with Germany 
and reluctantly continued negotiations throughout the summer 1918.  
The coup de grâce for a project none of the parties really wanted to participate 
in but nevertheless felt compelled to progress, was dealt by the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary in October 1918, less than six months after 
the Central European enthusiasts celebrated the realisation of their dreams. 
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Finally, one interesting line in the story of Central Europe in Austria-Hungary 
remains to be discussed: the opposition to the notion and the use of Central 
Europe in agitation of small nations for the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary. Most of all, it was Masaryk, who portrayed Central Europe as a threat 
to what he considered the interests of individual allies. It was already noted 
that despite sophistication of this argumentation, it did not work too well – in 
the following chapter, we will discuss whether this was because the allies did 
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Chapter 5: Central Europe in Anglo-Saxon environments 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the side of the definitive discourse of Central Europe 
where the notion is theorized as a representation of the Other. The chapter also 
explores the impact of just such a constructed notion on the behaviour of 
political actors and suggests a significant impact, especially in the more distant 
United States. However, and importantly, the collected evidence goes against 
the supposition that Central Europe could have driven great power 
endorsement of the break-up of the Dual Monarchy.  
The chapter maps out the use and development of the notion of Central Europe 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. After initial observations about the prevailing 
fuzziness of the concept during the late 19th century, the chapter divides into 
two larger sections, one focusing on Britain and the other on the United States. 
The chapter observes that in both environments, the pan-German 
interpretation of Central Europe was gradually adopted and policy makers in 
both countries defined their policies in opposition to this supposed plan for 
German domination of Europe and beyond.  
 
5.2 A fuzzy concept 
Anglo-Saxon literature from the late 1870s and early 1880s features fairly wide 
references to Central Europe in various academic and policy fields and 
branches of science. Yet, there seems to be disunity among authors as regards 
its territorial extent. Archaeologists delineate Central Europe to include 
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, parts of France, Austria and Bohemia, based 
largely on their analysis of Palaeolithic settlements (Lubbock 1879: 141). 
Historians typically identify it on the basis of Teutonic settlement areas existing 
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in the 1st century BC (Stuart-Glennie 1879: 3, Stevens 1879: 160) Geologists 
estimate its extent on the basis of major  Silurian fossil deposits, including 
Bohemia, Bavaria, Eastern France, Carpathian Mountains and surrounding 
areas. (Clough 1879: 280, Geikie 1885: 641) Even geographers cannot agree on 
a shape and size for Central Europe, presenting several versions ranging from 
limiting its extent to the plains between the Alps and the Baltic (Fisher 1886: 
73) to considering the whole mainland rump of Europe (minus its peninsulas) 
as included in its designation. (Swinton 1875: 100, see Appendix 16)  
Until the 1890s, this essentially fuzzy territorial definition for Central Europe 
was evident in authors both from the UK and the United States. However, from 
the mid-1890s, UK authors started to gravitate towards identification of Central 
Europe as consonant with the then contemporary German Empire and Austria 
Hungary. This was especially visible in the fields of transport, industrial 
management and engineering (e.g. look at periodicals such as The Railway 
Engineer, or Engineering Magazine115). In contrast, US authors, further removed 
as they were, seemed to sustain the fuzzy definition much longer.  
 
5.3 The view from Britain 
In the years preceding the First World War, the concept of Central Europe 
adopted in Britain essentially had been defined by the pan-German movement; 
a political project for unification of the area ‘naturally’ dominated by Germans. 
This interpretation found its way into the strategic considerations of policy 
makers and, as this chapter documents, exercised an influence in policy choices 
made during the war. 
 
                                                 
115
 For comparison with earlier understanding in this branch of academic literature see, for example, 
Hadley (1886), who prominently included Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and other countries of 
mainland Europe into his understanding of Central Europe.  
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5.3.1 ‘The Seat of War’ 
British cartographers started to employ the notion of Central Europe in a 
consistent British cartographers started to employ the notion of Central Europe 
in a consistent manner as early as the 1860s. The Austro-Prussian war of 1866, 
as well as the heightening Franco-Prussian tensions that culminated in their 
war of 1870 – 71, brought about a boom in the printing of maps carrying the 
label, ‘Central Europe’. No less than 34 such maps were printed between 1866 
and 1874, as evident in the holdings of the British Library (Bacon 1866, Bacon 
1870, Philip 1870). Typically these were maps documenting or related to the 
conflicts of 1866 and 1870-1 indeed, representations of the Franco-Prussian 
battlefields dominate the content.  
These focused depictions seem relatively disconnected from the more varied 
output from other academics and scientists just discussed. The explanation 
perhaps lies in the fact that this boom in consistent cartographic representation 
of Central Europe was relatively short-lived, relating squarely to the conflicts 
just mentioned and not surviving long after their resolution. The majority of the 
maps were published between 1866 and 1873 and, unsurprisingly, at least two 
of these maps carry the expression, ‘The Seat of War’ as a suffix in their titles 
(preceding specification of ‘Central Europe’) (Bacon 1870, Letts 1870). The 
purpose of these maps had obviously been to visualise Germany’s expansionist 
ambitions and the increasing military threat it posed. Such a (rather simplistic) 
focus  is also evident in later British depictions of Central Europe - its 
cartographic expression and their volume always seem  connected directly to 
German activities and perceptions of its aspirations.  An examination of the 
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British atlases – as opposed to individual topical maps – display three different 
tendencies in their treatment of Central Europe: they either present no map of 
Central Europe at all (Bartholomew ed. 1895, Philip 1902, Bacon 1908), they 
feature maps of ‘Central Europe and the Mediterranean Sea/Countries’ or else 
‘Central and Southern Europe’ (Campbell 1885: 84, Bartholomew: 1890: 28, 
Nelson 1891a: 48 – 49, Nelson 1891b: 48). Interestingly, all the atlases in the 
last group feature maps prepared by the same cartographer – John George 
Bartholomew. Other than this sole, if very influential source, there was very 
limited exposure for the term ‘Central Europe’ in the bound cartographic 
volumes of the time. Loose individual maps offered more variety in their 
depictions of Central Europe with their correspondingly greater diversity of 
authorship.  
The number of printed maps of Central Europe dropped significantly between 
the mid-1870s and the outbreak of the First World War, as the concept itself 
seems to have shifted. Before the turn of the century, a majority of cartographic 
works depicted Central Europe accordingly to frame the 1866 and 1870-1 wars, 
focusing upon the German Empire and its neighbours to the west and south 
(e.g. compare Johnston and Johnston 1866, Appendix 17, and Stanford 1895, 
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Appendix 18116). However, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth 
century, the maps tended to depict the whole of mainland Europe as ‘Central 
Europe’ (e.g.Cook 1909, Stanford 1911, Philip 1914). This tendency to ‘zoom 
out’ from the previous focus on the conflict-prone Franco-German borderlands 
is apparent in the cartographic productions of several authors (e.g., compare 
Stanford 1895 to Stanford 1911, or Philip 1870 to Philip 1914). 
An explanation for this phenomenon can perhaps be drawn from analysis of 
successive map and atlas editions published by Bartholomew117, probably the 
richest source material for tracing the development of Central Europe as 
depicted cartographically. Bartholomew’s maps reveal that its location 
gradually shifted eastwards in the early 20th century. His earliest map of Central 
Europe focused on France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Germany. (Bartholomew 1892, Appendix 19) Bartholomew’s 1910 map is 
extended to cover Austria-Hungary as far as Budapest (Bartholomew 1910, 
Appendix 20) and then in 1915 to cover muchof this empire. (Bartholomew, 
Appendix 21) Moreover, at the onset of the First World War, Bartholomew 
chose to present a wider continental view of the area, covering the full 
territorial extent of Austria-Hungary. (Bartholomew 1914, Appendix 22)118 
This depiction of Central Europe should be seen in the context of needing to 
map the possible extent of German territorial ambitions. The progressively full 
inclusion of Austria-Hungary on these maps reflected increasing perceptions of 
a strong link between the two empires and the later final ‘zooming out’ to a 
continental scale was consonant with the outbreak of the First World War, 
whereby a much wider map frame was needed to provide a visual context for 
its many  battlefields. 
                                                 
116
 Their early maps of Central Europe were printed in mutual collaboration – see Johnston 1866. 
117
 John G. Bartholomew (1860 – 1920) was a foremost Scottish cartographer of the late 19th and 
early 20
th
 century, Cartographer to the King, co-founder of the Royal Scottish Geographical Society 
and its honorary secretary. (H. R. M 1920) 
118
 Bartholomew’s last map of Central Europe (Bartholomew ed. 1920) shows Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The total shift as compared to the 1892 version is 
more than 11 degree’s east. 
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So there may have been a slight disconnect evident in cartographic expressions 
of Central Europe and employment of the notion in academic writing - while 
cartographers were ‘zooming out’, eventually to a continental scale to frame the 
coming conflicts, academics increasingly and consitently ‘focused in’ on the 
German Empire and Austria-Hungary, having previously held no unanimity at 
all in their views about what the term connoted. Certainly, British geographical 
and historical works from the turn of the century exhibit a marked shift 
towards identifying Central Europe with Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
sometimes with the addition of Switzerland (Rose 1891) or Italy (Andrews 
1896, West 1903, Fry 1908).  
Both these tendencies can be explained by the same inter-related phenomena – 
the rise of Germany and its strengthening interconnection with Austria-
Hungary. While consensus over using Central Europe as  short -and for both 
empires strengthened, cartographers needed to provide a wider visual 
contextual frame for the territories that might be subject to their growing 
ambitions. 
 
5.3.2 The influence of German Central Europe concepts 
Essentially, Britain displayed no autochthonous conceptualisation of Central 
Europe. Understanding of the concept of Central Europe derived from the 
translations of the German works. The importance of Joseph Partsch’s Central 
Europe (1903), published under the editorship of Halford Mackinder, has 
already been described in detail (section 1.1.4). Partsch presented his British 
readers with a vision for Central Europe, a region that would be “willingly or 
unwillingly” dominated by the Germans (Partsch 1903: 142). The work drew 
detailed commentary in countless reviews and was often criticised for its less 
than subtle hints of a wider political agenda and was generally regarded as not 
constituting a serious geographic work (G. G. C. 1904). Yet, with this book, the 
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vision of a German-dominated Central Europe became the key interpretation 
transplanted into the British environment, an influence whose implications will 
be traced in later sections of this chapter. 
There were, of course, alternative interpretations available as well. For 
example, the English translation of Hans Ferdinand Helmolt’s The History of the 
World reads: 
“…under the heading of ‘Central Europe’ we include the common 
achievements of the Romance and Teutonic races in the heart of 
Europe subsequently to the decay of the Kelts. The histories of 
Germany, Italy and France before the Renaissance, and of 
Christianity from the age of migration to the Reformation…” 
(Helmolt 1907: 1) 
Finally, reviews of works published in Germany also provided British readers 
with insight into the competing definitions for Central Europe, their extent and 
underpinning rationale. For example, The Geographical Journal carried George 
Chisholm’s review (Chisholm 1907) of Alfred Hettner’s Grundzüge der 
Länderkunde, with its definition of Central Europe (Hettner 1907). Yet, it was 
the understanding of Central Europe as a sphere of ambition for the German 
nation (as first presented to British audiences by Partsch), which resurfaced 
in the British policy making environment during the First World War.  
 
5.3.3 Shifting threat perceptions 
The combined threat of Germany and Austria-Hungary dominated the 
considerations of the British Government during the First World War (Foreign 
Office 1916), yet, this had not necessarily been a long-term trajectory of 
thought or opinion in Britain prior to the war. 
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At the turn of the century, the British government’s first and foremost concern 
was the potential threat of Russia to its imperial possessions and interests 
(Venier 2004: 331, also Green 2006: 33, Williams 1991). Germany was also 
perceived as a source of potential threat and concerns over its growing 
ambitions, military might and naval capabilities were rising. Yet, it was 
generally considered as but one of a number of potential sources of threat to 
the empire.  
Indeed, Britain’s relations with Germany were not openly hostile at least until 
the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905. After all, the Salisbury government had 
approached Germany with offers of alliance over Far Eastern issues twice 
during 1900. (Williamson 1969: 3) Given that Austria-Hungary presented no 
real challenges for the British Empire – and was surrounded to the west and 
north by much greater security concerns, this country rarely entered into the 
government’s strategic considerations in this period. The Great Game was 
clearly still dominating the strategic outlook at Whitehall. In fact, concerns over 
Germany itself in foreign policy circles only built up incrementally, as reports of 
increasing German ambitions gradually coagulated into perceptions of a threat 
to the interests of the British Empire (Foreign Office 1905, Sanderson 1907). 
There would be a growing sense than German ambitions posed a challenge to 
Britain in the Middle East and, potentially, even in India.  
At a popular level, Germanophobia erupted fairly regularly in Britain in the 
early years of the 20th century – generally over suspected connivery in 
complicating Britain’s relations with its allies (Tomes 2002: 134) to outright 
scaremongering over a potential invasion (Fontana and Edwards 1996: 39). 
The intensity of suspicions towards Germany had increased in the popular 
press for at least two decades prior to the First World War. These popular 
expressions of fear certainly did not go unnoticed in Germany (Lascelles 1905) 
and were largely mirrored in the Berlin press. Yet, the strong language of the 
own daily presses was not reflected in any real policy positions until the last 
five years or so before the outbreak of war in 1914. 
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5.3.4 Halford J. Mackinder 
Mackinder is surely the most famous British theorist of European regional 
reorganisation, with his Middle Tier rivalling conceptions of German-
dominated Central Europe. Mackinder’s Middle Tier of small independent 
countries was designed to divide two formidable rivals of Britain: Russia and 
Germany. It became synonymous with his famous dictum implying that 
whoever ruled this region, (would one day) rule the world (Mackinder 1919). 
Yet, this particular theory was not published until after the First World War. In 
fact, the first version of his heartland theory, published in 1904, displayed a 
surprising lack of concern over Germany.  
Mackinder’s 1904 pivot thesis (Mackinder 1904) addressed the strategic 
concerns of Britain as a global power rather than just a European country. He 
clearly focused on any threat that might emanate from an area inaccessible to 
British naval power, the regions of continental and arctic drainage in Eurasia. 
(Mackinder 1904: 429) At the time of writing, this looked most likely to 
originate from the Russian Empire (Mackinder 1904: 437). 
Germany only appeared in his essay four times - and these mentions were all on 
the same page. The third119 is perhaps the most interesting for our purposes 
and also in light of Mackinder’s future theorizing (Mackinder 1919 and 1943). 
Here Mackinder attested that: 
 “The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, 
resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, 
would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-
building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This 
might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia”. 
(Mackinder 1904: 436) 
                                                 
119
 In his first mention, Mackinder remarked how Russia “in the world at large… occupies the 
central strategical position held by Germany in Europe”. The second identified Germany as a 
country of “a great inner crescent”. 
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From this quote it follows that Germany would only be considered a threat if 
aligned with an expanding Russia, since this would lend fleet-building 
capacities as well as an oceanic outlet to the land-based power. Moreover, 
Germany was not the only power of the inner crescent that Mackinder 
considered dangerous if interconnected with the pivot area – for his references 
to China are unmistakable. (Mackinder 1904: 437)  
A preoccupation with the German threat, so typical of his later works, and the 
emphasis on territorial measures to keep Germany and Russia apart, are both 
missing in Mackinder’s 1904 essay. In fact, the fourth mention of Germany in 
the 1904 text hinted that Germany should be allowed to develop its influence in 
South America (Mackinder 1904: 436).  
It only remains to be commented that in this earliest version of the heartland 
theory, there was nothing inevitable about the forging of any alliance between 
Germany and Russia against the British Empire. Germany was not characterised 
within the geographical pivot of history and, indeed, did not even figure as a 
major independent threat to the British Empire. While Mackinder had 
acknowledged Germany’s rising power in his previous writings (Mackinder 
1902), in this essay urging a fostering of unity forthe global British Empire 
(Vernier 2004: 333, Heffernan 1998: 55, Toal 1992,), ‘the [European] seat of 
war’ (Letts 1870) was not as important as ‘the natural seat of power’ 
(Mackinder 1904: 435, Appendix 9) in the heart of Eurasia. Central Europe was 
not at all Mackinder’s preoccupation in his 1904 thesis.  
 
5.3.5 Central Europe, Drang nach Osten and the Berlin-Baghdad 
Railway 
The notion of Central Europe entered the British diplomatic record early 
in1906 with Reginald Tower’s120 letter of 24 January to Secretary of State 
                                                 
120
 Reginald Tower was a Minister-resident in Munich 1903 – 1906.  
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Edward Grey, detailing the growing influence of the pan-German movement in 
Germany. Tower also described pan-German conceptions of Central Europe as 
visions for a unified economic zone spanning all Germans in Europe, with a 
distinct anti-British edge. (Tower 1906)  
More than with any pan-German Central Europe designs, the British Foreign 
Office was preoccupied with the related notion of a German Drang nach Osten – 
a generic term for ambitions to expand power east of its international borders – 
and, more specifically, the Berlin-Baghdad railway, which had become a bone of 
contention from 1897 when Germany ousted Britain from the project. Henry 
Lansdowne (Viceroy of India 1888 – 1894, then Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs 1900 – 1905) thought that the project might afford Germany a 
threatening predominance in Asia Minor, rendering the scheme a challenge to 
British interests (Lansdowne 1903). By the mid-1900s, these perceptions were 
hardening with a clearly observable German naval build-up.  
Amidst growing mutual suspicions, tensions between the two countries rose, if 
only gradually. While in 1906 Fairfax Cartwright121 considered that any 
differences between Britain and Germany could be settled without too much 
difficulty (Cartwright 1906), the same individual reported only two years later 
that the “foreign policy of the German government… seems to prefer to use 
crooked ways to attain its aims” - considering that it was now almost 
impossible to bring about an entente between the two countries. (Cartwright 
1908) By the end of the decade, the German press was openly anti-British, 
typically characterising Britain’s opposition to its naval build-up as hypocritical 
and an obvious effort to maintain its undue advantage on the seas. (de Salis 
1909a) These charges were typically levied by the liberal and pan-German 
national newspapers, then the main contemporary proponents of the idea of 
Central Europe (de Salis 1909b). By 1912 the tension was obvious (Goschen 
1912) and Lord Richard Haldane, Secretary of State for War, openly demanded 
                                                 
121
 Fairfax Cartwright was a Minister-Resident in Munich 1906 – 1908 and Ambassador to Vienna 
1908 – 1913. 
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“retardation of the rate of construction” of German battleships (Goschen 1913) 
as Berlin was now clearly considered a significant threat to the British Empire. 
 
5.3.6 Britain and Austria-Hungary 
At the same time (from approximately 1910), increased attention was 
beginning to be paid by British diplomats to the relationship developing 
between Germany and its allies – namely, Italy and Austria-Hungary. Edward 
Goschen observed that Italy was an increasingly unreliable member of the 
Triple Alliance and that only “political reasons” were preventing it from 
breaking away completely (Goschen 1912). The relationship with Austria-
Hungary also was not without its tensions and occasional shows of mistrust by 
the German public (Goschen 1910a). Speculation that Britain was trying to 
detach Austria-Hungary from Germany were floated for the first time as early 
as 1909, when King Edward VII visited Emperor Franz Jozef in Bad Ischl 
(Goschen 1910b).  
The official line on the British relationship with Austria-Hungary in the late 19th 
century had been one of “close connexions” (Bridge 1972: 219) and 
cooperation in the complex situation arising from the Ottoman Empire’s 
faltering grip on the Balkans. The failure of Anglo-German talks in 1901 was a 
major disappointment for the Austrian government, which hoped that 
cooperation between Britain and the Triple Alliance could be established. 
(Goluchowski 1901) In the early years of the 20th century, British diplomats 
were also convinced that the Austrian government remained keen on 
maintaining friendly relationship with Britain (Plunkett 1905) and that Austria 
was solely concerned with maintaining the status quo in the region (Goschen 
1905).  
A deterioration in relations was effected with the conflicting policies pursued 
by both countries in Macedonia during 1906 – 1908 and, most notably, in their 
treatment of the Bosnian Crisis in early 1909. (Goschen 1907, Goschen 1908, 
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Cartwright et al. 1909, Cartwright et al. 1911) Interestingly, following the 
Bosnian Crisis, opinion shifted on Austria-Hungary within the Foreign Office. 
While until then, it was perceived as a weakening Empire, the Bosnian Crisis 
convinced many that Austria-Hungary was actually displaying signs of renewed 
strength (Hardinge 1909, Cartwright 1910) and an ability to emancipate itself 
from German influence. (Cartwright 1909) As Fairfax Cartwright (now 
Ambassador to Vienna) opined:  
“A strong Austria-Hungary means an independent Austria-
Hungary; a weak one means an Empire dependent for guidance 
upon Germany.” (Cartwright 1909b) 
This premise would remain the essential guideline for British policymakers for 
years to come. British conduct in the wake of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 
suggested that it saw a vested interest in maintaining a balance of power on the 
continent for fear of undermining Austria-Hungary (Crampton 1971: 208). The 
particulars of the outbreak of the First World War showed that Britain had no 
direct quarrel with Austria-Hungary. (Grey 1914)  
However, concerns were raised by Cartwright over the role Austria-Hungary 
would play as an ally in German designs to expand their influence eastwards 
(Cartwright 1911b, 1911c)122. British diplomats had started to employ the 
notion of Central Europe as shorthand for Germany and Austria-Hungary since 
well before the First World War (Goschen 1910b), with their growing 
references to Berlin’s Drang nach Osten (Cartwright 1911b). In their view, 
Austria-Hungary was a vital piece in any German expansion strategy and only a 
strong, detached Austria-Hungary could stop the German march eastwards. But 
the dual monarchy was deeply dependent on its larger and stronger ally. As 
Cartwright put it, Austria was “completely supplanted by Germany” (Cartwright 
                                                 
122
 Interestingly, Cartwright drew much of his information in this regard from Karel Kramář, who was 
also the major source of information for Chéradame and other authors pointing out the danger of 
German east-ward expansion. 
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1911c). It was with these impressions that British policy makers entered the 
turmoil of the First World War. 
5.3.7 The Foreign Office and Masaryk’s dismemberment plan 
Very early into the war, the British government was approached by the leaders 
of the small nations comprising Austria-Hungary with a suggestion that the 
dismemberment of the dual monarchy would be to Britain’s advantage. In 
addition to Masaryk (Seton-Watson 1914), a number of Polish and Yugoslav 
representatives and organizations contacted the Foreign Office during the 
autumn of 1914 (Spring-Rice 1914, Clerk 1914, Rodd 1914). However, at this 
early stage, no great note was taken of any such representations – even if a 
similar, contemporaneous suggestion by Hungarian opposition representatives 
was acknowledged and its possibilities investigated further – though with no 
great affect. (Elliot 1914, Foreign Office 1914) In any case, suggestions that the 
break-up of Austria-Hungary be encouraged were rebuffed in spring 1915, even 
though consultations with representatives of small nations would continue 
thereafter (de Bunsen 1915, Clerk 1915a, Foreign Office 1915a), providing the 
British government with valuable intelligence (Clerk 1915b, Foreign Office 
1915f). In addition to Masaryk, Yugoslav representatives, most consistently 
Franjo Supilo, also started to use the same tactical argument when advocating 
break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in their communications with the 
British government fairly early into the war (e. g. Supilo 1915), as did some 
Polish representatives later on (Dmowski 1917). George Clerk123, at that time a 
senior clerk at the Foreign Office and a member of the de Bunsen Committee124, 
thought that the break-up of the empire was well beyond practical 
consideration (Clerk 1915b). The so called Tyrrell-Paget report in 1916 was the 
first governmental document to suggest break-up of the empire as a possible 
                                                 
123
 George Russell Clerk was a diplomat and privy councilor, later an Ambassador to Czechoslovak 
Republic. 
124
 De Bunsen Committee was set up to determine British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The 
committee suggested federalization of the empire, a solution which the government also favoured in 
the case of Austria-Hungary until late in the war. 
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basis for post-war territorial settlement in Europe; however, the report did not 
gain much traction (Tyrrell and Paget 1916).  
The argument that break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire would spell an 
end to the imperial designs of Germany did not seem to work - the British 
government seemed of the mind concerned that its break-up would simply 
result in the creation of small, weak and quarrelling nation-states 
(‘Balkanization’); which would thus become even more susceptible to German 
influence and dependent on Austria-Hungary. Yet, this did not signify that 
governmental officials necessarily held positive views about Central Europe as 
it was then understood – as a notional blue-print for German expansion. A 
memorandum, ‘What Germany Covets’ (Foreign Office 1916, FO 925/30277), 
was issued by the Foreign Office in 1916, using André Chéradame’s famous 
“Map showing the German schemes of Central Europe and Central Africa” 
(Foreign Office 1916). The text accompanying the map explained that Germany 
planned a world conquest. For this purpose, Gemany needed to build a 
sufficiently strong territorial base to intimidate the British Empire: 
“For this project, Germany must obtain domination over Austria, 
Serbia, Roumania, Greece, European Turkey and Asiatic Turkey. 
The scheme is termed ‘Mitteleuropa’.” (FO 1916) 
A recognition of the threat posed by Central Europe to Britain’s imperial 
interests was certainly present within the Foreign Office; yet, the envisaged 
solution to prevent its rise would differ from the one offered by Masaryk. 
 
5.3.8 Efforts for detachment of Austria-Hungary from Germany 
The notion of Central Europe that regularly appeared in the dispatches and 
reports of Foreign Office (Beak 1917, Rumbold 1917a, Clerk 1917a) was a 
response to the context provided by Germany’s Drang nach Osten and its Berlin-
Baghdad railway project. Central Europe was presented as only the starting 
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point of any German envisaged expansion to the east and as threatening to the 
interests of Empire. Austria-Hungary was considered the key to countering 
such plans; however, it was the Austro-Hungarian Empire‘s detachment from 
Germany, rather than its break-up,  that the Foreign Office decision-makers saw 
as their preferred enabler.  
Robert Cecil’s125 comments on the Tyrrell-Paget report offer an insight into the 
thinking behind the British government’s reluctance to aid the break-up of the 
empire. In his view, any break-up would leave a collective of small, independent 
and weak states exposed to the potential overlordship of Germany, something 
they would not be able to resist. In contrast, should the allies manage to secure 
Austria’s defection from its alliance with Germany, this would greatly enhance 
their chances of victory in the war. (Cecil 1916) The idea was to convince 
Austria-Hungary to desert Germany and sign a peace treaty with the allies, its 
so called ‘separate peace’ strategy. This would, of course, only be achieved if 
Austria was promised protection of its continued existence. 
At the beginning of the war, British officials insisted that “it was notorious that 
His Majesty’s Government was engaged in the struggle to a large extent for the 
rights of the smaller nations” (Spring-Rice 1914). Yet, his did not mean that the 
British government was supporting dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. In 
fact, by 1916 the possibilities for detachment of Austria-Hungary from Germany 
had risen to prominence in policy circles, as a way to deprive Germany of a key 
ally and win the war. Austria was increasingly viewed as suffering from war 
fatigue and internal tensions and therefore more likely to respond to offers of  a 
separate peace (Patterson 1916, Rumbold 1918). Emperor Karl, who replaced 
Franz Josef in 1916126, was seen as inclined to such thinking (Rumbold 1918d), 
an assertion proved with exposition of the Sixtus Affair in 1918. 
                                                 
125
 Robert Cecil was the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for much of the First World 
War (30 May 1915 – 10 January 1919). 
126
 Franz Josef I died in November 1916 
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The tradition of securing the balance of power, which had underpinned the 
system of European Concert in the hundred years leading up to the war was 
also a strong influence here. For decades the main guarantee of peace in Europe 
had lain with the striking of power balances through alliances and efforts to 
isolate members of the system that might potentially represent a danger – but 
the idea of removing an important member of this system from the political 
map altogether seemed destabilizing at best. (Amery 1918) The volatile and 
vulnerable Balkans of the early 20th century was highlighted as an illustration of 
what could happen, should a collective of small weak nations arise to replace 
Austria-Hungary. Masaryk’s idea of forging a ‘barrier’ against German 
expansion to the east did not gain as much traction as his later one of Austria 
acting as a ‘counterweight’ to Germany after the war – perhaps significantly, 
Masaryk’s later postulation was much more aligned with any policy-maker’s 
notion of how European power relations worked. (e. g. Smuts 1917) 
Moreover, Britain itself was an empire and its enemies could use the same 
tactics (promises of dismemberment and emancipation should Britain lose the 
war) to encourage its constituent nations to sabotage the war effort. Perhaps 
the best illustration was a series of Foreign Office minutes that likened CNC to 
Sinn Fein (Foreign Office 1918). 
Finally, the group of politicians who rose to prominence in the Lloyd George 
cabinet (1916 - 1922), was not necessarily positively predisposed to the rise of 
small nation states. Described by some as ‘new imperialists’, this group led by 
Leo Amery and Alfred Milner strongly believed that the world was developing 
towards larger multinational political units rather than smaller nation states 
(Amery 1953: 162). In their view, the way to counter any potential German rise 
was to detach and restructure Austria-Hungary into a federal unit. Even as late 
as October 1918, when the demise of the dual monarchy was imminent, Amery 
argued that: 
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“The fact is that “Middle Europe” is an inevitable and necessary 
outcome of this war whatever the actual issue of the struggle or 
the terms of peace imposed by the victors.” (Amery 1918: 308) 
His suggestion was to join German Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, 
Romania and Bulgaria in “a new Danubian Confederation” (Amery 1918: 307 – 
308). He was pragmatic about its likely political geographic orientation; 
“such a union would largely work in co-operation with Germany 
is also a fact which we should accept with a good grace. The 
cooperation will be of a very different character from the league 
between Hapsburg and Hohenzollern in the past.” (Amery 1918: 
308) 
This idea was eventually dismissed by his colleagues (Namier 1918, Cecil 
1918b), but not before the suggestion had been widely aired, considered as it 
was by the War as well as the Political Intelligence Department. (Cecil 1918a) 
This episode demonstrated the following: while any German-led Central Europe 
pitched against Britain would obviously be opposed,  fears of a Central 
European ‘Balkanisation’ and any resultant disruption to  traditional regional 
power balances were so strong as to  lead to contemplations of  a British-
designed federation, even if it would ‘co-operate’ with Germany.  
 
5.3.9 Separate peace efforts  
In light of the above, it is not surprising that Masaryk’s seemingly binary choice 
between allowing development of a launch pad for German conquest of the 
world and enabling the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not 
convince many. Among the few who got on board with his arguments were 
members of the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Intelligence led by 
Lewis B. Namier.  
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But within the Foreign Office, key decision makers remained unimpressed. The 
sceptics even included George Clerk, who was in frequent contact with many 
representatives of small nations (Clerk 1915a, 1915b, 1917a). Instead, the 
government worked towards achieving a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. 
In these negotiations, assurances of its non-interference in internal affairs were 
actually communicated to the Austrian government, suggesting that Austria-
Hungary might become a stabilizing power in the region once liberalized127. 
The idea of conducting separate negotiations with the Austrian government had 
first been raised in the summer of 1916 (Foreign Office 1916b) and, by the end 
of the year, Lloyd George himself had become convinced that it was this 
strategy that possessed the strongest chance of success, as he learned about the 
new emperor’s negotiations with France (Lloyd George 1935: 1184). Talks with 
Austria-Hungary were conducted for much of 1917 and early 1918 (Smuts 
1917, Rumbold 1918c, 1918d), although they would ultimately fail to deliver 
the separate peace that was being aimed for. The idea was to detach Austria-
Hungary from Germany and develop a post-war counterweight to its east in 
Europe. It became clear during May 1918 with the announcement that new 
military and economic treaties had been concluded between the German and 
Austrian emperors that this idea would not materialize and Austria-Hungary 
would be tied firmly into the German orbit (PID FO 1918). As reported by 
Rumbold, the treaties on economic and political union represented “a step to 
the Mitteleuropa scheme” (Rumbold 1918a) which “might become a serious 
reality” (Rumbold 1918b).  
 
                                                 
127
 J. C. Smuts, who negotiated on behalf of Britain wrote in his report on negotiations he assured his 
counterpart that “we had no intentions of interfering in [Austria’s] internal affairs, but we recognized 
that if Austria could become a really liberal Empire, in which her subject peoples would, as far as 
possible, be satisfied and content, she would become for Central Europe very much what the British 
Empire had become for the rest of the world… and she would have a mission in the future even 
greater than her mission in the past.” (Smuts 1917: 219) 
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5.3.10 A reluctance to see the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
Only at this point, when the materialization of Central Europe as a union of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed possible, did the voices and demands of 
its composite small nations start to gain traction. The Foreign Office now turned 
to a strategy of weakening Austria-Hungary by any means, and the allies 
stepped up their support to small nations capable of actively weakening the 
monarchy (especially propaganda and battle groups).  
Throughout the war, the Foreign Office supported any disruptive efforts of the 
small nations in order to weaken Austria-Hungary and therefore Germany; yet, 
as has already been discussed at some length, their preference was for a 
reorganization of the empire that would end up weakening any alliance with 
Germany (mainly by increasing the clout  of the Slavs), rather than effecting 
rupture. (Smuts 1917)  
The ability of national representatives and their networks to disrupt enemy 
ranks through wholescale desertions (Clerk 1917a: 313) and targeted 
propaganda (Granville 1918) impressed the allies. Valuable intelligence was 
supplied (Clerk 1916) as sizeable companies of men ended up fighting on the 
side of the allies (Cecil 1918c, 1918e) and this motivated a growing sense of 
obligation on the part of British policy makers (Clerk 1917a, Hardinge 1918, 
Lloyd George 1918). Yet, even in the last stages of war, many Foreign Office 
officials wanted to keep the door open for the potential survival of Austria-
Hungary, if at all possible. On 5 September 1918, almost a month after 
recognizing CNC, Robert Cecil minuted:  
“Our recognition of the Czechs was very carefully worded and 
though it would undoubtedly be consistent with the 
dismemberment of Austria it does not in fact bind us to that 
solution.” (Cecil 1918f, Appendix 25) 
What finally convinced the British government to grant CNC recognition was 
the armies that the CNC controlled in Siberia, which had become central to 
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allied plans to deal with Bolshevik Russia (Granville 1918, Cecil 1918c, Cecil 
1918d).  There was also the question of recognition by other allied states 
(Foreign Office 1918b). Beneš demanded recognition in return for the 
continuing involvement of Czech battle groups on the allied side in Siberia 
(Cecil 1918d), and he eventually got it (Foreign Office 1918, 1918b, 1918c). 
Masaryk’s narrative of Central Europe did not seem to have made much of an 
impact. 
The realisation of an anti-British Central Europe stretching down to the Middle 
East would certainly have been a nightmare of British policy makers; however, 
they did not ultimately believe that the break-up of Austria-Hungary would 
prevent it; quite the contrary, they believed it would leave Germany as the only 
great power in the region and enable it to dominate the region even more 
easily. Anyway, the crumbling of Austria-Hungary would come  from within. 
The British government would have preferred establishment of a new 
federation in the area128, but the emerging regional picture was perceived as 
too unstable to predict or manage. So they chose not to bind themselves to any 
particular design or cause and essentially let things take their own cause 
(Namier 1918). 
 
5.4 The view from the USA 
A Pan-German interpretation of Central Europe would find its way into 
American academic and policy circles as well, though considerably later than 
was the case with Britain. Nevertheless, the concept was visibly present in the 
minds of policy makers at the most crucial junctures of the First World War. 
 
                                                 
128
 Beneš, aware of the British concerns over viability of small nation states, even submitted proposal 
of new ‘Pro-Entente Central Europe’ (Beneš 1918) consisting of two federations, a plan he would 
later return to during the Second World War. 
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5.4.1 Central Europe almost unknown to cartography 
As compared to the UK, cartographic expression of Central Europe was all but 
missing in the United States, with perhaps one sole exception – the works of 
Arnold Henry Guyot, a Swiss-American geographer and cartographer129. While 
his 1866 publication Guyot’s Geo r phic l Series made no mention of Central 
Europe, instead discussing a German Confederation (Guyot 1866: 85 – 86) 
separately from Prussia and Austria (Guyot 1866: 89), Guyot did publish a wall 
atlas of Central Europe only four years later (Guyot 1870). Presumably, this 
development was consonant with the pronounced spike in map-printing of 
Central Europe during the Franco-German conflicts at the turn of the 1870s; 
yet, it did not show the same characteristics as British maps (see section 5.1.2). 
It offered a wide continental view stretching from Madrid to St. Petersburg. 
Other cartographic expressions of Central Europe originating in this period in 
the United States are rare - world atlases printed in the United States before 
1900 do not feature Central Europe at all. (Cram 1887, Grant 1887, ELAS 1899)  
While its cartographers largely ignored the term ‘Central Europe’, US academics 
in other relevant disciplines did not share the tendency of their British 
counterparts to gradually focus on German Empire and Austria-Hungary. 
Rather, US authors seemed to perceive a loose identification of Central Europe 
with the mainland of the continent, with France featuring as a prominent 
Central European country. (Cheyney 1907, Schwill 1907)  
 
5.4.2 Central Europe in American political science publications 
Only a handful of works from the turn of the century referred to Central Europe 
in the sense of an alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary.  
                                                 
129
 Indeed, occasional mentions of Central Europe did appear as general and vaguely defined 
geographical description, such as in a work of A. T. Hadley on railroad transport history. (Hadley 
1866) 
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An example was World Politics at the end of the 19th century by Paul S. Reinsch 
(1900), who was Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin. 
Reinsch viewed the idea of “central Europe under the hegemony of Germany” as 
the result of an anticipated future “struggle for existence on the field of 
commerce and industry” (Reinsch 1900: 292). He contextualised the concept 
within the commonly observed tendency towards emergence of ever larger 
political units, such as the British Empire (Reinsch 1900: 293). Reinsch 
concluded that rather than moving towards conflict, Britain and Germany were 
heading for an accommodative relationship since both now had a vested 
interest in the emergence of a global free trade order. (Reinsch 1900: 289) 
Similarly, American reviews of (and responses to) Joseph Partsch’s Central 
Europe were more neutral and much less alarmist than the British ones. Robert 
E. Peary, a polar explorer, praised Partsch’s writing style and evaluated the 
book very positively overall in the Society journal. Unlike his British 
counterparts, Peary did not ponder over the intentions of the writer, but 
focused on his methodology, highlighting Partsch’s geographic determinism 
and his focus on economics, offering a well rounded review of the work itself 
rather than a judgment of the author’ proclivities. (Peary 1903: 418 – 419)  
Yet, coverage of the concept in journals and even the daily media became more 
negative in the run-up to the war. Albert Shaw’s article ‘Progress of the world: 
Militarism in Central Europe’ (1911) pointed to the strategic threat that alliance 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary presented: 
“Germany and Austria-Hungary have become so closely allied as 
to be virtually, for all military purposes, one and indivisible. 
Austria continues to build her Dreadnoughts, and they become 
part of the defensive and offensive force of which Germany is the 
leader.” (Shaw 1911: 28) 
A year later, Homer Lea seemed convinced of the inevitability of conflict 
between Britain and Germany, reasoning that Berlin had not yet realised its 
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destiny ofnational exaltation and was only about to begin such a quest, which 
“must of necessity result in a struggle with the Saxon race”. (Lea 1912: 132 – 
135)  
Finally, the war itself solidified interpretations of Central Europe as embodied 
by the German – Austro-Hungarian alliance, as had been observed in Britain. 
The material existence of the wartime alliance, the influence of British thought 
and writings on the subject, with translations of seminal European works (e.g. 
Naumann 1916, Chéradame 1916) went a long way towards explaining the 
adoption of this interpretation. Appendix 12 shows an example of the 
prevailing  understanding of Central Europe as depicted in Jacob Schapiro’s 
Modern and Contemporary European History (1918), edited by James Shotwell. 
 
5.4.3 Central Europe in the documents of the Inquiry  
Central Europe appears in the correspondence of war-time US policy makers 
(House and Seymour 1921: 3, Seymour 1928: 148 – 149, Lansing 1918a) as well 
as the staff of government departments and special commissions. Most 
remarkable was the frequent use of the expression by members of the Inquiry. 
The Inquiry was an analytical unit, which served as the Presidents personal 
staff preparing materials necessary to support American participation in the 
anticipated peace conference. It was constituted in September 1917 under the 
supervision of Woodrow Wilson’s confidante, Colonel Edward Mandell House. 
In his account of the events of the Paris Peace Conference, House stated that  
“The bulk of the work of The Inquiry dealt with Mittel Europa, 
indeed, with the distracted areas of Central Europe and the Near 
East on either side of the much-heralded Hamburg-Baghdad 
Railway, stretching from the North Sea and the Baltic to the 
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Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean…” (House and Seymour 1921: 
5)130 
This view of what Central Europe meant and where it was headed was also 
projected in the very first document the Inquiry (The Inquiry 1918) submitted 
to President Wilson - this became instrumental in formulation of his Fourteen 
Points speech (Wilson 1918b, Appendix 28). 
In The Inquiry papers Central Europe features interchangeably with Mittel-
Europa (House and Seymour 1921), Middle Europe (Appendix 29) the Mid-
European Economic Union (Kerner 1918d), while Mid-Europe (Kerner 1918c) 
also figures quite frequently, typically in connection with contemplation of 
Germany’s Drang nach Osten (Hershey and Anderson 1918: 124 – 125) and the 
Berlin-Baghdad railway scheme (Beer 1918).  
Interpretations of Central Europe carried in the Inquiry papers were typically 
premised on a re-reading of pan-German writings and interactions with 
opponents of the German – Austro-Hungarian alliance, namely Chéradame 
(Chéradame 1918), Masaryk (1918d, Shotwell 1937: 10 - 11) and Seton-Watson 
(Seton-Watson 1918). It was, in fact Masaryk, who provided the Inquiry with a 
recherche on pan-German literature dealing with Central Europe (Masaryk 
1918d). Those involved in the project observed considerable staffing problems, 
as America lacked experts on the politics of the region and the Inquiry had to 
rely on experts from other fields (such as archaeology) and recent immigrants 
from Europe; the former lacking crucial insights, the latter burdened with 
biases. Reportedly, almost a half of all reports produced by the Inquiry were 
outsourced. (Gefland 1963: 132) 
 
                                                 
130
 This statement perhaps expresses House’s definition of Central Europe better than the bulk of the 
work of the Inquiry, as only about 500 items from total 1200 in the holdings of the Inquiry archives 
deal with areas included in this outline and the work focusing on Latin America was somewhat out of 
proportion to its involvement in the war. (Gefland 1963: 46 and 185) 
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A significant body of reports and memoranda featuring the notion of Central 
Europe in the Inquiry Papers come from the pen of R. J. Kerner, the Inquiry’s 
Austria-Hungary expert. Kerner displayed a strong pro-Slav bias (Kerner 
1918b, 1918c) and passed negative comment on US policy towards the Slavs in 
his reports (Kerner 1918a).131 His portrayal of Mid-Europe (as he preferred to 
term it) was one of a pan-German plan to dominate and destroy Slavs (Kerner 
1918c: 18). 
Kerner presented his ‘nightmare scenario’ of Central Europe in ‘The German 
and Austrian Solutions to the Near Eastern Question’ submitted in March 1918 
(Kerner 1918d). In this document he outlined a German plan to gradually 
dominate Austria-Hungary, Finland, former Baltic provinces of Russia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Yugo-Slav lands and, finally, Russia itself. 
The only obstacles to the “virtually complete domination of Europe” by 
Germany in such aMid-European Economic Union were the Czecho-Slovaks and 
the South Slavs (Kerner 1918d). Kerner considered that the formation of such 
an “economic colossus”   would hold dire consequences for the whole continent 
– Russia would become Central Europe’s economic vassal, Italy also, while 
France would only keep its status due to its colonial empire, but only “in a third 
rate economic position”. (Kerner 1918e: 14) 
Besides Kerner’s memoranda, analogous Inquiry Paper documention projecting 
this particular view of Central Europe – i.e., as a pan-German plot (quoting from 
Chéradame 1916) to dominate Europe – was submitted by representatives of 
the small nations in the United States. Most prominent was the memorandum 
submitted by the Bohemian National Alliance in America, which warned against 
Central Europe and Germany’s Drang nach Osten, somewhat predictably 
suggesting that any resultant “Bohemian-Slovak state [would be]… a strong 
barrier against German aggression” (BNAA 1918).  
                                                 
131
 After the war Masaryk noted the Kerner was working “on our behalf” (Masaryk 1938). 
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After the war, House insisted that “Bohemia was looked upon as a bulwark 
against a resuscitated Germany, which might some time in the future plan a 
new drive to the east” (House and Seymour 1921: 4); however, the actual 
events of the last months of war suggest otherwise. 
 
5.4.4 Preference for the survival of Austria-Hungary 
In fact, Inquiry members could not agree on what to do with Austria-Hungary. 
Rather than opting for dismemberment, even Kerner had called for 
federalisation of Austria-Hungary, as in the self-determination he saw a danger 
(if not a German plot) that the small nations might be drawn into the German 
economic and political orbit under a bracket of Central Europe. (Kerner 1918d: 
10) Seymour preferred trialism and the overall lack of consensus resulted in 
the Inquiry operating with a set of scenarios for Austria-Hungary rather than 
any concrete policy preferences (Gefland 1963: 200 – 203). 
Yet, this was not because US policy makers somehow failed to understand the 
dangers of Central Europe portrayed by Masaryk and other small nation 
representatives (e.g. Dmowski 1917, LLCR 1918), quite the contrary: Wilson, 
House and his Inquiry were convinced that an eastwards expansion built on the 
foundations of pan-German Central Europe plans was exactly what Germany 
was after (Wilson 1917b). House informed Wilson as early as February 1916 
that Frederic C. Penfield had (US ambassador to Austria-Hungary) 
“…confirmed our belief that Austria-Hungary and Turkey are now 
but little more than provinces of Germany. The Central Empire 
runs from the Baltic to the Dardanelles and beyond.” (House 
1916) 
Some core members of the Inquiry were well vested in the idea of Central 
Europe, too; Isaiah Bowman, one of the key members of the committee, was a 
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Ratzel enthusiast and for a period of time served as an assistant to Albrecht 
Penck. (Martin 1980: 12 –13)  
Indeed, the first draft memorandum of the Inquiry submitted to the President 
started with a detailed analysis of how Germany had already created a Berlin-
Baghdad axis, which would eventually – if successful – make it the master of 
Europe and Asia. However, measures to counter this situation – deemed as 
dangerous to the interests of the USA – did not focus on carving independent 
states out of Austria-Hungary. Instead, the recommendation was for the control 
of both ends of the axis by friendly powers, neutralisation of the Turkish Straits 
and increased democratization of Germany. As far as Austria-Hungary was 
concerned, the draft recommended its federalisation and extrication from 
German domination. (The Inquiry 1918) The memorandum was delivered to 
Wilson by House on 4 January 1918, and the two individuals spent the 
following two days hammering out the President’s famous 14-points speech. 
(Hodgson 2008) 
Wilson’s speech differed from the Inquiry’s recommendations on several counts 
(compare The Inquiry 1918, Wilson 1918; also see Gefland 1963: 134 – 148) 
and did not mention Central Europe or Berlin-Baghdad axis; yet we know the 
Inquiry’s draft was considered, as Wilson personally asked for it (Mamatey 
1957: 173) and added notes to the margins of the document, reformulating its 
recommendations (Gefland 1963: 139). At odds with what is often maintained 
(e. g. Chicago Tribune 1918, or Hacohen 2002), Wilson did not champion the 
independence of small nations in his speech. While he did call for a unified 
Poland (which was also a plan of German and Austria-Hungary) and evacuation 
of Belgium, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, with regards of “the peoples of 
Austria-Hungary” he suggested only that they “should be accorded the freest 
opportunity to autonomous development” (Wilson 1918: 15).  
If the Masaryk group was bitterly disappointed, the fact remains that Wilson 
actually gave Austria-Hungary assurances against dismemberment (Wilson 
1917a, Page 1917) and expressed his approval that Britain had also delivered 
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similar assurances during the Smuts mission only days before his speech (Lloyd 
George 1937: 26, Lloyd George 1918b, Unterberger 2000: 91). This was to 
remain the President’s position until the summer of 1918. 
Masaryk had to face down Wilson’s rebuff in May 1918, despite the fact that the 
meeting was arranged by Richard Crane132 assistant of the Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing. Let alone Masaryk’s propaganda based on othering from 
Central Europe, Wilson was not even convinced by the reports he had received 
from his own officials. The US liaison officers (e.g. Frasier 1918) and 
ambassadors (Page 1918, Stovall 1918) lobbied for official US recognition of the 
CNC as a provisional government of the future Czechoslovakia, reporting on the 
impact of small nation propaganda and forces on the course of war, or the role 
of Czech forces in Siberia. USA only recognized CNC on 3 September (Lansing 
1918b), following recognition by Britain. While the later peace note response to 
Austria-Hungary demanded independence for its nationalities (Appendix 30), 
Wilson’s policy preference remained on the side of regional federation rather 
than realisation of new independent states. 
 
5.4.5 The Mid-European Union 
The staff of the Inquiry, like Colonel House (and, for that matter, Wilson 
himself) feared for the survival of a group of small independent nation states 
and feared a ‘Balkanization’ of Central Europe (Coolidge 1919, Heffernan 1999). 
Their concerns and preference for federation in the region motivated national 
leaders to acquiesce to the idea of a new multinational unit, provided they were 
first guaranteed independence (Masaryk 1918c). In late 1918, Masaryk wrote 
to Beneš: 
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 Richard Crane was a son of Charles Crane - American industrialist, sponsor and friend of 
President Wilson -. who was Masaryk’s admirer. Richard’s sister, Frances, married Masaryk’s son 
Jan, future foreign minister of Czechoslovakia. Charles Crane also lobbied president in Masaryk’s 
favour; however, Wilson twice refused to see Masaryk, after reading his memorandum on Russia, 
which apparently displeased him. (Kalina 1982) 
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“House je v srdci pacifista, ale pochopil náš program a akceptoval. 
…má zájem v Mid-European Union: rozbití Rakouska je jim jen 
negace, žádají pozitivní konstrukci.” (Masaryk 1918b)133 
The ‘positive construction’, as phrased by Masaryk, should have been the Mid-
European Union, a regional structure that would become a “wall of free peoples 
against the German Drang nach Osten” (NY Times 1918). The project, which 
was intended to bring about a regional federation of small peoples, was 
supported by House, the Inquiry and the Committee on Public Information – the 
official US agency for wartime propaganda – and launched in September 1918, 
bringing together representatives of 12 different nations. The idea was hailed 
by the press as “a Safe Mitteleuropa… instead of the grandiose, imperialistic and 
predatory Mitteleuropa of which the two Kaisers dreamed” (Philadelphia Public 
Ledger 1918). However, the venture was in fact stillborn. 
At its first meeting in September 1918134, the objective of the union was 
formulated as  
“a united front against the Central Empires, application of the 
doctrine of self-determination, the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary, and a Mid-European federation of nationalities.” (Miller 
1918) 
However, only a month later, on 26 October, the Declaration of Common Aims of 
the Mid-European Nations signed at a rather pompous inaugural event at the 
Independence Hall in Philadelphia called only for self-determination and 
merely pledged coordinated efforts to safeguard liberty (Mid-European Union 
1918). The very use of the word ‘Mid-European’ met with resistance of some 
delegates (May 1957) and the idea of federation was watered down into article 
5, which stated: 
                                                 
133
 - House, in his heart, is a pacifist, but he understood our program and accepted it… he is interested 
in Mid-European Union: the dismemberment of Austria is just a destruction for them, they demand 
positive construction. -  
134
 Only two days after US recognition of CNC, supporting the thesis that the recognition and promise 
of creation of a regional federation were in fact linked. 
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“…we believe our peoples having kindred ideals and purposes 
should co-ordinate their efforts to insure the liberties of their 
individual nations for the furtherance of their common welfare, 
provided such a union contributes to the peace and welfare of the 
world.” (Mid-European Union 1918) 
Pushed by the US government as an outside actor, the whole venture only 
enlisted a half-hearted commitment on the part of nations that were supposed 
to partake centrally within it. The project soon fell apart owing to the ongoing 
clashes between individual national representatives (Masaryk 1938: 289) 
Yet, the US government remained concerned over the viability of the new 
successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and especially the much 
territorially-reduced Austria. The possibilities for a   ‘Danubian Federation’ 
(Coolidge 1918) were explored once again in late 1918, but unavailingly, owing 
to the opposition of the former small nations of the dual monarchy (House and 
Seymour 1921: 90). 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
This chapter documented conceptualisation of Central Europe from outside, as 
the Other, so to speak. Despite the substantial influence that this essentially 
negative and defensively-conceived concept had on the minds of policy makers, 
Masaryk’s ultimate failure suggests only a very limited impact of the notion on 
actual structure. Yet, the US effort to establish a ‘Mid-European’ union in the 
aftermath of the break-up of the Dual Monarchy suggests that policy makers 
may have had the ambition to bring territorial constructs (however theoretical) 
to fruition. In this case, such efforts were frustrated by contradictory realities 
on the ground. Yet again, the notion had failed to change the world map. 
In the Anglo-Saxon environment, original conceptions of Central Europe were 
few and far between -their definition and cartographic depictions differed from 
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one another quite widely. In Britain, the notion started to coagulate into 
shorthand for Germany and Austria-Hungary considerably earlier than was the 
case in the United States, clearly evident in cartographic works. Publication of 
Partch’s Central Europe (Partsch 1903) introduced into the British environment 
a pan-German interpretation of the notion as a region to be ‘naturally’ 
dominated by Germans. Policy circles started to take note of the notion in 
similar vein by 1906, with reports of growing ideological support for the pan-
German movement. While seminal points of departure in the USA are not as 
clear as they were in Britain, the same interpretation of Central Europe seems 
to only have settled upon during the war, despite the fact that it had been 
visible in American writing from the beginning of the century (Reinsch 1900). 
The evidence of the German role in Anglo-Saxon policy makers, academics and 
journalists arriving at an understanding of Central Europe comes in  their 
frequent parallel use of the German term Mitteleuropa in  English language 
texts. 
In both environments, a negative view of the notion gradually developed as it 
was considered a challenge to the interests of both the British Empire and the 
United States. This threat perception was built on the presumption that the 
notion served as a political plan to form a strong continental base for wider 
German expansion, loosely defined as a march to the east (Drang nach Osten). 
The ultimate strategic concern of both was the envisaged plan of Germany to 
expand its influence along the so called Berlin-Baghdad axis. 
Yet, despite the fact that concern over Central Europe was pronounced in both 
countries, Masaryk’s strategy of portraying the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary as the only way to prevent its rise did not really work. None of the 
allied powers was that keen on breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire135. 
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 In France, Beneš’s work was aided by the fact that the French public was familiar with the 
idea of small nations as an ally in their anti-German fight through works of Andre Chéradame 
and other publicists (Abrams 1944: 189, Lefranc 1898, Chéradame 1900, Henry 1900) and the 
French government was eager to enlist émigré Czechs and Slovaks to foster her ranks at the 
front. (Unterberger 2000: 62) Negotiations for recognition of supreme authority of the CNC 
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Their preferred tactic was to detach Austria-Hungary from Germany, federalise 
it to increase the influence of the Slav element and turn it into a counter-weight 
for Germany in the region. In fact, they feared the break-up of the empire fresh 
in the memory of recent destabilisation of the Balkans in the wake of Ottoman 
decline. ‘Balkanisation’ and the ultimate demise of small nation states in the 
face of Germany was the envisaged risk if Austria-Hungary unravelled.  
To sum up, both British and American policy makers preferred to resolve the 
dilemma of Central Europe within the established framework of balance of 
power equations within the European continent. Even after the collapse of the 
dual monarchy, officials in both governments sought to federalise the successor 
states, but these initiatives failed due to the opposition of the newly 
independent nations. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
over Czech and Slovak soldiers were open as early as spring 1917. A letter intercepted by the 
British intelligence services suggests that this step was motivated by the fact that CNC offered 
the French government 40.000 men strong fighting power in summer 1916. (Masaryk 
1916a)Yet, at the same time the French government, just like the British and the American one, 
was in secret talks with the Austrian Emperor on the possibility of separate peace. This would 
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Chapter 6: Variations in Time and Space 
 
 
6.1 The story of Central Europe 
The chapter argues strongly that the processes identified in the core research 
were not accidental - they repeated themselves regularly as the notion of 
Central Europe was redefined in subsequent historical periods. The last decade 
of the twentieth century is highlighted as the key episode, which shows 
potential signs of indirect impact of Central Europe on the changes in 
international structure.  
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to outline the development of 
discourses over Central Europe from the Paris Peace Conference until the 
present day, in order to map the usage of the notion, patterns in its employment 
and their recurrence throughout the twentieth century and beyond. Themes 
established in the core research period – the “narrative of the middle” (Bugge 
1999), attempts to substantiate envisaged regional identity, the problem of 
inclusion or exclusion of Germany – will be followed through subsequent eras. 
The chapter will trace the fortunes of Central Europe as a deployed construct in 
the revisionist aims of various interest groups. Emphasis will be laid upon 
identifying the mechanisms of how and why definitions of Central Europe 
harnessed the support or opposition of various actors and in highlighting the 
resulting implications. The intent here is to introduce the reader to complexity 
of Central European discourse and to identify its operation at various levels.  
At the end of the First World War Central Europe was a notion closely 
associated with the shattered plans for union between Germany and Austria-
Hungary. The Paris Peace Conference confirmed the sovereignty of the 
nationally-defined successor states that would replace the dismembered 
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Austro-Hungarian Empire. But the solution would soon be proven far from ideal 
– instability, national tensions and economic impoverishment plagued the 
region, and caused many to think of alternatives. The erratic interwar period 
gave rise to a multitude of new conceptions for multinational union in the area, 
springing from the most diverse sources. Notion of Danubian Federation 
appeared as a competing term developed by authors wishing to leave Germany 
out of their framework. However, newly independent successor states resisted 
any real efforts for their integration despite growing indications that they might 
not be able to safeguard their ‘armed national sovereignties’. Indeed, the 
consolidation of Germany in the mid-1920s brought with it a new wave of 
theorizing Central Europe along earlier lines – consisting of Germany and 
successor states to Austria-Hungary. But with the hardening of German national 
ambitions in the early 1930s, the original concept was being moulded into an 
ever-more pronounced program for domination of the area by the German 
nation. This tendency continued until a term better suited for such a purpose 
was introduced – the Reich. 
The beginning of the Second World War brought a virtual U-turn to theorising 
of Central Europe in many aspects. Treated as a mere tool of propaganda in 
Nazi Germany, Central Europe had ceased to be the primary term associated 
with German expansionism, replaced with the term Reich. Exiled leaders of the 
successor states, now finally convinced of the need for a stronger multinational 
union to counter the German threat, were thus free to develop the notion to 
denote their own plans of federalisation of a strip of countries between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Encouraged and supported by the British and 
the US governments, they signed a series of treaties establishing the basis of 
future union and worked towards their implementation. However, power 
politics took precedence over promises extended to exiled successor states 
politicians and the Western Allies yielded influence over Central Europe to the 
Soviets. This decision dealt a devastating blow to any plans for federation in the 
area, as the Soviet leadership was fiercely opposed to any integration that 
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might strengthen its new satellites. When Yugoslav plans for a Balkan 
federation surfaced in 1948, the reprisals were fierce and uncompromising.  
In the early Cold War period, some émigré thinkers living in the West presented 
plans for neutralisation of an area to buffer the spread of Communism – in line 
with the geopolitically substantiated paranoia of the time. However, the 
Western allies were not willing to risk yet another war over Central Europe and 
this new vision failed to gather substantial support. For over three decades, 
Central Europe was not talked about, save for some émigré theorists returning 
to the interwar discourse themes, since the division of Europe into the East and 
West made it redundant. 
However, Central Europe made a surprise comeback in the 1980s. But the form 
in which it re-emerged seemed far removed from the Central Europe of earlier 
periods. In contrast to previous territorially defined political projects, Central 
Europe of the 1980s was an abstract, culturally defined conception. Formulated 
and promoted by dissidents of the Eastern Bloc, Central Europe was a spiritual 
escape, an antithesis of authoritarian regimes, a negation of the Eastern-ness 
ascribed to their countries. Idealised Austro-Hungarian past was invoked as a 
model of cosmopolitan culture and associated with all that was supposedly 
Central European – artistic creativity, cultural uniqueness, humanistic values, 
etc. Such a definition of Central Europe was enthusiastically embraced by 
Western audience attuned to grievances of Eastern dissidents. Central Europe 
became an intellectual project for those, who wished the Iron Curtain to 
disappear. 
And disappear it did. From the moment the Berlin Wall was torn down, an 
imaginary mythical Central Europe came to being in the eyes of its 1980s 
constructers. It became a narrative of cultural approximation to the West, a 
means of othering from the East European past. As grand geopolitical theories 
assigned the region to German sphere of influence in the post-Cold War period, 
Central Europe was on its way to become part of the West. Central Europe 
became principally used in the context of European integration and associated 
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with the group of countries that were on the right track to achieve speedy 
inclusion into Western economic and security structures. In this context, the 
notion became a tautology in itself. Central European countries were on their 
way to become members of the EU and NATO and countries on their way to 
become members of the EU and NATO were Central European. Indeed, since the 
bulk of post-Communist countries joined the NATO and the EU, the frequency of 
the use of the notion substantially declined. It seems like once again, Central 
Europe has been made partially redundant by its inclusion, this time into the 
West. 
The story documents the fine shape-shifting qualities of Central Europe. Its 
boundaries have been fluid – sometimes including Germany, sometimes not, 
sometimes stretching from Estonia to Greece, sometimes limited to Germany 
and Austria. Its opponents in one period changed into its primary proponents in 
the other. One day it was on the top of the strategic agenda and the next it was 
deemed irrelevant. What was the root cause of these erratic changes? In line 
with the suggested hypothesis, the chapter searches for answers by looking at 
the identities and interests of those who took part in the discourses over 
Central Europe, the character and contents of their concepts, and the change 
these brought to the substance of the notion. It looks into how some concepts 
gained more decisive influence than others and asks why. It analyses the 
contemporary international context, interests and behaviour of relevant actors 
on the international scene, and the influence the notion of Central Europe 
exercised upon them.  
To foreshadow the tale told on the following pages, a comparison between 
interwar and Second World War notions of Central Europe is the most 
revealing. The interwar period witnessed gradually emerging monopoly of the 
notion concentrated in the hands of writers belonging to Haushofer’s Geopolitik 
school whose interests were moulded by the evolving ambitions of Germany. 
The Second World War witnessed a handover of the discourse to exiled political 
leaders of successor states, with – fairly obviously, their interests completely 
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opposed to the first group. The influence this handover exercised on the 
character of conceptions of Central Europe was profound. While in the 1930s, 
the Central European discourse subsumed a multitude of theoretical schemes 
envisaging German domination of the territories of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire so as to realize their true potential as a major power; the 
writing of the next decade focused on discussion of concrete projects of (con-
)federation of the strip of nations running north to south between Germany and 
Russia, so as to safeguard them from the threat presented by both and ensure 
their economic prosperity. The differences in concepts that constituted the 
main body of the discourse of Central Europe thus shifted the very substance of 
the notion in terms of geographical location, purpose and character.  
Similar comparisons can be drawn for all subsequent periods discussed in the 
chapter. Moreover, implications of these divergent meanings of the notion 
resulted in differing influences being exercised upon the behaviour of various 
decision makers, whether they were aligned with their interests or not. The 
1930s concepts were thoroughly exploited by the Nazi government for 
purposes of justification of German expansionist ambitions, while being 
vigorously opposed by the leaders of successor states. On the other hand, in the 
1940s, the exiled leaders of successor states took an active part in 
reformulating the meaning of the notion and laid the legal foundations of the 
future Central European (con-)federation through international treaties. The 
governments of Great Britain and the United States provided material help for 
the groundwork conducted by representatives of exiled governments as they 
perceived the plan as furthering their own interests in preventing any future 
rise of Germany. However, the project went contrary to the power ambitions of 
the Soviet leadership, who opposed the potential construction of a strong 
political unit within what it already perceived as its own emergent sphere of 
influence. The great lengths to which the Soviet leaders went to succeed in 
preventing Central European federation from realisation is thoroughly 
documented in the chapter. Deprived of strength in numbers, nations planning 
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a common Central European state would remain divided and firmly anchored 
within the Soviet orbit for decades to come. 
The discussion in this chapter will trace many other similar examples. Our aim 
here is to show how and why the notion of Central Europe was changing 
throughout the twentieth century and beyond, and what the implications of 
these changes were. 
6.2 Interwar discourse of Central Europe 
The trenches of rural France were not the only place were the First World War 
was fought. For numerous nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
battle for their future was also fought in the pages of books and journals, where 
various concepts of post-war political organization of the region were being put 
forward. They fought against the idea of Mitteleuropa136, the German blueprint 
for unifying the territories of Germany and Austria-Hungary under a single flag. 
Its foremost war-time proponent, Friedrich Naumann, presented it as a 
federative plan of unification. (Naumann 1916) But for the resistance of the 
small nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Mitteleuropa would have been a 
synonym for plans to impose even heavier domination of Germans in the area. 
Independent nation states based on the principle of self-determination were 
the vision of post-war Europe that small nations of Austria-Hungary fought for 
in the corridors of power in London, Paris and Washington. 
The Central Powers were defeated and so was the idea of Mitteleuropa. Instead 
of a multinational union, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was broken up into 
smaller nation states. Or so it would seem. However, Austria was established as 
an independent nation state separate from Germany and four-and-a-half 
million Hungarians found themselves living outside of Hungary. The feeling of 
differential treatment on the part of the nations of former Austria-Hungary was 
aggravated by a disproportional division of economic resources, again, to a 
significant disadvantage of Austria and Hungary. Mutual suspicion and 
                                                 
136
 Literally translated as Central Europe 
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resentment was pervasive among the successor states. Hungary was left 
internally unstable and Austria impoverished, Czechoslovakia jealously 
guarded its “armed national sovereignty”, while an enlarged Romania was 
struggling with internal integration.  
A multitude of problems and their pervasive character soon began to challenge 
the wisdom of the nation state system in the area and projects for federation in 
Central Europe were soon back on the table.  
 
6.2.1 Disenchantment of interwar years 
The term Central Europe was used by British and American authors of the early 
interwar period as a short-hand for the successor states of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. It appeared in the works of Malbone W. Graham (1924), 
Kenneth L. Roberts (1922), Leslie H. Guest (1921), George A. Schreiner (1920), 
Pantcho Doreff (1921) and many others.137 However, new conceptions of 
Central Europe comparable to Mackinder’s Middle Tier (Mackinder 1919) were 
not presented. The main feature of their writing was the description of changes 
established by the Paris Peace Conference and their apparently grave shortfalls. 
The creation of small isolationist nation states was blamed for a deterioration 
of the economic situation and persisting instability in the region. Central 
Europe was also becoming a synonym for post-war chaos, impoverishment and 
continuous petty clashes between the nascent nation states in the area. Many 
authors called for revision of the settlement and increased cooperation among 
successor states, but stopped short of suggesting a more concrete form for such 
cooperation. 
A general disenchantment with the situation following the break-up of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire was pervasive in the international community. 
                                                 
137
 In the case of Schreiner and Doreff, the use of the notion of Central Europe is slightly inconsistent 
at some places; however, in general, they do equate it with the former territories of Austria-Hungary, 
sometimes including the Balkan states as well. 
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(Steiner 2005: 289) The United States entered into self-imposed isolationism 
and avoided entanglement in the complicated situation in post-First World War 
Europe. On the other hand, in Britain, interest in the fate of former Austria-
Hungary was somewhat more lively. However, majority of observers presented 
a rather grim view of the situation in the area in the aftermath of the empire’s 
break-up. The most colourful representation of a condemnatory view of the 
dismemberment and its implications came from the pen of British journalist 
and war correspondent, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett.  
Ashmead-Bartlett also identified Central Europe with the former territories of 
Austria-Hungary. He voiced his experiences and observations of nationalist 
tensions and economic chaos in the area in no uncertain terms. The title of his 
book The Tragedy of Central Europe (Ashmead-Bartlett 1923) suggested a thing 
or two about its contents and the views presented. In several places within the 
book he openly wrote that the dismemberment of the empire was  
“a mistake… committed in an atmosphere of hate before the 
violent passions produced by the War had cooled down and 
before economic facts could be considered dispassionately and 
separated from the primitive instincts of revenge.” (Ashmead-
Bartlett 1923: 295)  
Ashmead-Bartlett identified the discrepancy in the division of economic 
resources and capacities, as well as dissection of vital economic links, as roots 
of the desperate impoverishment of Austria and Hungary. He warned that 
widening the economic gap between the successor states would fuel hatred 
among the nations in the area, resulting eventually in further conflict. Even 
though his statements are sometimes confusing and contradictory138, his 
conclusions were surprisingly close to what was to transpire some fifteen years 
later. Quite aptly, Ashmead-Bartlett highlighted the pattern and eastward 
                                                 
138
 For example, on page 300 Ashmead-Bartlett wrote that “each State has, in fact become a water-
tight compartment of racial hate and economic ruin and chaos” (Ashmead-Bartlett 1923: 300), while 
he devoted several pages directly preceding this line to description of Czechoslovak economic 
prosperity and monetary soundness. 
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direction of German territorial ambitions and the mortal danger it presented to 
both Czechoslovakia and Poland. (Ashmead-Bartlett 1923: 306 and 310) He 
posited that as soon as Germany would emerge from its economic ruins, 
millions of Germans in Czechoslovakia would strive to be “restored to the 
Motherland”. (Ashmead-Bartlett 1923: 296) Austria, well beyond the economic 
point of no return in his view, had to be either incorporated into Germany or 
further subdivided among the surrounding states, “if she [was] to save her 
people from complete ruin”. (Ashmead-Bartlet 1923: 294) Yet of Hungarians he 
said that they would “never [to] rest until they have regained some portion of 
their lost territories and wealth, which have been filched by their neighbours”. 
(Ashmead-Bartlet 1923: 294)  
In short, Ashmead-Bartlett thought that the dismemberment of Austria-
Hungary was ill-conceived and a grave danger to the European peace. He called 
for revision of the settlement in order to avoid otherwise inevitable future 
conflicts. (Ashmead-Bartlett 1923: 294, 306 and 307) In early 1920s, this was 
the view held by many at the Foreign Office as well.  
 
The fortunes and political career of the foremost of British analysts of Central 
Europe, Robert W. Seton-Watson, document the change of heart in official 
circles in the early 1920s. Seton-Watson was a vigorous champion of the cause 
of the small nations of former Austria-Hungary and a resident expert in the 
British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Unlike Ashmead-Bartlett, 
Seton-Watson opposed any calls for the revision of borders of successor states. 
With rising concerns about the viability of the settlement established in the 
aftermath of the war, his standing with the British Government diminished 
dramatically. His lenient view of especially Czechs and Romanians caused much 
damage to his prestige as a foremost expert on the area. (Batonyi 1999: 1085 - 
86) Even though he did return to active work within Foreign Office between 
1939 and 1942, his influence on policy was limited due to a lack of access to 
decision makers. 
 249 
Halford Mackinder’s career followed a similar path. His impact on the foreign 
policy of Great Britain in the interwar period was limited (Ó Tuathail, Dalby and 
Routledge 1998: 18), going little beyond his official duties as chairman of the 
Imperial Shipping Committee and short service as a privy councillor. (Blouet 
1987: 182) Richard Grayson demonstrated that Britain’s cold relationship with 
the Soviet Union was based on mutual distrust and occasional clashes in the 
19th century, rather than Mackinder’s interpretation of history. (Grayson 1997: 
253 – 256) Moreover, the British government showed a growing preference for 
disengagement with continental affairs and an appeasement policy towards 
Germany (Mc Donough 1998: 19), seemingly rendering Mackinder’s 
confrontational concept redundant. Finally, the negative implications of the 
break-up of the Dual Monarchy contributed to the discreditation of Mackinder’s 
Middle Tier concept. In fact, the records of the Foreign Office from the early 
interwar period suggest that the British Government was inclined to encourage 
formation of regional union in Central Europe (Medlicott 1981: x, compare to 
sections 5.2.8 and 5.2.9) in direct contradiction to Mackinder’s 1919 treatise.  
 
Records in the National Archives in Kew show considerable Foreign Office 
preoccupation with issues surrounding the successor states of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in the years following the Paris Peace Conference. The main 
concern in the early interwar period seems to have been the complicated 
economic and political situation in Austria, to which much of the recorded 
communication was tied. Contemplation of the potential consequences of a 
possible Anschluss (Lindley 1921a and 1921b) were intertwined with problems 
of release of Austrian property, held as a lien for war reparations, to facilitate 
economic revival (Foreign Office 1921, Treasury 1921) and efforts to help 
Austria obtain loans from private sources. (Geddes 1921, Curzon 1921, Balfour 
1921) Two unsuccessful attempts to restore the Habsburgs in Hungary (Hohler 
1921a and 1921b), controversy over the Western Comitats and the Baranya 
handover, formation of the Little Entente and its occasional sabre rattling at 
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Hungary (Clerk 1921a and 1921b) provided further themes that kept telegraph 
lines to Foreign Office hot in what was evidently an uneasy year the 1921. 
Overall, the Foreign Office was greatly concerned about nationalist tensions, 
economic situation and general instability in the area, all brought about by the 
dismemberment of the former empire. 
The favoured policy of the British Empire was to decrease the obstacles to 
international trade projection in the area, thus fostering economic recovery and 
stabilising the region. (Chamberlain 1925) However, isolationism, nationalist 
rivalries, occasional skirmishes and internal instability of many successor states 
hampered any such efforts. Some sources suggested that in the midst of serious 
economic problems, persisting national tensions and the petty rivalries of 
successor states, the British Government started to favour the creation of a 
federative union of states in the Danube basin under the leadership of Prague. 
However, Czechoslovakia was judged incapable of constituting and leading such 
a bloc due to prevalent anti-Hungarian sentiments there. (Steiner 2005: 289) 
The impression left by the recorded communication between the Foreign Office 
and its representatives, is that of diminishing patience of the British 
government with the leaders of the successor states and their turf wars. Indeed, 
Britain was increasingly avoiding direct involvement in endless disputes of the 
successor states and favoured dealing with their problems through Allied 
institutions and the League of Nations itself.  
The controversy of the French-sponsored Autonomous Government of the 
Palatinate in 1924 marked a watershed in the main themes of the Foreign Office 
records. The attention of foreign policy makers turned almost exclusively 
towards Germany. The Locarno Treaty and issue of terminating military control 
of Germany dominate the bulk of the European records of the Foreign Office for 
the years 1925 and 1926 respectively. It seemed that His Majesty’s Government 
lost all enthusiasm for attempting to resolve the issues of successor states. 
Finally, in 1927, the main concern of the British government shifted back to the 
larger picture of security within Europe and tensions between the main powers. 
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Internal discourse within the Foreign Office was dominated by considerations 
of developments in Germany and her relations with other powers from 1927 
until the Second World War. Central Europe only resurfaced as a major theme 
of British foreign policy concerns with the Anschluss in 1938. 
 
To sum up, the system of nation states put in place of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire that was favoured by Mackinder and Seton-Watson fell into 
disfavour within official circles in Britain soon after the shortfalls of the 
settlement started to show. Considerations of Central Europe published in the 
early interwar period highlighted an unjust division of economic resources and 
industry among the successor states based on national principle, the negative 
impact of severing vital economic links between former parts of the empire, 
persisting nationalist tensions and the instability of nascent successor states. 
But these considerations did not result into new coherent plans for the 
reorganisation of Central Europe. Even though Mackinder and Seton-Watson 
remained influential in academic circles and within the anti-appeasement camp 
(Batonyi 1999: 1085 - 86), official circles started to favour creation of some 
form of federative unit in the area. However, these contemplations were 
frustrated by the growing differences between the successor states themselves. 
The British government preferred to distance itself from this issue in favour of 
the more pressing need to stabilise Germany and security in Europe. The events 
of the interwar period convinced many in Britain that the nation state solution 
was not suitable for Central Europe. As was to be seen, it would also fail to 
prevent resurgence of Germany and its alliance with Russia. 
 
6.2.2 Changing face of new Mitteleuropa 
Henry Cord Mayer noted that in the early post-First World War period “the 
term Mitteleuropa for a time lost its broader emotional appeal” in Germany 
(Meyer 1946: 189). This was hardly surprising for Germany was humiliated, 
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devastated and impoverished. Contemplations of the creation of a regional unit 
headed by Germany could not have been seriously undertaken until the 
country’s situation could be at least stabilised. As a result, the forging and 
prioritisation of the discourse of Central Europe and its prominence in the 
foreign policy debates in Germany resembles an inversion of the image just 
painted for interwar Britain. In a see-saw like manner, with the diminishing 
interest of Britain in successor states, contemplations of Central Europe started 
to reappear in Germany.  
This process is demonstrable in the numerous concepts of Central Europe 
published in Karl Haushofer’s Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (Journal for Geopolitics) 
during the interwar period.139 The journal was published for the first time in 
1924, the year that British foreign policy makers started to lose interest in 
Central European issues and projects. The ascendancy of revisionist writers 
bent on the creation of a German-dominated political unit in Central Europe 
was epitomised by Martin Spahn’s famous Volk und Reich in 1925. The new 
project of Mitteleuropa was conceived of as a way to reinstate Germany to its 
major power position through the unification of Germany and the former 
Austro-Hungarian territories. 
 
6.2.2.1 The way out of strategic defeat 
The new contemplations of Mitteleuropa in Germany were conceived of as a 
way out of the strategic catastrophe suffered by Germany in the First World 
War.  
                                                 
139
 Of course, the discussion of Central Europe in Germany was not limited to this journal. Notable 
works on the topic were published in other journals and as independent volumes. However, the 
Zeitschrift für Geopolitik offers the most concise discussion and high number of various concepts of 
Central Europe, allowing the comparison and analysis of development of the discourse across the 
interwar period. Moreover, the comparison of the list of authors publishing their concepts of Central 
Europe in and outside of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik shows high level of similarity. This suggests 
that notable authors writing on Central Europe outside Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, would have been 
invited to present their views in journal, as it was the leading medium carrying the discussion of the 
topic. 
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The debate started with broad contemplation of the results of the First World 
War and discussion of the standing of Germany in the emerging new European 
economic and power structure. This discussion established the building blocs of 
subsequent conceptions of Mitteleuropa. Some of these themes were 
foreshadowed by Walther Vogel in the following paragraph: 
“Die durch die Versailler Friedenserpressung hergestellte 
Internationalisierung der deutschen Flüsse speziell des Rheins, ist 
in der bisherigen Form auf die Dauer unhaltbar. Frankreich is am 
Rhein ein Fremdkörper, weil es … naturgemäss der 
Rheinschiffarhrt durchaus abträgliche Absichten verfolgen muss. 
Anderseits hat sich an der Donau gerade nach dem Verschwinden 
der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie die relative 
Lebensberechtigung dieses Staatswesens deutlich gezeigt. Die 
Donau-Uferstaaten werden im eigenen wohl verstandenen 
Interesse nicht dauernd im Zustand gegenseitiger argwöhnischer 
Missgunst verharren können. Ihre volle geopolitische Potenz aber 
werden Rhein und Donau erst dann entfalten, wenn sie einmal 
durch einen leistungsfähigen Kanal miteinander verbunden 
sind…”140 (Vogel 1924: 144) 
This paragraph essentially encompassed the idea of Central Europe that would 
be presented in following volumes of Zeitschift für Geopolitik. The unjust and 
unsustainable Versailles settlement had to be countered by the construction of 
a strong organic political unit in Central Europe. Defined by features of natural 
or human geography, the new Mitteleuropa would consist of Germany and the 
                                                 
140
  - The internationalization of German rivers, especially the Rhine, imposed by the blackmail of the 
Versailles Peace, is in its present form unsustainable for long. France is a foreign body on the Rhine 
and it must naturally pursue intentions harmful to navigation on the Rhine. On the other hand, the 
relative right to life of this state entity on the Danube was clearly demonstrated right after the 
disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In their own best interest, the states on the banks 
of Danube cannot permanently remain in the state of mutual suspicious resentment. The full 
geopolitical power of Rhine and Danube will only develop once they have been connected by an 
effective channel... - 
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territories of the former Austria-Hungary, and become a major power in world 
politics.  
The backdrop to all contemplation was the perceived injustice and shortfalls of 
the Paris Peace Accords. Authors pointed to the injustice done to Germany by 
the harsh conditions of peace and the unsustainability of successor states 
created in the space of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bitterness towards 
France became an omnipresent feature. Authors would usually follow with 
considerations of economic chaos after the war and the dismemberment of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, leading to suggestions for a larger economic area 
based on traditional economic links. The historical role of German nation to 
create and lead such a unit would be asserted and the connection with Austrian 
Germans emphasised. Finally, the theories would be based upon and 
underpinned by tenets of geographic determinism and the organic theory of 
state.  
 
Vogel’s article laid ground for all features of German interwar Mitteleuropa 
concepts, with the exceptions of contemplations of economy and the historical 
role of the German nation. It should not be forgotten that at the very heart of all 
concepts of Mitteleuropa laid the aim of reinstating Germany as a major power. 
Therefore, the concepts and their main themes were continually developing 
with the changing situation in Germany as well as perceived international 
context. The outlined themes best played out and were developed in works 
published in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. 
 
6.2.2.2 Geographic determinism 
Geographic determinism is not to be unexpected in a journal entitled Zeitschift 
für Geopolitik, as it was one of the very building blocs of German geopolitics. 
(see section 1.1.5) Vogel’s article presented the Rhine and Danube as the life 
veins of a Central European region, the German nation and its areas of 
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influence. Should these two rivers and their respective areas be interconnected 
and governed by the same political entity, they would constitute a major power 
in Europe stretching from the North to the Black sea. Similar lines of reasoning 
based on another geographical feature, the Danube basin, and its central role as 
the natural core of economic cooperation was used by Friedrich Papenhusen to 
justify the suggested union with Austria and close economic cooperation with 
the successor states. (Papenhusen 1927)141 Essentially, in the late 1920s, 
geographic determinism was used to pinpoint the constitutive features of 
Mitteleuropa and establish it as an area of ‘natural’ unification. Certain 
geographic features – rivers, basins and areas surrounded by given mountain 
chains – were said to be ‘destined’ for political unification. 
However, by the 1930s, the employment of geographical determinism was 
changing. It was primarily being applied in contemplation of the strategic 
position of Germany. Gradually, it was becoming more aggressive in tone, 
finally taking a militant spin following the ascendancy of Nazism. Published 
articles carrying titles such as “Der Raum als Waffe” (- Space as a weapon – 
Schenke 1938) or “Fromme Wünsche… Die slawische Idee der Absperrung des 
Deutschtums vom Osten” ( - Wishful thinking… the Slavic idea of blockading 
Germanhood from the East – Haushofer 1933). This pattern was to a certain 
degree developing in earlier articles as well, but only reached prominence 
within conceptions of Mitteleuropa after 1933.  
The change was striking. While Vogel wrote of the state-building qualities of 
rivers, Schenke viewed geographic space as a weapon. 
 
6.2.2.3 Organic theory of the state 
The expression ‘die Lebensberechtigung’ (the right to life) used in Vogel’s 
article (1924: 144) points to another characteristic feature – the organic theory 
                                                 
141
 Outside of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik , Karl Haushofer’s Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen and its 
“shatter-belts” theory is the best representation of geographical determinism applied to the role of 
Danube and Rhine. (Haushofer 1931b) 
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of the state, another constitutive part of geopolitical heritage. Vogel and other 
authors publishing in early volumes of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik were building 
on the traditions introduced by Friedrich Ratzel (see section 1.1.5, compare 
with Maull 1931: 41142). They used notions borrowed from biology to present 
the spreading German influence and building a united bloc in Central Europe as 
natural processes.143 
The front-runner in the application of organic theory of the state to the issue of 
Germany’s future within Europe was, of course, Karl Haushofer, whose works 
published in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik carried subtitles such as “Geopolitisches 
Naturrecht auf Lebensraum” (-natural geopolitical right to living space - 
Haushofer 1934: 6) and operated with notions “Reichskörper” ( - body of the 
Reich – Haushofer 1931: 2), “fremde Lebensformen” (- alien forms of life – 
Haushofer 1934: 10) or “biologisch haltbar Vertrag” ( - biologically sustainable 
treaty – Hauhofer 1934: 11).  
In line with the growing tendency towards social Darwinism in Germany, the 
biological references in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik articles gradually became more 
numerous and pronounced from late 1920s onwards. The organic theory 
dictated that Germany, as a young and strong state, should ‘naturally grow’ to 
establish its domination over larger territory. Embodiment of this natural 
growth should have been Mitteleuropa, or after 1933 simply just Reich. 
 
6.2.2.4 German cultural uniqueness and historical mission 
Contemplation of the history, settlement patterns and unique cultural 
characteristics of the German nations was another major common theme 
appearing throughout the volumes of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.  
                                                 
142
 “…die Synthese zwischen Boden und Bevölkerung, die in der Staatsidee verkörpert wird, schafft 
den lebensfähigen Staat.” – …the synthesis of soil and population, which is embodied in the state 
idea, creates a viable state. (Maull 1931: 41) 
143
 “Eine europäische Staatengemeinschaft muss von Innen heraus wachsen, muss sich organisch 
aufbauen wie ein Naturkörper….” – European community of states has to grow from the inside, it 
needs to build itself organically, as a natural body… – (Streeruwitz  1931: 30) 
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The German nation was portrayed as a bearer of distinct culture, the front-
runner of civilisation to the east of the Rhine and west of Urals, the natural 
unifying force in the area. (Zillich 1929)144 Successive articles accentuated the 
historical mission of the German nation to unify the area identified with the 
realm of German influence and lead it to greatness and prosperity. The 
emphasis was shifting from explanatory forms intended to establish the 
uniqueness of German nation in the mind of the reader, through the more self-
assured explorations of the realm of German nation, to rather pompous 
proclamations of historical mission to unify and dominate more or less a 
loosely defined area. Depiction of German nation shifted from the role of the 
leader towards the role of the ruler. 
The notion of Deutschtum (German-hood) reappeared in 1927 (Sieger 1927: 
630) and its borders were correlated with the borders of the envisaged 
Mitteleuropa.145 Various concepts in turn positioned these borders differently, 
on the basis of the percentage of German population (Maull 1931: 6), the 
geographical location of German settlements or use of the German language 
(Zillich 1929: 149, Trampler 1934: 25). Yet other concepts, such as the one 
fostered by Friedrich Papenhusen, identified Central Europe with unified 
Germany and Austria. (Papenhusen 1927: 320) Most predominant, however, 
was the linguistic approach, not least because it launched the boundaries of 
Deutschtum the furthest. Various versions of the Deutschtum principle were 
increasingly replacing the geographic determinism as the main tool for 
delineation of boundaries for Mitteleuropa. 
                                                 
144
 Influential works on the civilisational exceptionality of the German nation and its mission were 
published all through the 1920s and 1930s. Most notably Arthur Moeller’s Das Dritte Reich (1923), 
Gisehler Wirsing’s Zwischeneuropa und die deutsche Zukunft (1932) or Albert Brackamnn’s Krisis 
und Aufbau in Osteuropa: Ein weltgeschichtliches Bild (1939). 
145
 ‘Die Grenzen dieses deutschen Kultureinflusses sind … in der Form einer der stärksten, 
einschneidend-sten Kulturscheiden Europas aufgeprägt… Mitteleuropa wird deutscher Kulturboden 
sein.’ - Frontiers of these German cultural influences were impressed in form of one of the strongest 
and the most incisive divides in Europe… Central Europe will be the soil of the German culture. – 
(Trampler 1934: 24 – 25) 
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An interesting feature of these considerations is their eastward orientation. 
Luxembourg and Switzerland are often conspicuously missing from these 
considerations, which are geared towards establishing the right of German 
domination over areas to the east of and south east of German and Austrian 
borders, where the German population was an obvious minority.  
A careful reading cannot escape the fact that the eastward direction of cultural 
considerations was a repetition of the very same theme in Mitteleuropa 
concepts that had appeared during the First World War period. The interwar 
concepts repeat the very same lines of reasoning – settlement, cultural 
influence, use of German language, etc. In this regard, interwar concepts can be 
considered a direct continuation of their earlier counterparts. 
 
6.2.2.5 Der Anschluss Österreichs146 
Papenhusen’s article ‘Geopolitische erwägungen zum deutsch-österreichischen 
Anschlussgedanken’ (- Geopolitical considerations of thought on German-
Austrian union -), published in 1927, introduced another important theme that 
winds through Zeitschrift für Geopoltik – der Anschluss Österreichs.  
Hinted upon by Vogel (1924: 144, see above), the theme started to develop in 
1927 issue of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik and culminated in the special issue 
dedicated to Anschluss in 1931147. This special edition was introduced by 
Albrecht Haushofer’s article titled ‘Ein Volk, ein Staat’. (– One nation, one state! 
- Haushofer 1931)  
As this well known mantra of Anschluss advocates suggested, the basis of 
proposed unification was a common linguistic, cultural and historical heritage 
and destiny. (Maull 1931: 42, Steinacker 1931: 44) Supporting evidence to 
substantiate the claimed mutual advantages offered by Anschluss was drawn 
                                                 
146
 A union with Austria 
147
 Zeitschrift für Geopoltik, 1931, issue 1: ‘Untersuchungen zur Geopolitik Österreichs’ – Survey of 
Austria’s geopolitics, contains 13 different articles on history of Austria, her current affairs and 
envisaged a future tied with Germany. 
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from historical trading patterns, transport links and the geomorphologic 
characteristics of the area. The emotional appeal of necessity to unify the 
unnaturally divided nation was coupled by invocations of the dangers posed by 
external enemies. (Maull 1931: 42)  
In a Mitteleuropa context, Anschluss was the logical continuation of the earlier 
concepts of unification between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As 
noted above, Papenhusen identified unified Germany and Austria with the 
concept of Mitteleuropa (Papenhusen 1927: 320); others thought Anschluss 
would be the first step on the way to build a wider bloc. (Streeruwitz 1931: 34, 
Haushofer 1931: 3) But all changed with the political watershed of 1933. In 
articles published after this year, Austria completely lost its separate identity 
within the Mitteleuropa concepts presented and simply became understood as a 
south-eastern appendix of Germany148. Editors of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 
reclassified Austria as part of the ‘Raum der Deutschen’ (Realm of the Germans) 
from 1935 onwards.149  
 
6.2.2.6 Economic autarchy 
Economic considerations overarched virtually all conceptions of Mitteleuropa. 
In early volumes of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, the revival of economic 
cooperation and trading patterns of former Austria-Hungary were itemised as 
basic preconditions for the restoration of prosperity in the area and the 
achievement of economic self-sufficiency. Synergetic advantages of cooperation 
between Germany and successor states in the form of customs union were 
                                                 
148
 ‘…Österreich nicht Mitteleuropa, sondern deutscher Anteil am Südosten ist…’ – Austria is not 
Central Europe, but a German allotment to the South-east. – (Schumacher 1934: 239)  
Outside of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik , the identification of Austria with an appendix of Germany 
was also prevalent. See for example Heinrich von Srbik’s Mitteleuropa: Das Problem und die 
Versuche seiner Lösung in der deutschen Geschichte (1938) or works of Harold Steinacker (1934, 
1937) and Wilhelm Schüssler (1937).  
149
 From 1935, the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik section Mitteleuropa was renamed Raum der Deutschen 
and Austria was included into this section.  
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highlighted. The common aim of these articles was the creation of an autarchic 
economic unit with a large common market.  
In the early 1930s the theme shifted – economic considerations typically 
reflected the isolation of Germany from world markets due to the trade barriers 
imposed by the British Empire, the USA and other countries. (Kreil 1932: 208) 
The common suggestion following from this observation was then a creation of 
Germany’s own common economic area with the Central European successor 
states150, which would be able to compete with the USA or the British Empire. 
(Schmertz 1931: 182) ‘Die Grossraumwirtschaft’ (greater area economy), 
rather than national economy, was increasingly becoming the catch-phrase of 
these concepts. As articles became more self-assured, some authors went as far 
as to claim that the successor states were desperate for Germany to initiate 
such a bloc.151 By 1934, an autarchic economic unit in the form of a customs 
union was being presented as a necessity for the German nation under the 
threat of war from its enemies.152  
Yet the early version of this theme was reminiscent of the earlier concepts of 
Friedrich Naumann and other First World War period Mitteleuropa theories, 
which were based on similar contemplations of the links between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. However, the projects for a greater economic area gradually 
developed into a tool of achieving economic autarchy for Mitteleuropa 
perceived as the personification of Deutschtum. 
 
6.2.2.7 Revisionism of Versailles Peace Treaty 
                                                 
150
 ‘mitteleuropäischer Gesamtwirtschaftsraum’ – Central European common economic area – 
(Scheffer 1931: 94 
151
 ‘Aktive Mitteleuropapolitik gilt auch heute noch … als “Imperialismus”… aber die Staaten 
donauabwärts warten auf eine deutsche Aktion.’ – Active Central Europe policy is even today still 
considered as “imperialism”, but states down the Danube are waiting for German action. – (Schmerz 
1931: 181) 
This view was also pushed in wider academic discussion in early 1931, see for example Steinacker’s 
‘Vom Sinn einer gesamtdeutschen Geschichtsauffassung’ in 1931 volume of Deutsche Rundschau. 
152
 ‘Kriegsgefahr … bedeutet Autarkiestreben’ – The danger of war means striving for autarchy – 
(Trampler 1934: 69 
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In early issues of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik authors focused on counting the 
losses of Germany and the gains of its rivals after the Versailles Peace 
Conference. Revisionism was an integral theorisation from the very beginning. 
Vogel had started by expressing his misgivings over the provisions of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty. In two sentences he suggested that these were unfair, 
unnatural and untenable, as well as intentionally hostile towards Germany. 
(Vogel 1924: 144) The very same take on the Versailles Treaty appeared in an 
article of Hermann Lautensach (1924), who focused on considerations of the 
unbearable burden of reparations, the unjust territorial losses, and direct bitter 
criticism of France and its conduct towards Germany.  
Indeed, a revision of the Paris Peace Conference treaties, which had established 
an existing structure in Europe, was the very precondition of its reorganization. 
If Mitteleuropa was to be established, these treaties needed to be revised. 
This theme gradually developed in all subsequent Mitteleuropa articles – 
through progressively more aggressive criticism. In 1932, Paul F. Lüdorf wrote 
that France was utilising the treaty of Versailles as a continuation of war by 
other means.153 By 1934, discussion of this topic culminated in open calls for 
revision of the Versailles Accords in favour of Germany. (Haushofer 1934, 
Trampler 1934) 
 
6.2.2.8 Successor states – a mistake of history 
Authors writing for Zeitschrift für Geopolitik could hardly be called ‘friends of 
the successor states‘. Starting with Vogel quoted above (1924: 144), Zeitschrift 
für Geopolitik contributors shared the view that the system of small, isolationist 
and mutually suspicious states created at the Paris Peace Conference was 
                                                 
153
 “Der Versailler Vertrag is kein Friedensvertrag im bekannten Sinne. Er ist ein durch Erpressung 
verbriefter, dauernder Eingriff in die Lebenssubstanz des Gegners. Mit dem ganzen Anhängsel seiner 
Ausführungsbestimmungen bildet er die Fortsetzung des Krieges zur Erreichung der im Vertragstext 
noch nicht festgelegten Kriegsziele.” - The Treaty of Versailles is not a peace treaty in a known 
sense. It is a persistent interference in the opponent’s essence of life sustained through extortion. With 
all the appendices of its implementation provisions, it constitutes a continuation of war to achieve war 
aims not yet determined in the text of the treaty. – (Lüdorf 1932: 214) 
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unsustainable for economic reasons as well as the internal tensions between 
majority nations and their sizeable minorities. (Loesch 1930: 29)154 
Highlighting the level of national (but predominantly German) minorities, they 
pointed to the fact that talking about nation-states in the area was misleading 
and it would be more appropriate to organize the area as a larger political unit. 
The case for abolishing the nation state principle in the area was built on 
references to economic necessity, national composition, geomorphological 
characteristics, transport links, (Haushofer 1931: 5) etc.  
In concepts of the 1930s, authors were more or less openly concluding that it 
was a historical duty of the German nation to ‘reorganize’ the area. (Trampler 
1934: 68) From calls for unification of the area the concepts gradually moved 
towards asserting the natural and necessary domination of the German nation. 
The obvious aim of this theorizing was to substantiate the case for German 
leadership in the area. Indeed, this is another theme that evokes Naumann’s 
concept. The natural leadership of Germans in the area was a feature of earlier 
German Mitteleuropa concepts. Adaptation of this theme to contemporary 
conditions necessitated questioning the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
existing structures. 
 
6.2.2.9 The threat of France 
References to France as a threat to Germany were present in Mitteleuropa 
concepts since the very inception of the debate. (Vogel 1927: 144) Besides 
complaints about the injustice of Treaty of Versailles, German authors were 
particularly bitter about the successor states’ links with France.155 In fact, 
                                                 
154
 ‘Er ist ein schleichender Kleinkrieg, der mit ungleichen Kräften geführt wird – auf der einen Seite 
nur die Abwehrenergie einer zahlenmässig schwächeren Volksgruppe, auf der anderen der Staat als 
Kampfwaffe der Mehrheitsvolkes.’ - It is an insidious little war, fought with unequal forces - on the 
one hand, only the defensive energy of a numerically weaker ethnic group, on the other, the state as a 
fighting weapon of the majority people – (Trampler 1934: 41) 
155
 ‘Ganz Mitteleuropa, von den Ardennen bis zum Schwarzen Meere, is heute mehr oder weniger 
durch Frankreich fremdbestimmt, gleichgültig, ob es sich um Sieger oder Besiegte des Weltkrieges 
handelt… Dazu diente zunächst der polnische Vasall und im weiteren Verlauf das von Frankreich 
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France’s activities in the area provided a major rallying call for negative 
reference in virtually all concepts presented.  
The involvement of France with the successor states was presented as a direct 
danger to the German nation156, which had to be countered.157 Any mention of a 
Danube Federation, a Danube customs union, let alone Pan-European ideas, 
was dismissed as French machinations to achieve hegemony over Europe. 
(Trampler 1934: 54 – 55) All these projects were branded as ‘illusions’, 
‘meaningless’ or ‘bloodless schemes’, as they purportedly went against 
‘geopolitical truths’. (Schmerz 1932: 229) Authors asserted that the task of 
organizing Central Europe should fall to Germany. (von Loesch 1930: 40)  
Anti-French fervour and the resulting resentment at all its Central Europe 
schemes was at its highest in some early 1930s articles, with some articles even 
contemplating the option of war with France. (Ross 1932)  
This particular feature of interwar Mitteleuropa concepts was not a usual 
feature of First World War period German concepts. Even though Naumann 
wrote at the height of the First World War, his misgivings about France were 
mostly historical. (Naumann 2009: 48 – 60) While the radical anti-French line 
seems to be a fresh inter-war addition in Mitteleuropa thought, the feature is 
reminiscent of writings of some of the earliest pan-German Central Europe 
authors, Paul de Lagarde and Constantin Frantz (see Chapter 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                         
finanzierte Gebilde der Kleinen Entente.’ – Whole of Central Europe, from the Ardennes to the Black 
Sea, is today more or less over-ridden by France, whether they are winners or losers of the world 
war… To this end served the Polish vassal and followed by the structure Little Entente, financed by 
France.’ (Lüdorf 1932: 214) 
156
 ‘Das Ideengut der Französischen Revolution, die Staatsidee der liberalen Demokratie wird den 
östlichen Völkern geradezu suggeriert als vorbeugendes Mittel gegen die Wirksamkeit der deutschen 
Volkstumsidee, die im Osten Europas bedeutend an Boden gewinnt.’ - The ideas of the French 
Revolution, the state-idea of liberal democracy, will actually be suggested to eastern nations as a 
prevention tool against the validity of the German Volkstumsidee, which in Eastern Europe gained 
significant ground. – (Trampler 1934: 55) 
157
 ‘Begriffe wie: Donauföderation, Donauzollunion und ähnliche, mussten blutleere Schemen 
bleiben…’ – Notions such as Danube Federation, Danube Customs Union and similar, must remain 
blood-less schemes… - (Schmerz 1931: 177) 
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6.2.2.10 From revisionism to hegemonic ambitions 
So themes present in the Mitteleuropa concepts published in Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik were to a great extent a continuation of themes established by earlier 
German traditions. The organic theory of the state as well as geographic 
determinism stemmed from Ratzelian tradition. The German cultural 
uniqueness and historical mission to unify the area were well vested in First 
World War concepts of Mitteleuropa and reached back to the romanticism of 
the nineteenth century. So was the focus on economic considerations and the 
suggested extent of the future union. A certain level of adaptation to the older 
idea of unification with Austria-Hungary was necessary given its 
dismemberment. The questioning of the viability of successor states and an 
emphasis on Anschluss Österreichs became expressions of such adaptation. 
Bitterness towards France was surely rooted in contemporary experiences; 
however, such tradition can be traced back into 19th century Germany as well 
(Frantz 1861, Lagarde 1881). The only original theme seemed to be the 
revisionism of the Versailles Peace Treaty, obviously tied to the specific post-
First World War situation. 
Yet, even though these themes and characteristics remained essentially the 
same throughout the period, the gradual change in attitude the authors took to 
the area was striking. The 1920s articles mostly possessed a descriptive and 
exploratory character. They focused on contemplating the adverse effects of the 
Paris Peace Conference settlements on the economic and strategic position of 
Germany and situation within the area of former Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Emphasis was laid on suggesting a model for alleviating such grievances 
through regional cooperation. Articles highlighted the uniqueness of German 
nation and presented it as a unifying force of multinational Central Europe. 
(Zillich 1929) Geographically and economically substantiated concepts 
stretched the spatial notion of Mittleuropa from north-western corner of 
Germany towards the Balkans, by accentuating the role of the Danube and 
surrounding areas for achievement of economic autarchy.  
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However, by the early 1930s, the accent changed, and conceptions of Central 
Europe were increasingly presented as blueprints for unification of a scattered 
German population (Trampler 1934: 27) and expressions of natural right of 
German nation for “living and breathing space, and equal rights”. (Haushofer 
1934: 4) The Anschluss was portrayed as the first step in creating a 
Mitteleuropa that encompassed the realm of the German nation. Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik introduced a section dedicated to Central Europe in 1932 and articles 
under this section put forward suggestions for creation of a geographical unit 
designed to accomplish German national ambitions, rather than to alleviate 
grievances caused by the aberrations of Paris Peace Conference. From 1933 
onwards, articles took a marked anti-liberalist turn and emphasised the unique 
German form of society, as opposed to both western liberalism and eastern 
despotism. Militarist thought appeared the same year accompanied by 
numerous references to Adolf Hitler and Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, The National Socialist German Workers' Party). 
Finally, the journal’s “Mitteleuropa” section was replaced by “Raum der 
Deutschen” in 1935. The areas of successor states were openly ascribed to the 
future rule of the German nation and divided into units defined on a 
geomorphologic basis, such as “Donauraum”, “Alpenraum” or “Mittelgebrige”, 
much in a way one would approach contemplations of sub-national units, 
rather than regional integration of sovereign states. 
 
6.2.2.11 The mirror of changes 
Early analysts of the German school of geopolitics ascribed a high public profile 
for Mitteleuropa concepts to the close affinity existing between Karl Haushofer 
and leading proponents of National Socialism (Rouček 1942: 183 – 187). 
Geopolitics was described as the “court theory” of the Nazi regime.  
However, later commentators challenged this view and suggested National 
Socialists merely exploited geopolitical concepts for their own ends, or 
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disregarded and went well beyond them whenever suitable. Jürgen Elvert’s 
analysis takes the middle ground between the two extremes. He linked the 
extraordinary popularity of geopolitical concepts with wider philosophical and 
social developments in Germany. (Elvert 1999) Elvert pointed to the heritage of 
romanticism, irrationalism and tradition in 19th century German philosophy; to 
the peculiarities of the development of German statehood; an emphasis on the 
uniqueness of German culture; a perception of injustice of the Versailles 
Accords; feelings of encirclement and experience of economic hardship. The 
combination of these led to an increasing tendency towards rejecting all 
supposedly alien concepts (e.g. ‘French’ nation state idea or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
liberalism) and the search for a unique German way (Sonderweg). Elvert 
illustrated how German geopolitics was in line with these general trends, how it 
expressed its aspirations and how it led to a high identification of German 
public with its concepts, especially, the idea of Mitteleuropa. 
The above discussion of themes present in German conceptions of Mitteleuropa 
suggests very similar conclusions. A majority of themes stemmed from earlier 
German traditions and their combination and was present in First World War 
conceptualisations as well. The only new themes were the ones connected to 
the specifics of the Paris Peace Conference settlements. Indeed the presented 
development of themes within concepts and a gradual change in overall 
character of concepts can be linked to ascending Nazi ideology in Germany 
during the period. This is not to say that all authors of Mitteleuropa concepts 
were Nazis, it only demonstrates that Mitteleuropa was being constructed 
within wider discussion in German society. 
Mitteleuropa gained prominence as a possible means out of hostile 
encirclement, towards possible restoration of the mythical German Empire and 
its rightful place as a world power. The idea of restoration of the greatness of 
the German nation won support from all levels of society. Politicians both left 
and right of centre endorsed various concepts presented. But such link worked 
both ways and concepts were in turn influenced by the changing moods of the 
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public and the growing ambitions of the politicians. Mitteleuropa was a popular 
concept mirroring changes in popular mood.  
If Mitteleuropa was an expression of ambitions for German society, it was 
indeed changing with them. A growing ambition for the German Reich rather 
than a dream of pluralist Central Europe shaped the concepts with increasing 
intensity. Contemplations of the role of rivers as state-building features 
changed into perceptions of space as a weapon. Mitteleuropa changed into a 
Raum der Deutschen. Following the Nazi rise to power, Mitteleuropa became an 
expression of Nazi ambition for hegemony over Europe. 
 
6.2.3 Way out of desperation 
Conceptions of Central Europe in Austria were developing very much along the 
main lines of German concepts presented in the previous subchapter. Indeed, 
many of them were printed in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. One such example came 
from Ernst Streeruwitz, Austrian Chancellor in 1929. 
Streeruwitz’s article entitled Österreichs Mission in Europa (Austria’s mission in 
Europe, 1931) portrayed Austria as a bridge between Germany and scattered 
German speaking population in the former Austro-Hungarian territories. 
(Streeruwitz 1931: 27) It built on a limited historical analysis of movement of 
nations from Asia to Europe, concluding that the German nation was weakened 
in comparison to French nation by the incursion of the Slavic nations, which 
split the German population. Streeruwitz avoided the issue of North-German 
Confederation and the exclusion of Austria from it and instead focused on the 
earlier historical role of Austria in its fight against the Ottomans. The familiar 
theme of condemnation of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary carried the 
reader through to paragraphs vilifying any French-backed initiatives such as 
potential Danubian (Con)Federation or Pan-European Union. Finally, building 
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on the organic theory of state158 he suggested that unified Germany and Austria 
would become a core of Central Europe, which would grow further.159 
Streeruwitz’s article presented the mainstream Austrian idea of Central Europe, 
which portrayed a unified Germany and Austria as the core area of the future 
strong economic and political unit, an area that would eventually expand to 
include surrounding areas on the basis of historical links as well as economic 
cooperation.  
The most pressing issues in Austria of the day stemmed from economic 
impoverishment following the loss of territory, industry and virtually all 
economic links after the post-First World War settlements. Streeruwitz’s 
considerations were thus well vested in the practical problems of the country.  
In essence, the Austrian theorists of Central Europe saw it as a tool to achieve 
the very same aim as their German counterparts –alteration of the situation in 
which Austria found itself following the Paris Peace Conference. The notion of 
Central Europe became the new framework, which would help to renew the lost 
links and raise Austria from its ashes, even if it would be within a German 
dominated structure. In fact, the idea of one great German nation and Central 
Europe as its exaltation permeated geopolitical thought in Austria with relative 
ease. (e. g. Sieger 1927, Steinacker 1931)  
A Mitteleuropa discussion was widespread in Austrian intellectual circles. A 
volume edited by Josef Nadler and Heinrich von Srbik contained the essays of 
sixteen well-known Austrian authors, presenting various aspects of the role of 
Austria in the history and future of Central Europe. (Nadler and Srbik 1936) All 
of them plotted the historical mission of Austria in context of Deutschtum, as 
did the works of Alois Jaschke (1934), Karl Wache (1933) and many others. 
                                                 
158
 see footnote 8 
159
 ‘Wenn Österreich und Deutschalnd sich wirtschaftlich zusammenschliessen… wenn dann 
Deutschland die Brücke zu Frankreich zu schlagen vermöchte und wir Österreicher die altgewohnte 
Verbindung mit dem Osten herstellen, dann könnte ein natürlich gewachsenes, gesundes Mitteleuropa 
entstehen, aus dem später Grösseres werden mag.” – When Austria and Germany are economically 
unified… when then Germany is able to bridge the gap with France and us Austrians able to establish 
the old link with the East, then the naturally grown and healthy Central Europe can arise, out of 
which something bigger can grow. – (Streeruwitz 1931: 30) 
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On the other hand, there were those in Austrian society that chose not to pin all 
their hopes on Germany. Among them an arch enemy in the eyes of German 
geopoliticians – Count Richard Nicolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi viewed the future of global politics as belonging to five 
major powers: Pan-America, the British and Russian Empires, the East-Asian 
bloc (Japan and China) and Europe. With none of the other powers being as 
internally divided as Europe, the European nations needed to find a way to 
unite their powers to remain competitive in terms of business as well as 
political power. His proposal was for a gradual unification and federalization of 
Europe beginning with periodical conferences dealing with issues of common 
interest, through customs union, to the fully realised form of the United States 
of Europe. The borders of this concept were identified with the borders of 
Europe itself - cultural in the east and natural in all other directions. 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi 1924) He hoped that the Little Entente would be the first 
building cell of future United States of Europe and even relied on countries of 
the Little Entente to summon a Pan-European conference to unleash the 
process of unification. His concept, much detested by German geopoliticians as 
a covert attempt by France to gain hegemony over Europe, attracted 
widespread interest among European leaders. Over two thousand politicians 
(including heads of states) attended the first Pan-European Congress in October 
1926. (Steininger, Bischof and Gehler 2002: 296) However, the devotion of the 
European leaders to construction of a United States of Europe was only half-
hearted. Even though Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans inspired admiration of 
Winston Churchill and the Kellogg-Briand Memorandum (Salmon and Nicoll 
1997: 6), the goals of Pan-European Movement became even more distant in 
1939 than they had been in 1923, as the European powers were yet again on 
collision rather than reconciliation course. (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1939) 




6.2.4 Émigré Hungarian Danubian concepts 
Hungarian émigré society also cherished the idea of Central Europe as a way to 
alleviate the conditions imposed on Hungary by the Paris Peace Conference. 
However, their Central Europe was somewhat different to German and Austrian 
notions of Mitteleuropa. 
Instead of Central Europe, Hungarian writers developed the idea of a Danubian 
Confederation. Central Europe as a notion was negatively associated with the 
wartime proposals for union between Austria Hungary and Germany. Thus 
conspicuously Hungarian interwar concepts tended to leave the German 
element out.  
The best known proponent of the idea for Danubian Confederation was Oszkár 
Jászi, who laid out a plan for its creation for the first time in 1918 in his book 
The Future of the Monarchy: The Fall of Dualism and the United States of 
Danubia. (Jászi 1918) In his original concept Jászi had suggested the creation of 
a United States of Danubia consisting of Hungary, Austria, Bohemia, newly 
united Poland and Illyria (South-Slav regions under Croatian leadership). 
However, his plans were disrupted by the results of the Paris Peace Conference 
and Jászi was compelled to gradually reformulate his concept and its basis, 
what he would repeat several times in the following decades.  
Jászi criticized the successor states for their efforts to reach economic autarchy, 
their growing isolationism and particularly for their policies towards national 
minorities. Indeed, one of Jászi’s primary concerns were the fortunes of 
Hungarian minorities in the successor states, which put together accounted for 
4.5 million people or about 1/3 of all Hungarians. In his view, the mixed 
nationalities of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire territories simply 
required something other than a nation-state solution and only a settlement 
that would respect the cultural autonomy of all nations in the area could bring 
lasting peace. (Jászi 1969: 231)  
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The second problem Jászi sought to resolve was the severence of economic 
links that had so adversely affected Hungary after the dismemberment of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Only the mutual cooperation of successor states, 
especially in the field of agriculture and trade of agricultural goods, could bring 
prosperity to all. In his view, some form of union of successor states would be 
much more desirable than a collection of „armed national sovereignties“. 
(Litván 1999: 233) Therefore, in the early 1920s, the goal of his concept was to 
overcome the notion of small states in Central European space and „to break 
down economic isolation while protecting a perfect political and territorial 
sovereignty of the new states“. (Litván 1999: 233) Ideally, the settlement of his 
new Danube Union of Nations would resemble the constitution of Switzerland 
with separate concepts for nationality and citizenship. In 1922 Jászi looked 
towards the countries of the Little Entente to take a lead in creating such a 
unit160, however, he soon became disillusioned with their attitude to Hungarian 
minorities. (Congdon 1982: 397) 
Another vocal call for the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Trianon161 came 
from the socialist writer Joseph Diner-Dénes in the form of his book Hungary: 
Oligarchy, Nation, People (published in French as La Hongrie: Oligarchie, Nation, 
Peuple, 1927). Diner-Dénes suggested that France should promote friendship 
between Hungarians and their Slavic neighbours and inspire a conclusion of 
series of bilateral treaties creating the mutual bond between the successor 
states. He also struck another note popular in French intellectual circles (see 
below, section 3.1.6) by hinting that such a conglomerate could become a 
building bloc for a future pan-Europe. Diner-Dénes thus appealed to the French 
                                                 
160
 In his 1918 concept he advocated the leadership of Germany and he would have returned back to 
this approach in 1939. Eventually, during the Cold War, he even advocated the idea that cooperation 
of Soviet satellite states would bring them closer together and possibly gradually lead to their 
confederative settlement. Georgy Litván branded Jászi a ‘developmental optimist’ in reference to 
these changes in his idea of who should lead the unification of the area. However, observation of this 
researcher would be that there is a possibility that Jászi’s primary concern was with the security of 
interests of Hungarian compatriots, under whose ever domination might be more likely in the given 
situational context. 
161
 Peace treaty between the Allies and Hungary as a successor state of Austria-Hungary, signed on 4 
June 1920. 
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public not only by acknowledging the complaints of the Hungarian nation (in 
Hungary and surrounding countries), but also by suggesting a process that 
would improve the situation and possibly create the model for a structure 
guaranteeing the peace in Europe. 
Jászi and Diner-Dénes were not the only Hungarian writers who advocated 
creation of some form of Central European unit, there were many other 
individuals and groups (such as Tuz group in Bratislava or Vilagossag group in 
Paris), who had put forward their own concepts of cooperation in the area and 
ideas as towards how it should be achieved. Elemér Hantos (1933, 1935) and 
Gusztav Gratz162 both suggested concepts very similar to that of Friedrich 
Naumann –gradual integration on the back of preferential economic 
cooperation. A rather unusual concept was presented by Miklos Makay on the 
basis of analysis of ‘historical experiences of subjugation’ – referring to the non-
German speaking areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. He suggested 
political integration of these territories to build a future “continental United 
States”. (Romsics and Király 1999: 202) 
However varied these concepts might have been, their common denominator 
was an attempt to uphold some form of unity of the Hungarian nation now 
scattered across several states. The injustice of the Treaty of Trianon for the 
Hungarian nation was decried and renewal of the historical links between the 
nations in the area called for. Concepts were presented to be in the interest of 
all successor (or even European) states, as regional cooperation should ideally 
promote economic prosperity and build a sustainable peace.  
However, Regent Horthy’s regime would soon adopt a pro-German course and 
this friendship would have won the revision of territorial adjustments of 
Trianon in a manner that could hardly have been presented as in the interest of 
all successor states. Close links with Nazi Germany secured Hungary territorial 
                                                 
162
 Unlike other Hungarian authors, Hantos and Gratz chose the notion of Central Europe to describe 
their concept, rather than the Danubian reference typical of other Hungarian authors. Both authors 
had previously taken part in the discourse of Central Europe during the First World War. 
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gains at the expense of Czechoslovakia (First Vienna Award, 1938) and 
Romania (Second Vienna Award, 1940), in exchange for its alliance with the 
Axis powers. 
 
6.2.5 Armed sovereignties 
The correspondence of the Foreign Office with its representatives in successor 
states during the interwar period suggests that interest of Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes laid first in 
safeguarding their independence and borders against possible Hungarian or 
German revisionism. (Medlicott et al. 1981: x) Therefore it is not surprising that 
the efforts of their intellectuals (as well as statesmen) were directed towards 
this aim rather than the construction of a supranational unit in Central Europe.  
Only a few politicians advocated the necessity of regional cooperation. Milan 
Hodža, a former member of the Franz Ferdinand d’Este Belveder Circle and a 
popular Czechoslovak agrarian, was one of them. In his lecture Czechoslovakia 
and Central Europe (1931), Hodža outlined a new geopolitical ground-plan for 
the troubled Central European space. He viewed Germany as part of the West 
European political and economic context and thus excluded it from his (Central 
European) considerations. His conception of Central Europe included the 
successor states and the Balkans. He advised economic cooperation especially 
in the area of agriculture and trade of agricultural products, which could 
eventually grow into closer economic and political links. This concept irritated 
German geopoliticians of Haushofer’s group, who had just reached the peak of 
their popularity. In discussion with these authors Hodža developed his concept 
of a political federation in Central Europe. Its backbone was to be the Visla-
Danube-Vardar-Thessaloniki corridor. Central Europe would thus consist of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Greece – a belt of states between Russia and Germany spreading from the Baltic 
Sea to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. He was to present this concept in his book 
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Federation in Central Europe during the Second World War (1942). 
Interestingly, even though the title of his book carries the notion of Central 
Europe, Hodža often chose to refer to the “Danubian Federation” in order to 
distinguish his conception from interwar German Mitteleuropa projects. 
Another interesting project was Jozef Pilsudski’s resurrection of the idea of an 
Intermarium, stretching from north-west Poland to the Black Sea. (Levy 2007: 
165) The concept had originally been developed by Prince Adam Czartoryski in 
19th century and brought back to life in the early efforts of the Second Polish 
Republic to incorporate Lithuanian territories. But this idea was still-born, 
given the regional rivalry of Poland and Lithuania and the Bolshevik ambitions 
to the east.  
However, this is not to say that the successor states did not initiate or enter into 
regional cooperation. Quite the contrary. However, the aim of this envisaged 
regional cooperation was not to create a federal unit, but rather to ensure the 
continued existence of nation states. 
Exceptionally active in this regard was Czechoslovakia and its prime minister, 
Dr. Edvard Beneš. Beneš‘s aim was to create regional links that would 
guarantee the upholding of the peace treaties and bring about the necessary 
economic reconstruction. (Medlicott 1981: xi – xii) To fulfil the first aim, Beneš 
aligned Czechoslovakia with France, which was both in favour of the rigorous 
execution of the Versailles Treaty and looking towards the successor states to 
establish alliances encircling Germany. Series of bilateral military agreements 
among Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
signed in 1920 – 1921 established the Little Entente. The primary purpose of 
the Little Entente was to create a coalition against potential Hungarian 
revisionism. (Crampton 1994: 37) Subsequently, Poland was linked to the Little 
Entente by less comprehensive agreements with Czechoslovakia and Romania. 
Links with Poland provided for mutual assistance in case of unprovoked attack 
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from the east and links with France163 were designed to establish a coalition 
against possible German resurgence.  
Many diverse groups and statesmen, ranging from Hungarian émigré circles to 
advocates of Pan-European union looked upon the Little Entente as the corner 
stone of a future integrated regional unit. However, rather than a starting point 
of any regional integration process, the Little Entente had essentially been 
designed to safeguard the national sovereignties of its members. Moreover, it 
soon became clear that its anti-Hungarian bias would most likely prevent any 
suggestions of a closer integration with the country at its midst. This became 
especially obvious in the aftermath of the two unsuccessful attempts of former 
Emperor Karl to take the Hungarian throne in 1921, when the Little Entente 
countries went as far as mobilization to prevent his ascendancy. (Young 1921, 
Clerk 1921b) 
Nascent economic cooperation between the successor states (revisionist and 
non-revisionist alike) was further hampered by their enormous differences in 
economic strength and the value of their currencies. At the two poles of the 
monetary value spectrum laid Czechoslovakia and Austria. While 
Czechoslovakia was improving the exchange rate of its crown, the Austrian 
crown devalued beyond recognition, accompanied by hyperinflation, which 
took prices to 14,153 times their pre-war levels. (Schubert 1991: 49) Regional 
rivalries, mutual suspicion and efforts to build autarchic economies added more 
barriers than it was possible to remove. The situation was further complicated 
by the agrarian crisis of late the 1920s as well as the Great Depression, inducing 
a “suave qui peut attitudes”. (Crampton 1994: 37)  
To sum up, the limited number of concepts that sprung up in the non-
revisionist successor states was stalled either by their rivalries and deep 
differences, or the fear of revisionism, and a determination to maintain their 
“armed national sovereignties”. (Litván 1999: 233) Nevertheless, the 
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 Poland, Romania and The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes all had their respective 
defensive bilateral treaties with France. 
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experiences of the inter-war period and the failure of successor states to 
safeguard their independence would fuel talk of regional integration between 
exiled governments during the Second World War.  
 
6.2.6 The battle of interests 
Following from the discussion above, it can be concluded that the discourse of 
Central Europe as a notion in the interwar period was eventful. It started off 
from the ground prepared by the events of the last days of the First World War 
and the Paris Peace Conference. The project of a regional political unit in 
Central Europe, in its wartime Mitteleuropa sense, was defeated by the principle 
of the self-determination of nations. However, it soon became clear that the 
system of nation states was not living up to expectations. A multitude of 
problems that arose from the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and the resulting instability of the region brought around many to thinking that 
something other than a nation state solution would eventually need to be found.  
French diplomats became avid, if unlikely, advocates of construction of a new 
supra-national unit in Central Europe. Their motivations were rather 
transparent – to prevent any possibility of an Anschluss Österreichs and a 
German resurgence. Even as the concept of independent nation states was still 
being pushed through the negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference, the Paris 
government was working towards creation of a supra-national union of 
successor states164. (Low 1974: 217) Avoiding the discredited notion of Central 
Europe, the term Danubian Confederation was selected to describe the 
proposed regional structure, designed to facilitate regional cooperation and 
provide a safeguard against German resurgence. Similarly, French scholars also 
argued that Central Europe was a non-entity, only existing in the minds of 
                                                 
164
 As discussed in Chapter 6, British and the US leaders attempted to force such a solution on 
successor states in the wake of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in mid- to late-1918; 
however, without much avail. 
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conquerors and likeminded writers.165 Instead, they wrote of Danubian basin 
successor states, using these notions interchangingly in a non-political context. 
(Lhèritier 1928: 47) However, besides favouring some form of Danubian 
Confederation, the French policies did not possess a coherent aim. Successive 
general secretaries of the Quai d'Orsay favoured once a pro-Hungarian 
approach then a pro-Czechoslovak one. (Bogdan 1989: 216) As a result, France 
failed to convince either side of viability of such a project. By 1921, it had 
become clear that the successor states would reject any form of political 
integration. (Low 1974: 264) The Little Entente became a backbone of French 
policy towards the region, which it remained until the fateful year of 1938.  
However, plans for a French Danubian Confederation “gave rise to dark 
suspicions” in Rome (Burgwyn 1997: 9). Italy suspected a Habsburg link behind 
the whole plan and was ultimately worried that the Danubian Confederation 
might just be a new name for the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. In an effort to 
protect its territorial gains and regional positions, Italy worked tirelessly to 
prevent even the distant possibility of its formation: Italian manoeuvres 
complicated negotiations over restoration of trade links between the successor 
states, frustrated the transfer of agreed territories (Baranya) to Hungary, 
blocked economic help to Austria, etc. All to the significant irritation of the 
Allies, especially Great Britain. (Medlicott 1981: vi – vii) 
The reality of nation state settlement in the area of former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire disappointed many at the Foreign Office and the influence of its 
wartime advocates’ diminished as a consequence. In the view of reports of the 
disastrous economic impact of dismemberment especially on Austria, Britain 
attempted to encourage economic cooperation in the area. The possibility of 
creating closer links among the states along the lines of the French sponsored 
idea of Danubian Confederation was contemplated. However, this hope was 
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 ‘Où commence et où finit l’Europe centrale? … Elle n’est en effet ni un Etat ni un assemblage 
d’Etats. Elle n’a vèçu que dans l’imagination des conquèrants où des ècrivains.’ – Where does 
Central Europe start and where does it finish? It is neither a state, nor a group of states. She only lives 
in the imagination of conquerors and writers. – (Aulneau 1926: 8) 
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frustrated by the successor states’ strife to maintain their independence, 
frequent nationalist squabbles and growing economic disparities. British 
diplomats were growing increasingly impatient with the games played by the 
successor states leaders and eventually shifted attention to the stabilisation of 
Germany.  
On the other hand, the idea of Central Europe was gathering support in 
Germany. New conceptions of Central Europe were being formulated by 
geopolitical theorists on the basis of earlier German plans for the creation of a 
political union in all lands inhabited by a scattered German population. Besides 
themes specific to the post-Versailles situation, the characteristics of the new 
German Mitteleuropa can be traced to the philosophic and cultural heritage of 
the nineteenth century German environment. The oft-mentioned influence of 
Halford Mackinder on German geopolitics of the time seems to have had 
exercised much less influence on concepts of Mitteleuropa than previously 
thought. Direct references are scarcely found beyond the works of Karl 
Haushofer and all the major themes that could be ascribed to his influence (e. g. 
geographical determinism or overwhelming concern with the territory east of 
the German borders) can be more reasonably ascribed to traditions already 
present in German thought. The lengthy discussion of German concepts 
presented in this chapter had one aim – to demonstrate that Mitteleuropa 
concepts presented in this period were largely exaltations of German national 
ambition. Based on a heritage of original German thought, rather than foreign 
geostrategic concepts, Mitteleuropa plans were developing with increasing self-
confidence and radicalism until the moment when the growing emphasis on the 
superiority of German nation made any even remotely multinationalist concept 
redundant. The rise of Nazi ideology reinstated a notion of Reich, which was 
better suited to the new official line of natural domination of the German 
nation. 
The German line on Mitteleuropa gathered substantial support among the 
proponents of Anschluss in Austria. The idea of a common German state in 
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preference to a truncated and impoverished Austria seemed plausible, to many. 
However, not to the other nations of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Hungarian authors avoided reference to Central Europe in their calls for 
reunification of the Hungarian nation under the common banner of 
multinational confederalism. Instead, they chose to refer to a Danubian 
Confederation, which ostensibly excluded Germany.  
But the other successor states had little interest in creating a Central European 
multinational union with or without Germany. They had only just concluded 
their fight for dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and established 
their nationally defined sovereignty, forged in direct opposition to wartime 
Mitteleuropa plans. Some concepts were being put forward by those who 
sought to overcome isolationism in the area on the basis of historical economic 
links (e. g. Hodža). Hardly by coincidence, these were usually the same 
politicians who had been involved with plans for federalization of former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. (e. g. Hodža and Jászi) However, their arguments 
failed to gather substantial support among the successor states, suspicions that 
any kind of multinational union would eventually mean domination of one 
nation over another.166  
 
To sum up, all the actors in this story were following interests based on their 
own identities. Britain, far remote from the area, was attempting to wash her 
hands of the complicated situation in the continent. It seemed that to establish 
regional cooperation and help the impoverished countries help themselves was 
the best way out. France was attempting to build a strong circle around 
Germany to prevent its resurgence by encouraging creation of a federation of 
states on its eastern and south-eastern borders. Italy was safeguarding its 
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 Rare Soviet view of the aspects of potential integration in Central European area was published by 
V. I. Khorvatskij in 1933 as Pan-Evropa I Dunaiskaya Federatsiya (Pan-Europe and Danube 
Federation, 1933). The volume focused on discussion of contemporary situation, persisting problems 
and aspects of various integrative plans, upholding the Soviet internationalist view specially applied 
to questions of agricultural production and trade. 
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territorial gains, while the countries of the Little Entente were guarding their 
national sovereignty. Meanwhile, the hands of Austria and Hungary were tied 
by peace treaties and a need for foreign help, yet calls for revisionism among 
large sections of society and the political spectrum were apparent. And, of 
course, Germany had embarked upon the quest of reinstating its position as a 
major power. 
In this story, Central Europe started off as a notion connected to plans for 
unification between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The actors took their 
respective positions to it based on whether such a plan benefited or damaged 
their interests. France favoured the building of federation in the area, but both 
excluding and against Germany. French diplomats and academics chose to refer 
to a Danubian Confederation, as they addressed successor states opposed to the 
idea of Central Europe. Hungarian revisionists also avoided Central European 
reference and promoted the Danubian connotation, as it placed Hungarians at 
its heart and left out Germany. Italy dreaded having a strong neighbour who 
could challenge its recent territorial gains and opposed any integration in the 
area, however it was termed; Central Europe or Danubian Confederation. 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes adopted a similar stance for their own reasons – safeguarding their 
national independence. But for Germany and some elements of Austrian 
society, Central Europe was the very embodiment of their ambitions. 
Therefore the discourse of the notion of Central Europe was driven by the 
German line of theorising as the French, Hungarian and other lines were diluted 
by references to the Danubian Confederation or a complete opposition to any 
integration in the area. As a result, Central Europe in interwar period was most 
of everything associated with the political project of exaltation of German 
national ambitions.  
This meaning of the notion of Central Europe would be challenged during the 
Second World War – ironically by concepts put forward by those, who had been 
its most outspoken opponents in the interwar period. 
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6.3 The Second World War 
In early 1938, the revision of the status quo established by the Paris Peace 
Conference started with the Anschluss Österreichs. Germany embarked upon 
its second campaign of the Drang nach Osten within 25 years. The height of 
appeasement was famously marked by the Munich Conference in September 
1938, when Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier endorsed German 
annexation of the Sudetenland in exchange for a promise of no further 
territorial adventurism by Hitler. A false promise, indeed. The fate of 
Czechoslovakia was sealed in March 1939, when Hitler pushed Slovakia into a 
unilateral declaration of independence (Domarus and Romane 2007: 86, Špiesz, 
Čaplovič and Bolchazy 2006: 207) and proclaimed Bohemia as a German 
Protectorate (Ruthenia assigned to Hungary). Following the invasion of Poland 
and acquiring of the Memel territory, German territorial advances and its newly 
proclaimed vassals were approaching the borders of Mitteleuropa envisaged by 
the contributors of Zeitschift für Geopolitik.  
The stage was set for the Second World War… and backstage some had already 
started to plot an alternative Central Europe all over again.  
 
6.3.1 (Former) successor states 
The new debate, which started at the outbreak of the Second World War, was 
very much a ‘governmental’ undertaking. The main contributors to the debate 
were the members of governments in exile of the occupied countries located in 
London. Also very much involved were the Foreign Office, special offices and 
working groups established by the US government, and influential groups of 
émigré politicians and diplomats. The single most important factor driving the 
(former) successor states’ politicians to contemplate the creation of 
supranational unit in the area was the fact that none of the successor states had 
managed to safeguard its sovereignty and independence in the face of the 
resurgent German expansionism. It became a widespread conviction that in 
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order to protect their independence in future, creation of a larger and stronger 
federative union was necessary. Of course, provided that Germany did not win 
the war… 
Milan Hodža, the former Czechoslovak prime minister now in exile in London, 
elaborated his concept of regional cooperation in the early war days publishing 
it in 1942 as Federation in Central Europe (Hodža 1942). Facing both German 
and Russian expansionism, the freedom and security of small nations in Central 
Europe could according to him only be guaranteed by their association in some 
sort of a federative unit. (Hodža 1997: 231) In his view, establishment of a 
strong union of nation states, even at the cost of giving up a part of sovereignty 
to the new union, was a better option for small states in the area than the 
enduring danger of being taken over by one or another power. When talking 
about a Central European federation, Hodža characterized it in the first instance 
as a regional economic association of agrarian states167, which would gradually 
develop into a political unit. Its members should have been Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece. He 
provided a detailed description of how his Central European Commonwealth 
should be constituted and how its institutions would operate.  
On the other hand, another former Czechoslovak prime minister and president 
(also in exile in London), Edvard Beneš, thought that “it would be premature to 
deal with the question of Central Europe in all its details” before the war was 
over. (Beneš 1941: 1) Writing in 1941, he pointed out that all successor states, 
with the exception of dismembered Czechoslovakia and occupied Poland were 
in collaboration with Germany. Therefore, it would be hard to outline their 
future association, but: 
“It would be in the interests of Europe if in the region between 
Germany and Russia there were created a large political 
formation of a federative type, powerful from the military point 
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 Hodža was a leader of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party in Slovakia between 1918 and 1938. 
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of view, which would yet have great political, economic, and 
cultural possibilities. Through co-operation between the Poles 
and the Czechoslovaks there would emerge a political unit with a 
sufficiently large population, and adequate industrial and 
economic wealth, a unit, which would become an important 
factor in the post-war political equilibrium of Europe.” (Beneš 
1941: 2) 
Beneš suggested that this Polish-Czechoslovak union could become the core of a 
future Central European Federation, which could include Austria, Hungary, 
Romania and possibly more “small peoples of Central Europe”. (Beneš 1941: 3) 
In more general terms, he called for establishment of a post-war order in 
Europe on the basis of national and religious freedom, and economic and social 
justice (Beneš 1941: 4), but refused to elaborate specifics, such as structures or 
mechanisms of the future union. 
Whatever their differences, both Beneš and Hodža were working actively 
towards foundation of the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. A declaration on 
the intent of future collaboration to this end was signed by both exiled 
governments in London as early as 11 November 1940. (Halecki 1948: 68) The 
Protocol on Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation was signed on 19 January 1942 
(Central European Observer 1942) and set out the basic structural 
characteristics of the future union. This confederation was to be complemented 
by a similar structure in the Balkans168 that the exiled governments envisaged 
in their plan for the post-war reconstruction of the region. However, Soviet 
pressure, especially on Beneš, prevented its realisation.  
The Polish-Czechoslovak plans did not please the Soviets. The Soviet foreign 
minister Vyacheslav Molotov expressed opposition to the plan during his 
meeting with Beneš in 1942. (Táborský 1949: 389) In 1943 Beneš made a 
second attempt to obtain the Soviet blessing for the plan, which finally crashed 
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 This was presumably the Balkan Union envisaged by the Greco-Yugoslav treaty signed on 15 
January 1942 (Bulletin of International News 1942) 
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with the establishment of the Soviet sponsored puppet government in Lubin. 
(see below, p. 32) 
Oszkár Jászi also contributed to the wartime debate over Central Europe. In his 
1941 article (written just days before the German attack on the Soviet Union), 
he considered various possible outcomes of the war and their potential 
implications for the region. The first possibility, in his view, was a victory for 
the German-Russian alliance169, which might result in a condominium of these 
two powers over Central Europe. On the other hand, a victory for the French-
British alliance could lead to three different scenarios. The first would be the 
restoration of the status quo ante, which would be “absolutely necessary for a 
healthy new order in the Danube basin”. (Jászi 1941: 132) The second option 
was restoration of the Habsburg monarchy, which “none of the nations in 
question would accept voluntarily”. (Jászi 1941: 133) A final possibility was 
democratic federal structure built of restored nation states, which would 
guarantee “national autonomy for all the minority groups inside of the various 
states, the final elimination of the feudal estates, and the creation of a 
progressive and cooperative peasantry”. (Jászi 1941: 134)170 Only the last 
option could bring lasting peace to the Central European region and Europe as a 
whole. Jászi avoided making specific recommendations beyond this general 
principle, but underlined that without the wholehearted cooperation and 
support of Germany, the problem of Central Europe could not be resolved. 
(Jászi 1941: 137) 
Jászi’s scenarios were, like many other wartime conceptions of Central Europe, 
dictated by the realities of interwar period of rising nationalism, the 
isolationism of successor states, their economic difficulties, respective turns to 
authoritarianism and, finally, recurrent German and Russian expansion. Two 
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 German-Russian alliance Jászi referred to came to end with the German attack on the Soviet 
Union on 22 June 1941. Jászi wrote his article before this date, though, ironically, it was printed in 
the July 1941 issue of the Journal of Central European Affairs. 
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 Similar compartmentalization of possible solutions appeared in Aurel Kolnai’s 1943 ‘Danubia: A 
Survey of Plans of Solution’ published in Journal of Central European Affairs, however, the potential 
outcomes under German and Russian domination were, indeed, listed separately. (Kolnai 1943) 
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motives dominate all Central Europe concepts deriving from the pens of 
successor state authors: first, the nations of Central Europe were unwilling to 
live in one multinational unit; second, small divided nation states could not 
guard their independence against German and Russian expansionism. 
Therefore, a majority of authors proposed some form of compromise, a 
federation or confederation in the Central European area, based predominantly 
upon economic cooperation. (Beneš 1941, Jazsi 1941, Feierabend 1942, Hodža 
1942, Kulski 1942)  
At an early stage of war, caution was an inevitable hallmark since 
reorganization of Central Europe was obviously dependent on the result of war. 
(Beneš 1941: 2) However by the end of 1942, concepts had evolved into 
structured plans for the creation of a Central European federation, premised 
upon expectations of an Allied victory (Ciolkosz 1942, Mühlstein 1942, 
Feierabend 1942, Hodža 1942, Baranski 1943). The compartmentalization of 
Central Europe into two or three federal units according to cultural and 
national affinities was also proposed (Vambery 1943, Pakstas 1942, Feierabend 
1942). Even though some still advocated a return to the status quo ante, with 
minor modifications to facilitate regional trade (Tennenbaum 1942), the 
consensus of successor states scholars over the necessity of some form of 
political integration was clear. Even Austrian exile groups endorsed plans for 
regional federation on the stated basis of historical cultural and economic links. 
(Allina 1942, Müller-Sturmheim 1942)  
An interesting report on a future Central and South-East European Union was 
published by the Danubian Club in October 1943.171 The union would have 
consisted of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. (Danubian Club 1943: 6) The plan specified 
detailed workings for the future Union, including an electoral system, 
mechanisms for a bi-cameral parliament, power sharing between the union and 
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 The Danubian Club was a London based independent organization established by former members 
of the South-East Europe Committee of the Fabian Society and joined by many leftist émigrés 
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states, system of checks and balances, a rotational presidency, judiciary system, 
citizens’ rights, etc. The distinguishing feature of the plan was its emphasis on 
friendly relations with the Soviet Union (Danubian Club 1943: 5) and its 
prescription for a planned economy. For the plan envisaged central planning, 
agricultural cooperatives, centrally coordinated extensive industrialisation and 
controlled international trade – all modelled on the practices of Soviet Union. 
Given the leftist leanings of members of the club, these features are not 
surprising. But even this, essentially socialist plan, could not possibly satisfy the 
Soviets themselves.  
As became clear when considering Polish-Czechoslovak collaboration, it was 
becoming increasingly obvious that the post-war organization of the Central 
European area would depend upon “the relation between the Western 
democracies, Soviet Russia and Germany” (Jászi 1945: 3), rather than the 
wishes of governments or population in the area itself. Specifically, it would 
depend “far more on the aims and methods of Russia than on those of the 
United States and the British Commonwealth” (Jászi 1945: 3). To continue the 
futile story of efforts towards a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation, the Soviets 
agreed to include the Polish government within the Czechoslovak-Soviet 
friendship and alliance treaty of 1943, thus potentially providing the basis for 
future confederation. However, they never said which Polish government it 
would be. Appeasing the Czechs, the Soviets put this matter aside until the 
opportune moment arrived with the establishment of a Soviet puppet 
government in Poland on 1 January 1945.172 By the end of the month, the 
Czechoslovak government in exile would, in any case, have severed diplomatic 
relations with the Polish government in exile in London, and recognized the 
Soviet sponsored provisional government instead. The ousting of the Polish 
government in exile finally terminated any prospects for a wartime Polish-
Czechoslovak confederation. Following this development many authors writing 
on the issues of Central European political integration started to observe that 
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 The Soviet-controlled Lubin Committee, or more officially, The Polish Committee of National 
Liberation, was proclaimed the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland 
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the Soviet leadership had no desire to see regional groupings in Central Europe 
(Gross 1945, Jászi 1945) for that they might be strong enough to resist their 
intended post-war dominance of the region. 
However, there were those, who refused to recognize the inevitability of Soviet 
dominance and called for federation in Central Europe even after the Iron 
Curtain had firmly fallen across Europe. (e. g. Kutschera 1948) Their calls 
would fall upon deaf ears for decades to come, of course. 
 
6.3.2 Mitteleuropa = Das Grossgermanische Europa = Das Reich?173 
As is apparent from the evolution of the discussion of the 1920s and 1930s (see 
above, section 6.1.2), concepts of “Mitteleuropa” in German discourse were 
increasingly replaced by the concept of “Raum der Deutschen”, “Reich” and 
“Grossgermanische Europa”. (Elvert 1999: 309) Despite the fact that many 
advocates of “Mittleuropa” held key posts in the Nazi government prior to the 
Second World War (Gilbert 1947: 63), by 1939 it had become obvious that the 
realisation of any such economic or political unit was not an aim of Nazi foreign 
policy. With gradual German advances well beyond any previously envisaged 
borders of Central Europe, these outdated concepts lost their appeal and 
Mitteleuropa was now just loosely understood as a synonym for the living space 
of the German nation and the bedrock of a future Europe under the future 
German leadership. Reich rather than Mitteleuropa became the expression of 
German political ambitions.  
Factual evidence for this assertion is voluminous – for example, the failure of 
Hermann Neubacher’s174 1943 effort to reverse and steer Nazi policies towards 
a more constructive solution. He suggested that areas of the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire should be organized and governed along the lines of earlier 
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 - Central Europe = Great-German Europe = The Empire? -  
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 Hermann Neubacher was an active supporter of “Mitteleuropa” concepts throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, and an Austrian in charge of political affairs of occupied south-eastern Europe. 
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conceptions of Central Europe, emphasising German leadership of multicultural 
area rather than racially pure dominion. Despite the fact that Nazi fortunes 
were already declining by this time, Hitler rejected any such plan. (Ritter 1975: 
349) 
So the Mitteleuropa plans all but disappeared. While, during the First World 
War, Naumann’s concept of Mitteleuropa had represented the exaltation of 
German nation’s ambition for political unification by joining Germany with 
Austria-Hungary, there was no need for such project during the Second World 
War. As already commented, the notion itself was increasingly being 
supplanted by such expressions as “das grossgermanische Europa” (the great-
German Europe, Blume 1941), “das Neu-Europa” (new Europe, Muck 1940), or 
even simply “das Grossdeutschland” (Great-Germany, Leibrock 1941). As the 
emphasis shifted from politics towards economics, especially the questions of 
structuring the future economic system of the enlarged economic area – 
typically labelled “Grossraumwirtschaft”, (Predöhl 1941, Gablenz 1941, Funk 
1944) the territory under German domination did not need to be 
conceptualised in political terms anymore, in order to justify expansion. The 
expansion was a fait accompli and theorising now focused on organization 
rather than definition.  
Even though geopolitics was coined the “court science” of Nazi Germany, 
subsequent analyses showed that geopolitical theories were used for 
propagandist rather than policy making purposes. Even those few articles 
published in the early 1940s maintained the notion of Mitteleuropa lent it a new 
meaning defined by the Nazi expansion. Hassinger stretched its geographical 
remit along the entire flow of the river Danube and in north eastern direction 
by the inclusion of the Baltics. (Hassinger 1942: 176) Nazi ideological 
indoctrination was pervasive. Schäfer accused all earlier German authors of 
building their concepts of Mitteleuropa on the basis of undesirable liberal ideas, 
rather than natural spatial and organic theories. (Schäfer 1942: 59) Overall, the 
“influence of all these theories on the making of Hitler’s personal foreign policy 
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was nil” (Gilbert 1947: 65). Rather than informing the Nazi policy making, the 
new, rather mindless concepts of Mitteleuropa followed in its tracks. 
For example, the attack on the Soviet Union was in direct contradiction with 
Karl Haushofer’s concept of the Kontinentalblock (Continental Bloc, Haushofer 
1931b). Haushofer, the father of German Geopolitik, viewed the future of the 
world in terms of Pan-Ideas, political units of continental character. He 
understood Mitteleuropa simply as a living space for the German people and 
identified it with the former Austro-Hungarian Empire unified with Germany. 
Perhaps overestimating the influence of his role model, Halford Mackinder, he 
viewed the successor states as a mere strip of territories made independent for 
the sole purpose of preventing cooperation between German and Russian 
nations, due to the threat that this would pose to the interests of the British 
Empire. Should Germany gain the two main navigable rivers of Europe – the 
Rhine and the Danube – under its territorial control, it would form a strong 
continental unit with global strategic significance. Such a political unit would 
then become a core of the Pan-Idea of Europe stretching its influence over 
northern Africa. Its neighbour would have been Pan-Asia, with its core in the 
Soviet Union. (Haushofer 1931: 78 – 79) However, in the 1941 revision of his 
theses, Haushofer completely dropped the area originally assigned for the 
Soviet Union and split it between zones belonging to Germany and Japan. 
(Haushofer 1941) His profound change of heart followed fairly blatantly the 
change in Nazi policy and the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. 
It must be concluded therefore that Mitteleuropa concepts changed into one of 
many propagandist tool of the Nazi regime. Their interchangeability with 
notions such as the Great-German Europe suggests that Mitteleuropa was little 
more than yet another euphemism for German domination of areas delineated 
as living space of the Germans. It lost its emotional appeal in favour of Reich, 
what was essentially a culmination of processes of changing ambitions of 
theorists as well as politicians in the 1930s.  
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Nevertheless, the notion of Mitteleuropa – however vague its meaning during 
the war – was strongly associated with Nazi propaganda and fell into disgrace 
following the Nazi defeat. Even forty years later, Timothy Garton Ash wrote that 
in Germany, the word Mitteleuropa could only have been whispered if one did 
not want to be accused of harbouring expansionist ambitions. (Ash 1986) 
 
6.3.3 The return of the Middle Tier 
After the war broke out in 1939, British and American writers started to 
analyse its causes and to suggest steps to safeguard peace in the future. Halford 
Mackinder updated his theory of the clash of sea- and land-power in an article 
for Foreign Affairs in 1943. (Mackinder 1943) More importance was assigned to 
an Inner Crescent surrounding the Heartland and Mackinder advocated the 
necessity of British-Russian-USA cooperation in order to prevent the growth of 
Germany in the area. Now it was the cooperation of the sea- and land-based 
powers that was presented as crucial in order to prevent the rise of a hostile 
power in the Inner Crescent area and thereby safeguard world peace. 
Given the fact that both world wars broke out in the same area, featuring the 
same malefactors, it does not come as a surprise that neutralization of Germany 
was the preoccupation of researchers in the West. Due to the eastwards pattern 
of the Reich’s expansion, many scholars made the association between 
neutralizing Germany and stabilising the former territories of the Austro-
Hugarian Empire as preconditions for any sustainable peace of the future.  
To resolve the question of how this might best be effected, Robert Dickinson, 
then the Reader in Geography at University College London, compiled an 
unusually elaborate enquiry into the problem of Central Europe. Dickinson not 
only explored various definitions of Mitteleuropa/Central Europe/Europe 
Centrale that had been published in German, English and French literatures, he 
also contrasted them with the notion of Lebensraum, Deutschland, Reichs-, 
Volks- and Kulturboden. The focus of his enquiry determined the character of 
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his work and its conclusions, as Dickinson’s book was one of very few wartime 
Anglo-Saxon conceptions of Central Europe that avoided taking up Mackinder’s 
Middle Tier theory as the basis of the proposed solution. In his view, Central 
Europe could be divided into three parts –West Central Europe (Germany, 
Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria), Vistula Central Europe 
(Poland and the Baltic states) and Danubian Central Europe (with Bohemia as a 
sort of crossroads). Denouncing German domination, he also asserted that 
thereby to advance the creation of a federal union in Central Europe was 
admittedly “necessary, but quite inadequate” because of the internal fault-lines 
between nations and cultures. (Dickinson 1942: 210) Dickinson insisted that 
such solution could not ensure a lasting peace. So instead, he suggested this 
creation of three federative units consisting of sovereign national states in each 
of his respective parts of Central Europe. (Dickinson 1942: 211) It comes as a 
disappointing conclusion to an otherwise excellent analysis that Dickinson 
failed to resolve on the problem of Bohemia, as he could not decide into which 
one of the regional units to include it. (Dickinson 1942: 212) Similarly, he 
refused to delineate the borders of individual units more precisely, as he 
asserted it would all depend on the outcome of the war.  
George Harrison’s and Peter Jordan’s Central Union (1943) was written at a 
much lighter level, as regards the evidence presented to the reader. On the 
other hand, it seemed much more confident in suggesting what needed to be 
done. Harrison and Jordan identified a ‘Middle Zone’ comprising Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Albania and Greece (see Appendix 35). The basic idea behind their Central 
Union was its proclaimed ability to resist any future Germany aggression, cast 
very much along the lines of ‘Divided we fall – United we stand’ idiom. 
(Harrison and Jordan 1943: 6 – 8) Harrison and Jordan suggested that the 
previously problematic ‘German wedges’ of Silesia and East Prussia within 
Middle Zone countries should be removed. This simply meant the assignment of 
both areas to Poland and repatriation of “only about one and a half million 
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Germans”. (Harrison and Jordan 1943: 11) They viewed the creation of their 
Central Union as a strategic goal for European security, whose importance 
 “would be twofold: (1) It would collaborate actively with the 
democratic and peaceful powers, (2) by its very existence the 
Central Union would prevent any would-be conqueror from 
seizing the most vital strategic area of Europe.” (Harrison and 
Jordan 1943: 15) 
An emphasis was laid on modelling the Central Union after the USA and making 
it a vanguard of European democracy. Even though the threat of Russian 
aggression was not spelled out explicitly, the maps and illustrations spoke 
almost as loudly. Harrison and Jordan denounced Danubian federative plans as 
they could “never be a complete solution of the problem”. (Harrison and Jordan 
1943: 25) The argumentation ran along traditional Mackinderian lines, even 
though the authors avoided referring to Russia as a potential enemy and the 
necessity of keeping it apart from Germany. However, references to Poland as 
the keystone of the union and a country of “utmost political and strategic 
importance” since it was “the only country in the Middle Zone to have both 
Germany and Russia for neighbours” (Harrison and Jordan 1943: 21) clearly 
show the underlying basis of their thinking. The volume went to great lengths 
in trying to assure Russia that the Central Union would be an asset for her, 
featuring deliberately over-emphatically titled subchapters, such as the ‘Central 
Union – the friend of Russia’ (Harrison and Jordan 1943: 33) or ‘Russian 
doorways to the world’ (Harrison and Jordan 1943: 35).  
Overall, Harrison and Jordan’s treatise feels like a propagandist peace of 
literature published at the height of the war. It was built on Mackinder’s 
original Middle Tier concept, but with a federative twist, given the glaring 
failure of the nation-state solution to prevent German resurgence. Despite its 
best efforts, the treatise betrays the view of Russia as potential enemy, present 
of course in Mackinder’s original concept.  
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An article by Reginald Lang, ‘Central Europe and European Unity’, published in 
1946 is quite different both to Dickinson’s academic volume and the heavily 
illustrated political pamphlet of Harrison and Jordan. Dealing with the realities 
of post-war Europe, the argumentation is empirical and factual. Central Europe 
was again defined along Mackinderian lines, with conclusions presented to 
tackle both the underlying principles and pragmatics of suggested Central 
Europe. Lang had warned on earlier occasions of the dangers of keeping Europe 
divided along national lines. In his view, only a united Europe could be a 
guarantor of peace. Specifically, he pointed to Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
suggesting they would either fall into Soviet sphere of influence or face 
recurring future conflicts, if Europe remained divided. (Lang 1946: 27) Only a 
unified Central Europe could bring unity to Europe as a whole and thus 
guarantee sustainable peace. He concluded his article as follows: 
 “As long as Central Europe is disjoined, there can be neither unity 
in Europe nor peace in the world. When Central Europe is united 
with Western Europe in a European Federation, there will be unity 
in Europe and peace in the world.” (Lang 1946: 29) 
Lang’s article would be one of the last academic contemplations of Central 
Europe for decades to come. In the post-war period, British writing on the topic 
of Central Europe shifted away from suggestions for political reorganization, 
towards the views epitomised by Felix Gilbert, who argued that rather than a 
political reality, “the term Central Europe is a descriptive, geographical concept, 
designating the area between Germany and Russia from Poland’s Baltic coast 
south to the Mediterranean”. (Gilbert 1947: 58) He reserved expression of any 
political aims to the underlying aims of the German notion of Mitteleuropa and 
stated that Central Europe had a purely geographical connotation. Given the 
situation on the ground, with the Iron Curtain now a depressing reality, it was 
not surprising that many writers placed a politicised Central Europe on the 
shelf of history.  
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In the United States, wartime period witnessed a boom-time for geopolitics. The 
perception was that its main thought had been proven right by two world wars. 
Its prominence in the foreign policy of Nazi Germany led US researchers to 
renew their study of geopolitical theory. Many authors therefore became 
interested in Central Europe during the course of the Second World War, 
analyzing earlier German concepts, as was the case with Henry Cord Meyer. In 
his paper, “Mitteleuropa in German Political Geography”, Meyer dealt with 
various concepts originating between 1880 and 1939. As Meyer himself 
admitted, his and other similar papers published during the same period, were 
more like “autopsies” of what had been written before rather than new 
treatises on Central Europe. (Meyer 1946: 178) A marked exception were the 
works of Feliks Gross (1944, 1945), who focused on proposals for 
reorganisation of Central Europe as presented and conceived by exiled 
government groupings in the United States and the Great Britain. His elaborate 
record of what was being proposed, planned and done in reality constitutes an 
invaluable source of information on the practicalities of federative plans. Gross 
himself favoured creation of an inclusive federation, stretching from the Baltic 
to the Aegean Sea. (Gross 1945: 34) He suggested that Austria had to be 
included in order to prevent any future Anschluss and that the union had to 
observe federative and democratic principles. In Gross’s view, the model should 
not have been the United States of America, as suggested by a number of other 
proposals, but rather the Swiss Confederation or the British Commonwealth. 
Gross’s application was based upon Mackinderian lines, with the addition of the 
federative principle but contained assurances for the Soviet Union that the 
East-Central European Federation would effectively work as a bridge between 
the USSR and Europe. (Gross 1945: 81) Finally, Gross placed his East-Central 
European Federation within a wider system of federations across the whole of 
Europe. (Gross 1945: 72)  
With the defeat of Germany, of course, the United States emerged as a global 
power. The geographical scope of strategic policy was extended from the 
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western hemisphere to cover all possible theatres of global conflict. (Sloan 
1988: 118) And the Soviet Union was expanding its influence over Central 
Europe and elsewhere, as foreshadowed again by Halford Mackinder. Classical 
geopolitics seemed to be the tool of choice for the US policymakers searching 
for an effective analytical yardstick to make sense of a complicated post-war 
international situation.  
However, US political geographers other than Gross did not conceptualise 
Central Europe. The focus was on the reconstruction and regional integration of 
Western Europe, as countries to the east and south-east of occupied Germany 
and Austria went Communist and the envisaged buffer zone went to the Soviets. 
Political geography in the United States now took a strategic turn with its 
conceptualisation of global super-power rivalry, future potential conflict zones 
and the means of countering threat – only very few still believed the Middle 
Tier, now under Soviet domination, could be one of them. 
 
6.3.4 Federalism versus power politics 
The threat (and reality) of Hitler’s New Order had finally convinced the 
quarrelling politicians of the (former) successor states that in order to resist 
future threats, the creation of some form of union in the region was necessary. 
With Reich, rather than Mitteleuropa being the synonym for the new 
international nightmare, Central Europe could be theorized and ascribed 
independent characteristics and qualities. With introduction of Reich, Central 
Europe could be theorised in other than pan-German context and new 
conceptions started to emerge. Through the discourse driven by exiled 
governments and émigré politicians from occupied countries based in London 
and New York, a new vision of Central Europe was forming. It would designate 
a future partnership of equal nations along the area designated as the Middle 
Tier by Mackinder, either within one or more federations. Its professed 
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characteristic features would be freedom, democracy, respect for national 
identities, peace and cooperation.  
The discourse of Central Europe differed from the interwar one in its much 
greater emphasis upon practical steps towards the realisation of federative 
plans. Exiled governments, émigré politicians and academics were busy 
elaborating the basis for compatibility in respective national systems of 
education, agriculture, transport, etc. Journals such as New Europe and the 
Journal of Central European Affairs were printing report after report, proposal 
after proposal towards this end. Agreements were being signed on partial areas 
of cooperation, especially agriculture (New Europe 1943) or education (CEEPB 
1943a), as serious planning of post-war reorganization of Europe got under 
way on both sides of the Atlantic. These efforts, of course, assumed that 
Germany would not win the war. 
As Feliks Gross, now Secretary of the Central and Eastern European Planning 
Board, observed, the proposed projects generally fell into three categories: 
“(1) One inclusive federation of states from the Aegean Sea to the 
Baltic, 
 (2) Two federations: in the north a Polish-Czechoslovak union; in 
the south a Danubian federation of Austria, Hungary, Rumania, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania 
 (3) Three federations: (a) in the north a federation of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia; (b) in the middle a Danubian federation of 
Austria, Hungary and Rumania; (c) in the south a union of Balkan 
States.” (Gross 1945: 29) 
Gross posited that the all-inclusive federation was the most desirable option for 
the majority of exiled politicians and academics involved. (Gross 1945: 34) The 
other two options were only considered, should the one inclusive union prove 
unattainable. All official exiled governments’ work towards regional integration 
was being conducted with one union in mind.  
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In the United States, the first concrete steps were taken at the International 
Labor Organization’s meeting in November 1941, when delegations of the 
exiled governments of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia issued a 
common declaration on regional solidarity. (Gross 1944: 170) Based on this 
agreement, the Central and Eastern European Planning Board was formed, 
consisting of representatives of these countries. (Lipgens 1982: 443) This body 
restricted itself to producing research, reports and plans on economic, social 
and educational questions (Gross 1944: 172), while the governments in exile in 
London based officials were busying themselves with overarching questions of 
the future Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav federations. It was 
envisaged that these two base federative components would expand over time 
to cover an area stretching from Poland to Greece. (Beneš 1942: 12) 
Representatives of Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia were also 
included in the processes of the planned regional integration and took part in 
research, discussions and preparation of plans focusing on individual areas of 
future cooperation. (New Europe 1943, CEEPB 1943a, CEEPB 1943b) Research 
and planning work was conducted both in London and New York, with the 
financial and administrative help of the US Government. (US Committee on 
Educational Reconstruction 1943) 
At first sight, it might seem that the British Government was also in favour of 
federation in Central Europe. Winston Churchill expressed his support for the 
idea in his speech to American audience on 21 March 1943. (UN Information 
Office 1943) The Foreign Office started up a Foreign Research and Press 
Service, tasked to analyze the ethnic, economic and political conditions of the 
successor states. Interestingly, the FRPS was the first body to designate the area 
as Eastern, rather than Central Europe. An FRPS report The Reconstruction Of 
Eastern Europe II. International Relations published in 1941, favoured the three 
federations solution. (FRPS 1941) However, the FRPS soon changed their minds 
after consultations with the exiled governments and in August 1942 published 
another report, this time entitled Confederations in Eastern Europe. (FRPS 
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1942) This favoured the creation of only two units in Central Europe. Finally, in 
1943 FRPS published so-called Macartney Memorandum175, officially entitled 
The Settlement of Eastern Europe, envisaging four possible scenarios: 
permanent Russian control, permanent German control, an independent 
Eastern Europe on either a selective or comprehensive basis. Despite its title, 
the report was not a suggestion for settlement, as the previous ones had been. 
Rather, it presented contemporary context and suggested possible future 
scenarios, running essentially along familiar Jászi-like lines. (Jászi 1941) 
However, none of this confusing and incoherent mesh of memoranda and 
reports was actually implemented as British policy. Power-politics would take 
precedence over federalist idealism. 
 
Feliks Gross maintained as late as March 1944 that members of the Central and 
Eastern European Planning Board in New York possessed very little 
information on the attitudes of the Soviet Union towards their work:  
 “There is no official statement in this respect, but an opinion is 
expressed in a Moscow periodical, War and the Working Class, 
where an unfriendly attitude to any federal idea in Europe is 
taken by the author, Mr. Malinin.” (Gross 1944: 175) 
Conversely, the exiled governments in London, especially the Czechoslovak one, 
had more direct and specific knowledge of Moscow’s opinion on the matter. 
Eduard Táborský published Beneš’ diary notes taken during meetings with 
Vyacheslav Molotov and Alexander Bogomolov, during which it became obvious 
that Moscow was opposed to the proposed Polish-Czechoslovak confederation. 
(Táborský 1949: 389 - 390) However, continuing to inform the British 
Government and the exiled Polish government about their dealings, the 
Czechoslovak government also worked on plans that ought to have been much 
more to the potential liking of the Soviet Government. For in 1943, Beneš put 
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 Named after its chief author C. A. Macartney. 
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forward another proposal, which envisaged the basis of confederation in a 
system of bilateral treaties of friendship tying both Czechoslovakia and Poland 
to the Soviet Union. The Soviets suggested agreement to this proposal in 
principle. (Táborský 1949: 391) Táborský noted somewhat bitterly that it 
might have been just a Soviet deception to appease Czechs, while planning for 
instalment of their own puppet government for Poland. (Táborský 1949: 393) 
 
No matter how focused, organized and practically oriented the work on 
federative plans was, the reality at the height of the war dictated that Germany 
had to be defeated, before any kind of non-German dominated Central Europe 
could be created. For this purpose, the cooperation of the Soviet Union was 
vital. And the Soviets had nothing to gain from the federative Central Europe. 
Quite the opposite, they logically wanted to keep the countries on their western 
and south-western border divided and weak. All the hopes and effort put into 
the planning of a future federation in Central Europe in the west 
notwithstanding, the Moscow (October 1944) and Yalta (February 1945) 
conference deals sealed the fate of Central Europe, where the Soviets were dealt 
an upper hand.  
Spheres of influence were soon to be divided by an Iron Curtain, cutting Europe 
into East and West. There was no space left for Central Europe. 
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6.4 The Cold War - the nonexistent concept 
Talking a long view, the Cold War was a peculiar chapter in the history of 
Central Europe. Following all the feverish work on the plans for Central 
European federation during the Second World War, the geographic notion 
almost vanished in the following decades. As the following section documents, 
the cause of all this was the bi-polar structure of the post war world.  
However, the same processes identified in the construction of the notion 
(formulation of identities, interests and actions) in earlier periods were equally 
complicit in its disappearance from daily parlance. The Soviet interests for 
domination in the area were in direct contradiction to any Central European 
integration project. Even a suggestion of such ambition met with fierce reprisal. 
On the other hand, new concepts of Central Europe continued to be formulated 
in the émigré communities in the West mostly in form of neutralised federation 
of buffer states between the East and the West, these plans failed to gather 
substantial support among Western policy makers as they were not willing to 
risk a conflict with the Soviet Union over this issue. Indeed, Soviet domination 
of the area was recognized in the period of détente, where recognition of 
respective spheres of influence became a precondition for any talks of 
limitation of nuclear arms race.  
Thus the Central European projects of regional federation met with direct 
Soviet opposition and lack of support in the West. As a result, any concepts 
produced in the period were stillborn. 
 
6.4.1 The story of the ‘Titoist Clique’ 
Soviet opposition to regional integration on its outlying flanks was real and 
fierce. In fact, it would trigger the first majors split and a tidal wave of purges 
that swept across Communist Parties in the region.  
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For in 1947, Josip Broz Tito picked upon his wartime plan for Balkan federation 
consisting of the six Yugoslav republics and Bulgaria. Tito also signed a string of 
treaties with other countries of Communist Europe (Meissner 1955: 30 – 35) 
and approached the Bulgarian leader, Georgij Dimitrov, with an offer to 
establish closer links and cooperation in the Balkans. Soviet suspicions over the 
nature and extent of Tito’s proposals were laid bare with Dimitrov’s statement 
at the press conference in Sofia in January 1948. He revealed that their talks by 
now did not consider whether a union stretching from Poland, to 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece should be 
constituted, but that it was more of a question of when and how. (Lipgens 1982: 
454) Yet it was obvious from his statements that no actual arrangements for 
such a comprehensive union had yet been made; however, the stated intention 
was bad enough in Stalin’s eyes. (Meissner 1955: 15)  
The Soviet reaction was furious. The Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders were 
summoned to Moscow immediately. Dimitrov was brought to heed, but Tito had 
sent a delegation headed by Milovan Djilas, Secretary of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party’s Politburo, instead. Djilas’s recollections of a showdown 
highlight that Stalin had spelled out that “no relations between the peoples’ 
democracies were permissible that were not in the interests and had not the 
approval of the Soviet government.” (Djilas 1962: 134) The non-compliant 
Yugoslav Federation would be outlawed by Comintern in June 1948 and all 
countries of the Soviet Bloc followed by denouncing existing treaties with 
Belgrade. Dimitrov mysteriously died upon his next visit to Moscow and all 
other leaders, who had showed signs of support for the plan were hit by an 
ensuing purge aimed at the ‘international Titoist clique’. Lucretiu Patrascanu, 
Laszlo Rajk and Traycho Kostov176 and many others paid with their lives. 
                                                 
176
 Lucretiu Patrascanu was a prominent member of the Romanian Communist Party leadership and a 
Minister of Justice 1944 – 48. László Rajk was a Hungarian Communist leader, Minister of Interior 
(1946 – 48) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1948 – 49) Traycho Kostov was President of the 
Council of Ministers and a General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party (until spring 1949).  
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(Lipgens 1982: 455) There was no space for alternative structures within the 
Soviet Bloc! 
 
6.4.2 The end of the multiple choice question 
The fate of Tito’s plan suggested the very same thing to the West as it had to the 
East – that the Soviet leadership was afraid of the regional integration of their 
European vassals, as this might have challenged their domination of the area. 
The idea was picked up upon almost immediately. 
A 1948 special edition of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Looking toward One World, featured two articles promoting 
federative plans for Central Europe from the pen of European émigrés. In his 
contribution to the volume, Joseph Rouček, a political scientist of Czech origin, 
pointed out that there were only two options – a divided Central Europe under 
Soviet rule or federative Central Europe integrated with the West. Rouček 
pointed out that Soviet rule was being tightened by the day (referring to the 
Soviet opposition to plans revealed by Dimitrov) and pointed to the danger of 
gradual Communist takeover in other European countries, especially France 
and Italy. He posited that the key safeguard against the spread of Communism 
in Europe was the liberation of countries of Central Europe from the Soviet 
zone of influence and building of a strong bulwark by their federalisation. 
Arguing along distinctively Mackinderian lines, Rouček advised that: 
“the safety of America depends on her ability to defeat efforts of 
any powerful European nation to establish an imperialistic 
control over central-eastern Europe and subsequently over the 
whole continent.” (Rouček 1948: 64) 
Even though Rouček did not present his own concept of what a desirable 
federal unit should look like or work, his references to the wartime efforts of 
exiled government groupings in London and the Central and Eastern European 
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Planning Board in New York are unmistakeable. Rouček did take part in the 
work of the CEEPB during the war and his article showed desire to return to 
these plans. In an attempt to sell the idea to the American scholarly public, 
Rouček made good use of the then popular concepts in political geography and 
presented the creation of Central Europe as a strategic interest for the West. 
Similarly, an article by Oscar Halecki, a historian and a director of the Polish 
Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, called for a return to wartime 
considerations of federative plans, starting with the Polish-Czechoslovak union. 
(Halecki 1948: 68) Focusing on the history of efforts for federalisation of the 
region, his goal was to turn readers’ attention to  
“the right of the peoples of east-central Europe, who have 
suffered so much in the past, finally to organize their political 
existence according to their own wishes.” (Halecki 1948: 69)  
Criticising the Soviet veto of federative plans, Halecki called for the support of 
the West in the fight to win such a right. 
In another American journal, the Proceedings of the American Philosphical 
Society, our ‘developmental optimist’, Oscar Jászi wrote in August 1948, that the 
Soviet domination of the region was unlikely to hold for long. “I doubt that this 
experiment will be successful” claimed Jászi (1949: 26) reasoning that:  
“dissatisfied nations and suppressed nationalities are opposing 
the new state systems forced upon them. They revolt against the 
superstate which gives its orders to all the states and which 
protects or expels national units. Is there a possibility of avoiding 
a new catastrophe? I see only one. And this is the Marshall Plan, if 
duly supplemented… Federalism is the only possible means of 
reconciling state and nations and of liberating national 
minorities.” (Jászi 1949: 27) 
Although still prioritising the theme of national minorities, Jászi made a radical 
departure from his usual Danubian concept and suggested a federal union of 
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the USA with all beneficiary states of the Marshall Plan. Such a federation would 
then “also give help to those unfortunate small nations who would like to 
federate, but who cannot, impeded by power politics”. (Jászi 1949: 27) In this 
way, Jászi not only brought the outside power into his Central Europe concept, 
but also contextually linked it to what was to become ‘the West’ during the Cold 
War period.  
 
All three articles suggested, of course, that the discourse of Central Europe had 
become bi-polar. The multiple options for the future of Central Europe typical 
of earlier periods premised upon a number of competing concepts suddenly 
became an either-or question of belonging to either to the East or to the West – 
a zero sum game, if you like. Central Europe was not seen in its own terms as an 
entity that might deliver the best for all nations in the area by linking trade and 
building upon other potential complementarities. The threat and indeed 
leadership of Germany was out of the equation completely. Now Central Europe 
was portrayed as a strategic safeguard for the West in its fight against the East. 
All three articles had been written by émigrés from the area and asserted that 
the new Soviet satellites had been placed into the Soviet sphere of influence, 
whereas in fact they would prefer to be (and righteously belonged) on the other 
side of the Iron Curtain. Quite intriguingly, this was the very same theme that 
would be picked up thirty-five years later. (see sections 1.1.2 and 6.4.1) 
Moreover, Rouček’s, line of argument that an embrace of Central Europe into 
the bosom of the West was a strategic imperative would also resurface in post-
Cold War discourse.  
Rouček’s reasoning did not fall on entirely deaf ear in the United States (see 
section 6.3.5). However, the US establishment was not willing to risk yet 
another war over Central Europe. The uncompromising Soviet reaction to Tito’s 
plan for federation sent a clear message that for Stalin, prevention of such 
projects was a cause worth killing for… even his own comrades! 
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6.4.3 Brief resurrection  
From 1948 onwards, the notion of Central Europe was slowly disappearing 
from daily parlance. ‘East-central’, ‘Central-eastern’ or even ‘Central-Eastern-
Balkan’ (Rouček 1948) Europe entered the stage. Federalist plans published in 
the West could be represented as inconsequential outcries from émigré groups 
for “liberation from the Soviet and Communist yoke”. (Ripka 1953: 1) Even 
though occasional mentions of Central Europe were still appearing in the 
British press (e.g. The Times, 21 January 1952), the notion of Eastern Europe 
appeared ever more frequently, referring to all European countries on the other 
side of the Iron Curtain (e.g. Manchester Guardian, 7 May 1953). 
In his article on meaning of the geographical term Central Europe Karl 
Sinnhuber (1954) noted that “in view of the great changes in the political 
boundaries and cultural landscape of Europe which have taken place during the 
recent past, we may need to modify our ideas as to the extent of Central 
Europe” (Sinnhuber 1954: 15). He asked whether it would “not be better to 
cease using this term altogether”. (Sinnhuber 1954: 16) Sinnhuber, indeed, 
concluded that even though Central Europe remained a relevant topographical 
term and physical region, it had “at least for the moment … ceased to exist” as a 
political notion. (Sinnhuber 1954: 37) 
However, the vitality of Central Europe seemed to draw fresh breath, if not 
particularly strongly, in the late 1950s, as the debate over potential superpower 
disengagement in Europe filled the pages of the daily presses and academic 
journals alike. Central Europe briefly appeared to possess potential as a 
demilitarized zone between the Eastern and the Western bloc in Europe.  
This was the thrust of an article of James Warburg and Wilhelm Grewe, 
published in 1959, which suggested the disengagement of both the Soviet Union 
and the United States from the area, for the sake of German unification and 
easing of the tension between the blocks in Europe. They posited that in order 
to prevent a superpower confrontation in Europe, Central Europe would need 
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to be neutralized, demilitarized and its countries forbidden from entering into 
military alliance with one or the other superpower. (Warburg and Grewe 1959: 
16) In Warburg and Grewe’s article, Central Europe as a concept independent of 
both East and West was effectively resurrected and restored to its role as 
Mackinderian buffer (minus the previously defining problem of Germany of 
course). Similarly, Central Europe also featured as a potential buffer zone in an 
article by David Dallin, who warned that “caution is necessary in any plan of 
disengagement in Central Europe, for a weak Germany would permit the 
expansion of Russian power over Germany and France.” (Dallin 1959: 1) Dallin 
maintained that withdrawal from Central Europe should be undertaken 
simultaneously by the West and the East and very carefully considered by the 
West, in order to prevent the spread of Communism. If this could not be 
assured, disengagement might bring more dangers than it would obviate, 
damaging the interests of the West. 
Dallin’s views were of limited significance as either of the superpowers was not 
ready or willing to surrender its position. For Central Europe was now 
considered a political concept of the past. 
 
6.4.4 No more Central Europe? 
The recognition of the division of Europe into Eastern and Western was near 
universal by the late 1950s. The war time division into spheres of influence was 
confirmed and fostered by the creation of security and economic structures on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain respectively. There was no space left for Central 
Europe. In the words of Saul B. Cohen: „Europe outside of Russia is divided into 
two parts: West and East. Central Europe is no more. It is a mere geographical 
expression that lacks geopolitical substance”177. (Cohen 1964: 218) 
                                                 
177
 Cohen viewed – now foregone - Central Europe as “lying between the Rhine on the west and 
Russia and the Balkans on the south and east”. (Cohen 1964: 218) 
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A significant drop in usage of the term suggests that Cohen’s opinion was 
shared by many. A simple, quantitative comparison of the number of 
publications, which the feature notion Central Europe in their title in the 
collections of the British Library during the period 1950 – 1959 with earlier 
and later periods shows that use of the notion in the 1950s halved as compared 
to the 1940s and even dropped below pertaining levels in the 1920s. On the 
other hand, use of the notion of East-Central Europe was in ascendancy in the 
1950s (having been non-existent before the late 1930s). However, this rise and 
a doubling in the number of publications featuring this notion in the 1970s 
might be misleading, as pointed out below. 
 
Figure 2: Number of books featuring ‘Central Europe’ and ‘East Central 
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A qualitative comparison of the contents of books featuring both notions shows 
another interesting pattern. Only one book featuring Central Europe in the title 
published in the 1950s dealt with the potential reorganization of the regional 
power politics – Hubert Ripka’s A Federation of Central Europe (1953). In 
contrast, out of twenty-four books featuring Central Europe in the 1940s, nine 
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elaborated detailed concepts, while seven works were devoted to analysis of 
post-war situation in the area. In the 1950s, the notion of Central Europe 
featured predominantly in books on the history of the region and the fate of the 
European Jews both before and during the Second World War. Occasionally, the 
odd study on economics or a regional bibliography was published. Some 
solitary and somewhat obscure conceptions of federations in Central Europe 
did indeed appear under alternative names, such as Danubian Federation, 
however, without much recognition or even correlation to reality. For example, 
the work of Ferdinand Miksche, émigré Czechoslovak army officer, completely 
ignored the fact of Soviet domination and insisted that the only obstacle in 
creation of federation in the area was Czechoslovakia, which resisted 
integration projects. (e. g. Miksche 1953)  
East Central Europe as a notion appeared during the late 1930s in the works of 
authors of Polish origin, who sought to counter the notion of Central Europe 
established by contemporary German discourse (Mitteleuropa), attempting 
thereby to construct an independent identity for the region of Mackinder’s 
Middle Tier and to emphasise the exclusion of Germany from such a context. 
(Janowski 1938, Gross 1945, Janowski 1945) The early Cold-War period 
revived this notion in reference to countries that had fallen under Soviet 
domination. So East Central Europe was a term preferred by authors writing 
about the post-war expansion of Communism and US foreign policy.  
The total number of volumes (twenty-five) in the British Library collections 
featuring Central Europe in their title that were published in the 1960s, might 
suggest a resurgence of the notion. However, eleven volumes focused on the 
subjects of history and archaeology and dealt mainly with pre-history and 
middle ages more than recent past. Even though four featured publications 
atlases with divergent delineation of the area and five volumes contemplated 
Communist takeovers and institutional design, there were no new conceptions 
of Central Europe among the books to be found in the British Library. The 
understanding of Central Europe as a political entity or project was completely 
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diluted. Instead, the notion was being used in a very loose geographic manner 
by authors writing on subjects unrelated to its earlier use (such as the typology 
of Baroque churches or survey of sites where Roman coins were discovered). 
Even the notion of East-Central Europe was losing its political appeal in 1960s 
and it featured in titles of books dealing with ecology, geology or agriculture.  
This pattern was even more pronounced in the 1970s, when seven out of eleven 
books featuring East-Central Europe in their title were on history, two on 
foreign trade, two on aspects of early 20th century US diplomacy and one on 
urbanisation. As for Central Europe, twenty-five out of fifty books were again 
works on history and archaeology. The next highest category involved 
consideration of the characteristics of the balance of power in the area (five 
volumes), closely followed by work in zoology, botany and geology (each three 
volumes). The appearance of strategic considerations should be put into 
context of the ongoing SALT I and II negotiations and other efforts to curb the 
superpower arms race. It should not be forgotten that substantial conventional 
forces were deployed by both sides in the wider borderlands of the Iron Curtain 
and the strategic considerations of Central Europe appearing in 1970s dealt 
precisely with such matters. Rather than suggesting neutrality of the region or a 
change in political organization, they focused on the challenge of ameliorating 
the prospects of a East-West stand-off in the area.  
As is apparent from the following chart, the region was increasingly being 
conceptualised in terms of bipolar power struggles and references to Eastern 
Europe rocketed from three in 1930s to four-hundred-and-nineteen in the 
1970s. The notion of Central Europe now trailed significantly behind references 
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Even though this short survey cannot claim to be representative of the whole 
volume of publishing, it does offer an idea of how usage of the notion changed 
in comparison to earlier periods. While in the 1940s actual conceptions of 
Central Europe accounted for almost 40 % of all works published and 
considerations of political situation in the area for another 30 %, this type of 
work would all but disappear in the following two decades.  
The drop in use of the notion of Central Europe, the short-lived rise in the 
number of East Central European references and the changing pattern of use of 
both suggest that even thought references to Central Europe were increasing in 
the academic literature, they were not tied to any political concept. In fact, and 
allowing for some exceptions, they were not tied to politics at all. 
Understanding of Central Europe as a political concept was marginalised. 
Instead, it became increasingly associated with history and arts produced 
within a vaguer geographic identity. 
Lacking the political support for reinvigoration on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain, Central Europe was just a political chimera of the past. But, contrary to 
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Cohen’s assertion that Central Europe was no more, it would perhaps be more 
appropriate to say that it now was in a deep coma and only being maintained by 
hopeful émigré groups. (see section 6.4.5)  
 
6.4.5 Pax Sovietica 
As is apparent from section 6.3.2, there were significant changes in the debate 
over Central Europe in early Cold War period. First of all, its continuation had 
been limited to the works of émigré authors (Rouček, Halecki, Jászi). Second, 
argumentation in favour of creation of a new Central Europe was cast within 
the prevailing global bi-polar conflict rather than regional context. Central 
Europe was referred to as a part of the West by mistake on the wrong side of 
the Iron Curtain, strategic buffer against the Soviet Union or safeguard against 
spreading of Communism rather than a significant regional context in its own 
right. Third, published concepts were designed to influence mainly the US 
academic and public establishment, as the decision making power over the 
destiny of the region now lay in the hands of superpowers rather than local 
politicians. Fourth, concern over a defeated Germany disappeared. 
Initially, the idea of a Central Europe being included within the Western sphere 
of influence enjoyed the support of the US Government (Gross 1957: 367 and 
369). Continuing within a war time pattern of cooperation with the US 
Government and imitating the First World War Mid-European Union initiative, 
émigré representatives in the USA signed The Declaration of Liberation in 
Philadelphia’s Independence Hall in 1951.178 Signed by “exiles from Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
and Yugoslavia loyally united and single in thought” (NCFE 1951: 12), the 
declaration called for liberation of these countries from the Soviet sphere of 
influence and their inclusion into the integration processes under way in 
                                                 
178
 Also called The Second Philadelphia Manifesto in the context with the 1918 Mid-European Union 
Declaration (Gross 1957: 367)  
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Western Europe. (NCFE 1951: 14) The declaration was sponsored by the 
National Committee for a Free Europe, an American anti-Communist 
organization founded by Allen Dulles, that supported nine further panels 
examining the preconditions and actions necessary to achieve it. The activities 
sponsored by NCFE intentionally aimed not only at the creation of a Central 
European union of some form, but at the inclusion of these countries within a 
common European union. (NCFE 1954: 6) The declaration also had portrayed 
the Soviet designated European countries as ‘captive countries’ for the first 
time – thus introducing two major themes that would be heavily picked up at 
the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s - the ‘kidnapped West’ concept; and 
the need, even right, for a speedy integration into the Western structures.  
But declarations, the formation of assessment panels and the establishment of 
Radio Free Europe would be the limits of official US support for the cause of 
Central Europe. As peaceful transition from Communism failed to materialize 
and the Soviet Union tightened its control of European satellites following 
unrest in 1953 (East Germany) and 1956 (Poland and Hungary) unrests, the 
support of the US government dissipated.  
Indeed, to the great frustration of émigré groups, even the short-lived renewal 
of the debate over the topic of Central Europe as a demilitarized zone failed to 
galvanize more robust support, as neither of the superpowers was willing to 
unilaterally cut their military presence in the area. One of the very few 
federalist initiatives remaining was the project of Hungarian émigré groups in 
the United States – in the shape of their Studies for a New Europe journal. The 
journal articles gravitated towards concepts envisaging Swiss type canton 
confederation and neutrality, later suggesting a buffer role between the East 
and West and UN supervision of the area. (Dreisziger 1983: 548) Another 
similar medium with a wider breath of contributors was the New Europe 
journal, effectively the continuation of the periodical started by R. W. Seton-
Watson during the First World War. 
 313 
However, a further disappointment for émigré groups would come in the form 
of superpower détente from the mid-1960s. The US government would now 
abandon projects that could potentially cause irritation to the Soviets for the 
sake of establishing a dialogue aimed at maintaining global peace. The early 
Cold War Western claim that Soviet satellites in Europe would be used as a 
springboard for aggression against the West started to look like overstretched 
propaganda. The threatening image of the USSR in the West would be 
minimized and President Johnson pragmatically accepted the existence of 
spheres of influence in Europe as a projected starting point for any dialogue. 
(Borsody 1980: 225 - 6)  
Reality and the Western recognition of this Pax Sovietica frustrated any hopes 
of Western support in bringing about the creation of Central Europe as a 
political reality. The limited writing on the topic during the period shows how 
the geopolitically charged argumentation introduced in the early Cold War was 
dropped in favour of a return to older interwar themes. For example, Hungarian 
émigré authors returned to the criticism of the Trianon Treaty and 
contemplations of issues of Hungarian minorities in successor states of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Only two volumes considered the future reorganization of Central Europe 
during the 1970s in the English language. (Varsanyi 1976, Wagner 1970) Both 
of them were edited volumes featuring the works of the Hungarian émigré 
academics. Concepts picked upon themes resonant in 1920s Hungarian writing 
on Central Europe, such as injustice of the Trianon settlement (Kardos 1970: 
161), the problem of Hungarian minorities (Gallus 1970: 294) and the need for 
a solution other than the nation-state regional re-organisation. (Koszorus 1970: 
245) A certain level of traditional ‘Greater Hungarian’ bias is evident in some 
contributions in the volume edited by Julius Varsanyi. On the other hand, 
concepts were rooted in the Cold War context – the ‘liberation’ of captive 
nations and their necessary integration into West European structures. Rather 
than suggesting why the West should support the creation of Central Europe in 
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one or another form; both volumes built their respective cases on the specific 
discussion of regional context, the commonalities among countries and their 
shared history. While a minority of authors still advocated neutrality for their 
constructed Central European union (Wagner 1970: 21), a majority anchored it 
firmly in the Western camp (Ionescu 1970: 71). In both cases, the call for 
liberation of these Western-oriented nations from alien Eastern domination 
was loud and clear. (Wagner 1970: 5)  
However, these were rare and lonely voices in defence of Central Europe as a 
political concept. The lack of support for such plans in the West and the 
complete ban on their contemplations on the other side of the Iron Curtain 
muffled any possibility of a realistic debate of Central Europe in political terms. 
(Borsody 1980: 225) Instead, Central Europe acquired the character of a 
loosely defined geographical notion, applied apolitically most usually to history 
and arts. In conditions of Pax Sovietica, it was the notion of Eastern Europe that 
experienced a steep ascendancy in discourses within international relations.  
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6.5 The breaking of the ice 
So, towards the end of the Cold War, émigré proponents of the idea of Central 
Europe had found their cause abandoned by the West for the sake of peaceful 
coexistence. By the early 1980s, the advocates of Central European 
(con)federation and constructers of helvetized neutrality had all but died out.  
Stephen Borsody was one of the last ones to advocate such a federative solution 
in 1980. (Borsody 1980: 221) However, he was also quick to observe that those 
on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain were not as ready as those on the 
Western side, to accept the “European status quo as final”. (Borsody 1980: 224) 
Now dissidents in the East would seize the discourse of Central Europe from 
the hands of the émigré groups in the West, who had dominated it for the 
previous thirty years. The divorce from the idea of neutral buffer was now 
obvious and decisive: 
“Myšlenka neutrality, popřípadě neutrálního pásma ve střední 
Evropě je absurdní, ovšem nikoli zjevně. Je asi tak nenápadně 
absurdní, jako by byl pokus vyřešit neutralitu mezi koncepcí 
archy a nebezpečím potopy přísným zákazem plaveckých 
kurzů.”179 
Instead of offering definitions and blueprints for those who hoped to challenge 
the status quo, Central Europe turned into an intellectual refuge of despair, a 
metaphor of anti-politics. 
 
6.5.1 Metaphor of anti-politics 
To return to the discussion foreshadowed in the Introduction, in April 1984 The 
New York Review of Books published an English translation of an article ‘The 
                                                 
179
 - The idea of neutrality, if need be, a neutral zone, in Central Europe is absurd, though not 
conspicuously. It is just about as inconspicuously absurd, as would be the attempt to resolve 
neutrality between the concept of the Ark and the threat of the Flood by strict prohibition of 
swimming courses. – (Preisner 1984: 280) 
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Tragedy of Central Europe’ by Milan Kundera (Kundera 1984: 33 - 38), 
originally published in émigré  journal 150 000 Words.  
Kundera defined Central Europe as “a culture or a fate“ with “imaginary“ 
borders, containing „an uncertain zone of small nations between Russia and 
Germany“ (Kundera 1984: 35). He picked upon the Cold War depiction of  
Central Europe as an area of small nation states „culturally in the West, 
politically in the East“ (Kundera, 1984), desperately seeking a political 
comeback into its native European cultural region. However, Kundera did more 
than that. He recast this depiction in a new light. His language was not the one 
of the academic conceptualizing the historical and political facts of the Cold 
War, but the one of an artist depicting the unbearable suffering of his native 
region under a foreign yoke.  
Kundera’s essay was tailor-made for a Western audience, aiming once again to 
raise support for repressed nations under Soviet domination. He employed 
crude civilisational and cultural overtones and painted a doomed picture of 
tragically fated nations condemned to the heavy-handed rule of an alien power. 
Interestingly, Kundera counted the Jews among the native nations of Central 
Europe. He described the Jewish nation as a “Central European nation par 
excellence”, delving deeply into their recent historical fate, and drawing a vivid 
parallel between their suffering and the fate of other nations in the area. This 
emotional portrayal of the highly cultured and civilized nations of a “kidnapped 
West”, suffocating from the Soviet rule, engendered a strong response from the 
educated public, especially in the USA. Even though Kundera’s essay was 
criticized for its exaggerated emotionality and lack of serious argumentation, it 
is widely credited for bringing the notion of Central Europe back into everyday 
parlance. 
However, Kundera did not start a new discourse over Central Europe. Rather, 
he utilized the idea already present in underground dissent within the Eastern 
Bloc (Špetko 1982: 81 – 85) and gave it a popular, artistic form, which 
captivated the imagination of his Western audience. Indeed, dissident writers 
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were critical and sceptical of many aspects of Kundera’s article, especially his 
depiction of Central Europe as a bridge between the East and the West. 
(Šimečka 1986a, Šimečka 1986b, Jehlička 1986, Hauner 1989) 
When the Czechoslovak samizdat, journal Střední Evrop  was established in 
1984, it was not under Kundera’s influence, but rather the perceived need of 
dissident intellectuals to define their own vision of Central Europe to counter 
Kundera’s depiction. (Mlejnek 2009)180 The introduction of the first issue 
summarized the alternate notion of Central Europe: 
“Vytyčme Střední Evropu jako duchovní prostor proměnlivých 
hranic. Chceme-li ho vymezovat, hledáme zároveň svoje místo 
v Evropě, k níž se kulturně hlásíme... Tenhle sborník nespatřuje 
Střední Evropu v žádných rigorózních hranicích. Vymezujeme ji 
spíš instinktivně... Nemáme na počátku žádnou syntetizujíci ideu 
Střední Evropy.” (Ulrich 1984: 3)181 
As is apparent from this quote, Czechoslovak dissidents had by now abandoned 
the federative programs or projects of neutrality typical of the Second World 
War and the early Cold War period. Now they turned to an abstract idea of 
Central Europe as an independent cultural unit within a (Western) European 
civilisational context. Art, literature and music became common denominators 
of any 1980s’ dissident definition of Central Europe. (Zagajewski and 
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 ‘Když jsme s Rudolfem Kučerou a dalšími přáteli zakládali samizdatovou revue Střední Evropa, 
nebylo tomu tak pod vlivem Milana Kundery - spíše jsme cítili potřebu se vůči němu vymezit. Tak 
vznikl i můj text o Kunderově eseji nazvaný Hodnota jednoho svědectví. Nemohl jsem mimo jiné 
souhlasit s Kunderovým konstatováním (z pařížského exilu), že „střední Evropa zmizela". Střední 
Evropa se pro nás naopak stala ztělesněním určitých návyků, zvyklostí a společného dědictví, které 
nemohl nikdo jen tak vymazat….” - When we established the samizdat revue Central Europe with 
Rudolf Kučera and other friends, it was not done under influence of Milan Kundera – rather, we felt 
a need to define ourselves in contrast with him. This gave rise to my comment on Kundera’s essay, 
titled ‘The Value of One Witness Account’. I could not, among other things, agree with his statement 
(formulated in Paris exile) that ‘Central Europe disappeared’. On the contrary, for us, Central Europe 
became an embodiment of certain tendencies, traditions and common heritage, which no-one could 
erase just like that…’ - (Mlejnek 2009) 
181
 - Let’s define Central Europe as a spiritual territory of unsteady boundaries. If we want to define 
it, we are at the same time looking for our place in Europe, for which we put a cultural claim in… 
This anthology does to see Central Europe within any strict borders. Rather defines it instinctively… 
we don’t have any synthetic idea of Central Europe to start with. – (Ulrich 1984: 3) 
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Kolakowski quoted in Weidenfeld 1988: 88) Scepticism, mysticism and irony 
were its hallmarks for Central Europe was a fictional territory of liberty, 
cosmopolitan culture and all-human ideals. Central Europe was a fate. 
Moreover, an unrealised, aspirational fate. Central Europe was not where they 
wanted to be, but who they wanted to be. 
Central Europe thereby became a metaphor of anti-politics (Konrád 1984), an 
intellectual outcry for change in the existing systems within Eastern Bloc as 
well as for the deliverance from the oberbearing dullness and restraint of the 
Eastern Bloc itself. György Konrád openly wrote that Central Europe was 
nothing more than a dream, a cultural-political Antihypothesis (Konrád 1984: 90 
- 91). Yet others maintained that the dream they harboured could become 
reality. (Busek 1988: 17) But this dream was not a neutral, ‘neither East nor 
West’ federative structure in Cold War context. It was an abstract cultural 
concept increasingly connected with what the notion of West stood for – 
democracy and freedom. 
The departure from a project aiming at neutrality between the two blocs was 
associated with the spreading belief (or was it just wishful thinking) that the 
days of the Eastern bloc were numbered. Milovan Djilas, a Communist himself, 
famously published an article entitled ‘Decay of Communist Systems’ where he 
highlighted notorious corruption, inefficiency and weakening of ideology in 
Communist states. (Djilas 1984: 150) In his view, the Soviet dominion over its 
European satellites was coming to an early end and its fall was the pre-
condition of their revival.182  
Observing the weakening grip of the Soviet Union on its European satellites, 
Zdeněk Mlynář asserted that the future of Central Europe directly depended 
upon its inclusion within the Western European integration processes and 
                                                 
182
 ‘…und [ich] kam zu dem Schluss, dass diese Systeme zu verfallen beginnen. Und dass sie um so 
schneller und tiefer verfallend, wenn der Expansionsimus der Sowjetunion gezügelt wird: Der Verfall 
ist die Vorbedingung von Wiedergeburt und Erneuerung.” – and so I arrived to the conclusion that 
these system have started to decay. And that they will be decaying faster and deeper when 
expansionism of the Soviet Union is curbed: the decay is a precondition of rebirth and renewal. 
(Djilas 1984: 150) 
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upon a willingness to extend Western economic structures over the whole of 
Europe. Still sceptical about the Soviet reaction towards such a possibility, he 
advised military neutrality for the Central European countries, while pursuing 
economic integration. (Mlynář 1986: 71) Yet others, such as Miroslav Kusý 
argued that the polarity of Western and Eastern Europe actually did not exist. 
He substantiated this claim by demonstrating the superficiality of integration 
within the Eastern Bloc, reminding the reader of the region’s long ‘European 
past’. (Kusý 1989: 91) Kusý asserted that Central Europe only started to move 
away from a European identity when its nations turned their backs on their 
common heritage and interests; namely, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
had been dismembered, falling a prey to one or other of the expansionist 
powers to the West and East. (Kusý 1989: 95) An early return to the (Western) 
European civilisational context was thus not only desirable, but also natural 
and inevitable.  
 
6.5.2 Imperial hangover? 
The romantic fiction of Central Europe to denote an abstract, borderless and 
free community connected by a shared history and culture often found its 
personification in the idealistic imagination of the Austro-Hungarian society in 
the 1980s. 
Idealisation of the cosmopolitan culture of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire was implicit in many Czech, Polish and Hungarian texts contemplating 
Central Europe in the twilight years of the Warsaw Pact. Ferenc Fejtö, a 
Hungarian socialist living in France, even suggested the dismemberment of the 
empire had been an “incorrigible mistake” (Fejtö 1989: 20) and praised the 
achievements of the “often enlightened Habsburg governments”. (Fejtö 1989: 
27) This aspect of dissident writing was often criticised for its selective take of 
history. It was suggested that the imagined past was just a mirror of the aspired 
future. (Bugge 1999)  
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Of course, not all dissident writers were longing for reinstatement of the old 
monarchy. Indeed some authors were highly critical of the legacy of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. These included Slovenian author Viktor Blažić (1989), 
Hungarian Péter Hanák (1989) and Mostar born Predrag Matvejević (1989).  
On the other hand, there were those who took the imperial hangover a step 
further still and dreamt of a reinstatement of the pre-Versailles order. András 
Hegedüs presented his concept for a Carpathian Basin federation, which would 
include all regions inhabited by the Hungarian population (Hegedüs 1988: 57), 
essentially reviving the Great Hungarian ambitions of some elements of the 
Hungarian society. This was in certain respects a continuation of ideas 
cultivated by émigré Hungarian groups in the 1960s and 1970s and of interwar 
revisionists before them. And Hegedüs was not the only individual embarking 
upon such endeavours in the 1980s. With the declining legitimacy of official 
state ideology, nationalism was on the rise in all countries in the region. In 
Hungary, concepts and manifestations of Greater Hungary started to spring up, 
some of them even making it into manifestos of nascent political parties. One 
such example would be the Great Hungary Plan of the Patriotic Popular Front 
presented in the mid-1980s. (Scott 2006: 72) However, these and similar 
concepts were marginal within the wider context of the Central Europe 
discourse. 
 
Defying its tainted connections with German expansionism, Mitteleuropa was 
revived in Austria. Austrian discourse over the notion shared many 
characteristics of the dissident vision that has been commented upon above. It 
was largely an intellectual endeavour driven by writers and artists, promoting 
Central Europe as a concept expressing regional cultural affinity. In spatial 
terms, Central Europe was identified with the general territorial shape of the 
former Austro-Hungarian Empire, with Vienna depicted as its unifying focal 
point. Peter Bender’s quote of Vienna’s mayor: “Wien ist Mitteleuropa und 
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Mitteleuropa ist Wien”183 (Bender 1988: 77) speaks for itself. Vienna was 
portrayed as a natural centre of a region with shared history and cultural 
heritage, artificially divided by Iron Curtain. References to former empire were 
unmistakeable.  
Given the connotations of the discourse rising east of the Iron Curtain, a certain 
level of ‘k.u.k nostalgy’184 in 1980s Austrian contemplations of Central Europe 
was probably inevitable. Writers in the countries that used to belong to the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire were themselves idealizing its cosmopolitan past and 
the same theme would resonate in Austrian writing. (Busek 1988) While the 
negatives of the old monarchy could not really be denied, they were usually 
both admitted and condemned. Even though some imperial ideas appeared in 
the margins, the emphasis was typically placed on art and culture, resulting in a 
modification of the old imperial abbreviation to ‘K.u.K – Kunst und Kultur’. (- art 
and culture - Busek 1986: 9)  
Austrian interest in the Central Europe debate was defined in terms of its 
ambition to move from the position on the periphery of Europe into a position 
of regional centre. In his introduction to the anthology Aufbruch nach 
Mitteleuropa (1986) Erhard Busek asserted: 
“Wir müssen die geschichtliche Vernetzung mit Mitteleuropa und 
unsere geopolitische Position zu einer aktiven Gestaltung unseres 
Schicksals nutzen. Verzichten wir auf diese Chance, werden wir 
tiefste Provinz.”185 (Busek 1986: 9) 
A number of independent organizations sprang up to support the idea of 
Austria becoming a centre of revived regional cooperation. For example, ‘Club 
pro Wien’ established in 1986 had the specific goal of contributing to Vienna 
                                                 
183
 - Vienna is Central Europe and Central Europe is Vienna – (Bender 1988: 77) 
184
 “k.u.k. – kaiserlich und königlich” – imperial and royal – refers to the Dual Monarchy 1867 – 
1914, when the abbreviation expressed the fact that the Austrian Emperor was also a Hungarian king 
and was used by all joint authorities and institutions, such as the army or the treasury.  
185
 - We have to use our interconnection with Central Europe and our geopolitical position to actively 
shape our fortunes. Should we renounce this opportunity, we will remain the remotest of provinces – 
(Busek 1989: 9) 
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becoming a “metropolis of Central Europe, a metropolis of minds”. (Busek 
1986: 9)  
However, some authors were deeply sceptical about Austria’s ability to become 
a focal point and a future leader of the region. (Blažić 1989: 63) They were also 
pointing out that should the Central Europe come to shake off its Eastern yoke, 
it would need to think long and hard about its relationship with accelerating 
processes of European integration, rather than historical and cultural ties. 
(Rudolf 1988: 143) Nevertheless, Austrian corroboration of the dissident 
narrative of Central Europe reinforced its fundamental tenets of cultural 
affinity. Moreover it also offered an outside endorsement of the concept as well 
as additional channels for its construction and promotion.  
 
6.5.3 The western option 
West German writers were understandably very conscious about the past 
connotations of the term Mitteleuropa. They pointed out that it was not a 
historically innocent notion and observed its linkage with the earlier 
hegemonic ambitions of Germany. (Rovan 1988: 6) Nevertheless, they chose to 
view it in a more pragmatic and contemporary context, in this case with a 
meaning constructed by the dissident authors in the Eastern Bloc (Schwarz 
1989: 154). Of course, it was also a useful instrument for ongoing German 
unification efforts. (Papcke 1988: 133) The espoused version of Central Europe 
included a divided Germany and contemplations of Central Europe were 
predominantly centred on its problems. 
Karl Grobe-Hagel and Egon Schwartz reviewed the history of Mitteleuropa in a 
German speaking environment and highlighted its strong association with 
expansionist policy and aggression in the past. (Schwarz 1989: 143 – 152, 
Grobe-Hagel 1988: 103 – 118) Grobe-Hagel observed that given the then 
contemporary geopolitical situation, there was no space for Central Europe as 
an independent bloc. (Grobe-Hagel 1988: 119) West Germany had already been 
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incorporated into western economic and security structures and Grobe-Hagel 
saw both its future and that of a unified Germany and Central Europe in this 
context.  
Schwartz on the other hand noted that Central Europe it its latest incarnation 
did not look for construction of a territorial unit, rather it was a programme of: 
“universalism, anti-racism, sympathy for all ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious differences, the right to criticize, the renunciation of 
aggression, the abandonment of ready-made ideologies, respect 
for the human being, the control of harmful illusions in oneself, 
the spiritual resistance against lies and hypocrisy… protection of 
the environment… social justice, equality between men and 
women, raising living standard of the Third World, support and 
propagation of the cultural activities.” (Schwarz 1989: 154) 
These were all essentially the values ascribed to the notion of the West and 
Schwarz suggested that such a value defined program was relevant and 
plausible. So what both Grobe-Hagel and Schwarz were saying was that there 
was no space for Central Europe as a territorial unit. However, Schwarz claimed 
that in the European countries of the Eastern Bloc, associations of the wider 
public with a value based abstract definition of Central Europe would give it 
“ipso facto the power of existence”. (Schwarz 1989: 154) What they were not 
saying, but clearly had in mind, was that should these countries ever emerge 
from the Soviet influence, they would become the part of the West.  
A cautious approach was typical of the West German authors of the day, who 
resented the Austrian ‘Friede, Freunde, Eierkuchen jetzt!’- type186 enthusiasm 
for a new Central Europe. Several authors, with a touch of Cold War paranoia, 
suspected that the whole Central Europe debate revival could just be a Soviet 
deception to neutralize parts of Western Europe, weaken their links to the rest 
of the Western bloc and then establish their own dominance. For Joseph Rovan 
                                                 
186
 - Peace, friends, crumpets, now! – (Papcke 1988: 135) 
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wrote that “Central Europe is today a weapon against Europe”187 (Rovan 1988: 
14) and warned that the risk that West Germany could fall into the hands of the 
Soviets were still the same as at the beginning of the Cold War. On the other 
hand, he also suggested that a Central Europe aligned to the West could weaken 
the Soviet position. Rovan therefore suggested that these countries should be 
swiftly embraced within the West European structures, should such a chance 
arise. 
More pragmatic writers also observed that the new Central Europe debate 
would aim at delivering Eastern bloc countries, and especially East Germany, 
straight into the arms of the West. (Weidenfeld 1988: 95) However, they came 
to the very same conclusion as sceptical authors of Rovan’s persuasion – 
inclusion into Western structures should be favoured over any kind of neutral 
block in Central Europe. An obvious reason for such assertions was the fact that 
West German authors were primarily interested in Central Europe in the 
context of German unification. Given the fact that West Germany harboured no 
intentions of leaving Western structures, Central Europe (or at least a unified 
Germany) would need to be included within them as well. Moreover, some 
authors saw the Central Europe project as a convenient framework for fostering 
of Germany’s future role in Europe and a tool for emancipation from under the 
American influence (Rovan 1988: 12). 
Whatever their reasons, the verdict of German authors was almost unanimous – 
Central Europe, as an intellectual project, was designed to lead the countries it 
contained into the West European structures.  
 
6.5.4 Complementary interests 
The development of the story of Central Europe in the 1980s is somewhat 
puzzling in the context of earlier debates. The new phase in the construction of 
                                                 
187
 ‘Mitteleuropa [ist] heute eine Waffe gegen Europa’ (Rovan 1988: 14) 
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meaning represented a decisive break with the political bloc building projects 
of the past. Instead, Central Europe as a notion shifted to an abstract level.  
Those who seized control of the discourse, were almost invariably writers and 
intellectuals of dissident Eastern Bloc groups and their attitude to the notion 
was very different to the one taken by exiled governments or émigré politicians 
of the past. The idea of a buffer zone or a neutral bridge between the East and 
the West was losing its appeal, but above all it relevance, as it increasingly 
seemed that there might not be anything to buffer or bridge. Instead, authors 
writing of Central Europe aimed at fostering an abstract cultural identity that 
interlinked it with the West. 
The narrative of Central Europe that would dominate the discourses of the 
1980s had been developing (especially in the Czech intellectual environment) 
since the late 1970s. The interest behind this effort was one of othering from 
whatever the East stood for – Soviet domination, imposed regimes, the dullness 
or the uniformity. Central Europe was being constructed as a distinct cultural 
identity expressing dissociation with the political realm of the Eastern Bloc. 
Originally built on an idealized past with overtones of self-proclaimed 
uniqueness, Central Europe was being increasingly cast in values typically 
ascribed to the West – freedom, liberalism, individuality, etc. Following the 
success of Kundera’s article, this aspect of the Central European narrative was 
intentionally cultivated as a means of approximation to the West. The message 
was clear – Central Europe was yearning for its lost freedom. In simple binaries 
of the divided Europe, this was associated with becoming a part of the West. 
Central Europe found many enthusiasts in Austria, as it offered a way out of the 
peripheral role it had played in Europe since the end of the Second World War. 
The concept of Central Europe identified to a high degree with former Austria-
Hungary, a device that would allow Austria to reinvent itself as a regional 
leader. Austrians were keen to embrace it. (Busek 1989: 9) 
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Less enthusiastic and a bit more suspicious than the Austrians, German 
politicians also saw Central Europe as a useful concept. In their case, in efforts 
for German unification. The uncertain borders of an increasingly abstract 
Central Europe became an advantage, as dissident writing contemplating 
Germany allowed it to buy into the concept. Mitteleuropa became a motto of 
new phase of Ostpolitik introduced by the SPD in 1986. (Bugge 1999: 26) 
Indeed, non-German authors were suspicious of German motivations in the 
revived use of the term Mitteleuropa. (Blažić 1989: 54) However, it was exactly 
the addition of German question into the equation that ensured that Central 
Europe was talked about as a natural part of the West, due to the West German 
interest in unification and its obvious unwillingness to sacrifice its Western 
links. 
Thus the 1980s version of Central Europe would be the one that finally 
managed to gather support among all interested parties. But what did it have in 
common with its earlier versions and variants?  
 
6.5.5 A not-so-obvious link 
So Timothy Garton Ash seemed to be onto something, when he proclaimed that 
Central Europe was back in 1984. However, it did not return from obscurity in 
the form of the academic (con)federative concepts typical of earlier periods. It 
was revived as an abstract lament of intellectuals and artists against the 
totalitarianism of the Soviet dominated countries.  
The difference between the discourse over Central Europe and its earlier 
versions is striking. As compared to, for example, the Second World War period, 
it differed in terms of main actors shaping the discourse, their motivations, the 
nature of concepts put forward, the audiences addressed, the aims and the 
envisaged reconstruction of Central Europe. While during the Second World 
War the discourse was in the hands of exiled governments, working towards 
the creation of political union to safeguard their countries from expansive 
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neighbours. Research on the integration potential of systems of education, 
transport and agriculture was carried out for the purpose of future federal 
planning. The main partners in the discourse were the US and the British 
governments, who were viewed as guarantors of realisation of these plans. As a 
result, Central Europe was clearly defined along the lines of ongoing 
federalisation plans. On the other hand, at the end of the Cold War, Central 
Europe was being constructed predominantly by writers and intellectuals 
persecuted by uniformly authoritarian regimes, yearning to see their fall. The 
aim was to assert values of individuality, creativity, independence, freedom and 
high culture against the uniformity, dullness, restraint and domination of the 
authoritarian regimes and the Soviet Union. The audience was the foreign 
public as much as the domestic one. Central Europe was the means of othering 
from purportedly alien and implanted (Eastern) political regimes and asserting 
a largely imagined authentic (Central European) culture. (Bugge 1999: 27) 
Central Europe was an abstract cultural entity with, often intentionally, blurred 
geographical boundaries. (see Ulrich 1984: 3) 
So it would seem that the construct of Central Europe in the 1908s could not get 
any more far removed from what the notion meant in the interwar or early Cold 
War period. Did it have anything at all in common with any of its precursors?  
On first sight, it did not. Comparing the characteristics of the discourse and its 
results would suggest that 1980s Central Europe had hardly anything in 
common with the Central Europe of earlier periods. However, analysis of the 
antecedents of ideas expressed by dissident writers brings a surprising result. 
The discourse of Central Europe driven by Eastern Bloc authors drew on 
essentially the same sources as the first German conceptualisations of Central 
Europe in the late 19th century. (Bugge 1999: 31) Moreover, there was a 
recurrence in underlying ideas and the pattern of their employment in the 
construction of Central Europe. 
Some theorists (Bugge 1999, Macura 1997) have claimed that this was in large 
part due to the prominence of Czech authors in the construction of 1980s 
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Central Europe. Vladimir Macura pointed out that the Czech romanticists of the 
19th century were obsessed with the myth of a ‘middle’ as the ideal between the 
extremes in all forms (geographical, cultural, linguistic, etc.). Being middle or in 
the middle, meant achievement of the ideal – the best of both extremes without 
their negative excesses. One step further was the perception of the middle as a 
mediator of values, influences and culture. Yet another step was the perception 
of this mediator as unique and central to everything. 188 Macura (1997) 
suggested that this self-perception of an idealised central uniqueness devised 
by the 19th century romaniticists was fairly faithfully replicated in Kundera’s 
Tragedy of Central Europe. The very same theme of the ideal of the centre is 
present in the German romanticists tradition, from which the first proto-ideas 
of Central Europe drew their origins (replacing the notion of Deutschtum). The 
notion of “Mittelvolk” (- the central nation -) appeared in German writing in 
1817 as a synonym for the German nation. (Jahn 1817: 11) Such parallels are 
numerous and include perceptions of the West, a radical othering from Russia, 
an emphasis on culture (as different from civilization), and a suspicious attitude 
to modernity, etc. (Bugge 1999: 32) The search for a shared identity seems to 
be a common denominator of both periods in formulation of their abstract, 
culturally-defined Central Europe.  
Therefore, despite all the differences between the process and the result of 
construction of the meaning of Central Europe in 1980s and earlier periods of 
the twentieth century, it is to be concluded that rather than being independent 
of these discourses, the Central Europe of the 1980s returned to their very 
fundamentals.  
 
                                                 
188
 Both ‘middle’ and ‘centre’ are in Czech and German expressed by a single word: in Czech ‘střed’, 
in German ‘die Mitte’. It is the root of both ‘Střední Evropa’ and ‘Mitteleuropa’ – the respective 
Czech and German version of the notion Central Europe. ‘Centrum’ and ‘Zentrum’ used in Czech and 
German are derived from Latin, just like ‘centre’ in English language, but used less frequently. The 
original versions are preferred in construction of adjectives and words with the shared root, such as 
respective words for mediator, medium, means etc. 
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For we might speculate that it was the return to the shared narrative of the 
middle that induced a general support of the 1980s version of Central Europe, 
but it seems more likely that many just found the narrative convenient and 
flexible enough to further their own interests. The real opportunity to do so 





6.6 Brand new game 
In 1999, Robin Okey posited that the notion of Central Europe as conceived by 
1980s dissident intellectuals failed a decade later because it had no 
instrumental value for the emergent transitive countries. 
“Not surprisingly, the anti-politics of this Central Europe of the 
mind had little to contribute to the real politics which broke out 
after November 1989. The nationalist masses have spoken, but 
not about Central Europe. They share with the intellectuals of the 
1980s a commitment to the idea of Europe. But it is a 
commitment which books no Central European mediation, 
whether as power bloc, federal or cultural pluralist model, or 
Viennese metropole.” (Okey 1992: 129) 
However, in this statement, Okey seems to be mixing two very different 
approaches to Central Europe – the intellectual project of the 1980s and the 
political programs of earlier periods. More plausible seems to be Peter Bugge’s 
analysis, in which he identified the utility of the construct of Central Europe, in 
terms of identity building, bloc building and means of othering. (Bugge 1999) 
His conclusion was that  
“if perceived as a tool for escaping from ‘Eastern Europe’ (from 
the Soviet grip of course, but also from the stigmatizing 
connotations of the label), Central Europe certainly served its 
purpose”. (Bugge 1999: 33) 
To some degree, the intellectual project of Central Europe started to be realised 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet, following the break-up of the Eastern Bloc, 
no Central European political unit was constituted. Okey considered it a 
betrayal of the strong revival of the notion in the 1980s and its past regional 
integrationist connotations. Bugge pointed out that realisation of Central 
Europe as a political entity was never really on the agenda in the 1980s. In 
every case, when the Central European Free Trade Area, the Central European 
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Initiative and many other intergovernmental organizations came to being in 
1990s, they covered different areas and countries. Frustratingly for Bugge, 
Okey and other researchers, none of these organizations became 
personification of the political project of Central Europe envisaged in earlier 
decades of the 20th century. 
 
6.6.1 Central Europe as a fuzzy fact 
The discussion in the previous subchapter showed that not only did the Central 
European discourse in the 1980s represent a marked departure from the 
project of political bloc building, but it also increasingly steered its context 
towards ongoing Western European integration processes and structures. The 
very point of employing the notion of Central Europe was in an effort to 
differentiate oneself from the ‘Eastern’ context. Claims that the notion failed to 
create a regional block (Bugge 1999: 33) because it was not in line with the 
wishes of the masses (Okey 1992: 129) seem to be missing this point.  
For it seems fair to say that, following the fall of the Iron Curtain, those who 
took part in the construction of the notion in the 1980s, behaved in a way that 
suggested that they took the existence of Central Europe (however fuzzily 
delineated it may have been) as a fact. The 1990 volume of Střední Evrop  was 
not a samizdat anymore. It was printed as a publication of the Institute for 
Central European Culture and Politics. It did not feature any more 
contemplations of Central Europe. Instead, it presented articles on histories of 
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Lithuania and Slovenia; translations of works by 
Francis Fukuyama and Zbigniew Brzezinski; and contemplations of scale of 
forthcoming economic, social and political transitions. In short, the volume 
printed articles on various aspects of a Central Europe that was presumed to 
exist.  
The mythical contemplations of Central Europe typical of 1980s dissident 
writing disappeared as the need for assertion of cultural identity was clearly 
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diminishing. Their place was taken by the much more practical theorizing of 
transition, internal reforms and the foreign policy direction of post-Communist 
countries. As is apparent from the following chart, references to Central Europe 
more than doubled in the 1990s. This increase is to be explained by Central 
Europe’s new found centrality in the EU and the NATO integration. 
 
Figure 4: Number of books featuring ‘Central Europe’ and ‘East Central 
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But, as has already been mentioned, the concept of Central Europe in the 
immediate post-Cold War period essentially remained fuzzy and confusing for 
many. First of all, it did not designate any kind of politically or economically 
unified area, or even connote a recognized group of independent countries. 
Second, the definitions of Central Europe presented by hundreds of authors 
varied from one another wildly. Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer defined 
Central Europe as consisting of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
(Bialer and Jervis 1991: 159) The editors of Střední Evrop  conceived of it in 
terms of former Austro-Hungarian territories, while Csaba Kiss’s Central 
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Europe extended from Finland to Greece and from Germany to Ukraine. (Kiss 
1989: 128)  
In practical terms, Central Europe was treated by academics, statesmen and 
journalists from the transitive countries as an existing concept, aligning their 
countries to the West. Invocations of cultural and historical proximity became 
instrumental in their efforts to achieve speedy inclusion into Western economic 
and security structures. (Kuus 2007, Bugge 1999, Ash 1998) Central Europe 
was also used as a point of internal self-identification, as a means of othering 
from the ‘East European’ past and affirmation of the new quality of society. This 
understanding of Central Europe is clearly a continuation of the 1980s theme of 
othering, however, with a more pronounced practical than philosophical twist. 
Yet, the question remained, whether the ‘West’ thought Central Europe was or 
should become a part of it… and what the ‘East’ had to say about it. Discourse 
over Central Europe had to an extent been placed back in the hands of 
geopolitical theorists and a Western audience. 
 
6.6.2 The big picture 
As Fukuyama-like euphoria over the global predominance of the liberal order 
soon evaporated in the West, conceptualisations of future geopolitical 
confrontation started to appear. Confrontation on a global scale was said to be a 
persisting feature of new international context. Consolidation of Western gains 
in Europe became an imperative. ‘Central Europe’ had to become the part of the 
West, as a requisite safeguard against a future global confrontation. Thus after 
decades of Cold-War silence, Central Europe was again the topic of the day in 
geopolitical considerations. 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly national security advisor to President Carter and 
a known quality in geostrategy, proposed measures that would anchor the post-
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Communist countries in Europe firmly within the democratic camp. To ensure 
the penetration of the sea-power (the West) within the inner parts of Eurasia, 
the western world ought, in his view, to take advantage of the land-power's 
retreat and incorporate the abandoned territories within its own structures. 
„The main goal of the United States in Europe is to strengthen the 
American bridgehead on the Eurasian continent, so the enlarging 
Europe could become the spring board for the penetration of an 
international order based on democracy and cooperation into 
Eurasian mainland.“ (Brzezinski 1997: 92)  
However, Brzezinski questioned the ability of the European nations to achieve 
this goal on their own, arguing for an enduring need for American protection. 
The expansion of the European Union into vacated space of the former Eastern 
bloc should therefore be institutional by an enlargement of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. The eastern borders of NATO and the EU should, 
according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, be fully consonant. Thus the transitive 
countries would simultaneously become part of the economic, political and 
defence structures of the democratic bloc, thus ensure its enduring 
international orientation towards the West. Needless to say, it would also better 
foster an enduring US influence over European affairs.  
Brzezinski defined Central European space loosely, as the “historic area of 
constructive German cultural influence… the area of German urban and 
agricultural colonization…” (Brzezinski quoted in Krejčí 2005: 367), thus 
extending the limits of this influence well into the territory of the Russian 
Federation. Hence Brzezinski positioned Germany firmly within his Central 
Europe and Central Europe firmly under the influence of Germany. He 
identified Germany as the most reliable and unflinching ally of the USA in 
Europe, striving to achieve historical rehabilitation and pose as a model 
European country. This effort would logically impel Germany to extend the 
highest possible level of support to Central European countries pushing for 
membership of the European Union. Consequently, Brzezinski saw “Germany in 
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the role of patron of the final formal incorporation of this new Mitteleuropa into 
the European Union and NATO”. (Brzezinski quoted in Krejčí 2005: 367) Under 
the leadership of Germany, Central Europe would thereby be securely included 
into the western camp through its economic and security ties.  
Despite the criticism Brzezinski’s ideas received for their overt promotion of US 
hegemony, they were enthusiastically received by establishments of Central 
Europe (even academia itself), since the message was consonant with the 
Central European aims of achieving membership of EU and NATO. His writings 
became a starting point for many subsequent definitions of Central Europe 
produced in the area itself. 
 
Another work enthusiastically embraced in the transitive countries was the 
somewhat ‘unorthodox’ geopolitical essay of Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash 
of Civilisations’ (1993). In his opinion, the world comprised of dynamic 
civilisations defined as “the highest cultural groupings” of people (Huntington 
1993: 23). These included Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin American and, possibly African civilisations. The differences 
among civilisations for him were not only real, but were basic, and would 
inexorably lead to confrontation. The fault lines between the civilisations that 
replaced the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War would become 
flashpoints of crises and bloodshed.  
Owing to Western civilization’s extraordinary relative power to other 
civilizations, the assertive promotion of its basic values and its self-portrayal as 
a global culture, other civilizations would inevitably become opposed to it and 
the pattern of future conflict would be ‘the West against the Rest’. In this global 
fight launched by ‘the Rest’, the Central European space would occupy a crucial 
strategic location in the borderlands of the Western and Slavic-Orthodox 
cultures. According to Huntington, as the Cold War ideological division of 
Europe disappeared, a historical-cultural division mirroring the lines of the 
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limits of Western Christianity in the sixteenth century might logically re-
emerge. Such a line could separate Finland and the Baltic States from Russia, 
then cutting through Belarus and Ukraine, separating Transylvania from the 
rest of Romania, and Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of the former 
Yugoslavia. Countries to west and north of this line would lie within Western 
culture, characterised by Protestantism or Catholicism, a common experience of 
European history and a higher degree of economic development, thus 
separated from the Orthodox and Muslim populations on the other side. 
(Huntington 1993: 30)  
Moreover, this region was identified as the only place where Western 
civilisation shared land boundaries with Muslim and Slavic-Orthodox 
civilisations, suggesting that its control was critical. Re-emergent patterns of 
violent interaction between the three cultures (Muslim, Slavic-Orthodox and 
Western) along the fault-line were, according to Huntington, likely to manifest 
themselves in the twenty-first century. On the grounds of what happened in 
Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, he predicted a future of bloody 
conflict for the region along this boundary. The only way to avoid it would be to 
promote the greater cooperation and full integration of the Central European 
space into Western culture; and, concomitantly, to build a cooperative 
relationship with Russia. (Huntington 1993: 48 – 49) 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ did not go uncontested; however, his view 
of Central Europe was received favourably in the region itself and adopted as 
standard textbook on international relations in many post-Communist 
countries. His civilisational narrative was a convenient concept for those 
attempting to forge new Western identities for states striving to join Western 
economic and security structures. 
 
Brzezinski and Huntington had sought to reinstate Central Europe within 
Western geopolitical conceptualisation. Whether it was Brzezinski’s strategy of 
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moving into no-mans lands or Huntington’s unorthodox civilisational concept, 
Central Europe formed an integral part of their updated takes on the global 
power struggle. Meanwhile, the Mackinderian take on Central Europe would be 
most dutifully resurrected in emergent Russian geopolitics. (Kolossov and 
Turovsky 2001: 144) 
 
Alexandr G. Dugin, a guru of Russian geopolitics, applied Mackinder’s 1904 
theses directly to a contemporary setting. He identified the USA as the 
embodiment of a sea-power and forecast the reestablishment of Russia as its 
opposing land-power in alliance with Germany. He envisioned an early rupture 
of the modern European alliance with the United States and Great Britain, 
because of unspecified antagonism of European continental integration and the 
British interests. (Dugin 1997: 221) Russia would seize the opportunity 
presented by such a scenario to prepare the conditions for building a new 
Eurasian empire. This continental empire, counter-balancing the global sea-
power of the United States, would consist of three different axes of continental 
power: Moscow – Berlin, Moscow – Teheran, Moscow – Tokyo. (Dugin 1997: 
224)  
Within this grand design, Central Europe represented a distinctive geopolitical 
entity, united strategically, culturally and politically. Within the Central 
European space he included all the nations of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Germany, with some areas of Poland and Ukraine. Dugin argued that 
the consolidating power here had always been Germany and the Central 
European ‘geopolitical conglomerate’ ought naturally to fall under its control. It 
was not only the natural tendency but also historic duty of the region to unify 
around this traditional core. Acknowledging ongoing processes of European 
integration, a German-led Central Europe, in alliance with France might create 
a European vector that was strong enough to offer Eurasia protection from 
potential attack by the sea-powers.  
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All of the integration processes in the European arena would have one basic 
aim: to foster a Berlin – Moscow axis. This axis would ensure the genuine 
autarchy of a Eurasian Empire and its superpower standing.  
 “Германия сегодня - экономический гигант и политический 
карлик. Россия с точностью до наоборот - политический 
гигант и экономический калека. Ось Москва - Берлин 
излечить эндуг обоих партнеров и заложит основание 
грядущему процветанию Великой России и Великой 
Германии.”189 (Dugin 1997: 228) 
The strategic logic of a German sphere of influence and also the alliance with 
Russia had original basis in Mackinder’s concept, where it was identified as a 
region holding the key to world hegemony. The Berlin-Moscow axis suggested 
by Dugin corresponded to the alliance warned against by Mackinder. In fact, 
Dugin’s application of Mackinder’s thesis seems to be the least modified of all 
contemporary grand geopolitical theory. It lent a convenient theoretical basis 
for Dugin’s intended characterisation of Eurasian Empire pitched as the 
antithesis of Western liberal society. He portrayed Russia as the inheritant of 
Mackinder’s land-based power with its traditionalism, hierarchism, and 
religionism – and status!  
 
Vladimir Kolossov and Rostislav Turovsky observed that Alexandr Dugin and 
post-Cold war Russian geopolitics more generally, have drawn heavily on the 
traditional geopolitics of the early 20th century, and accentuated the roles of 
physical space, natural resources and direct control of territory “as though the 
world has been frozen in a Haushoferian time warp” (Kolossov and Turovsky 
2001: 146). The pivotal role of the area of Central Europe in its original 
deterministic sense has thus been embraced a good century on. Similar themes 
                                                 
189
 - Today, Germany is an economic giant and a political dwarf. Russia is the exact opposite – a 
political giant and an economic cripple. Axis Moscow – Berlin heals maladies of both partners and 
lays foundation for the coming prosperity of Great Russia and Great Germany. – (Dugin 1997: 228) 
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can be found in German New Right circles, with geopolitical theory built on 
similar deterministic tenets including a desire for future regional arrangements 
between Russia and Germany (Lohausen 2001, Schiedel 1998, for more insight 
see Bassin 2003) However, the events of the post-Cold War decades will, of 
course, highlight that actual developments in the region followed Brzezinski’s 
prescriptions much more closely than Dugin’s.  
European Community introduced its PHARE program (Poland and Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) as early as 1989 to assist in the 
transformation of the centrally planned economies of Poland and Hungary into 
market economies. This program was later extended to cover Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It was also accompanied by two further 
programs – SAPARD (Special accession programme for agriculture and rural 
development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), 
which were aimed at aiding the restructuring of agriculture and development of 
infrastructure. Eventually, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia shifted 
into CARDS programme in early 2000s. PHARE became the main tool of pre-
accession help for countries with good prospects for early membership in the 
European Union. By the mid-1990s, all of the countries remaining in the 
program would have applied for the membership in the EU, joining in 2004 and 
2007.  
The integration of Central European countries into the EU was foreshadowed 
by their inclusion into NATO. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined 
NATO in 1999, followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovakia in 2004. The latest round of enlargement of NATO involved Croatia 
and Albania in 2009.  
Brzezinski’s vision certainly seems to be being realised – more so than the 
visions of his contemporaries. 
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6.6.3 Within the big picture 
Geopolitics has been on the rise in the transitive countries as well and 
theorisation of the notion of Central Europe has mirrored the mainstream 
grand theory of Western geopolitics. Predictably, authors usually chose to 
incorporate their concept of Central Europe into either Brzezinski’s or 
Huntington’s vision. Two exceptional examples are the writings of Zoltán 
Pásztor, a Slovak historian of Hungarian origin and Oskar Krejčí, advisor to the 
last Communist government of Czechoslovakia and generally acknowledged as 
the highest authority in Czech geopolitics. 
Pásztor defined Central Europe on the basis of morphological characteristics. 
(Pásztor 2000: 4). It consisted of areas formed by Hercynian and Alpine-
Carpathian folding. His Hercynian Europe extended from Calais to Lviv and 
from the Jutland peninsula to Basel; while the Alpine-Carpathian area stretched 
from the western foothills of the Alps to the eastern ridges of the Carpathians. 
Pásztor’s definition embraced all the states located in the outlined region and 
the borders of his Central Europe coincided with the current national borders 
of these states. (Pásztor 2000: 5) Thus his concept interlinked what was 
commonly understood as Western Europe and the post-Communist countries, 
establishing a geographic claim for their closer integration. 
In support of this definition, Pásztor laid great emphasis on characterising the 
cultural identity of Central Europe and dealt with specific characteristics of and 
stages in the historical development of the region at length. In an effort to 
define the unique features of Central Europe, he engaged with a lengthy 
analysis of German historical context and its legacy, relying heavily upon 
historical determinism. The result was a geopolitical approach that saw Central 
Europe cast as a “boundary culture”, based on geographical data and historical 
evidence. He saw the future of Central Europe within the European Union and 
under the regional stewardship of Germany (Pásztor 2001: 239 - 250). The last 
pages of his book showcased two main characteristics of contemporary 
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regional writing on Central Europe– the emphasis on identity and culture, and a 
Huntingtonian vision of future.  
Krejčí observed that in 1990s, the contemporary definition of Central Europe 
crystallised along the lines of integration and globalization processes. (Krejčí 
2000: 10; see section 6.5.4) He presented a fusion of an intellectual project of 
the 1980s and earlier territorially defined conceptions, characterising Central 
Europe as a notion encompassing “both objective geographic and power 
characteristics as well as spiritual judgements”. (Krejčí 2000: 13) Interestingly, 
Krejčí used the very same approach as Mackinder in defining Central Europe by 
its accessibility from the sea through navigable rivers. (Krejčí 2000: 20) Then 
he divided Central Europe into a: 
 Northern zone – a Central European or Polish-German lowlands, 
extending into the East European Plain, surrounded to the south by the 
Czech and Slovak mountain chains, 
 Inner zone – a Carpathian-Alpine zone, its borders defined by the 
Bohemian forest, the Czech and Slovak mountain chains, and the Prut, 
Kupa, Sava and Danube rivers, 
 Southern zone – the Balkans, including Greece and European the part of 
Turkey. 
Krejčí excluded Germany from Central Europe, and essentially, kept more 
strictly to the Mackinder’s Middle Tier area. Krejčí characterised the area of his 
enquiry as East-Central Europe, even though the title of his book was the 
Geopolitics of Central European Space. Yet, he followed a similar path to Pásztor 
in arriving at conclusions about the mid-term future of Central European space 
and also saw the future of his East-Central Europe as heavily under the 
influence of Germany; however, very much within Brzezinski’s framework. 
(Krejčí, 200: 241-242) In Krejčí’s view, it was a necessary and desirable 
development, one that would firmly anchor East-Central Europe into the orbit 
of the West. (Krejčí, 2000: 242) 
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6.6.4 The integration tautology 
These two examples document how very different the basic tenets of concepts 
of Central Europe in post-Cold war period could be and yet how similar their 
conclusions usually were. Myriads of other definitions and theories arose in the 
period (Volner 2004); however, they all shared some peculiar distinguishing 
features. Allowing for occasional nationalist or pro-Russian concept, theorists 
generally viewed the future of their countries within the EU and the NATO. As a 
consequence, very few new conceptions of Central Europe as a political unit 
have emerged and the writing has generally focused instead on descriptive 
treatises exploring the positioning of the region in regard to its intended 
integration context. In many respects, this was a continuation of the intellectual 
projects of the 1980s. For being included within Central Europe meant 
positioning oneself on the right track for speedy membership of the West. The 
process of othering from the Eastern European legacy continued as theorists 
busily established Central European credentials of their countries to ensure 
they were not left out of the concept. These feverish efforts to demarcate 
Central Europe according to one’s particular interests, led Timothy Garton Ash 
to comment: “Tell me your Central Europe, and I will tell you who you are.” 
(Garton Ash, 1999: 384) 
As suggested in the introduction, the main part of the discourse over Central 
Europe would not be found on the pages of dense academic volumes, but was 
present in daily parlance. Use of the notion became the tool that academics, 
statesmen and journalists of post-Communist countries alike used to express 
the new democratic quality of their governments, the liberal openness of their 
societies and the Westwards orientation of their foreign policy. Central Europe, 
loose and undefined in its territorial definition, but well crystallized in its 
contextual aims, became a measurement of the approximation to the Western 
liberal ideal. It appeared in the daily media, journal articles and countless 
books, as well as the names of regional organizations, institutes and NGOs. 
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The works of Merje Kuus, an Estonian scholar living and working in Canada, 
offers a worthy retrospective analysis of how Central Europe was 
conceptualised during this period. Central to Kuus’s work are the notions of 
identity and otherness. Europe derives its self-identification from being 
different from the East. In her words:  
“...much of East European studies [during the Cold War] 
represented not an engagement with but a disengagement from 
the complexities of East Central Europe in favour of simple 
binaries such as West versus East.“ (Kuus 2004: 45)  
The situation changed with the fall of the Eastern bloc, when the post-
Communist countries raced for the support of the West in their transition 
towards hoped-for integration within western international structures. Central 
Europe became the expressed means of approximation to the ‘Western’ ideal 
and was invoked predominantly in the context of integration. Central Europe 
was then in turn associated with the group of post-Communist countries racing 
for membership of EU and NATO. 
The concept of Central Europe, as presented here, is thereby the product of a 
deliberate effort of East Central European countries to differentiate themselves 
from „the East“ in order to identify with (Western) Europe. On the other hand it 
is also a product of the EU’s and NATO’s eastward enlargement that has “fuelled 
a threefold division of the continent into the European core, the Central 
European applicants not yet fully European but in tune with the European 
project, and an eastern periphery effectively excluded from membership.“ 
(Kuus 2004: 475) This characterisation of Central Europe is very flexible in 
identifying “various shades of Easterness and Europeness“, as evidenced by 
Kuus’ conspicuously functional move to extend her original Central Europe 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and 
Slovenia) by two more countries – Romania and Bulgaria – following their 
accession to the EU in 2007. However, the bottom line for use of the notion was 
to express how ‘Western’ European the countries were becoming, by labelling 
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them ‘Central’, rather than ‘Eastern’. Kuus posited that Central Europe was like 
a waiting room for inclusion into Western economic and security structures. 
The notion of Central Europe became tautological – being called Central Europe 
meant the country was perceived to be a good way along to achieving all the 
necessary benchmarks for either EU or NATO integration and countries 
perceived as being some way down such a trajectory were called Central 
European. 
The tautological character of the Central Europe narrative was enhanced by the 
use of the notion in the West. Jason Dittmer’s research of the use of the notion 
between 1993 and 2003 suggests that journal articles used designation of 
‘Central European country’ for those countries that were viewed as on a good 
way to joining either the NATO or the EU. For example, no article in the 
researched database designated Romania or Bulgaria as Central European in 
the period of 1994 to 1997, but up to 15 of them do so between 1998 and 2003, 
when it became obvious both countries would soon join the EU. (Dittmer 2005: 
90 – 91) Even more peculiar was the case of Slovakia that managed to fall out of 
the Central European group in articles on NATO expansion following the 
decision of the alliance not to include it in the first round of expansion. (Dittmer 
2005: 88) While it was often designated as Central European between 1993 and 
1997, it disappeared from lists afterwards. Thus Central Europe worked in 
reverse as well – those countries, who were not approximating themselves to 
the Western ideal fast enough, were left out.  
Even though Dittmer’s research was limited by its exclusive focus on English 
language newspaper articles contemplating issues of either NATO or EU 
integration, it offered a valuable insight into how Central Europe was being 
constructed in the daily parlance. It documents, how the post-Cold War notion 
of Central Europe became a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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6.6.5 The rise and fall of the tide 
The above discussion has documented how Central Europe became a major 
preoccupation for those who were trying to conceptualise the geopolitical 
implications of the collapse of bi-polar global power structures, as well as those 
who were trying to find their place within the new ones. The discussion 
represented to varying degree the interests of the various involved parties – the 
transitive countries were striving to be included within the economic and 
security framework of the West, Russia was coming to terms with loss of 
empire, while the United States was attempting to foster and secure the 
position of a hegemon. Within these tensions, Central Europe again became a 
battlefield of competing concepts, however, its contemporary positioning was 
more or less agreed– it was to be included in (Western) Europe. 
The post-Cold war discourse of Central Europe in the post-Communist 
countries carried forward the theme of othering developed in the 1980s. With it 
went a lack of territorial exactness. As a means of othering from the East and 
approximating to (Western) Europe, Central Europe became intertwined with 
efforts to integrate within its structures. Innumerable definitions of Central 
Europe were put forward by academics as well as politicians in the transitive 
countries. Their common denominator was the positioning of Central Europe as 
an area that should be included in a Western context whatever the justification 
afforded by geography or history (Pásztor 2000 and 2001), and whatever the 
contemporary political situation of individual countries provided (Krejčí 2005). 
The reformulation of classical geopolitics provided a handy tool and often a 
framework for analysis of emergent concepts. Hungtington and Brzezinski 
offered superpower endorsement for inclusion of Central Europe into the 
Western realm, Dugin provided a necessary other to distinguish from with his 
contemporary inversion of Mackinder.  
In the context of the daily politics of integration, Central Europe became a 
virtual tautological designation for countries that had reached the set 
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benchmarks for inclusion within EU and NATO. Dittmer’s research showed that 
a designation of Central Europe as those countries that were well on their way 
to join either the NATO or the EU was widespread. Not only could countries be 
included within the concept, they could also fall out.  
Germany and Austria were rarely talked about as Central European in the 
context of integration, but both of them were often included in various 
presented concepts of Central Europe. In the end, it was the perceived 
connection with either one of them, which gave substance to the very idea of 
Central Europe in 1980s. Lack of inclusion of Germany into Central European 
integration debate is understandable - East Germany became a part of both 
NATO and the EU in 1990 through unification with West Germany. Austria 
never attempted to join the NATO due to its neutral status, but joined the EU in 
1995 with Finland and Sweden. This singled Austria out of the common 
integration context of post-Communist countries. Moreover, Austria had been 
perceived as a part of the West and did not need the narrative of Central Europe 
in the context of its inclusion within the EU. However, both Germany and 
Austria were referred to as Central European in other than integration contexts. 
(Bugge 1999) 
Overall, discourse over Central Europe was dominated by processes of 
European economic and security integration, therefore the association of the 
notion with an uncertain regional group of countries, who were becoming 
Western was widespread. This association also meant that once the given 
countries were included within EU and NATO, the rising tide of writing on 
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One could argue that a certain parallel with the period of the early Cold War 
could be drawn. The need as well as opportunity to conceptualise the near 
future of the region diminished following the Communist takeovers of the late 
1940s, as it did in following waves of the EU and NATO integration at the turn 
of millennia. The volume of writing on Central Europe markedly diminished 
after 2005, suggesting that immediate future of the region is regarded as settled 




This chapter documented that processes of definitive discourse of Central 
Europe identified in the core research are present in subsequent periods of 
redefinition of the notion. Consistently, the notion has been reformulated by 
changing groups of authors with varied geopolitical aims in mind; typically 
targeting the change of the international structure through definition of an 
overarching regional identity transcending established national boundaries.  
The notion also reflected changes in identity of authors and the interests they 
represented. Typically formulate as a sense of Self, interpretations of the notion 
as the Other outside the envisaged boundaries of the region also exert the 
influence on policy makers, if the notion was consonant with their own 
perceived interests. 
Yet, it seems to be a pattern than unless all active political players bought into 
the same discourse of the notion and did not oppose its aims, Central Europe 
failed to have a clear impact on the international structure. The key period, 
which suggests Central Europe may have contributed to the changes on the 
ground, is the period of western integration of the former Eastern Bloc 
countries in the 1990s. The following chapter will suggest that future research 
should focus on this particular period to examine archival evidence supporting 
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Chapter 7: Findings and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
By late 1918, Central Europe was in disarray. Germany had been decisively 
defeated, the Dual Monarchy had fallen apart, Austria was impoverished and 
Hungary was descending into chaotic and uncertain political disorder. 
Meanwhile, conflict was looming between newly-established Czechoslovakia 
and Poland over the border town of Teschen. 
The ‘Central Europe’ Naumann had dreamt of only three years earlier had 
thereby collapsed in the worst possible way. US and British policy makers still 
hoped for its ultimate replacement by a regional federation with Mackinder 
optimistically foreshadowing his Middle Tier. But the successor states were not 
interested. Their hard-won sovereignties were evidently to be fostered, not 
diluted in any new regional construct. 
If, indeed, the purpose of theorizing Central Europe was to bring about a new 
regional identity and structure, it had demonstrably failed. Yet, none of this 
negates the hypothesis set out at the beginning of this research, to which we 
now return. 
 
7.2 Findings: Comparative analysis of 1880 – 1918 concepts 
In drawing together our research conclusions, we ought first to return to the 
thesis’ opening hypothesis: 
Conceptualisations of regional identity are exercises in geopolitics, which 
throu h the definitive discourse of ‘self’  nd ‘other’ exercise influence over 
the behaviour of political actors, thereby indirectly impacting upon 
international structure. 
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The following sections will present the findings of the core research vital for 
examination of the hypothesis focusing on its individual parts. First of all, 
features of the definitive discourse will be presented, followed by the outline of 
dominant interpretations of Central Europe. Finally, findings in regards to the 
influence of the concept on political actors and the international structure will 
be summarized.  
 
7.2.1 Definitive discourse of Central Europe 
This first subchapter summarizes the findings of the core research into 
development of the Central European discourse in individual regions, identifies 
its shifts and changes, and observes the clear domination of German notions, 
generally adopted in the other countries of the region.  
 
7.2.1.1 Germany 
The oft-repeated myth that theories of Central Europe in the form presented by 
German authors during the First World War reach as far back as the early 19th 
century was largely dispelled through the research presented in the Chapter 3. 
It was demonstrated that, not just Karl Ludwig von Bruck but also Friedrich List 
– along with significant other purported Central Europe theorists - were in fact 
rather theorising a notion of Germany.  
While the expression Central Europe was present in daily German parlance 
during this period, it was a generic and vague geographical reference more than 
anything else. The political entity under construction in the period before 
March 1849 was Germany itself and overarching precursor of any Central 
European idea only really entailed the grossdeutsch program for Austrian 
inclusion within Germany. While many conceptions of Central Europe were 
essentially a continuation of this grossdeutsch program, it does not mean that 
grossdeutsch theorists had been developing Central European concepts 
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themselves. Yet, the link was considered strong enough to allow later Central 
Europe theorists to draw upon the historical authority of the grossdeutsch 
authors. Many commentators on Central Europe also adopted this misleading 
narrative, positioning grossdeutsch authors as theorists of Central Europe (e.g. 
Meyer 1955, Brechtefeld 1996). The original writings of these authors 
examined in this thesis (e.g. Bruck 1949a, b and c in Appendix 1, 2 and 3) 
suggested otherwise. 
It has been demonstrated that Central Europe was chosen as a replacement 
notion for Germany by the grossdeutsch authors after the founding of the 
German Empire with Austria obviously now a definitive, separate entity. 
Austria’s parting with the rest of the German states was not a sudden event. In 
fact, it happened gradually and certain levels of othering were already apparent 
by 1848, especially in Bruck’s writing. The widening gulf between Austria and 
other German states, the solidifying structures of the Zollverein, the war of 1866 
and, finally, the year 1871 brought the realisation that Germany as a notion had 
come to mean the German Empire, not any wider area of German speaking 
settlement. The need for a replacement notion therefore arose with authors 
now advocating the need for alliance between Austria and a separate Germany 
– this became the new Central European project (Frantz 1879, Lagarde 1881).  
Yet – contrary to the version insisted upon in so many later analyses of Central 
Europe - this research showed that the development of Central Europe as a 
notion did not follow directly from the works of these two authors. Neither 
Constantin Franz, nor Paul de Lagard, were mainstream authors during their 
lifetime - their works were rather rediscovered and thrust into the spotlight by 
Central Europe advocates during the early 20th century. Many German authors 
of the late 19th century conceptualised the notion but on widely varied bases 
(Wagner 1883, Bretano 1885, Penck 1887, Ratzel 1898a and Volz 1895). The 
definitive discourse crystallizing Central Europe as an overarching political 
project aiming to unite Germany and Austria-Hungary took at least two decades 
to develop and was not necessarily linear.  
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The discourse was increasingly shaped by the broader influences of German 
geography, political science and philosophy – geographical determinism, the 
organic growth theory of the state (Ratzel 1895, Hözel 1896) and imperial 
rivalry with the perceived build-up of other large empires (Frantz 1879, Ratzel 
1895). Christian universalism translated into a belief in the historical mission of 
German nation (Frantz 1882, Lagarde 1881, Partsch 1903) and nationalism a 
conviction that nations should be unified under one political roof (Ratzel 
1898b). Meanwhile, romanticism presented German exceptionality (Partsch 
1903) and the narrative of Germany as the land of the middle (Frantz 1882) 
fostered by self-concentrated cartographic visualisations.  
The result of this debate was still a fairly vaguely delimited Central Europe 
(broadly positioned between France and Russia), but with relatively settled 
characteristics: it was identified with the area of German settlement, where 
Germans would supposedly fulfil their historical mission to organise and lead 
other nations by virtue of their superior civilisational qualities and 
organisational vigour. Put simply, since Germany was a young vigorous state in 
the middle of Europe, it would expand into a Mitteleuropa, encompassing the 
whole of the German nation, thereby dominating the continent.  
An integral part of theorising Central Europe became its definition as a larger 
political unit as well as othering from other empires of the day. In one go, 
authors presented an imperial construct for Germany and delimited it 
positionally by referencing other empires – it was to lie between Russia and 
France, keeping a check on French expansionist ambitions and ultimately 
rivalling the global domination of Britain. Virtually all Central Europe authors 
envisaged a place for Germany among the great imperial nations of the day, 
and, what is more, a privileged place among them. The theoretical frameworks 
underpinning Central Europe – the belief in a future world organized into large 
territorial units (especially), German exceptionality and the organic theory of 
state – called for such an outcome. The ideal being aimed for was the United 
States, a continental political union stretching from one ocean littoral to 
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another. Such a continental extent would allow Germany to take advantage of 
the diverse and more robust production afforded by a larger economic area, 
buttressed by a greater variety of naval transport routes to facilitate global 
trade. Corresponding political clout was envisaged to come with increased 
economic power.  
Strong economic lines of reasoning had entered into conceptions of Central 
Europe by the early years of the 20th century (e.g. Sartorius 1902). The main 
reasoning behind the plan to unify a still vaguely-defined territory was the 
economic interest of Germany. It was envisaged that the future of the world lay 
in ever fiercer competition between larger economic areas, partitioned from 
one another by high customs duties barriers. The construction of an economic 
zone beyond German borders came to be seen as a vital economic necessity, 
drawing upon the earlier inspiration provided by the customs union of German 
states in the 19th century. Theories retained their original underpinnings, but 
economic considerations gained predominance in the discourse – evidenced not 
only by the multitude of written works espousing their significance, but the 
materialisation of a variety of organisations aiming to realise such  plans. The 
most prominent among them was Der Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsverein 
(MEWV) proposed by Julius Wolf. Conceptualising Central Europe economically 
blurred its boundaries once again, stretching it to the west to cover the main 
German river mouths. The authors were also convinced that it would be 
difficult to imagine any of the countries involved (except for Austria-Hungary) 
willingly joining any German economic bloc. Yet, the addition of this economic 
line of reasoning helped to extricate Central Europe from the narrow confines 
of a pan-German discourse and thereby potentially communicate the notion to a 
wider public.  
Economic theorising of a Central Europe would be the norm until the outbreak 
of the First World War, but its popularity always remained relatively limited. 
The breakthrough for Central Europe as a genuinely popular concept only came 
with the experiences of war, the consequent economic blockade and political 
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alliance with Austria-Hungary. The overtones of shared identity, historic 
mission, narrative of unique destiny and the vision of the future great power 
status all lined up in the early period of the war. Pan-German nationalism 
would make its inevitable comeback in a situation when Germany and Austria-
Hungary were surrounded by enemies. Central Europe became synonymous 
with a plan to break out of encirclement and project German power to the 
south-east, perhaps as far as the Persian Gulf, providing an attractive 
alternative prospect centring on expansion. In the difficult realities of war, 
Central Europe provided a vision of purpose, victory, conquest and future 
power status. 
Of course, it was Naumann’s Mitteleuropa that would become the centre-piece 




The discourse of Central Europe in Austria-Hungary was intertwined with shifts 
in the dynamics of the relationship between its nationalities. Austrian Germans 
felt cut off from their brethren in the ascending German Empire – with the 1867 
Compromise having reduced their kingdom by half territorially, they remained 
a minority in the re-constituted monarchy. Austrian German nationalism was 
born out of the feeling of insecurity was repeatedly irked by the perceived lack 
of support from the side of the court, which had to balance the interests of its 
growing Slav population at the expense of the traditionally dominant position 
of its Germans, who in turn viewed it as an attack on their natural rights. Self-
help clubs mushroomed and a pan-German movement quickly emerged.  
The notion of Central Europe as a political concept rather than just a vague 
geographical reference materialised in Austria-Hungary at the same time as it 
did in Germany, the late 1870s to the early 1880s. While various groups of 
authors entered the discourse over the notion, it was relatively swiftly 
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subsumed by the pan-German movement. The Viennese government had 
considered pan-German ideas a challenge to Austria’s sovereignty as well as a 
clear potential threat to the country’s fragile ethnic balance, so publications that 
emanated from such quarters were subjected to strict censorship. Thus, the 
formation of the notion was heavily influenced by pan-German publications 
smuggled in from Germany, through those of Austrian authors in German 
journals and through the direct international influence of prominent German 
authors themselves (e.g. Albrecht Penck).  
Pan-Germans essentially presented Central Europe as a shared strategic, 
economic, cultural and historical space and vision for all Germans, one that was 
to be brought together under one political and economic umbrella to overcome 
its unnatural divided state - thereby providing the basis for realising Germany’s 
great power potential. The main underlying concepts (nationalism, 
romanticism), theoretical frameworks (organic theory of state, geographical 
determinism) as well as the envisaged purpose of Central Europe (to unify 
German nation and provide for expansion of its influence) basically copied the 
pan-German discourse in Germany. Allowing for some exceptions in the 
literature (e.g. Peez 1895), Central Europe came to mean the combination of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary for Austrian pan-Germans. This is consistent 
with their efforts to re-establish and safeguard German predominance in the 
Dual Monarchy, or at least Austria. Such conceptualisation of Central Europe 
provided for a German majority within the envisaged political and economic 
construct and addressed underlying grievances, painting a cosy picture of 
natural German leadership and romanticising ahistorical mission to lead the 
region and achieve greatness. 
The near complete domination of pan-Germans in the discourse effected a 
relatively swift settlement on a notion of Central Europe along these lines. It 
was often employed by the daily press to describe attempts to finalise a 
customs union during the 1880s and 1890s. 
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Yet, until the First World War, the pan-German movement remained essentially 
fringe and Austria’s citizens of all national denomination stayed relatively loyal 
to the throne. The influence of the economic line of (Central European) 
theorisation would be felt through the activities of MEWV; however, baseline 
definitions remained focused on Germany and Austria-Hungary. Just as with the 
case of Germany, the war represented a big break-through for Central Europe, 
when the notion transcended its relatively narrow discourse boundaries and 
became a household term within society. 
 
7.2.1.3 Anglo-Saxon 
In British and American writing, the notion of Central Europe had appeared 
occasionally by the late 19th century, though it was a rather fuzzy and loosely 
defined notion, which authors tended to mould to their individual liking.  
British cartography presented the first consistent depictions of any designated 
Central Europe in the period of late 1860s and early 1870s, focusing on 
Germany. The underlying purpose of these maps was to provide visualisation of 
Germany’s ambitions in its contemporary wars. Later cartographic 
representations of Central Europe demonstrate a shift to coverage of larger 
areas of Europe and a significant eastwards shift to cover Austria-Hungary, 
documenting wider, changing perceptions of how Central Europe was 
perceived, and basically linking the two empires together. In the USA, maps of 
Central Europe were virtually non-existent before 1900, reflecting a 
pronouncedly lesser concern about developments on the continent as 
compared to Britain. The Central Europe discourse was properly introduced to 
English-speaking audiences with Partsch’s ‘Central Europe’ in 1903. This work 
also remained the single most important English language treatise, guiding 
interpretation of Central Europe in Britain until at least the start of the First 
World War. Partsch presented Central Europe as a region to be “willingly or 
unwillingly” dominated by the Germans (Partsch 1903: 142), feeding into the 
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popular Germanophobia of the day, seemingly confirming Germany’s 
expansionist ambitions. Interestingly, Mackinder, who was an editor of 
Partsch’s volume, did not pay much attention to Germany in his celebrated 
essay of 1904. 
Early US reviews of Partsch’s work were somewhat more neutral and 
dispassionate than their British counterparts. Eventually, the limited coverage 
devoted to the Central Europe debate in Germany also turned into something 
altogether more negative, reflecting rising militarism and expansionism in the 
run-up to the war.  
Overall, the narrow discourse over Central Europe in existence in the Anglo-
Saxon environment entirely reflected interpretations of the notion as it was 
developing in Germany. It was a mirror to the new Self being constructed in 
Germany - alternatively, it could be seen as observations of the emerging Other. 
 
7.2.1.4 Central Europe before the outbreak of the war 
It follows from this discussion that the discourse was very obviously dominated 
by German authors, who used it as a concept to articulate growing German 
ambitions.  
While the notion first appeared as a simple replacement term for ‘Germany’ 
reacting to the unsuitability of the latter for any pan-German project after the 
establishment of the empire, German authors forwarded a wide array of 
definitions for the notion in the following two decades; and a variety of 
influences besides nationalism underpinned its development. Rather than a 
mere continuation of grossdeutsch ideas, Central Europe gradually coalesced as 
a project articulating the German ambition to assume its place among the 
leading imperial nations. 
Meanwhile, in Austria-Hungary, pan-German authors had led the discourse 
since its inception. Central Europe had been built on grossdeutsch ideas, 
drawing on developing Austrian German insecurity, this group’s feelings of 
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exclusion and its hope that a closer relationship with Germany might shore up 
its dominant (if potentially withering) position. Austrian authors eagerly had 
already bought into the developing discourse in Germany by the end of the 
nineteenth century, pushing their definition of Central Europe as Germany and 
Austria-Hungary combined, underlining the position of Germans as the leading 
nation.  
This definition and vision of Central Europe was directly transplanted into the 
Anglo-Saxon environment with Partsch’s Central Europe (1903). The book 
presented its readers with a concept that centred on the possibilities for 
German domination of vast swathes of the European mainland and fitted well 
with the then contemporary Germanophobic mood. The economic discourse in 
the early 20th century naturally placed a stronger emphasis on the economic 
interests of the German Empire, rather than the supposed national ambitions of 
all Germans, but other characteristics remained broadly the same. With the 
boundaries of the concept widening to cover strategic areas on the basis of 
economic complementarity, Austria-Hungary became more of a transit territory 
than the sole strategic ally. Yet, perceiving their own vulnerability, Austrian 
pan-Germans bought into this concept as well. They aimed at restoring their 
own position within the own monarchy with the idea that the strength in 
numbers provided by union with Germany would confer a strategic advantage. 
At the outbreak of the First World War, the dominant and largely pragmatic 
definition of Central Europe in place was one of a German-led customs union, 
providing the basis for the further expansion of the German economy. The war 
would signal a sudden comeback for pan-German awareness and aspirations.  
 
7.2.2 Dominant definitions of Central Europe during the war 
This section focuses on the defining characteristics, the implicit geopolitical 
imaginaries and the philosophical and theoretical concepts underpinning 
dominant definitions of Central Europe harboured during the First World War 
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in the individual environments examined in our core research chapters. Let us 
remind ourselves of the dominant definitions in existence before we reflect 
upon their influence on policy makers and emergent international structure. 
 
7.2.2.1 Germany 
The Central Europe discourse during the First World War transcended its 
previously limited boundaries and became part of a much wider social debate 
about war aims. While earlier on, the discourse had been dominated by pan-
German authors and later economists, now a great variety of authors entered 
into a debate that was carried widely in European daily parlance.  
This development spelled not just a wider variety of Central European concepts 
but a huge increase in authorship. Chapter 3 identified two broad streams: 
a) A narrow mainstream of strategic and economic concepts arguing for a 
union of Germany and Austria-Hungary built on pan-German nationalist 
rhetoric focusing on the elaboration of institutions and mechanisms of 
any envisaged future union. 
b) A lesser assembly of wider concepts, where Germany and Austria-
Hungary represented only a core of Central Europe and the basis for the 
future expansion of Germany’s influence – generally couched in notably 
more muted nationalist rhetoric. 
Both streams showed the influence of themes developed earlier in the Central 
Europe discourse from the late 1870s onwards – the organic growth theory of 
the state, geographic determinism, nationalism, a belief in historical mission 
and the superiority of the German nation, the vision of a future world composed 
of large economic and political units, as well as an economic line of reasoning. 
Many of these themes themselves echoed ideas already developed by the mid-
19th century, as witnessed in the writings of Friedrich List and others (see 
section 3.3.1). Both streams constructed an identity for Central Europe to 
contrast with the various Others that could be seen to confront it Imperial 
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Russia, France and Britain. In fact, the othering from these three was often 
presented as a very reason substantiating the need to constitute  Central 
Europe – so as to withstand and counterweight their pressures (see e.g. 
discussion of Naumann in section 3.6.1).  
The difference between the two streams lay in a subtle difference in interests, 
which individual authors followed in their conceptions of Central Europe. 
Mainstream authors essentially returned to the pan-German project, aiming for 
unification of the German nation through the union of Germany and Austria-
Hungary. In sharp contrast, the authors of the wider concepts generally sought 
to further the interests of the German Empire within the development of a core 
Central Europe bloc and its subsequent expansion and projection south 
eastwards towards the Middle East.  
In the mainstream of definitions that prevailed in the discourse, Central Europe 
became identified with a plan for the military, economic and political 
unification of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germans would reach the final 
stage of their unification by reasserting control over the smaller nationalities of 
the Dual Monarchy and achieve great-power status within an increased 
territorial power base. Friedrich Naumann’s concept became the embodiment 
of the dominant definition, driving perceptions of what Central Europe was 
about among the Entente powers as well as the small nations of Austria-
Hungary. 
Yet, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5, the lesser stream also played its role in 
shaping perceptions of Central Europe among its adversaries – concepts which 
suggested that German expansion to the Middle East sat well with the strategic 
concerns of imperial rivals, especially the British Empire. However, 
interestingly, both streams ultimately exercised remarkably little influence 
upon political decision making in Germany itself.  
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7.2.2.2 Austria-Hungary 
A flurry of pan-German Central Europe conceptions calling for union with 
Germany started to be published as early as August 1914. In an outburst of 
empathetic proclamations between the two German empires, Austrian pan-
Germans called for union in order to help re-establish their internal dominance. 
Two streams in theorisation developed. 
In the first one, internal reform of Austria occupied the major parts of essays 
yet, even then, only Central Europe was discussed.  The names of both states 
were used to highlight their nominal equality. Yet, revealingly, the German 
nation was considered to be one unit and the role of Austria as “a bearer of 
German culture” or the “medium of German supremacy in the East” was 
repeatedly underlined.  
The second one was fully in line with the established understanding of Central 
Europe as a replacement notion for Deutschland. Much less attention was 
devoted to internal reforms of Austria-Hungary, but its sovereign status and 
role within the envisaged military and economic unit was duly emphasised. The 
reasoning behind the necessity of the realisation of Central Europe was the 
envisaged future of a world consisting of larger economic areas and political 
units. 
While, generally the second stream copied the discourse in Germany, the first 
one was unique to Austria. As was the case with Germany, a clear distinction 
could be drawn between the identities of authors in both streams - those seeing 
themselves as primarily Austrian or German in the first instance. Authors in the 
first stream strived to remodel Austria to reassert its German character through 
their enactment of Central Europe, drawing on the strength in numbers that 
would be realised through union with Germany. Authors in the second stream 
were simply continuing a pan-German project, with some concessions made to 
provide for the interests of the Austrian throne and government.  
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Publication of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa somewhat derailed the Austrian 
discourse: the number of works published on the topic soared and many bought 
into Naumann’s specific plan for elaboration and implementation. Naumann’s 
proposal aligned with the ambitions of many Austrian Germans since it 
provided a well reasoned basis for the creation of a political and economic 
union for a strong majority of the German population, while at the same time 
being (at least on the surface) attuned to the sensitivities of the other nations of 
the Dual Monarchy. Naumann’s concept had a profound impact on the Austrian 
discourse and pushed alternative proposals to the fringe. Naumann’s followers 
enumerated key figures in the Austrian Central Europe movement, including 
Josef Maria Baernreither, assuring its continued prominence within the 
discourse. Under his influence, the Central Europe discourse spilled over into 
wider society and became equated with a plan essentially for economic union 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Highlighting the economic foundations 
of the plan, Central Europe was firmly paired with synonyms such as 
wirtschaftliche Vereinigung (economic union), wirtschafliche Annäherung 
(economic rapprochement), Zollunion (customs union). 
Naumann’s concept was opposed from some notably diverse points of view – 
Karl Renner due to his alternative vision of Central Europe, pan-German 
radicals for being an insufficiently ambitious proposal, Austrian Slavs for the 
very idea of such a construct, while Albrecht Penck refused to use the notion 
from then on in. Nonetheless, even these critics engaged with Naumann’s 
concept, thus entering into the very same discourse. The dominant 
interpretation of Central Europe until the end of war was to be tied with the 
plan for economic and then political union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, as 
portrayed by Naumann.  
Hungarians as well as Slavs took a mostly negative view of Naumann’s plan, 
even though they were willing to listen to him at first. One of the very few 
Hungarians convinced of the usefulness of the plan was Sandor Wekerle, who 
would crucially later become the Hungarian Prime Minster in 1917. But among 
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Slavs, the idea of Central Europe would become the anti-pole of what was 
desired. For them, Central Europe presented a plan for the perpetuation of 
German domination as opposed to strived-for equality.  
Evidently, the leader of the Czechs, Tomáš G. Masaryk, made good use of the 
Central European hype following publication of Naumann’s book. He adopted 
the dominant definition of Central Europe as the union of Germany and Austria-
Hungary and skilfully used its various portrayals to depict the dangers such a 
plan would present for allied interests. He used these narratives to try to 
convince allied governments that Austria-Hungary should be dismembered, if 
their interests were to be safeguarded from the danger Central Europe 
presented. This consistent narrative was also broadcast by several other 
members of his group in communication with various governments. Polish and 
Yugoslav representatives occasionally used the same argument in their efforts, 
too. To what degree of success, we will discuss below. 
 
7.2.2.3 Anglo-Saxon 
The concept of Central Europe prevalent in Anglo-Saxon environments derived 
from translations and interpretations of contemporary German writing. 
Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa was published in English language in 1917 
and was preceded by translations of André Chéradame’s works – all of which 
highlighted the dangers of the concept as a plan for German expansion across 
Europe.  
In both Britain and the United States, interpretations of Central Europe thus 
solidified along the lines of a German-Austro-Hungarian alliance, whose 
purpose was to provide the basis for an increased role and presence of the 
German nation in the world. In Britain, the concept was viewed as directly 
opposed to the interests of the empire, as it sought to challenge the existing 
status quo in Europe. Moreover, Central Europe was understood to comprise 
the basis for a wider German plan to expand influence into the Middle East (a la 
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Berlin-Baghdad railway project), posing a direct threat to British interests 
there.  
The US view of the concept might have been somewhat less alarmist, but 
certainly no more favourable. Many viewed it as a continuation of the Prussian 
expansionism of the 19th century and the notion had predominantly negative 
connotations.  
Central Europe, in many aspects, became the negative Other Britain and later 
also the United States fought against in the unprecedented conflict that was the 
Great War. 
 
7.2.2.4 The wartime definition 
The outbreak of the war brought about a resurgence of pan-German feelings, 
giving Central Europe a new momentum and vesting it with a new cloak of 
German solidarity. Pan-German plans for the union of Germany and Austria-
Hungary, to be forged through the tested means of a customs and military 
union, quickly overtook the remnants of any pre-war economic debate over 
wider union in Germany. In Austria-Hungary, the definition of Central Europe 
was firmly linked to this new interpretation, while two strands formed in its 
theorization, depending on the primary loyalties of authors. Overall, Central 
Europe came to mean an alliance of the two ‘Germanic’ empires, which was to 
be brought about by the war, with an ambition to eventually project its power 
further, especially to the Middle East. 
Friedrich Naumann’s book clearly dominated the wartime discourse and 
definitively became ‘the concept of Central Europe’, a centre-point for any 
debate. The book brought Central Europe to the peak of its popularity, various 
authors in Germany and Austria-Hungary engaging with it by suggesting details 
for its possible implementation, either proposing alternatives to or outright 
opposing Naumann’s blueprint. It was published in allied countries as the 
articulation of the ultimate war aims of Germany. Masaryk portrayed Central 
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Europe negatively, tailoring its description to match the strategic concerns of 
the British, French and US governments so as to maximise threat perceptions 
and thereby further the prospects for independent nation states to take the 
place of Austria-Hungary. 
It now remains to be explored what impact the discourse and dominant 
definition of the notion had on policy-makers on both sides of the fence. 
 
7.2.3 Influence on policy makers 
The final part of the research hypothesis proposes that the definitive discourse 
of Central Europe exercised an influence on policy makers and potentially 
impacted on emergent international structures. This section examines the 
gathered evidence before contemplating any potential structural effects.  
 
7.2.3.1 Germany 
While Bismarck was certainly not the passionate advocate of Central Europe as 
is often depicted, the files of the Auswärtiges Amt showed that the notion of 
Central Europe found application in policy making considerations during the 
1880s and 1890s. However, it was different to the pan-German concepts 
produced by Franz and Lagard: for the German Foreign Office associated 
Central Europe with the plan for a wider customs union in mainland Europe, 
then pitched as an alternative to bilateral arrangements with Austria-Hungary. 
It was a proposal for the reorganisation of the European trading relationship, 
with specific ambition to include France. The same use of the notion can be 
traced in the Caprivi period as well. Owing to a multitude of barriers, this idea 
was never realized. 
Central Europe resurfaced in the early months of the war. Crucially, it was again 
connected with the question of reorganisation of trade relations in Europe after 
the war. Delbrück’s commission observed that many trade relations had been 
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either severed or significantly reduced due to the events of war and could be 
renegotiated at the same time as the expiring trade agreement with Austria-
Hungary.  
The use of the notion thus remained aligned with the idea of a wider customs 
union for mainland Europe and Delbrück’s commission explored the 
possibilities for trade and cooperation with several of its neighbours, including 
France and Russia. The considerations of the commission were remarkably 
devoid of any pan-German language and the value of Austria-Hungary for 
customs or economic union was actually estimated to be very low, if not 
negative. The commission’s final proposal, presented to Bethmann-Hollweg in 
April 1915, was for a customs alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, 
Italy and Switzerland. The creation of this Central European union was to start 
with a customs alliance with Austria-Hungary (as the only state that would join 
it willingly), later to be expanded with the inclusion of other states at the time 
of peace negotiations. 
The members of the cabinet were not too impressed with the idea, many of 
them (including Delbrück) opposed to any alliance with the Dual Monarchy. Yet, 
the omnipresent conviction that the days of free global trade were over and 
Germany would be shut out from all markets if it failed to build its own larger 
economic zone, became the decisive guidelines in any argument. Eventually, the 
government decided to pursue negotiations for economic rapprochement with 
Austria-Hungary. 
Negotiations were kept to a technical discussion level and their record remains 
remarkably devoid of any nationalist language. The only manifestation of 
resurgent pan-German thought arrived with a memorandum of 13 November 
1915, which, ironically, did not go down well with the Austrians (Jagow 1915, 
Austro-Hungarian Embassy 1915). This memorandum was likely motivated by 
the advice of Tschirschky, who was himself a pan-German Central Europe 
advocate. However, the sharp rebuff delivered to such language by the Austrian 
side discouraged further use of the same rhetoric in following communication. 
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The language of a pan-German Central Europe was apparently not successful, 
even as a rhetorical exercise. 
The evidence that even the most famous proponents of Central Europe 
exercised any influence on the German government was at best limited. Even 
Naumann’s advances towards the German government only received the odd, 
occasional appreciative letter. Quite the contrary of his Central Europe being a 
contemporary guiding force for German foreign policy, many in the government 
started to think that his activities actually damaged Germany’s external 
interests. As the alliance with Austria-Hungary started to look an increasingly 
bleak prospect, a preference for a return to free trade conditions resurfaced. 
German ruling circles were only too aware that the proposals for a German-led 
customs union were viewed negatively among the allies (Luxburg 1915, 
Kühlmann 1916) and that the aggressive pan-German rhetoric of many Central 
Europe concepts was fostering the view that such a bloc would present a threat 
to their interests. At least one member of the cabinet openly expressed his 
opinion that the activities of ‘Naumann and his friends’ blocked any potential 
return to free trade (AA PA 1917).  
The one organisation the government followed closely was Julius Wolf’s MEWV 
(Bundesarchiv R43/405-407). This is in line with observation that the 
government files use the notion of Central Europe as a reference to the plan for 
a customs union in the territory mainland Europe, akin to pre-war economic 
concepts. This would align well with the timeline of the considerations of 
Delbrück’s commission, as this was set up before the pan-German mainstream 
wartime interpretation of Central Europe started to take shape in 1915.  
Government files used the notion as a label extensively in this early period. For 
example, the file classification, ‘Central European State Union’ (German Federal 
Archive, R 2593 – 2598) was set inaugurated. However, the notion rarely 
appeared in subsequent files recording actual negotiations with Austria-
Hungary, since Central Europe was associated with a wider customs union. This 
observation is consistent with pre-war economic conceptions of Central 
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Europe, which sought to establish a wider union starting with Austria-Hungary. 
The German government’s aims were also in line with this understanding of 
Central Europe. While trade and customs unions were being negotiated, the 
German government was clearly interested in striking a deal that would bolster 
the transport capacities of the Danube and Austro-Hungarian railways looking 
south-east to Asia Minor and the, eventually, perhaps the Middle East. 
On the other hand, none of the governmental considerations show a significant 
influence of geographic determinism or organic growth state theory, so 
prominent in all conceptions of Central Europe originating in the pre-war 
economic discourse. In fact, the only shared characteristic is the belief in the 
future organisation of global trade into mutually exclusive and protectionist 
larger economic zones. Moreover, the notion of Central Europe is relatively 
consistently associated with the idea of a wider customs union in the 
governmental files starting in the 1880s (e.g., the files in the Archive of the 
German Foreign Office, AA PA, Austria 83, R 8690). Therefore, it would be 
difficult to insist that the use of the notion in the early wartime period was in 
some way motivated by the pre-war economic discourse of Central Europe. 
Rather it is likely that the formation of the interpretation of the notion was 
parallel to the economic discourse in the early years of the 20th century and 
may even have predated it, placing first use of Central Europe within the late 
19th century (e.g. Reuss 1885), when its use in wider public was relatively 
unsettled, but among other things associated with such a plan.  
This would place the institutional definition of Central Europe within the 
German Foreign Office into the lesser stream of the wartime discourse as an 
independent concept, developed on the basis of earlier institutional 
interpretations reaching back at least three decades. Thus rather than being 
influenced by the discourse and its dominant definition of Central Europe, the 
German Foreign Office was an independent (if fringe) contributor to the debate. 
The notion of Central Europe developed as a proposal for a multilateral 
customs alliance in Europe and resurfaced several times in the 1880s, 1890s 
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and early 1900s; until it was finally fully utilised in the early days of the First 
World War. Thus, in direct contrast to what outside observers and 
commentators assumed, the German government was under very little (if any) 
influence from “Mr Naumann and his friends” (AA PA 1917: E569131). 
 
7.2.3.2 Austria-Hungary 
Following its defeat of 1866, the monarchy was in decline, torn by clashing 
ethnic ambitions and increasingly conscious of its seemingly ever stronger 
neighbour to the north-west. The main preoccupation of the Viennese throne 
was to safeguard the sovereignty of its now Dual Monarchy and keep a lid on 
simmering national tensions. Central Europe, a notion appropriated by the pan-
German movement was thus necessarily seen as a suspect notion when 
harboured among courtiers and cabinet members. It was designed to enhance 
the standing of the Germans at the expense of the Slavs and almost certain to 
cause a backlash among them.  
From the 1880s the government firmly associated Central Europe with 
contemplation of a closer relationship with Germany, in which Austria-Hungary 
would clearly become a junior partner. In this sense, the idea of Central Europe 
worked head on against the interests of the throne – it would curb Vienna’s 
sovereignty and upset the fragile national peace balance at the same time. Thus 
if the Austrian government took account of Central Europe, it was in a negative 
sense. In fact, the heir to the throne was plotting a comprehensive internal 
reform, which would see Austrian German (and Magyar) standing significantly 
reduced.  
Prime Minister Stürgkh and his Hungarian counterpart Tisza both imposed 
strict censorship and actively sought to limit debate on the topic within political 
circles during the early days of the First World War. The government was 
unsuccessful in stopping ‘pilgrimages’ of Central Europe enthusiasts into Berlin, 
but it was successful in stifling any brewing internal debate. The lack of 
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coordination was the key to their inability to formulate common proposals and 
engage meaningfully with the Berlin government. 
Stürgkh’s government drew a clear distinction between the contemplated 
customs union and the idea of Central Europe as a virtual union with 
Germany190. Several cabinet ministers voiced sharp opposition even to the idea 
of customs union due to the perception this would drive Austria-Hungary into 
ever deeper dependency on Germany. Naumann personally tried and failed to 
convince the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza, who remained one of the 
staunchest opponents of the plan. Finally, practical considerations and a 
persistent belief the world was heading for a global system of large exclusive 
economic zones, motivated the reluctant agreement of the government to the 
commencement of negotiations with Germany in August 1915. The label of 
Central Europe was purposefully avoided and replacement notions, such as 
economic rapprochement (wirtschaftliche Annäherung) were employed in the 
official documentation instead. 
It was only under the short-lived cabinet of Heinrich von Clam-Martinic (1916 – 
1917) where the Central Europe program got any kind of head-start and could 
be seen to exercise a strong influence on policy-making. Clam-Martinic’s cabinet 
featured a notable group of strong Central Europe enthusiasts, including 
Baernreither, Riedl and Czernin. Stalled negotiations were immediately 
reopened. At the same time, Sándor Wekerle, the chairman of the Hungarian 
branch of MEWV and the foremost of Central Europe advocates in Hungary, 
became Hungarian Prime Minister in May 1917. However, Clam-Martinic’s 
cabinet fell after only six months in the aftermath of rising nationalist tensions 
in the reopened Austro-Hungarian parliament. 
The subsequent Seidler cabinet retained some of these Central Europe 
advocates group in its inner core (especially Czernin, who held onto his foreign 
                                                 
190
 This distinction is also visible in treatment of the eventual negotiations with Germany, which 
remain filed as trade agreement negotiations, in sharp contrast to German filing of same 
documents under ‘Central European State Union’. 
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policy portfolio); however, their success in realizing any idea of Central Europe 
must be questioned carefully. The accords signed by two the emperors in May 
1918 represented a political capitulation of Karl to Wilhelm, rather than the 
summit of successful negotiations. Czernin was sacked in June 1918 and the 
Seidler government started to immediately press its preference for a customs 
arrangement rather than full union. The coup de grâce for the ill-fated project 
was dealt by the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary late during 1918. 
 
7.2.3.3 Anglo-Saxon 
The notion of Central Europe appeared in British governmental 
correspondence as early as 1906 as a distinctively anti-British pan-German 
plan to unify Germany and Austria-Hungary, and expand German influence to 
the south-east (Tower 1906). Many adopted the use of the notion in its German 
original – ‘Mitteleuropa’, using it in English language texts. ‘Drang nach Osten’ 
and ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ swiftly became bywords for Central Europe, as British 
officials identified it with a perceived strategic threat to the British Empire, 
even its Government of India. From the British point of view, Austria-Hungary 
was a key link in this plan and detachment from its stronger ally would 
hopefully ruin any prospects for its materialisation. A strong and independent 
Austria-Hungary was from the British point of view by far the best safeguard 
against expansion of German influence into the Middle East. (Cartwright 
1909b)  
This premise remained the British policy baseline well into the war, even 
though there was little doubt that the Dual Monarchy was firmly under the 
influence of Germany. Masaryk’s proposals for dismemberment thus fell on deaf 
ears in many quarters. The first official consideration of dismemberment was 
the Tyrrell-Paget report (Tyrrell and Paget 1916); however, this proposal did 
not gain much traction. The main concern was that the break-up would leave 
behind a group of small states exposed to German over-lordship. In contrast, 
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Austria’s defection would greatly enhance the chances of an allied victory and 
provide a counterweight to German influence after the war.  
These assessments were based on prevailing concepts of the balance of power 
and rooted in the pre-war system of the European Concert. The idea of Austria-
Hungary as a counter-weight to Germany was better aligned with policy 
makers’ mindsets than Masaryk’s proposal of a Slav barrier. Moreover, the 
group of New Imperialists in the cabinet of Lloyd George also believed the 
world would in future develop towards larger political units, not small nation 
states. Their preferred tactic was to detach Austria-Hungary from Germany, 
ensure its restructuring - to give equal status to all nationalities (therefore 
weakening any German element) - and turn the area of the formal empire into a 
regional counter-weight against Germany. The British government believed 
that Austria would be willing to agree to such solution, due to its perceived 
war-weariness and its attempts to negotiate a separate peace.  
It was only the material signature of protocols on economic and military union 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary of May 1918 that convinced British 
policy-makers that this scenario was dead. Horace Rumbold, British 
Ambassador in Switzerland, interpreted the protocols as a step towards 
Mitteleuropa (Rumbold 1918a and 1918b), warning that it could become a 
reality. As a result, the Foreign Office switched gears and started supporting the 
propaganda activities of the small nations of the Dual Monarchy to destabilize 
it.  
However, this did not imply a commitment to dismemberment. It was not any 
concrete fear of an emergent Central Europe that convinced the British 
Government to recognize the Czech National Council as the provisional 
government of a future Czechoslovak state. A much more convincing argument 
lay in the army that the CNC controlled and the allies needed. Even after 
recognition, as late as September 1918, Robert Cecil was convinced that Britain 
should not bind itself to dismemberment (Cecil 1918f); however, the Dual 
Monarchy would ultimately collapse anyway of its own accord. The Foreign 
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Office was anxious not  to witness avoid Balkanisation of the region and 
considered supporting the creation of a regional federation but ultimately 
decided to stay out of the matter and let it matters take their own course. 
In the USA, Central Europe featured in the writings of key policy makers, 
typically as ‘Mitteleuropa’. In the Inquiry papers, it appears interchangeably 
with ‘Mittel-Europa’, ‘Mid-Europe’ and ‘Mid-European Economic Union’, along 
with ‘Drang nach Osten’ and ‘Berlin-Baghdad’. The Inquiry’s interpretation of 
Central Europe was built upon the re-reading of pan-German writings and its 
interactions with significant opponents of the plan (Chéradame, Masaryk, 
Seton-Watson). The key analysts of the Inquiry (Kerner, Seymour) adopted the 
view of Central Europe put forward by Masaryk – i.e., it represented a German 
plan to dominate the Slavs and make headway eastwards to establish their rule 
over vast swathes of Europe. Masaryk presented the dismemberment of 
Austria-Hungary and establishment of a collective of independent Slav states as 
a potential bulwark against future spread of German influence. After the war, 
House asserted that the US government had always believed that an 
independent Bohemia could be considered such a bulwark. However, the 
evidence suggested otherwise. In fact, it took a long time to convince the US 
government to recognize the CNC at all and, even after the break-up of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, American representatives insisted on formation of a 
new regional union. 
House claimed that the bulk of the Inquiry’s work focused on ‘Mitteleuropa’, 
which he defined as stretching from the North and Baltic seas to the Persian 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean, identifying it with a purported Hamburg-Baghdad 
plan of German expansion; this had been a view undoubtedly adapted from re-
reading works such as Chéradame’s The German Plot Unmasked (1916), 
interactions with British policy makers and activist opponents of the concept. 
This view was also presented in the very first document of the Inquiry, which 
became instrumental to the formulation of the famous 14 Points speech of 
President Wilson. 
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However, the Inquiry was not keen on dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. In 
fact, the Inquiry was disunited over the question of what should be done with 
the Dual Monarchy, leaning towards its federalisation in general terms. Just like 
the British government, the Inquiry did not believe small nation states could 
resist Germany, considering these would eventually be drawn into its orbit 
under some Central European pretext.  
Already in 1916, both House and Wilson believed that Germany hankered after 
a stable continental base, which would help it to project power towards the 
Middle East. Since the plan was deemed a threat to US interests, the Inquiry 
proposed democratization of Germany and the federalisation of Austria-
Hungary as the best safeguard against it (The Inquiry 1918). Dismemberment 
was evidently not on the cards and Wilson actually delivered assurances of the 
continued existence of the empire after the war to the Austrian government. His 
14 points speech did not call for the break-up and establishment of 
independent nation states. History generally take  House’s post-war line that 
the US was a supporter of Czech independence (House and Seymour 1921); yet, 
in point of factWilson had actually refused to see Masaryk as late as May 1918. 
Even after recognition was extended to the CNC on 3 September, the US 
preference remained for regional federation.  
To this end, the government offered to finance an initiative for a Mid-European 
Union, adapting the notion to cover its own regional reorganisation plan. 
Masaryk confirmed that it was the US establishment that had put forward the 
very idea of the regional federation (Masaryk 1918b). Yet, the attempt to realise 
a ‘safe Mitteleuropa’ was a stillborn plan. This federative concept imposed by 
another outside actor – the US government in this case – did not even find 




7.2.3.4 Government views of Central Europe 
To sum up, the German government maintained its own definition of Central 
Europe – one that it had used fairly consistently from the 1880s. This was of a 
wider customs union in continental Europe, often cast as the alternative to 
closer relationship with Austria Hungary rather than something likely to foster 
it. This definition of Central Europe was also projected into the German 
governmental debate in the early days of the war. The government’s 
considerations were largely unscathed by the nationalist discourse developing 
in wider society. The fact that the outcome of the internal debate – relating to 
the opening of negotiations on a customs union with Austria-Hungary – 
coincided with the public discourse of Central Europe, was a result of the 
observed necessity to start a build-up of the envisaged bloc as soon as was 
practically possible. The only country that would be willing to join it was the 
Dual Monarchy, even though its value as a market for Germany was highly 
doubtful.  
On the other hand, the conduct of the top Austrian and Hungarian politicians 
was profoundly affected by the Central Europe discourse. In these state 
territories, the notion was developing as a pan-German notion, presenting a 
challenge to both the sovereignty of the Dual Monarchy and its fragile national 
and ethnic balance. Both Stürgkh and Tisza imposed strict censorship on 
debating Central Europe, clamping down on even internal pan-German debates 
through their personal connections with Central Europe proponents (e.g. 
Gustav Gross). The government consented to negotiations towards a customs 
union with Germany, but drew a clear difference between the two concepts. 
There were many powerful advocates of Central Europe in Austria-Hungary, 
but it took Stürgkh’s death and Tisza’s resignation to bring about a 
breakthrough in their influence on policy making. The short-lived cabinet of 
Clam-Martinic included several of the foremost advocates of Central Europe 
together directly in key positions. This six months episode represents the 
highest degree of influence on policy making the notion of Central Europe had 
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ever affected. The Seidler government somewhat muffled the influence of 
Central Europe enthusiasts but some of them remained in influential positions, 
working towards conclusion of negotiations. Unfortunately for them, their term 
in office coincided with the faltering commitment of Germany. 
Policy makers in the allied countries also kept the notion of Central Europe in 
view. In both Britain and the USA, Central Europe was equated to the Berlin-
Baghdad project, represented as the spring-board for German expansion to the 
Middle East and beyond, and considered a strategic threat. The notion was 
derived from observations of the discourse in Germany and its interpretations 
by authors opposing the notion. In fact, Central Europe often appeared in 
governmental correspondence in its German original, ‘Mitteleuropa’. However, 
policy makers in both countries refused to accept Masaryk’s insistence that it 
could only be countered by dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 
Dismemberment did not sit well with US and British policy mindsets rooted in 
pragmatic balance of power conceptions and underlined the persistent belief 
that small countries could not resist German pressure. Instead, after the Dual 
Monarchy collapsed, sections of policy making circles in both countries put 
forward their own concepts for Central Europe, which would have seen 
construction of a new federation from the successor states of Austria-Hungary. 
Eventually, the British government decided to turn down Leo Amery’s proposal 
of just such a construct. The US government pushed ahead with its Mid-
European Union; an attempt doomed to failure by the lack of commitment of 
those it was supposed to unify. 
To sum up, all key policy makers except for the German government – who 
alone maintained its own definition of Central Europe – were affected by the 
wartime discourse and the dominant interpretation of Central Europe as a pan-
German plan to expand its power. Seen as an attempt at forging a new regional 
identity envisaged by ambitious pan-Germans, the British and US governments 
opposed it, as did the small nations of Austria-Hungary, whose representatives 
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tried to exploit these negative feelings to bring about their recipe for structural 
change in the region.  
 
7.2.4 Influence on international structure  
Overall, concept of Central Europe as an attempt to define regional identity – 
and as a pan-German project of a German-Austro-Hungarian alliance – failed to 
exert an influence on international structure. 
The German government had a different idea of Central Europe than that 
represented in the dominant public discourse stipulated and – to state the 
obvious – it lost the war. On the other hand, the Austrian government under 
Stürgkh was opposed to the notion, while the cabinet of Clam-Martinic fell apart 
before it could bring the negotiations with Germany to completion. Central 
Europe enthusiasts in the Seidler cabinet might have rejoiced temporarily at 
the signing of the accords in May 1918. However, after Czernin’s resignation, 
the government changed its course profoundly, negotiating a much looser 
customs arrangement. Sovereignty and protection of a hard-won internal 
bargain took precedence over pan-German brotherhood. 
British diplomats interpreted the May 1918 accords struck between the two 
emperors as the long-promised arrival of Central Europe and policy changed 
accordingly,. .  Support lent to the propaganda activities of small nations gained 
momentum, though the British government could not bring itself to support a 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary until it fell apart on its own. The 
recognition of CNC certainly boosted confidence in the rebels lined up against 
Vienna, but, of itself, did not bring about the break-up of empire. 
The story of Masaryk in all of this is curious. He operated with a complex 
definition of Central Europe - invoking German domination of the region, the 
suppression of self-determination rights and the possibilities for a Berlin-
Baghdad axis - tailored to its chosen audience, to induce a threat perception in 
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ruling circles of the Entente countries. Central Europe was presented as an 
emerging regional identity harmful to the interests of individual allied 
countries, one that could only be countered by the break-up of Austria-
Hungary. This negative othering failed as well. While Masaryk’s portrayal of 
Central Europe was broadly in line with perceptions of his intended audiences, 
the remedy he suggested to this threat was not. He won recognition of CNC due 
to his POW army, not his portrayal of Central Europe. 
The two governments he was most keen to get on his side, the US and the 
British one, devised their own versions of Central Europe by the war end. In 
Britain, Amery’s extraordinary proposal that Britain should accept a German-
friendly Central Europe defined as a federation of successor states, was turned 
down. The US initiative, which heralded a creation of a Mid-European Union as 
a federation pompously announced at the Independence Hall, fell apart within 
less than two months. This failure to construct new regional identity was due to 
the lack of commitment on part of the nations involved. 
Thus the concept of Central Europe failed completely. There is no doubt that the 
pan-German advocates of the notion, the German government and the small 
nations of Austria-Hungary had a change of international structure in mind, but 
all of them fell short of seeing their ambitions delivered. The Austro-Hungarian 
government was torn between the protection of its sovereignty and the pan-
German ideas, only to be torn apart by nationalist tensions. The US government 
failed miserably in its attempt to engineer a new Central Europe.  
This succession of failures came down to the fact that each and every actor in 
this game pushed for interests diametrically different from their intended 
partners. Pan-German Central Europe advocates were out of synch with the 
German government and clashed head on with Austrian interests, particularly. 
The Austrian government was not interested during the early days of war in 
being a vassal of Germany. The German government was later not interested in 
taking on responsibility for a troublesome Austria. Masaryk pushed for a 
solution that was alien to US and British policy makers, while the US 
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government was intent on acting directly against the wishes of the would-be 
successor states. 
Yet, had the set up have been only very slightly different, one of the Central 
Europe concepts might have come to fruition. Had Clam-Martinic’s cabinet been 
in place at the beginning the war and Wekerle the Hungarian prime minister 
instead of Tisza, the story might have been very different. But instead of 
constructing alternative histories, it seems more profitable to examine the later 
development of the notion to establish whether Central Europe at any point 
impacted pertaining international structures during the twentieth century. Our 
Chapter 6 presented ample materials for such an exercise. 
 
7.2.5 Lessons learned from the core research 
The study of original writings that have been used as evidence for the 
development of the notion of Central Europe exposed the manifold 
misinterpretations carried by later analyses. The deliberate return to the 
original sources referred to in works of subsequent authors, rather than just 
sustaining their interpretations, has proved  revealing.  
Similarly, the extensive archival research undertaken has pointed to 
inconsistencies in conventional historical narratives. To name but one example, 
the image of President Wilson as a champion of independence for the small 
nations of Austria-Hungary is challenged by the best available record of events. 
The last observation also suggests the value of our elected methodological 
approach. For  the studied archival documentation suggests that the observed 
behaviour of ‘states’ was the result of the often complex decision-making of 
individuals, built on their perceptions and proclivities, to some degree 
constrained by existing international structures.  
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7.3 Discussion of findings in the context of following historical 
periods 
Our Chapter 6 documented the varied discourses that have existed over Central 
Europe, whose substance shifted significantly as one or another group of 
authors with their distinctive identities and interests entered the debate and 
gained an upper hand with their definition of the notion.  
 
7.3.1 Discourse and characteristics 
At the end of the First World War Central Europe was a notion closely 
associated with the shattered plans for union between Germany and Austria-
Hungary. The Paris Peace Conference confirmed the sovereignty of the 
nationally-defined successor states that would replace the dismembered 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. But the solution would soon prove to have been far 
from ideal – instability, national tensions and economic impoverishment 
plagued the region, and caused many to think of alternatives. The erratic 
interwar period gave rise to a multitude of new conceptions for multinational 
union in the area, springing from the most diverse sources. Notion of a 
Danubian Federation appeared as a competing term developed by authors 
wishing to leave Germany out of their framework. However, the newly 
independent successor states resisted any real efforts for their integration 
despite growing indications that they might not be able to safeguard their 
national sovereignties. Indeed, the consolidation of Germany in the mid-1920s 
brought with it a new wave of theorizing Central Europe along earlier lines – 
again involving Germany and the successor states to Austria-Hungary. But with 
the hardening of German national ambitions in the early 1930s, the original 
concept would be moulded into an ever-more pronounced program for 
domination of the area by the German nation. This tendency continued until a 
term better suited for such a purpose was introduced – the Reich. The rise of 
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this notion, better suited to express German ambitions at the end of 1930s, 
made Central Europe redundant. 
The beginning of the Second World War brought a virtual u-turn in the 
theorising of Central Europe. Treated as a mere tool of propaganda in Nazi 
Germany, Central Europe had ceased to be the primary term associated with 
German expansionism, now replaced with the term, Reich. Exiled leaders of the 
successor states, now finally convinced of the need for a stronger multinational 
union to counter the German threat, were thus free to develop the notion to 
denote their own plans for the federalisation of a strip of countries between 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Encouraged and supported by the British and 
the US governments, they signed a series of treaties establishing the basis of 
such future union and worked towards their implementation. However, power 
politics took precedence over promises extended to exiled successor states 
politicians and the Western Allies yielded influence over Central Europe to the 
Soviets. This decision dealt a devastating blow to any plans for federation in the 
area, as the Soviet leadership was fiercely opposed to any integration that 
might strengthen its new satellites. When Yugoslav plans for a Balkan 
federation surfaced in 1948, the reprisals were fierce and uncompromising.  
In the early Cold War period, some émigré thinkers living in the West presented 
plans for neutralisation of an area to buffer the spread of Communism – in line 
with the geopolitically substantiated paranoia of the time. However, the 
Western allies were not willing to risk yet another war over Central Europe and 
this new vision failed to gather substantial support. For over three decades, 
Central Europe was not talked about, save for some émigré theorists returning 
to the interwar discourse themes, since division of Europe into East and West 
made it redundant. 
However, Central Europe made a surprise comeback in the 1980s. But the form 
in which it re-emerged seemed far removed from the Central Europe of earlier 
periods. In contrast to previous territorially-defined political projects, Central 
Europe of the 1980s was an abstract, culturally defined conception. Formulated 
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and promoted by dissidents of the Eastern Bloc, Central Europe was a spiritual 
escape, represented as the antithesis of authoritarian regimes, a negation of the 
Eastern-ness ascribed to their countries. An idealised Austro-Hungarian past 
was invoked as a model of cosmopolitan culture and associated with all that 
was supposedly Central European – artistic creativity, cultural uniqueness, and 
humanistic values. Such a definition of Central Europe was enthusiastically 
embraced by a Western audience attuned to the grievances of Eastern 
dissidents. Central Europe became an intellectual project for those who wished 
the Iron Curtain would disappear. 
And disappear it did. From the moment Berlin Wall was torn down, an 
imaginary mythical Central Europe came to being in the eyes of its 1980s 
architects. It became a narrative of cultural approximation to the West, a means 
of othering from the East European past. As grand geopolitical theories 
assigned the region to German sphere of influence in the post-Cold War period, 
Central Europe was on its way to becoming part of the West. Central Europe 
became principally used in the context of European integration and associated 
with the group of countries that were on the right track to achieve speedy 
inclusion into Western economic and security structures. In this context, the 
notion became tautological in itself. Central European countries on their way to 
becoming members of the EU and NATO and countries on their way to 
becoming members of the EU and NATO were Central European. Indeed, since 
the bulk of post-Communist countries joined the NATO and the EU, the 
frequency of the use of the notion substantially declined. It seems like once 
again, Central Europe has been made partially redundant by its inclusion, this 
time into the West. 
In all cases, Central Europe was conceived of as a regional identity, which had a 
particular geopolitical aim – the change of an international structure to 
accommodate interests embodied in the notion. In the inter-war period, these 
were the interests of resurgent and aggrandizement-seeking Germany, which 
shifted with the growing ambitions of the Nazi regime, finally outgrowing the 
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notion itself. During the Second World War, Central Europe was conceived of as 
a regional federation, protecting the interests of countries who fell prey to 
Germany and its allies. In the early Cold War, it was theorized as a neutral 
buffer between the East and the West. In the 1980s, the idea clearly was the 
escape from Soviet domination for its European vassals and in the 1990s to 
make the case for their speedy inclusion in the NATO and the European Union.  
Thus, Central European concepts are definitions of a regional Self, seeking to 
replace that which already exists with something that is desired – a humiliated 
Germany with a new, larger and stronger German-led entity rivalling the 
declining empires of its peers; a patchwork of weak isolated states with a 
federation offering safety in numbers; the East with the West. Yet, what 
evidence is there to support the idea that definitive discourses of Central 
Europe as a Self or the Other have had an influence on political actors and 
international structure 
 
7.3.2 Influence on policy makers and international structure 
For the interwar period, our Chapter 6 documented the way in which 
geopolitics followed the whims of policy makers rather than the other way 
round. However, during the Second World War, the idea of Central Europe as a 
federated strip of countries separating Germany and Russia was both 
developed by the top politicians of their exiled governments and followed 
through by them (with obvious material support from the US government) with 
the clear intention of changing the international structure. Treaties of 
federation were signed by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments in exile, as 
well as by the Greek and Yugoslav ones. Yet, such plans remained unrealized 
because of pressure from the Soviet Union. Their opposition to any such 
structure was fierce indeed. The story of ‘the Titoist clique’ underlined the 
fierce opposition of the Soviet leadership to such a regional structure.  Stalin 
would go as far as to dispose of leaders even remotely supportive of the plan, 
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unleashing an international witch-hunt for traitors and expelling Yugoslavia 
from the bloc.  
It would seem that the concept of Central Europe exercised influence upon 
policy makers where their interests were in line with those served by the 
concept (e.g. the exiled governments in the period of the Second World War, or 
US support for the idea of a buffer zone in the early Cold War), but also maybe 
where they were deemed to be in direct opposition (e.g. Stalin’s reaction to 
Dimitrov’s announcement in 1948). However, when the concept became an 
inconvenience to the interests of policy makers, it would fall upon deaf ears 
(e.g. in late 1930s Germany).  
The strongest evidence for such a lack of interest and influence was the period 
of the Cold War. In a starkly bi-polar world, there was no interest among policy-
makers on either side in any version of Central Europe and the concept was 
understandably proclaimed as redundant (Cohen 1964). In an unexpected 
reverse, the concept was picked up in redefined form by the German 
government in pushing for re-unification at the end of the Cold War.  Central 
Europe would serve as a symbolic hallmark for the integration period that 
followed, a notion found on the tip of the tongue of any regional statesman.  
Yet, for all the variations in time and space and its supposed purpose of 
changing the international structure, Central Europe consistently fell short of 
the ambitions it represented. The only exception was the integration period of 
1990 – 2007, and perhaps, to a more limited degree, the late Cold War191.  
In the 1990s the notion was used to articulate and express the proximity to the 
region it hoped to become part of – the West. The ambition was to amend 
international structure by the inclusion of former Eastern bloc countries within 
the economic and security structures of the West. This ambition was certainly 
achieved. However, the role the notion of Central Europe played in bringing this 
                                                 
191
 It would be a stretch too far to claim that it was the concept of Central Europe that brought down 
the Iron Curtain. Yet, the concept can perhaps be credited with exercising some influence through 
new West German Ostpolitik or debate of the notion in leading Western media. 
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result about will need to be further examined, as secondary research presented 
in this thesis still needs to be confirmed by primary sources. 
It follows from these observations that for Central Europe to succeed as a 
regional identity, a more significant and sustainable confluence in the interests 
of political actors in the region or involved with its shaping will need to be 
observable than was the case for any of the definitive points examined. Only in 
the 1990s were regional politicians, NATO and EU policy makers agreed on a 
shared identity for the region, with crucially no significant actor opposing it192, 
creating the conditions for the new identity’s realisation. 
 
7.4. Conclusions 
The first subsection below focuses on the overarching contribution of the 
research undertaken in this thesis, together with its conceptual conclusions. 
The following three subsections then examine the research findings in even 
greater detail, framed by the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
 
7.4.1 Original contribution and conceptual conclusions  
This research examined historical geographic ideational constructs of Central 
Europe and their impact; therefore, it falls into fold between critical geopolitics 
and historical geography. This interdisciplinary cross facilitates the main 
original contribution of this work: the findings challenge the perception of 
constancy of regional identities, which underlines the modern geopolitical 
literature overwhelmingly guided by contemporary concerns. In contrast, this 
research engaged directly with historical variations of the notion are examined, 
avoiding their interpretation through the lens of the present. 
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 Of course, Russia would have opposed, but was politically impotent at the time. 
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Thus, the presented work challenges the mainstream approaches to Central 
Europe and contributes conceptually to both studies of regionalism and 
geopolitics of Europe in general. In contemporary scholarship, authors typically 
pursue one particular interpretation of a given notion and examine the 
evidence within its given framework. In sharp contrast, the core strength of the 
research is the empirical depth of its examination of the notion across its long 
history since 1840s; an exercise rarely attempted for any geopolitical concept. 
Such an approach allowed for examination of the contents and impact of the 
concept in individual periods of its formulation, avoiding the utilization of any 
particular and predisposed historical lens.  
This process exposed significant differences in interpretations of the notion 
across various periods. These findings underscored the ambiguous and untidy 
character of demarcations of Central Europe, and other regional identities in 
general. Moreover, the research showed that while regional identities are 
conceptualized with intention to change the existing international structure, 
they often struggle to make a real impact. This suggests that geopolitical 
imaginaries need to be analyzed in the complexity of their empirical context, 
rather than reduced to single interpretation and linked to practical politics 
directly. 
 
7.4.2 Concepts of Central Europe are exercises in geopolitics  
The research showed that conceptualizations of Central Europe were indeed 
constructions of regional identity conducted as exercises in geopolitics. In line 
with Rorty (1999: xxvi), it was observed that the notion was defined by 
individual authors based on their interests and perceived needs, which were in 
turn informed by their socially constructed identity.  
Naumann theorized Central Europe to bring Germany and Austria-Hungary 
under one roof to create a larger economic area. Austrian German authors put 
forward the idea of Central Europe as a larger German-led entity in an attempt 
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to counter the relative decline in the standing of this dominant (if waning) 
national group within their own empire. Masaryk defined Central Europe as a 
German plot to tighten domination over the smaller nations of Austria-Hungary 
and painted this as a threat to the strategic interests of the Entente countries, 
whose support for an independent Czech nation state he was trying to gain.  
They theorized Central Europe from their distinctive positions as German 
members of parliament, insecure Austrian Germans or disgruntled leaders of 
small nations, attempting to further their distinctive interests. All these 
concepts had a definite purpose – changing realities on the ground and 
furthering the interests a given author was following. In this sense, concepts 
defining the notion of Central Europe were exercises in geopolitics, envisaging 
future changes in international structure. As has been observed several times in 
this thesis, the notion was ascribed with certain characteristics, with the actual 
territory in question usually serving as a dependent variable. 
The Chapter 6 confirmed the same processes at work in succeeding periods of 
conceptualisation of Central Europe, pinpointing the changing identity and 
interests of authors as the main drivers of visibly erratic changes in definitions 
of the notion. Yet, what remained constant was that all proposals for a Central 
European regional identity were in all instances effectively proposals for a 
change in the geopolitical situation in the region. During the Second World War, 
the proposal had been to replace nation states with a regional federation; in the 
late 1950s it was to institute a neutral buffer between the East and the West; in 
the 1980s it was an intellectual project of othering from the dullness and 
restraint of the Soviet bloc.  
 
7.4.3 Definitive discourse is an evolving process 
The theorisation of Central Europe does not comprise a series of isolated pieces 
of writing; it was the process of a definitive discourse of Self (in Germany and 
Austria-Hungary) or Other (in Britain and USA). Definitive discourse was the 
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workshop in which the defining features of Central Europe were hammered out 
over time. The discourse in Germany was the most instructive in this regard, 
perhaps because it was also the most robust. The interplay between individual 
propositions gradually helped to construct a dominant definition of the notion. 
It was built on geographical determinism, organic growth state theory, belief in 
historical mission and superiority of the German nation and the vision of a 
future world organized into larger territorial units, the narrative of Germany as 
the land of the middle and an inherent interconnection with economic 
considerations. The development of the discourse also showed that the 
dominant definition of Central Europe had shifted over time, as some lines of 
argument gained more influence in the discourse than others. The entry of a 
multitude of economists into the discourse in the early 1900s and their intrinsic 
lead in the public promotion of the regional construct fostered the economic 
line of Central Europe theories, the dominant discourse until the outbreak of 
the Great War. The pendulum only shifted back to its pan-German dimensions 
as the war started with an inevitable nationalistic surge.  
Observations of the Central Europe discourse confirmed the relative strength of 
the dominant definition depends on how closely it coincides with the interests 
of participants in the discourse. (Bowker and Star 2000: 108) This process 
accounts for the sudden surge in popularity of the notion of Central Europe as 
well as a decisive swing back to a pan-German line early in the course of the 
war. The dominant definition shifted to an understanding of Central Europe as a 
customs and military union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, underpinned by 
strong pan-German nationalistic rhetoric and often accompanied by an 
ambition to project its influence further to the south-east. This portrayal of 
Central Europe, especially somewhat hybridised version advanced by Friedrich 
Naumann, was adopted into discourses in Austria-Hungary, Britain and USA.   
Again, similar processes were identified and established in our Chapter 6 more 
recent for more recent periods.  Evolving definitive discourses, shifting 
dominant definitions as construction of Self or Other were traced and their 
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relative influence assessed. Two periods stood out – the Cold War, when 
discourse over Central Europe could be measured at no more than a couple of 
entries per decade - whereconcepts put forward fell completely flat as they 
were not aligned with the interests of any relevant actor; and the 1990s 
integration period, when Central Europe surged to the top of its historical 
popularity and seemed to be in line with the interests of everyone but a 
crumbling Russia. 
 
 7.4.4 Overall, ideational concepts struggle to make an impact  
Finally, it was proposed that the definitive discourse of Central Europe as Self or 
Other exercised an influence over the behaviour of political actors, thereby 
indirectly impacting upon international structure.  
Interestingly, the most likely suspect, a largely pragmatic German government 
displayed a significant degree of isolation from the definition of Central Europe 
that dominated the press. This does not necessarily mean that our hypothesis is 
incorrect. In fact, the government itself thus participated in the definitive 
discourse of the notion, even if it remained on its fringes. It is an interesting to 
observe that as a consequence, the influence of the foremost proponents of 
Central Europe on the government’s interpretation of the notion or policy 
making was only very limited.  
On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government showed both extremes in 
its reaction to the dominant definition of Central Europe – first a heavy 
censorship was imposed on the merest public mention of the notion under 
Stürgkh and Tisza; then, after Clam-Martinic had packed his cabinet with pan-
German advocates of the notion, the government effected a swift volte-face and 
worked swiftly towards its fruition - alas, they were quickly timed out by 
events. Finally, the US and British governments were also influenced by the 
dominant definition, considering Central Europe a threat to their own interests.  
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Yet, successive Central Europes of whatever vintage failed to bring about their 
intended changes on international structure. In all cases, there was a significant 
actor, whose interests were opposed to what the particular concept of Central 
Europe represented.  
However, the Chapter 6 showed that there was at least one period in which we 
can plausibly argue that the concept of Central Europe might have contributed 
to the change in international structure – the1990s integration period. The 
concept of Central Europe showed influence on policy makers in other periods 
as well: federative plan motivated exile governments to start working on its 
preparations, Dimitrov’s announcement of similar structure infuriated Stalin, 
US government supported the neutralisation plan in early Cold War. But none 
of these plans was eventually brought into reality, bar the Central Europe of the 
1990s.  
It remains a suggestion for future research, to examine the influence of the 
notion and role in played in policy making over EU and NATO integration of 
former Eastern Bloc countries. This might, however, only be possible after the 
archives from the period have been opened in future. 
 
7.5 Post-script: Central Europe is back.  Again! 
So maybe Cohen was wrong (Cohen1964). Central Europe is still there, even 
now. While the Chapter 6 observed a decline in references to the notion post-
accession in recent years, Central Europe has recently resurfaced in the world 
media.  
The familiar context of an economic crisis, the search for redefinition of a status 
quo, with Germany in the middle of it all has returned - this time in the form of 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Germany took a leading role in convincing 
unwilling European governments to employ policies of austerity and give up 
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another slice of their sovereignty to establish common fiscal frameworks and 
banking supervision.  
As France elected a leftist government in early 2012, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel was left alone to bat for these unpopular policies. In the absence of any 
other large European Union state supporting her, she found herself surrounded 
by a very familiar group of supporters – the fiscally disciplined governments of 
the small states lying to the east of German borders. The reaction of political 
analysts to this new incarnation of Germany driving polices and Central Europe 
accepting them was almost immediate. Douglas Rediker and David Gordon 
wrote the following: 
“In many ways, "new Europe" harks back to the old "Old Europe." 
The newfound centrality of Central Europe is a return to the 
Concert of the 19th and early 20th centuries, with the continent's 
geographic core setting the tone for the periphery. It bears 
reminding that the last European transnational currency to 
collapse was the Austro-Hungarian crown after World War I, 
which eventually set in motion the geopolitical dynamics that led 
to the euro. Stresses on the eurozone could reorient Europe back 
toward Mitteleuropa, leaving the Visegrád countries as the 
crisis's surprising winners.” (Rediker and Gordon 2012) 
Others were quick to follow. The BBC’s Andrew Little described Central Europe 
as a new driver of European integration centred on Germany (Little 2012) and 
similar references started to appear in media and political commentaries across 
the board. 
It remains to be seen whether this newly-perceived application will be 
sustained in the public discourse, though its appearance suggests that Central 
Europe has not exhausted its shape-shifting potential or relinquished its 
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Appendix 1: K. L. Bruck: ‘Vorschläge zur Anbahnung der 
Oesterrechisch-Deutschen Zoll- und Handelseinigung’ (1849a) 
(Documents Bruck’s lack of use of the Central Europe notion, here used only 




Bruck, K. L. (1849a) ‘Vorschläge zur Anbahnung der Oesterrechisch-Deutschen 
Zoll- und Handelseinigung’, Wiener Zeitung, 26 October, no. 255, pp. 1 – 2 
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Appendix 2: K. L. Bruck: ‘Wien’ (1849b) 





Bruck, K. L. (1949b) ‘Wien’, Wiener Zeitung – Abend-Beilage, 9 November, No. 
268, pp. 1 – 2 
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Appendix 3: K. L. Bruck: ‘Denkschrift des keiserlich 
österreichischen Handelsministers über die Anbahnung der 
österreichisch-deutschen Zoll und Handelseinigung’ (1849c) 
(Document’s Bruck’s use of ‘Anschluss Österreichs’ rather than Central Europe) 
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Appendix 4: E. Plener article, Fremdenblatt, 20 July 1915 




Plener, E. (1915) ‘no title’, 20 July, Fremdenblatt, vol 69, no. 199, pp. 2 – 3  
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Appendix 5: K. Renner ‘Zollunion und Zwischenzoll’ (1915) 




Renner, K. (1915) ‘Zollunion und Zwischenzoll’, Arbeirter-Zeitung, 29 July, vol. 
27, pp. 1 – 2  
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Appendix 6: ‘Delbrück to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 12 April 1915 






























Delbrück, C. (1915a) ‘Delbrück to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 12 April, German 
Federal Archive, R43/404, folio 1b – 7 
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Appendix 7: ‘Delbrück to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 23 April (1915b) 






Delbrück, C. (1915b) ‘Delbrück to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 23 April, German 
Federal Archive, R43/405, folio 1d – 1f 
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Appendix 8: ‘Tschirschky to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 1 Sept. (1914a) 










Tschirschky, L. (1914a) ‘Tshirschky to Bethmann-Hollweg’, 1 September, 
Archive of the German Foreign Office, AA PA Austria 83, R 8690, not bound, 
document no. A 20240 
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Appendix 9: ‘Tschirschky to Foreign Office’, 9 November (1915a) 







Tschirschky, L. (1915a) ‘Tschirschky to Foreign Office’, 9 November, Archive of 
the German Foreign Office, AA PA Germany 180 Secret: European State 




Appendix 10: Memorandum from 13 November 1915 










Jagow, G. (1915c) ‘Promemoria 13 November 1915’, Archive of the German 
Foreign Office, AA PA Germany 180 Secret: European State Federation, vol. 2, R 
2593, E585811 – E585814 


















































Appendix 11: Austro-Hungarian Embassy, ‘Note’, 24 
November 1915 












































































Austro-Hungarian Embassy (1915) ‘Note 24 November 1915’, Archive of the 
German Foreign Office, AA PA Germany 180, Volume 2, R 2593, E585860 – 865 
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Appendix 12: ‘Tschirschky to Foreign Office’ 20 January 1916 
(points out inconsistencies between the statements in the Austrian embassy’s 












































Tschirschky, L. (1916a) ‘Tschirschky to Foreign Office’, 20 January, Archive of 
the German Foreign Office, AA PA Germany 180 Secret: European State 
Federation, vol. 2 R 2593, E585901 – E585907 
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AAPA (1917b) ‘Über den Stand der Verhandlungen mit Österreich-Ungarn 
wegen den Abschlusse einen Zoll- und Wirtschafts- bündnissen, in Verbindung 
mit der polnischen Frage’, 11 November, AA PA Germany 180 Secret: European 
State Federation, vol. 5, R 2597, E569117 – E569140 
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Appendix 14: Comparison maps of Austrian Empire and Austria 
Hungary 
(comparison of territory pre- and post- 1867 Compromise) 
 
Austrian Empire in 1815 
 
 
Map of Austrian (pink) and Hungarian (green) parts of the Dual Monarchy, 
Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina in blue 
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Appendix 15: List of Austro-Hugarian prime ministers 






Count Karl von Stürgkh  3-Nov-11 21-Oct-16 
Ernest von Koerber  29-Oct-16 20-Dec-16 
Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic   20-Dec-16 23-Jun-17 
Ernst Seidler von Feuchtenegg   23-Jun-17 27-Jul-18 
Baron Max Hussarek von 
Heinlein  27-Jul-18 27-Oct-18 
Heinrich Lammasch  27-Oct-18 11-Nov-18 
 
 525 
Appendix 16: William Swinton’s Central Europe (1875) 
(presents Central Europe as mainland rump of Europe minus its peninsulas) 
 
Source: Swinton, W. (1875) A complete course in geography: physical, 
industrial, and political, Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor, and Company, p. 100 
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Appendix 17: Johnstons’ Map of Central Europe (1866)  
(focusing upon the German Empire and its neighbours to the west and south) 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
Johnston, W. and Johnson, A. K. (1866) Johnstons’ Commercial Chart of the 





Appendix 18: Stanford’s Map of Central Europe (1895) 
(focusing upon the German Empire and its neighbours to the west and south) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 




Appendix 19: Bartholomew’s Map of Central Europe (1892) 
(focused on France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 
Bartholomew, J. G. (1892) B rtholomew’s Tourin  M p of Centr l Europe, 




Appendix 20: Bartholomew’s Map of Central Europe (1910) 
(extended to cover Austria-Hungary as far as Budapest) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 
Bartholomew, J. G. (1910) B rtholomew’s Contour Motoring Map of Central 




Appendix 21: Bartholomew’s Map of Central Europe (1915)  
(extended to cover whole Austria-Hungary) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 
Bartholomew, J. G. (1915) B rtholomew’s Oro r phic l M p of Centr l Europe 




Appendix 22: Bartholomew’s Map of Central Europe (1914) 
(a wider continental view of Central Europe at the onset of war) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 
Bartholomew, J. G. (1914) Bartholomew’s W r M p of Centr l Europe, 




Appendix 23: Letts’s Map of Central Europe (1870) 
(presenting Central Europe as ‘the seat of war’) 
 
 
Attached on a CD 
 
 





Appendix 24: Mackinder’s Natural Seats of Power (1904) 
(Mackinder’s understanding of the world order) 
 
 
Mackinder, H. J. (1904) ‘The geographical pivot of history’, The Geographical 
Journal, vol. 23, p. 435 
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Appendix 25: Robert Cecil on agreement with CNC (1918) 




Cecil, R. (1918f) minute, ‘Agreement between H. M. G. and Czecho Slovak 




Appendix 26: The Inquiry’s maps of spreading Prussianism  









Heffernan, M. (1999) ‘Inaugurating the American century: ‘New World’ 
perspectives on the ‘Old’ in the early twentieth century’, in Slater, D. and Taylor, 
P. J. (1999) The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of 
American Power, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 124 – 125  
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Appendix 27: Schapiro’s Map of Central Europe (1918) 




Schapiro, J. S. (1918) Modern and Contemporary European History, Boston, New 




Appendix 28: Wilson’s 14 points from the New York Times, 9 Jan 
1918 
(refers to widest possible autonomy for Austria-Hungary’s nationalities, rather 







































Memorandum of December 22 1917, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Paris Peace Conference 1919, volume 1, pp. 41 – 53 
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Appendix 30: American reply to the Austro-Hungarian peace 
note  
(declines to accept mere autonomy for Austria-Hungary’s nationalities) 
 
US GPO (1933) Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, 
Supplement 1, The World War, vol. 1, Washington: US GPO 
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Appendix 31: Contemporary map of Europe 1878 








Kiepert, H. (1878) General-Karte von Europa in 9 Blattern entworfen und 
bearbeitet von H. Kiepert, available at: 
http://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/35601dp/GeneralKarte_von_Europa
_in_9_Blattern_entworfen_und_bearbeitet_von_H/Kiepert.html, accessed on 20 
October 2013 
 549 
Appendix 32: Map of Europe 1914 












Appendix 33: Archives visited and groups of materials used 
 
Materials from following archives and groups were used in this research. The 
list only includes the groups of materials that were quoted or extensively 
consulted in the process of preparation of the presented thesis. Many other 




Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv 
 
Legacies: 
Nachlass Gustav Gross 
Nachlass Josef Maria Baernreither 
Nachlass Rudolf Höfke 
 
Administrative Registratur:  
Fach 4 K. und k. Ministerium des Äussern, Index Fach 4 bis Fach 6: 1907-1918, 
Geographie (1907-1918) 
Fach 34 Handelspolitik (esp. Karton 90 – 94) 
Fach 37 Handelsverträge nach Staaten ab 1909 (esp. Karton 67, 91, 94 and 97) 
 
Politisches Archiv:  




Nachlass Richard Riedl 
Ministerratspräsidium  1860 – 1918, Inneres MR-Präsidium, ÖMRP 
(Österreichische Ministerratsprotokolle) Protokolle des Gemeinsamen 








Národní Archiv České Republiky: 
 
Archiv Akademie věd České republiky 




Vojenský historický archiv - Vojenský ùstřední archiv  
- Czech National Association in America papers: 1993 Inventory Registry no. 
296 
- Czechoslovak National Council Paris papers:  
 received correspondence, box 22, 44 
 sent correspondence, box 13, 28 








Nachlass Friedrich Naumann: Akten N3001/29 
 
Reichskanzlei Stammakten, Abteilung I: 
Gruppe 11, Handel unde Gewerbe: Akten 403 – 407 Mitteleuropäischer 
Wirtschaftsverein 
 
BA Auswärtiges Amt, Handelspolitische Abteilung: 
Oesterreich: Gestaltung der deutschen auswaertigen Handels- und 





Oesterreich 83, R 9019 
Oesterreich 70, Geheim, Botschaft Wien: Deutsch-oesterreichischer 
Handelsvertrag 1906 - 1916 (esp. R 8552) 






Foreign Office documents series FO 371 General Correspondence 1906 – 1966, 
files: 
- 1900 
- 2241, 2602, 2806, 2864 
- 3002, 3133 – 3136, 3443, 3474 
 
FO 925 Maps and Plans. 1700 to 1944. (The principal collection of maps 
accumulated by the Foreign Office), file 30277  
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War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda: 
CAB 23, files: 7, 43 
CAB 24, files: 10, 17, 19, 42, 47, 49, 50, 55, 61, 145, 148, 149 
CAB 29, file 1 
CAB 22 file 2  
 




US National Archives: 
Group 256: Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Series 






roll 17  
roll 18  
roll 21 
 
Documents  included in series  
Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States 1916 – 1919 
Foreign Relations of the United States, the Lansing Papers 1914 – 1920 
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Appendix 34: Andre Cheradame’s ‘What Germany wants?’ map 
(in holdings of Foreign Office, circulated to staff in 1917) 
 
 




Appendix 35: Illustrations of Harrison and Johnson Central Union 
pamphlet 
(graphic illustrations of implications of lack of regional unity in the second 
world war work suggesting federation in the region) 
 
 
     
Harrison, G. and Jordan, P. (1943) Central Union, London: British Continental 
Syndicate Publishing Ltd 
